THE FIELD OF HIGHER EDUCATION

A sociology of reproduction, transformation, change and the conditions of emergence for cultural studies

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Declaration

The research was initially supported by an ESRC studentship, R00429434213. This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. The thesis does not exceed 80,000 words (excluding footnotes, references, and bibliography). Parts of this research have been presented at various stages of development at national and international conferences and published in academic journals and books, and are referred to where appropriate within the thesis.

Karl Maton
October 2004
Summary

This dissertation creates the basis for a relational sociology of higher education through a study of reproduction, transformation and change in higher education as a field of practice. It offers an original conceptual framework that builds on, integrates and subsumes the relational ‘field’ theory of Pierre Bourdieu and ‘code’ theory of Basil Bernstein in order to capture higher education as an emergent and irreducible social structure. The framework objectifies higher education as a ‘dynamic field of possibilities’ and conceptualises the generative mechanism underlying change in the field in terms of the ‘legitimation device’. This theoretical development is achieved through and utilised in an in-depth empirical study of how changes in English higher education enabled the possibility of emergence for the avowedly radical subject area of cultural studies as a named and distinct intellectual and institutional presence during the mid-1960s.

The empirical research involves qualitative discourse analysis of contemporary published accounts of postwar English higher education by participants in the field. First, the structure of the field prior to widespread declarations of ‘crisis’ and ‘revolution’ during the early 1960s is established. Second, public debates over perceived changes affecting higher education are analysed in terms of their underlying structuring principles. These comprise the ‘new student’ debate over the institutional map, and the ‘crisis in the humanities’ and ‘two cultures’ debates over the disciplinary map. Analyses of these debates reveal that the way threats to higher education and proclaimed solutions to these threats were constructed enable the maintenance of established hierarchies within the field. Third, these analyses are brought together to explore how the debates refracted and recontextualised changes from beyond the field and opened up different kinds of institutional and disciplinary spaces across higher education enabling the possibility for cultural studies to emerge. The conclusion shows how the legitimation device provides the basis of change within higher education and generates a model of how attempts to maintain status hierarchies through transforming the field involve the unintentional creation of conditions of possibility for positions aiming to change higher education.
In memory of Basil,
Sociology’s Debussy
Acknowledgements

The thesis is a study of how the impossible becomes possible; here I wish to acknowledge the people who helped make this study possible. I should first like to thank: Madeleine Arnot, without whose advice and encouragement the research would not have begun and who showed me the path; Rob Moore, especially for innumerable discussions as a colleague and companion on the journey; and Basil Bernstein, for convincing me to be a sociologist. This thesis is a first instalment on the debt I owe them. In addition, John Beck, Pierre Bourdieu, Ioan Davies, Ray Jobling, Richard Johnson, Alexandra Lamont, Pam Lowe, Gemma Moss, Johan Muller, Parlo Singh and Frank Thistlethwaite discussed ideas underpinning the thesis. Their generous support and criticism are extremely appreciated.

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Lastly, the thesis is personally dedicated to two extraordinary and inspirational women: to my mother Rosemarie for unwavering strength, hope and loving solidarity in the face of adversity; and to Alex, partner, best friend and invaluable colleague, for more than I can ever possibly say. Without them, this would have been impossible.
The impossible is the only thing worth thinking about.
Basil Bernstein
(personal communication, late 1990s)
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Prolegomena: Biographies of the Thesis & the Problem

*If I were redoing the Centre [for Contemporary Cultural Studies], I’d make a pitch for the study of institutions as examples of the way a culture continues itself and at the same time often subverts itself*

Richard Hoggart (quoted in Corner 1991, p.147)

*The most important stage of any enterprise is the beginning*

Plato *The Republic*, 377b

This thesis is concerned with how the impossible becomes possible; I begin with how this focus itself became possible.

The emergence of cultural studies
In 1960, speaking at a conference on ‘Popular Culture and Personal Responsibility’, Raymond Williams proclaimed:

  Hardly any work has been done on it, hardly any work is planned to be done on it, and within the existing educational system, particularly within the universities, where work of this kind should go on, the whole of this subject is frankly neglected; it is gathered up in bits and pieces as a marginal study to other subjects. ... as an academic discipline it does not yet begin.

  (in NUT 1960: 10).

The following year, reiterating that ‘there is no academic subject within which the questions I am interested in can be followed through’, he added, ‘I hope one day there might be’ (1961: ix-x). Three years later the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) was opened at Birmingham University by Richard Hoggart and cultural studies began to emerge as a distinct and named entity within English higher education. It began humbly. Birmingham University provided only furniture and minimal accommodation, as illustrated by directions given to prospective students during the late 1960s:

  The new Centre hut may be found by taking the main entrance to the Administration building; left along the corridor, first stairs down on the right; left at the bottom and left again into the back courtyard. The hut is at the far end of the outer courtyard, overlooking the parapet.

  (CCCS 1968: 4).
This symbolises its subsequent institutional positions as a discrete, named subject area within English higher education: departments and courses have remained small in number and marginal, mostly sited in lower status institutions and often enduring a precarious existence. The CCCS survived several closure attempts before being shut down in 2002 and the first full and named undergraduate degree course (begun at Portsmouth University in 1975) was closed in 1999 despite a healthy student intake. Nonetheless, cultural studies has become big educational business, proliferating journals, associations, conferences and textbooks. Moreover, its influence within the humanities and social sciences has been profound. Cultural studies has been the vanguard of wide-reaching theoretical movements, such as Gramscianism and postmodernism, and trumpeted as the future for such disciplines as sociology, English, history and geography.

In short, cultural studies has punched above its weight. And within higher education this punch has been aimed at established practices, ideas and orthodoxies. It has been an avowedly radical presence, committed to challenging prevailing forms of knowledge, revolutionising the disciplinary map, and reordering pedagogic and working practices. Since Hoggart’s founding proclamation that ‘some of the best growing-points occur in the borderland between two disciplines’ (1964a: 171), cultural studies has crossed disciplinary boundaries in order to grasp society and culture as a ‘whole way of life’ (Williams 1961: 46). Defined in opposition to the status quo, it has been described as ‘multi-’, ‘cross-’, ‘inter-’, ‘post-’, ‘trans-’ or ‘anti-disciplinary’ and as committed to crossing and breaking down intellectual and educational boundaries. Explicitly anti-canonical and devoutly against institutionalisation, advocates often warn of succumbing to the trappings of disciplinarity, as if higher education is an enemy aiming to assimilate its revolutionary potential. Practitioners identify cultural studies with a radical educational project committed to empowering and giving voice to dominated social groups silenced by higher education. It has been associated with democratic and participatory forms of teaching, evaluation, social organisation and curricula, as well as pioneering innovative intellectual practices, such as collaborative group work, collective authorship and publishing unfinished student research. Cultural studies has also offered a radical critique of the social role of higher education and been a key site for

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1 The following description of cultural studies draws on a wide range of accounts (see chapter 1) and my foundational research (chapter 3). This brief sketch is of British cultural studies within English higher education. Subject areas viewed as related to cultural studies, such as media and communication studies, have divergent emphases, and its development in other national contexts differs (see, for example, Blundell et al. 1993).
‘interventions’ by feminism, ‘race’ studies and queer theory. In short, the history of cultural studies is a history of radical positions in and on higher education over the past forty years. So, from within the institutional and disciplinary frameworks of higher education emerged something which questioned, challenged and attempted to change those frameworks. This paradox provides the genesis of this thesis which explores how the emergence of cultural studies from ‘bits and pieces’ in the early 1960s to become a named presence by the mid 1960s was made possible.

Biography of the thesis
Cultural studies is not, however, the principal focus of this thesis and for much of the study it remains an absent presence. To explain why is also to define my specific object of study and problem. In short, I began by addressing one problem and discovered that to answer it I first had to solve a prior problem. My original research aim was to trace the effects of the institutionalisation of cultural studies within English higher education on the subject’s intellectual and educational formations. To this end I conducted extensive empirical research into cultural studies (see chapter 3). As I analysed the results of this (henceforth ‘foundational’) research it became increasingly clear on two fronts that my question would not be fully answered by this research.

First, it became evident that to explain cultural studies one must research more than cultural studies; to adapt C.L.R. James (1963): what do they know of cultural studies who only cultural studies know? For one thing, its emergence and development within higher education occurred while higher education was itself undergoing dramatic change. The history of cultural studies represents an evolving position within an evolving system of institutional and disciplinary positions. Its history both lies within and is shaped by this changing context. Before one can understand how cultural studies relates to higher education, one needs first to understand what higher education is and how it changes over time. For another thing, without such an understanding of change in higher education one can only offer a story of miraculous conception. Existing accounts of cultural studies focus on its intellectual history and founding fathers, a story of Great Thinkers carving spaces out of the featureless rock face of higher education (see chapter 1). Yet cultural studies, an avowedly contextual and relational approach, argues that such idealist and subjectivist accounts are inadequate and highlights the contexts and conditions within which actors work and that create opportunities and constraints. These realisations brought higher education as a social field of practice to the centre of my picture.
Secondly, my foundational research asked questions of what can be known about cultural studies; a question which increasingly came to impose itself upon me was why there was a cultural studies to know in the first place. The balance wheel which maintained in motion the watch of the research became the clear knowledge that the non-existence of cultural studies was just as possible as its existence. Cultural studies argues against a teleological view of history, aims to recover actors and ideas being lost to the condescension of posterity, and criticises essentialist views of knowledge - these ideas highlight that cultural studies is itself contingent. I would, therefore, argue that an analysis of a subject area that does not ask how it was possible for that subject to emerge at all takes for granted the object of its analysis. This realisation raised the Kantian transcendental question of what must be the case for cultural studies to be possible and how its possibility came to exist.

In short, researching cultural studies showed that the foundational research would not by itself answer the original question. I first needed to address how higher education enabled the possibility of cultural studies. This represents not only a different object of study but also a different way of seeing that object. The research became refocused on higher education as a system of possibilities and the problem of how possibilities come to be created and distributed within this structure. This shift of focus is to distinguish two different issues:

(i) the emergence and distribution of possibilities for cultural studies within higher education (the focus of the thesis); and
(ii) the recognition and realisation of these possibilities by actors who became its founders (the focus of the foundational research).

The first issue is logically prior, for possibilities within the structure of higher education pre-exist their recognition and realisation, but also at least partly methodologically posterior to the second issue, because to examine the distribution of possibilities for cultural studies one must know something of how they came to be realised in its emergence. In other words, the foundational research enabled the thesis problem to be posed; in turn, a solution to the thesis problem would enable the foundational problem to be fully addressed.
Research questions

Cultural studies is present in this study as an emergent possibility within higher education. The thesis addresses processes prior to the emergence of cultural studies, which features as the ‘yet to be recognised or realised’. The principal research question is:

• How did English higher education enable the possibility of emergence for cultural studies during the mid 1960s?

If the founders of cultural studies are typically portrayed as carving out spaces within the cliff face of higher education sufficient for the academic subject to secure an initial foothold, then I am asking: what are the features of this kind of rock formation that enabled this kind of foothold to be carved out at this point in its geological space and time? This is, therefore, to ask questions of the nature of higher education. One can thereby rephrase the substantive question thus:

• How does higher education enable the emergence of practices and ideas aiming to change its existing structures?

Though focusing on cultural studies, I shall explore what this specific case can reveal about the nature of change in higher education. The thesis is a study of how the impossible becomes possible. It addresses not only how proclaimed forces for change emerge but how change itself occurs; this provides my third research question:

• What is the basis of reproduction, transformation and change in higher education and what is the process by which they occur?

Though focused on a specific study of English higher education during the early 1960s, the thesis is thus not simply of historical interest but rather has wider implications for research problems of contemporary relevance.

Biography of the problem

In the past decade higher education has become a growing focus of government policy-making, assuming a central role not only in educational issues but also questions of economic change and social citizenship. Governments worldwide are increasingly viewing higher education as a key policy lever for achieving greater competitiveness within a globalising context comprising ‘knowledge economies’, ‘information societies’ and rapid technological change. A burgeoning number of academic studies are

2 See Ahier et al. (2002), Delanty (2001) and Naidoo (2003) for discussions of the following changes in higher education.
highlighting fundamental transformations in higher education. From being largely left to their own devices, actors in higher education are becoming subject to growing external control and policy initiatives, in particular the implementation of new funding and regulatory mechanisms based on principles of managerialism and market mechanisms. Higher education has also been subject to dramatic expansion, as credential inflation raises the qualifications required in the occupational marketplace and governments equate prolonged education with economic advancement. Western industrialised countries in particular are said to be experiencing a fundamental transition from ‘mass’ towards ‘universal’ systems of higher education marking a new phase in the social position, function and practices of intellectuals, bringing in new kinds of students, and changing the shape, form and distinctive practices of higher education. Knowledge of the bases, processes and consequences of change in higher education is thus critical to understanding contemporary and ongoing developments.

The period prior to the emergence of cultural studies was portrayed in equally revolutionary terms as marking a fundamental transition in the nature, shape and form of higher education (see chapters 6-8). By examining an earlier period of change in detail, one whose consequences have been more fully worked through and that can be analysed with the benefit of critical distance, this thesis will shed light on issues of contemporary and enduring significance.3 Moreover, by analysing these developments in a generative manner, I aim to develop a conceptual framework for understanding change in higher education that reaches beyond the specificities of the case to provide insights into the nature of reproduction, transformation and change in higher education more generally.

Layout of the thesis
The thesis is structured into three main parts. In Part I the approach and conceptual framework for the study are established: chapter 1 reviews the literature on higher education and identifies the need for a relational sociology of higher education; chapter 2 engages in detail with the relational theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Basil Bernstein to create a working conceptual framework for the empirical study; chapter 3 discusses the methodological implications of this framework for the research design, how the research was conducted and the resulting process of conceptual development; and in chapter 4 the resultant theoretical framework is formally defined. Part II uses this framework to

3 On the value of historical studies of education, see Hill & Kerber (1967) and Cohen & Manion (1994).
address the substantive study. Chapter 5 establishes the structuring of English higher education within which intense debates during the early 1960s were conducted over proclaimed major changes to the field. Chapter 6 analyses the ‘new student’ debate over the institutional field, and chapters 7-8 analyse the ‘two cultures’ debate over the disciplinary field of higher education. In chapter 9 these analyses are brought together to generate a model of change in higher education and to show how the field provided conditions of possibility for the emergence of cultural studies. Finally, in Part III I review the analysis presented in the substantive study and theoretical developments offered by the thesis and suggest directions for further research and for the future of the sociology of higher education.
PART I

SEEING THE FIELD OF HIGHER EDUCATION

But in fact the belief that we can start with pure observations alone, without anything in the nature of a theory, is absurd.... Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem

Karl Popper (1989)


Getting hold of the difficulty deep down is what is hard. Because if it is grasped near the surface it simply remains the difficulty it was. It has to be pulled out by the roots; and that involves our beginning to think about these things in a new way. The change is as decisive as, for example, that from the alchemical to the chemical way of thinking. The new way of thinking is what is so hard to establish.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1946/1980)

Culture and Value (Oxford, Basil Blackwell), p.48e.
Chapter 1
A Missing Field: Review of literature on change in higher education

Universities today are homes of research into almost every subject save one - themselves. There are few fields of social science in which painstaking investigation is more necessary and less often pursued
Lord James of Rusholme (1965)

Omissions are not accidents.

[1] Introduction

Part I of the thesis addresses what Pierre Bourdieu (in Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 224) describes as ‘no doubt the most crucial research operation and yet the most completely ignored’: the construction of the object of study. I begin in this chapter by reviewing scholarly literature on higher education. The aim is to examine how change in higher education has been constructed as an object of study in order to explore theoretical and methodological starting points for addressing how higher education enabled the possibility of cultural studies. The review is conducted in three main stages that establish: the vantage points from which higher education has been viewed; the panoramas these positions offer; and what lies outside this range of vision. First, I outline the existing literature on higher education in terms of broad disciplinary approaches and principal foci. Reviewing this work in terms of a symptomatic analysis of a problem-field, I identify two principal positions on higher education as an object of study (internalism/externalism) and two positions on explanations of change (objectivism/subjectivism). Second, drawing on illustrative examples of studies, I discuss objectivist and subjectivist forms of internalism and externalism, showing what these epistemic positions reveal and how they are limited for the current study. Third, I examine what can and cannot be seen from within the problem-field as a whole. I argue that existing epistemic positions share a substantialist mode of analysis that obscures higher education as an irreducible social structure and so are unable to address my research question. I outline a relationalist position, one enabling higher education to be
seen, and show that though it is recognised in the approaches to education of Bourdieu and Bernstein, it has yet to be fully realised in studies of higher education.

[2] Change in Higher Education as a Problem-Field

Literature on higher education
It has become a mantra that research is undertaken in higher education into every possible area of enquiry except one: higher education. That little is known sociologically about higher education has become a recurrent complaint: in 1963 a review concluded that systematic research was ‘overdue’ (Simey 1963: 199); twenty years later a call by the British Journal of Sociology of Education for papers on contemporary changes in higher education received almost no responses (Reid et al. 1984); and a survey in the early 1990s concluded ‘there is little academic work on the sociology of British higher education at all, and the work that has been done has been concerned with a limited range of issues’ (Walford 1992: 190). More recently, a growing focus in sociology on proclaimed social and economic changes towards a ‘knowledge society’ or ‘information age’ and calls for ‘reflexivity’ suggest a potential flowering of work on higher education. However, the sociology of higher education remains today a Cinderella subject. The sociology of education has tended to equate ‘education’ with compulsory schooling and so pushed the study of higher education to its margins. The one specimen missing from the sociological zoo remains homo academicus and so calls to ‘reflexivity’ within sociology remain rhetoric rather than reality.

This is not to say, however, that there is little work on higher education per se: studies explicitly addressing aspects of higher education are voluminous. During the period 1966-2002 at least 35,000 Anglophone articles, monographs and books on higher education were published in Europe and the Commonwealth alone. In postwar Britain a


6 Higher education has shared a similar fate in educational studies and curriculum studies (see Richardson 2002 and Squires 1987). On reasons for this marginality see Davies (1983) and Moore (1996).

7 This figure is of texts listed in Research into Higher Education Abstracts, published by the Society for Research into Higher Education (SRHE) since 1966.
series of journals specifically focusing on higher education have been founded and the Society for Research in Higher Education (established 1964) has actively engendered and disseminated research through conferences, journals and book publications. Moreover, in the past decade a major governmental report (Dearing Report, 1997) addressed the shape and future direction of British higher education, several centres for the study of higher education have been established, and a series of bodies devoted to staff development and ‘learning and teaching’ have generated extensive scholarship on higher education. All these developments have given rise to an extensive body of literature in what can heuristically be called ‘HE studies’. However, an historical association of HE studies with university administration and staff development remains reflected in its tendency to foreground issues of policy implementation, organisational management, ‘best practice’ in teaching, ‘quality’ assurance, and professional development. Quantity of studies of higher education has been no guarantee of sociological study of the curriculum or knowledge.

In addition to the sociology of education and ‘HE studies’ one can add three further sources of studies. First, there are several sub-disciplines dedicated to analysing specific areas of the disciplinary map of higher education, such as philosophy, history and sociology of science. Second, to specialist or ‘objective’ studies may be added ‘subjective’ accounts: discussion among participants as participants. Third, a considerable proportion of research studies and textbooks, especially within the

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9 Institutions include the Centre for Higher Education Studies (Institute of Education, University of London, founded in 1987); the Centre for Research on Higher Education (Queens University Belfast and Ulster University, 1995); the Higher Education Research Centre (University of Salford, 2002); and the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies of Higher Education (University College London, 2003). Bodies include the Institute for Learning and Teaching, the Staff and Educational Development Association, the Universities and Colleges Staff Development Agency, and the Teaching and Learning Research Programme (1999-2008) of the Economic and Social Research Council.

10 A major overview of research divides the field into: teaching and learning, course design, student experience, quality, system policy, institutional management, academic work, and knowledge (Tight 2003). Though describing the study of knowledge as ‘the most fundamental’ it is also ‘the least researched’ issue in higher education (Tight 2003: 168). See also Barnett & Coate (2004) and Field (2002).

11 The two are often elided. Academic discussion of higher education often shows an empiricist tendency to believe that actors need no specialist knowledge or procedures to analyse their own universe, as if it were immediately comprehensible.
humanities and social sciences, comprise a meta-discourse on the subject areas within which they are located; each discipline has a plethora of accounts of its genesis, development, current state and future.

In summary, though the sociology of higher education remains underdeveloped, recurrent claims that higher education has been little studied can be said to be false to the extent there exists a formidable literature on the topic. However, this is not the whole story. In this chapter I show how symptomatic analysis of this literature reveals that, despite this voluminous literature, the claims are true to the extent that existing studies cannot see higher education itself as an object of study. Revealing this blindspot requires a specific way of viewing the literature, which I shall now introduce.

A problem-field
Analysing the intellectual terrain encompassed by the literature outlined above is not straightforward. There are a number of intellectual fields generating studies of higher education, each of which can be mapped in a variety of ways. The sociology of education, for example, has been divided *inter alia* into: ‘old’, ‘new’, neo-Marxist, feminist, and multi-cultural sociologies; political arithmetic, functionalist, human capital, methodologically empiricist, conflict and interpretative theories; and such dichotomous distinctions as macro / micro, normative / interactionalist, positivist / anti-positivist, traditional / emergent, among many others.\(^\text{12}\) Mapping the diverse literature on higher education is a potentially endless task in botanical labelling. Such maps of intellectual fields chart existing approaches, typically by gathering studies into groupings of various kinds, in order to topologise the known terrain. This often accompanies an announcement of allegiance to one or more approach. In contrast, my allegiance is less to an approach and more to a problem. Though I shall touch on many of the conventional landmarks, these topologies are of a different order to my focus. To establish how my research question can be answered necessitates a different kind of mapping, one beginning from the problem rather than existing approaches.

I shall explore the literature in terms of a problem-field, a structured array of possible epistemic positions or ways of defining and explaining an object of study.\textsuperscript{13} Exploring a problem-field is a different kind of task in three principal ways.\textsuperscript{14} First, though a problem-field is embodied in the cultural works of intellectual fields, they are not identical: one is a system of epistemic positions or meta-theoretical orientations discernible within questions, critical arguments, etc.; the other comprises intellectual positions instantiated in the products and practices of actors in determinate social and institutional contexts. An intellectual field may address a number of problems, and a problem-field may underlie a number of intellectual fields. So, as is the case here, the literature covered by reviewing a problem-field may be wide, eclectic and diverse. Second, the aim is not comprehensive coverage of existing literature (such as cataloguing theories or methodologies) but of the epistemic positions it embodies, where any approach may occupy several epistemic positions.\textsuperscript{15} Third, where mapping an intellectual field asks what at present is and is not known, reviewing a problem-field asks what can and cannot be known; one explores answers, the other searches for answers to a question that may not have been posed. Any specific problem-field is structured in such a way as to make certain things visible and potential objects for knowledge, and other things invisible within its current range of vision. This generates what can be called the epistemic doxa underlying an intellectual field. As Althusser wrote of science, it can only pose problems on the terrain and within the horizon of a definite theoretical structure, its problematic, which constitutes the absolute and definite condition of possibility, and hence the absolute determination of the forms in which all problems must be posed. (1970: 25; original emphasis).

\textsuperscript{13} The notion of a problem-field elaborated here draws on and develops Bhaskar’s notion of a ‘philosophical problem-field’ (1979: 19), Bourdieu’s conception of a ‘space of possibles’ (1993a), Popper’s ‘objective knowledge’ (1979), Althusser’s ‘problematic’ (1970) and Foucault’s ‘épistème’ (1970).

\textsuperscript{14} It is also different to a review of philosophical positions underlying the intellectual field; as I emphasise further below, my focus remains firmly on establishing a point of purchase for the substantive study rather than epistemological botany.

\textsuperscript{15} For those seeking a history of an intellectual field, a review of a problem-field can appear an expressionist portrait, with eyes and noses out of place and proportion. For example, in the following review conventional narratives of the sociology of education (‘old’ / philosophy of education $\rightarrow$ ‘new’ classroom studies + correspondence theories $\rightarrow$ post-structuralist ‘voice’ discourses) is reconfigured because these approaches are distributed across epistemic positions.
It is the ‘conditions of possibility’ offered by epistemic positions on the issue of change in higher education that is the focus of this review. This involves undertaking a symptomatic reading to explore absent presences: possible but as yet unrecognised or unrealised epistemic positions. Such depth analysis may show that blindspots within a body of literature reside deep down within its problematic such that available approaches may be akin to a multiple choice questionnaire without a correct question. I am, therefore, concerned less with establishing an empirical gap in knowledge than with the logically prior question of whether higher education as a social structure can be seen at all and, if so, from which epistemic position. The focus is not what has been said but what it is possible to say.

Reviewing the problem-field

The focus and form of the review follow from the research problem. To explore how higher education enabled the possibility of cultural studies I need to be able to analyse higher education as a distinctive object of study and changes within higher education that enabled the possibility of cultural studies to come into being. These provide the focus of the problem-field that I address (change in higher education), the two dimensions of this field I am concerned with (descriptions of higher education and explanations of change) and the principal questions I pose: what it is that studies objectify when examining higher education; and how they explain change in this object of study. One can distinguish two main answers to each of these questions as underlying the literature. First, in terms of descriptions of higher education:

- internalist approaches objectify an autonomous, closed and separate realm within higher education; and
- externalist approaches objectify relations between higher education and wider social influences and interests.

Second, in terms of explanations of change:

- objectivist approaches prioritise objective structures, such as forms of knowledge or social relations of power; and

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16 The significance of absences is a distinctive feature of depth ontologies, such as the critical realist ideas of Bhaskar (1975, 1979), and distinguishes this approach from empiricism (see Shipway 2002).
These distinctions cross-cut one another, generating four principal epistemic positions on the problem of change in higher education. In the next stage of the review I critically review these positions in two parts addressing internalism and externalism in terms of their objectivist and subjectivist forms. (The former are prioritised because they define the object to which explanations of change are applied). I shall illustrate each of these positions by focusing on: (i) disciplinary approaches to education as a whole, especially the sociology of education; (ii) studies of knowledge production (exemplified by accounts of cultural studies); and (iii) studies of knowledge reproduction and institutions, drawing mainly on HE studies. The principal approaches I discuss are presented in Table 1.1.

<table>
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<th>Table 1.1: Principal epistemic positions illustrated</th>
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<td><strong>Internalist</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Externalist</strong></td>
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<td>• ‘new sociology of education’ classroom studies</td>
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<td>Table 1.1 <em>heuristically</em> illustrates epistemic positions with approaches I discuss in the following review; approaches may occupy more than one position.</td>
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[3] Internalism: Decontextualising higher education

One can, I argue, distinguish two principal positions underlying how higher education is described: internalism and externalism. Internalism is evident in approaches to higher education that grant ontological and causal priority to one or more of its constituent parts (such as actors, discourses, practices and institutions) abstracted from wider sociological and historical determinations, including higher education as a social field of practice. Whatever their focus or approach, internalist studies view the beating heart of higher education as something to be found in a specific location within higher education, whether that heart comprises objective structures or subjective agency.

Objectivist-internalism

Internalist analyses of cultural works, as Bourdieu puts it, ‘seek the source of the understanding of cultural productions in these productions themselves, taken in isolation and divorced from the conditions of their production and utilization’ (1988: vvi), necessitating ‘a purely internal reading that excludes all references to determinations or historical functions, which are seen as reductive’ (1993b: 177). The main disciplinary approaches to education associated with an objectivist-internalist position emanate from philosophy and history. The dominant approach to the curriculum prior to the ‘new sociology of education’ (NSOE) of the early 1970s was the philosophy of education. This analysed academic subjects in terms of the unfolding of ‘forms of knowledge’ into ‘indisputably logically cohesive disciplines’ (Hirst 1967: 44).17 Though highlighting the internal structuring of knowledge, disciplines tended to become sociologically and historically decontextualised and the contribution of agents to actively constructing the curriculum was obscured.18

The philosophy of education approach focused on schooling; an example of objectivist-internalism addressing higher education is intellectual history. To illustrate this approach accounts of the intellectual history of cultural studies provide both a substantively apt and, for three main reasons, a crucial test case of this approach. First, cultural studies is


18 This critique by the NSOE (e.g. Young 1971b) can be extended to epistemology and the philosophy of knowledge more generally and to Foucauldian analyses of knowledge in terms of ‘regimes of truth’ and ‘epistemes’.
defined against belief in the autonomy of ideas and its *modus operandi* is contextualisation;¹⁹ second, proponents define it relationally, in terms of positions renounced, critiqued or brought together; and third, practitioners emphasise the need to apply contextual and relational thinking to cultural studies itself.²⁰ Nonetheless, despite these credentials, accounts of cultural studies offers an internalist history of the subject area’s emergence and development within higher education.²¹ Its conventional ancestry is intellectual - the ‘culture and civilisation’ tradition within literary criticism and British Marxism - and its emergence is primarily textual: ‘founding texts’ of *The Uses of Literacy* (Richard Hoggart 1957), *Culture and Society* and *The Long Revolution* (Raymond Williams 1958a, 1961), and *The Making of the English Working Class* (E. P. Thompson 1963). Subsequent developments are divided into ‘paradigm-periods’ with shifts often emanating from the overcoming of limitations within existing approaches.²² Typically only two institutions are discussed at length - the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) and the Open University course *Popular Culture* or ‘U203’ (1982-87) - and both for intellectual reasons: CCCS as the site of production of key texts; U203 as signalling a change in the subject’s dominant theory (to Gramscianism).²³ Rarely are sites discussed in terms of pedagogic practices or

¹⁹ An argument often found in cultural studies proclaims: in the past the cultural object or practice ‘X’ was abstracted from its context; this reifies X as unchanging and singular and denigrates actors involved with X as passive; research shows the role of X in the everyday lives of actors varies greatly; and so X must be considered within the historical and social contexts of its production and consumption.

²⁰ For example:

... if we are serious, we have to apply it to our own project, including the project of Cultural Studies. We have to look at what kind of formation it was from which the project of Cultural Studies developed, and then at the changes of formation that produced different definitions of that project.

(Williams 1989: 152)

See also Hall (1990, 1992).


²³ Other institutions cited form an arbitrary list and receive only passing mention; see, for example, Harris (1992) and Milner (1994).
institutional relations. Similarly, though defined *inter alia* as multi-, inter- and counter-disciplinary, discussion of relations between cultural studies and other subjects is minimal. This intellectual history is thus not only idealist but also atomistic, isolating the ideas of the subject area from their wider intellectual contexts.

Intellectual histories address knowledge production; objectivist-internalist accounts of *reproduction* in higher education are exemplified by studies of the curriculum of disciplines. Surveys of course content typically conclude there is both ‘core’ content and variation between institutions. Seeking the basis of variation and change in pedagogic discourse solely *within* pedagogic discourse, they arrive at what could constitute a starting point: that disciplinary discourses and practices are not independent of institutional contexts. An approach which appears to begin from this point compares disciplines’ instantiations in different kinds of universities. Though locating curriculum and pedagogy within institutional contexts, they tend towards internalism by neglecting that context which gives each discipline and institution its defining properties: the field of higher education itself. (Both approaches also tend towards synchronic analysis of the contemporary situation, abstracting their discipline from its trajectory within the field).

Thus far I have focused on knowledge and the curriculum; internalist accounts of higher education as a social system of actors and institutions form a parallel, though less systematised, set of approaches. First, a tradition of what can be called ‘philosophy of the university’ comprises normative models of university education which extract the essence of ‘the university’ and describe the development of universities in terms of

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24 Bennett (1996) and Miller (1994) discuss a single course at a single institution (U203) and Steele (1997) addresses the emergence of the ideas and practices that became known as cultural studies within adult education, but higher education as a social structure remains largely absent.

25 Examples include Clarke (1976), Fincham (1975) and Macfarlane (1997a, 1997b).

26 This is popular in postgraduate educational research because it neatly delimits the object of study by relying on the apparently self-evident nature of the differences between institutions (see chapter 3). See, for example, Scott (2000).

27 I distinguish internalism / externalism according to relations within / relations to *higher education* rather than (educational) knowledge. This extends the definition of internalism often found in sociological accounts of science where *knowledge* provides the dividing line, one which is itself idealist in neglecting internalist accounts of *institutions.*
approximation to this ideal. Though these ‘ideas’ are modelled on actually existing institutions, they relieve them of all external determinants, as if the (singular) university is self-determining and develops outside time and space. Secondly, histories of institutions of higher education are homologous to intellectual history. Though less inclined to decontextualise their focus from all social influences, they tend to both neglect the structuring of knowledge and describe their institution in isolation from other institutions. Finally, HE studies addressing such issues as quality assurance and ‘teaching and learning’ often focus on identifying structural aspects within institutions enabling best practice but decontextualised from relations to other institutions and wider social contexts.

Subjectivist-internalism
A second form of internalism emphasises the problematic of the subject. This is exemplified by the NSOE, which strongly critiqued the internalist account offered by the philosophy of education. However, while proponents proposed a rejuvenated sociology of knowledge, in empirical research it became more a sociology of knowing. Phenomenologically inspired, this interpretative research mainly comprised empirical studies of classroom interaction. While highlighting the actively constructed nature of curricula and the viewpoints of participants, it also tended to overemphasise the possibilities for radical change, abstract classroom practices from wider structural relations and neglect the significance of knowledge itself. The internalist focus was thus less replaced than transformed: from objective structures of knowledge to subjective encounters in the classroom.

28 One of the most influential is Newman (1873/1947); contemporary examples include Barnett (1990, 1997).

29 Examples of institutional histories are cited in chapters 5 and 6.

30 See Tight (2003) for numerous examples.

31 For example, Esland (1971) and Keddie (1971).


33 This is a common characteristic of empirical studies announcing a sociological ‘break’ with philosophical approaches to knowledge. A similar displacement of internalism is evident in the founding ‘break’ of the sociology of scientific knowledge, from within knowledge (the philosophy of science) to the laboratory (sociological studies of scientific practice; e.g. Latour & Woolgar 1986).
Subjectivist accounts are also evident in intellectual history. For example, alongside describing internal contradictions of theories, accounts of cultural studies also anthropomorphise knowledge. Its history is frequently portrayed as a heroic story of Great Men: the ‘founding fathers’ of Hoggart, Williams, Thompson and Stuart Hall (who joined Hoggart at the CCCS in 1964 and was its Director during the 1970s). Its emergence is portrayed as the result of intentional agents, an interconnected group of like-minded thinkers purposefully constructing a new academic subject through an act of will; its subsequent development is then typically identified with the concerns of Stuart Hall. The picture created is that the subject area would not have emerged at all if these particular actors had not existed or chosen to work in this field. Here the history of ideas becomes a Whig history of the actors who thought them.

Turning to accounts of institutions, subjectivist-internalism is illustrated by a large corpus of work in HE studies. Studies of organisational change, institutional leadership, policy implementation and management of innovation typically argue against top-down approaches and so avoid externalism by emphasising that relations between government initiatives and their outcomes within institutions are ‘loosely coupled’. They tend towards subjectivism, focusing on interactions between actors at various levels of ‘the implementation staircase’ (Reynolds & Saunders 1987). Similarly, HE studies of ‘teaching and learning’, curriculum design and student experience portray the construction and development of the curriculum as an interactional process. The thrust of these diverse studies is to argue that outcomes are contextually contingent: the central

34 On this tendency in secondary accounts of its emergence, see Jones (1994a, 1994b) and Williams (1970). Stuart Hall is for many the shaping influence on cultural studies: many ‘key’ texts are authored, co-authored or perceived as overseen by Hall, in his capacity as director of the CCCS in the 1970s and Professor of Sociology at the Open University in the 1980s. The shift of institutional focus in accounts between these institutions coincides with Hall’s move.

35 Recent examples include Clark (2004), Duke (2002), Knight & Trowler (2001), Shattock (2003), Trowler (2002b), and the substantial number of ‘guides to good practice’ in the ‘Managing University and Colleges’ series of books edited by Warner and Palfreyman.


37 Some studies are prefaced by a theoretical discussion of, for example, Foucauldian analyses of discourse, suggesting an objectivist emphasis. However, the accompanying substantive studies are typically subjectivist and focus on interactions among participants.
focus is the individual organisational unit (and its members) and the informing argument is difference; for example:

Any university possesses a unique and dynamic multiple cultural configuration which renders depiction difficult and simple depictions wildly erroneous. So values, attitudes, assumptions and taken-for-granted recurrent practices may be as different from department to department, building to building in one higher education institution as they are between one university and the next. (Trowler & Knight 2002: 145-146).

From this position, higher education is the sum of interactions between actors in wildly different contexts, such that universities are described as akin to ‘organized anarchies’ (Trowler 2002a: 4): there is no structural analysis of higher education as a whole.38

Summary
Approaches characterised by internalism reduce higher education to its component parts, abstracting production from reproduction of knowledge, disciplines from institutions, and individual disciplines or institutions from wider disciplinary or institutional maps. The limitations of this position for the current study can be illustrated by considering histories of cultural studies. In existing accounts cultural studies is almost entirely absent as a institutionally and socially contextualised set of intellectual and pedagogic practices among a range of possible practices; it exists in idealised form, as knowledge production only, in isolation from other disciplinary positions and abstracted from institutional contexts. However, the emergence of a subject area represents an evolving position within an evolving system of institutional and disciplinary positions. To understand the trajectory of a discipline one must also analyse the trajectory of the system of positions it is located within. This contextual blindspot is so thoroughgoing that though during the early 1960s the famous ‘two cultures’ debate was raging, the humanities were in ‘crisis’ and higher education was undergoing a ‘short term emergency’ (see chapters 5-8), it is as if the publication of four texts and opening of a Centre occurred in a vacuum. Such limitations of vision are built into internalism, whatever the approaches adopted; as a

38 The analysis of institutional change in higher education has currently reached the same stage as the sociology of education in the early 1970s: proclaiming decisive breaks with ‘rational-scientific’ and ‘positivist’ accounts that deny difference and agency (see, for example, Trowler & Knight 2002). I predict the epistemic gains made by such ‘new’ approaches will equate to those of the NSOE (see Arnot & Whitty 1982, Moore 1991, 1996).
possible starting point, it would thereby enable only a partial account of the emergence of cultural studies.

[4] **Externalism: Reducing higher education**

A second epistemic position underlying how approaches objectify higher education is externalism. In contrast to internalism, externalist approaches look beyond higher education, privileging *relations to* the field, and consider the form taken by its discourses and practices as reflecting extrinsic political, economic or social relations. Where internalism leads to higher education being abstracted from wider determinations, externalism reduces it to such influences, rendering it an epiphenomenon of either objective structures relating to, or the actions of agents located in, other fields of practice.

**Objectivist-externalism**

Returning to disciplinary approaches to education, the NSOE not only criticised the philosophy of education but also explicitly broke with the ‘old’ sociology of education as having ignored the curriculum in favour of political arithmetic studies of social inequality and educational opportunity.\(^{39}\) In place of this externalist account, the NSOE proclaimed:

> It is or should be the central task of the sociology of education to relate the principles of selection and organisation that underlie curricula to their institutional and interactional setting in schools and class-rooms and to the wider social structure.

(Young 1971a: 24).

However, just as NSOE’s empirical research of classroom interaction remained internalist (see above), its theoretical development retained this ‘old’ externalism. From the mid 1970s onwards various neo-Marxist theories of correspondence, reproduction and ideology explored the effects of social relations of power upon the curriculum.\(^{40}\) Forms taken by educational knowledge and pedagogic practices were viewed as reflecting the needs of external interests, such as bourgeois domination, patriarchy or the state.

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Successive theories progressively explored complexities and multiplicities within these external relations and proclaimed links to be more attenuated, contested and diverse than previously suggested. Nonetheless, what they all shared was a focus on external and structural relations of education. This was also the case for those liberal theories against which these analyses positioned themselves. Where neo-Marxist theories viewed education as a reproducer of class relations, liberal accounts saw it as an interruptor of class reproduction; both shared a focus on relations between structural relations in society and education. As Moore puts it:

both theories operate with a particular kind of social causality in which it can be argued: ‘because of this in society, then that in education’ or, alternatively, ‘change education thus and these things will follow in society’ (2004: 40).

The study of external relations has also been a major preoccupation of scholarship in HE studies, focusing on relations between higher education and the state, economy and society. Studies of relations with the state focus on the agencies, mechanisms and procedures whereby central and local government finance and manage universities and colleges, and changes in the policies, doctrines and approaches to these mechanisms. Salter & Tapper (1994), for example, analyse postwar changes in this relationship by identifying which parts of the state are concerned with higher education, the interests these have, and the methods used to pursue their intentions. Similarly, HE studies and histories of relations with economic interests, such as Sanderson (1972), explore the influence of industrialists in founding and funding institutions and of the state as fount of national economic policy. Lastly, a tradition of political arithmetic studies, famously exemplified by Origins and Destinations (Halsey et al. 1980), investigates the social origins and occupational destinations of students passing through higher education. What unites these studies is the relative neglect of knowledge and the curriculum and a tendency towards empirical descriptions of interactional relations with external social


fields; the basis of changes within higher education is thus located within changes in these fields.

Subjectivist-externalism
The ‘correspondence’ theories of NSOE outlined above were supplanted from the late 1970s onwards by feminist and later multicultural approaches that challenged the focus on class relations in favour of giving attention to gender and race. Alongside continuing the analysis of external relations to objective structures (now of patriarchy and racism), these approaches, under the influence of post-structuralist, post-modernist and standpoint theories, have increasingly emphasised subjective issues of ‘voice’. By the end of the 1990s this was the orthodoxy within school research. Instead of structural level theorising, it is associated with small-scale, qualitative studies and exploring issues of identity. It represents a partial return of empirical NSOE studies but rather than a sociology of knowing it has become more a sociology of knowers. The key question is whose voice is speaking and whose voice is silenced within pedagogic discourse; the focus is how pedagogic discourse works to reproduce external social relations of power. The basis of explanation for change resides in the changing subjective characteristics of actors whose opportunities and constraints reside beyond education.

The relating of works to the social characteristics of their authors, and their explanation in terms of the world view or social interests of particular social groups, has been a longstanding focus of sociological approaches to culture generally. This finds expression in the sociology of knowledge, the ‘strong’ programme of the sociology of scientific knowledge and more sociologically aware versions of intellectual history. Accounts of cultural studies, for example, often seek the basis of ideas in social characteristics of authors. The working-class backgrounds of Hoggart and Williams, for example, are held to have brought them into conflict with the values of the Leavisite tradition in which they were educated and they are often portrayed as ‘giving voice to’ a generation of working-class university entrants. The subsequent development of cultural studies is

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44 See Moore (1996), Moore & Muller (1999) and Young (2000).


46 See, for example, Bourdieu’s critique of internalist sociology of culture and literature (1993b).

47 See Brantlinger (1990), Inglis (1993) and Turner (1990), for example.
conventionally schematised as a movement through giving voice to the experiences of working-class men, a feminist emphasis in the 1970s on the silenced voice of women, critiques of these in terms of race and the experiences of ethnic minorities, and more recent claims to give voice to marginalised forms of sexuality. This writes intellectual history as a procession of the excluded and accounts for intellectual development in terms of groups of knowers: change equates to the addition of a new knower category where authors are held to speak on behalf of a social group of knowers outside higher education. The question underlying such anthropomorphic accounts is whose power and whose knowledge is not the principal focus.

Turning to HE studies the externalist focus on relations to, in particular, the state often partakes of subjectivism. Traditional ‘Whig’ history has long offered a history of great statespeople and this has remained a strand within studies of higher education, though typically a relatively minor one because of the relative autonomy enjoyed by the field. More commonplace are sociological studies of policy-making which focus on the principal actors involved. Such studies focus on the interests, intentions, aims and beliefs of key agents in the process of formulating and executing policy, often as part of an account of how these intentions were reformulated, negotiated and contested by actors within higher education on being implemented.

Summary
Approaches characterised by externalism tend to reduce higher education to a reflection of something else. Where internalism abstracts higher education from wider social conditions, externalism shortcircuits the relationship so that higher education becomes an expression of these wider contexts. From this perspective the questions are how external relations of power are linked to higher education and how and for what ends these means are used. This focus on the function of higher education leads externalist approaches to obscure both the internal logic of discourse and practices and, even where subjectivist, those actors who create, transform and reproduce those discourses and practices and for whom they also fulfil functions: academics. Externalism fails to see higher education as

48 In Maton (2000a, 2000b) I show how the Althusserian notion of the ‘intellectual proletarian’ and Gramscian ideas of the ‘organic intellectual’ have led to ‘imaginary alliances’ within cultural studies between authors and client knower groups beyond higher education.

49 For examples of studies of policy-makers, see Tight (2003) and Walford (1994).
a microcosm or universe with its own specificities, logic, rules, taboos, rituals and rites. Higher education becomes, to adapt Bernstein (1990: 166), ‘no more than a relay for power relations external to itself; a relay whose form has no consequences for what is relayed’. Where internalist studies often emphasise its infinite heterogeneity, externalist approaches tend to treat higher education as a homogeneous system and neglect its institutional and disciplinary specificities. As an epistemic position, externalism thereby cannot fully address the question of why cultural studies emerged in certain institutions and from particular disciplines and not others. It would highlight the significance of the wider context within which these events occurred but, finding the basis of its dynamics lies beyond higher education, could not offer explanations for how higher education enabled the possibility of cultural studies or why the emergence of cultural studies came about in the specific ways it did.

[5] Relationalism: A recognised but unrealised epistemic position

Thus far I have sketched the key vantage points from which higher education is viewed and explored the different panoramas these offer. The final stage of the analysis is to bring these epistemic positions together to consider what they reveal as a whole and, crucially, what remains hidden.

Higher education in the problem-field

Insights into higher education
At the start of this chapter I argued that claims that higher education has not been studied can be said to be both false and true. I declared them false to the extent that studies of higher education represent a considerable body of work. These studies (and the epistemic positions they illustrate) also offer valuable insights for the current research in two principal ways. First, empirical studies of English higher education represent a source of factual information on the people, agencies, mechanisms and procedures central to the events I analyse in the substantive study (chapters 5-9). Second, each approach highlights important issues for consideration; for example, philosophy of education focuses attention on what the NSOE ignores (the structuring of knowledge), while the NSOE highlights the significance of social and institutional contexts. This is also the case for the principal epistemic positions:
• *internalism* underlines the specificity of higher education, showing that it cannot be reduced to other social fields of practice; while *externalism* shows that higher education is not a separate, wholly independent and purely autonomous realm that can be abstracted from its social contexts;

• *subjectivism* draws attentions to the significance of the active contribution of participants; and *objectivism* helps reveal the structural relations which shape the activities of participants and to which they contribute.

Each of the epistemic positions also highlights blindspots of other positions: internalism reduces higher education to its constituent parts and externalism reduces higher education to other social fields of practice; subjectivism overemphasises the voluntaristic possibilities for radical change and objectivism obscures the roles played by and viewpoints of participants.

It is tempting to suggest that bolting together approaches exhibiting all four positions could produce a Unified Theory of Everything. They are clearly not incommensurate. A single account of cultural studies, for example, may shift between internalist idealism and externalist reductionism and between unconstrained agency and subjectless structures.50 All four epistemic positions can be embodied within a single study, approach or tradition. However, the temptation to search for a cumulative solution would be, at least for my research, flawed from the outset: an objectivist-subjectivist-internalism-externalism is not the answer.51 An old joke has a tourist asking a local for directions to, say, Cambridge and receiving the reply: ‘Well, to get there I wouldn’t start from here if I were you’. To reach the destination of analysing how higher education enabled the possibility of cultural studies, one does not want to start from within the current problem-field. This raises questions of what the positions share and absent presences in the problem-field.

*The absent-presence of higher education*

Claims that higher education has not been studied are true in that the epistemic positions share a common blindspot: they cannot see higher education as a social structure with its

50 Similarly, phenomenology and the concept of social structure were not incompatible in the NSOE (Moore 1988).

51 The temptation to seek a cumulative solution reflects the main positions in the problem-field: a non-relational mode of thinking sees the whole as simply the sum of its parts and a flat ontology examines only existing approaches rather than symptomatically analysing underlying epistemic positions. This tends towards addition rather than integration as a mode of intellectual development (see chapter 3).
own distinctive properties irreducible to other fields of practice or to its constituent parts. Studies of higher education assume the very thing that is subject to their analysis. This is not simply the result of neglect or misplaced priorities but rather embedded in the problem-field. For example, a review of ‘concerns and omissions’ in HE studies concludes there exists ‘a strong British literature on higher education, at both the macro and micro level’ (Tight 1999: 42). The ‘macro’ level is national policy and ‘micro’ level is student learning; ‘omissions’ highlighted by the review comprise a ‘meso’ level of ‘the institution, its context and operation’ (1999: 43). Higher education as something other than pedagogic practices, individual institutions or national policy is thus outside the range of vision. A second limitation concerns how change in this object of study can be explained by integrating the insight of objectivist and subjectivist approaches. In existing approaches these tend either to be separated (as, for example, ‘process’ and ‘structure’) or conflated as ‘structuration’; what is required is for relations between them to be captured rather than obscured. This is to say we need not only to be able to see higher education but in a particular way.

The kind of object of study constituting this absent presence is illustrated by the notions of ‘field’ and ‘arena’ in the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Basil Bernstein, respectively (discussed in chapter 2). Both enable a conception of higher education as an object of study sui generis, with its own distinctive properties and powers. Such ‘field’ approaches conceive higher education as a relatively autonomous social field of practice in which change is emergent from the structured actions of agents. The field represents the invisible dividing line between externalism and internalism but is more than merely a missing level. Recognising higher education as a field shows that internal factors such as universities or disciplines are situated within relations with other possible positions that underlie their properties, and that external influences do not affect all these positions uniformly but are instead mediated by the structure of this field. In short, it fundamentally alters the nature of those issues addressed from internalist and externalist viewpoints. Such field approaches also integrate without conflating objectivism and subjectivism by conceptualising change as emergent from the structured actions of agents.

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52 See, for example, Becher & Kogan (1980) where ‘process and structure’ are treated separately, and the examples of accounts of cultural studies and the NSOE I have discussed, where the influences of social structure and of agency are highlighted but without their interaction and relation being explored. The conflation of structure and agency as ‘structuration’ is less widely embraced, though see Deem et al. (1995) and Elliott (1998).
Substantialism and relationalism
What obscures this potential object of study is what Cassirer (1923) calls a
‘substantialist’ mode of thinking that is embedded in the problem-field. Substantialism
conceives of social relations in terms of cumulative interactions between specific
elements. This mode of thinking characterises externalist, internalist, objectivist and
subjectivist positions for which higher education comprises interactions between external
or internal structures or agents. Two effects of substantialism significant for this study
are: first, an acceptance of categories operative within the field (for example, assuming
the basis of differences between universities as self-evident) that obscures the need to
analyse their underlying structuring principles; and, second, an acceptance of the
empirical as the knowable, eschewing the generative description of possibilities before
they are recognised and realised. From this perspective the limits of the empirical are the
limits of the world - it is not possible to think in terms of possibilities unless they are
already realised.

In contrast, field approaches operate with a relational mode of thinking. To view higher
education in terms of field is to construct it as emergent from and irreducible to its
constituent parts. Emergent properties are relational, arising out of combination, where
the emergent object is capable of reacting back on its constituents, and has its own causal
powers, which are causally irreducible to the powers of its components. (Thus adding
together the interactions of external and internal structures and agents would not equate
to the field.) This is to perceive ‘the stratified nature of social reality where different
strata possess different emergent properties and powers’ (Archer 1995: 9) - a field is not
the same kind of object of study as its constitutive interactions. The epistemic position of
relationalism that underlies such an approach does not treat specific aspects of the object
in isolation but rather views that object as defined relationally, where relations are not
limited to interactions but rather revealed through analysis of a field’s underlying
structuring principles. ‘To think in terms of field is to think relationally’ (Bourdieu &
Wacquant 1992: 96) and to operate with a depth ontology that views the (non-empirical)
possible to be a legitimate part of the object of study. The difference is not simply a
matter of theory or method but of how the object is constructed; as Bourdieu puts it:

To think in terms of field demands a conversion of the whole ordinary
vision of the social world which fastens only on visible things: the

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53 See, among others, Archer (1995), Bhaskar (1975, 1979) and Sayer (1992) on depth ontology and the
nature of emergent powers.
individual ...; the group ...; and even relations understood as interactions,
that is, as intersubjective, actually activated connections.

I am neither suggesting existing approaches never exhibit relational thinking nor that this
is embodied only within the work of Bourdieu and Bernstein but rather that
substantialism remains deeply embedded in the problem-field and to see higher education
requires a new way of thinking.54 As Wittgenstein puts it in the quote opening Part I of
this thesis, ‘if it is grasped near the surface it simply remains the difficulty it was. It has
to be pulled out by the roots; and that involves our beginning to think about these things
in a new way’. The embeddedness of substantialism is shown by studies that objectify
something similar to ‘field’ but retain its mode of thinking.

‘Field’ studies?
Several approaches to education resemble a relational ‘field’ approach. Studies of the
history of school subjects announce their basis in the approach of Bernstein and overlap
with that of Bourdieu.55 They highlight the socially constructed nature of curriculum and
describe subjects as resulting from struggles for status and resources among subgroups.56
Such studies emphasise the need to examine both espoused and enacted curriculum and
highlight an often neglected historical dimension. However, they offer no
conceptualisation of a relational field nor systematic analysis of its structure. Goodson
(1983), for example, identifies subgroups within professional subject associations as
sponsoring ‘traditions’ of definitions of a subject (as shown in espoused proposals) and
traces relations between these in terms of the changing orientation of enacted curricula.57
Similarly, Ball (1985) analyses the institutional and intellectual trajectory of school

54 Relational thinking is common to structuralist approaches in linguistics, anthropology and history, and
is found in the work of Marx and Durkheim; see Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992: 16) and Swartz (1997: 61).

55 See, for example, Goodson (1997: 43-59) on the influence of Bernstein on ‘aspects of the sociology of
the curriculum’.

56 This approach is particularly associated with the work of Ivor Goodson; see Goodson (1981, 1983,
1985, 1988, 1997), Goodson & Ball (1984), and Goodson et al. (1998). (These sources frequently contain
the same studies). See also Ball (1982, 1985), Cooper (1984), and Walford (1985). On curriculum studies
see Whitty (1981, 1987).

57 The subjects are biology, geography and environmental studies; the ‘traditions’ are ‘utilitarian’,
‘pedagogic’ and ‘academic’.

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English since 1906 in relation to differing forms of interaction (‘normal’, ‘network’, ‘cluster’ and ‘speciality’ stages) between individuals and groups. The structuring principles of these ‘traditions’ and ‘stages’ and their relational positioning are not part of the analyses. The approach thus exhibits a flat ontology and a substantialist focus on interactions between empirically perceivable agents. Though inspired by relational theory, they do not realise its epistemic position in empirical research. The espoused position is relationalist, the enacted position is subjectivist-internalism (see Table 1.1).

Something similar to a ‘field’ approach can also be found in studies addressing higher education holistically, including:

- opinion surveys of academics, exemplified by Halsey & Trow (1971), that highlight the significance of beliefs from within higher education and examine the field of higher education as a whole;

- studies of disciplinary ‘tribes’ by Becher (1981, 1987a, 1994, Becher & Trowler 2001) which examine the disciplinary map in a ‘field’ manner, focusing on struggles over resources; and

- HE studies addressing ‘process and structure’ in higher education (e.g. Becher & Kogan 1980) that attempt to examine the ‘system’ as a whole.

These approaches provide valuable insights for a ‘field’ analysis but do not by themselves constitute such an analysis as they lack a generative conceptualisation of the field’s structuring principles. Halsey & Trow (1971) offer ideal types of the university; Becher’s studies conceptualise ideal typical models such as ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ research styles; and HE studies model higher education in terms of interactions between different levels of institutions and agencies. All share, in differing ways, substantialist notions of what constitutes the field of higher education and cannot see unrealised possibilities.

58 Goodson’s account of the influence of Bernstein can be summarised as one of inspiring an awareness of the socially constructed nature of academic subjects. The undertheorised nature of this work is evident in ‘hypotheses’ such as that subjects are pulled towards the ‘academic tradition’ (Goodson 1983). This does not arrive at what would constitute, from a relational field perspective, a starting point, namely that academic subjects are positioned in relation to competing and hierarchically arranged principles of hierarchisation whose underlying structuring principles can be systematically conceptualised (chapter 2). Little theoretical progress has been made since these hypotheses were announced (such as accommodating counterfactual examples to the hypothesis that subjects evolve up the educational system, which the trajectories of inter alia cultural, media and communication studies contradict). Progress is instead measured by empirical addition of studies of subject areas (see Goodson 1997). In these characteristics subject studies resemble HE studies. In both cases the theoretical bar is set so low the principal danger lies in tripping over it.

59 See also Halsey (2004) and Startup (1979).
Relationalist analyses do, however, exist. For example, the frameworks of both Bourdieu and Bernstein have provided the basis for empirical research. As well as Bourdieu’s own extensive writings, there are a growing number of studies using his approach to address issues within education.60 However, most anglophone studies are school-based and the number of analyses of higher education remains extremely limited.61 Moreover, empirical studies using his ideas often adopt and apply specific concepts (such as ‘habitus’) rather than conduct a systematic analysis of education as a relational field. Similarly, Bernstein’s approach has been the basis for extensive and sustained empirical research into education for several decades.62 This research has also overwhelmingly been school-based, often focusing on classroom interaction, and has tended to focus on exploring the value of specific aspects of Bernstein’s framework (in particular the concepts of classification and framing). More recently, however, studies have begun to use Bernstein’s concepts to address education from a ‘field’ perspective, though higher education and knowledge production have as yet been little discussed.63 This is not to diminish the achievements of these studies either on their own terms or for showing the value of aspects of these approaches for empirical research (I return to this in chapter 2). Rather, my point here is to highlight that though they show the possibility of relationalism, the potential of these approaches for analysing higher education as a relational field has yet to be fully realised. This reflects and underlies the starting point for this review: the marginal and underdeveloped nature of the sociology of higher education. Realising relationalism would at the same time, I believe, strengthen the sociology of higher education.

60 See, for example, Grenfell & James (1998) and surveys of the use of Bourdieu’s concepts in studying education offered in papers collected in British Journal of Sociology of Education 25(4), 2004. (See chapter 2 for Bourdieu’s own studies of education).


62 This represents a considerable body of work; see, for example, studies discussed in Bernstein (2000) and those collected in Atkinson et al. (1995), Christie (1999a), Morais et al. (2001), Muller et al. (2004) and Sadovnik (1995), and surveyed in British Journal of Sociology of Education 23(4), 2002.

63 As I discuss in chapter 2, by ‘field perspective’ I refer here to studies that focus on what Bernstein terms the ‘arena’ created by the ‘pedagogic device’; see chapter 2 for examples of studies using this concept. Examples of Bernsteinian studies of aspects of higher education include Breier (2004) and Vitale (2001).
[6] Conclusion

This chapter reviewed existing literature on higher education to establish theoretical and methodological starting points for the study in three main stages. First, I showed that, though sociology of higher education is underdeveloped, a diverse and voluminous body of literature examines aspects of higher education from a range of approaches. In order to determine how to analyse both higher education as a distinctive object of study and changes within that object of study enabling the possibility of cultural studies to come into being, I conducted a symptomatic analysis of the literature in terms of a problem-field. Four principal epistemic positions were identified, comprising objectivist and subjectivist explanations of internalist and externalist definitions of higher education. In the second stage I explored the different panoramas on higher education these viewpoints offered. Their principal limitations for the current study comprised: reducing higher education to its constituent parts abstracted from wider contexts (internalism) or to a reflection of other arenas (externalism), and obscuring the role played by actors (objectivism) and structures (subjectivism). Finally, I reviewed the problem-field as a whole, arguing that these positions share a substantialist mode of thinking that obscures higher education as an irreducible social structure. This, I suggested, can be objectified by relationalist approaches, such as those of Bourdieu and Bernstein. Having determined an appropriate epistemic position and approaches embodying this position the question becomes how these can be used to create an empirically-applicable theoretical framework for the current study. I address this in the following three chapters: chapter 2 discusses how a working conceptual framework was constructed; chapter 3 methodologically discusses how this shaped and was developed in the empirical research; and chapter 4 defines the resulting conceptual framework used in the substantive study.
Chapter 2
Field Theories: A working conceptual framework

The task is to produce, if not a ‘new person’, then at least a ‘new gaze’, a sociological eye. And this cannot be done without a genuine conversion, a metanoia, a mental revolution, a transformation of one’s whole vision of the social world.

Pierre Bourdieu (1992, in Bourdieu & Wacquant, p.251)

Concepts and abstractions that do not ultimately lead to perceptions are like paths in a wood that end without any way out.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1844/1966) The World as Will and Representation, II, p.82

[1] Introduction

This chapter continues the task of constructing the object of study by assembling a working conceptual framework capable of researching how English higher education enabled the possibility of cultural studies. In chapter 1 I argued that dominant approaches to higher education share a substantialist mode of thinking that obscures higher education as a social structure, and that a new, relational mode of thinking is required, one exemplified by the ‘field’ theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Basil Bernstein. In this chapter I use these approaches to provide an empirically-applicable theoretical framework for the current study. The spirit in which I discuss their ideas is clarified by a distinction made by Schopenhauer:

For the man who studies to gain insight, books and studies are merely rungs of the ladder on which he climbs to the summit of knowledge. As soon as a rung has raised him one step, he leaves it behind. On the other hand, the many who study in order to fill their memories do not use the rungs of the ladder for climbing, but take them off and load themselves with them to take away, rejoicing at the increasing weight of the burden. They remain below for ever, since they are carrying what ought to have carried them.

(1844/1966: 80).

For me the work of Bourdieu and Bernstein represent two highly significant rungs in a ladder. My allegiance is less to an approach and more to exploring a problem, and my
engagement with their work is shaped by the needs of the research question. To explore how higher education enabled the possibility of emergence for cultural studies requires being able to analyse higher education as a distinctive object of study and changes within this object that enabled the possibility to emerge. This necessitates a framework able to:
(i) objectify higher education as an irreducible social structure;
(ii) generatively go beyond the empirical in order to grasp the possibility of cultural studies prior to its emergence; and
(iii) unambiguously conceptualise changes enabling the possibility of cultural studies to emerge.

These requirements provide the ruler of engagement with the approaches by which the working conceptual framework is developed. First, outlining the ‘thinking tools’ offered by Bourdieu’s approach, I argue they enable higher education to be seen as a field but require development because they reduce practices to positions, lack generative capacity and are unable to analyse change and its underlying generative principles. Secondly, I suggest that Bernstein’s concept of ‘codes’ provides a means of conceptualising practices that is both generative and captures change, and that the ‘pedagogic device’ helps reveal the underlying basis of higher education as a field. Lastly, I argue that the focus of these concepts on pedagogic discourse obscures the significance of knowledge production in higher education. Turning to Bernstein’s mapping of ‘knowledge structures’, supplemented by my own concepts of ‘specialisation codes’ and the ‘epistemic device’, I show how issues of production can be embraced, enabling higher education to be studied as both an intellectual and educational field.

[2] Bourdieu’s Relational Fields

The first stage in developing the working conceptual framework used in this study draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu to objectify higher education as a field. Though the secondary literature on Bourdieu’s work is voluminous, the value of his approach to

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64 Other rungs in this ladder include critical realist philosophy of social science which underpins the epistemological foundations of the framework. Space precludes detailed exposition of this influence here; I have prioritised the substantive study (see chapter 10).
studying higher education has yet to be fully appreciated. Bourdieu’s extensive writings on education have often been abstracted from his wider ‘relational’ approach which, in turn, has typically been discussed at one remove from empirical research. In contrast, Bourdieu repeatedly claimed the value of his theory lay in its use in research:

There is no doubt a theory in my work, or, better, a set of thinking tools visible through the results they yield, but it is not built as such...It is a temporary construct which takes shape for and by empirical work (in Wacquant 1989: 50, original emphases).

Accordingly, my focus will be on the usefulness of Bourdieu’s approach for this research study, rather than its capacity for synthesis or philosophical closure; my questions are: what ‘thinking tools’ does Bourdieu’s relational sociology offer, how can they contribute to this study, and what are their limitations?

Bourdieu’s ‘thinking tools’

Bourdieu’s framework comprises a series of inter-defined concepts, principally those of field, capital and habitus. The concept of ‘field’ underlies his conception of society (or ‘social space’) as constituted by relations between fields of practice which, under the impact of the division of labour, have increasingly differentiated to become relatively autonomous. Bourdieu argues that each field has its own specific structure and logic, but all share homologous features; there are ‘general laws of fields’ (1993c: 72) including relative autonomy, relational and hierarchical structures, and struggles. Relative autonomy is crucial: that a field is neither wholly autonomous from nor reducible to other

65 The number of secondary accounts of Bourdieu is large and growing; see, for example, Calhoun et al. (1993), Harker et al. (1990), Jenkins (1992), Lemert (1981), Reader (1982), Robbins (1991) and Swartz (1997). See chapter 1 on the scarcity of Bourdieuan studies of higher education.


67 The following is thus not an attempt to either summarise Bourdieu’s framework, which is extremely rich and detailed, or review his extensive oeuvre - it is a highly focused raid on Bourdieu’s conceptual larder. Neither shall I discuss at length applications of his approach. The few anglophone applications of Bourdieu’s framework to higher education (chapter 1), while offering valuable empirical insights, tend to reflect its theoretical limitations in terms of the needs of the current study.
fields is the precondition of its existence. As such, the field serves as a crucial mediating context which ‘like a prism’ refracts external influences ‘according to the specific logic of the field, and it is by this intermediary that they act on the logic of the development of works’ (1993a: 164). Thus, contrary to internalist approaches wider changes cannot be ignored but, against externalist accounts, how these changes are played out within a field depends, first, on its ‘refraction coefficient’ (1993a: 182) or degree of autonomy from other fields, which shapes the extent to which wider pressures impact upon it, and, second, its internal structure, which shapes the way these pressures are realised within the field.

The field itself is defined by Bourdieu as a configuration of positions comprising agents (individuals, groups of actors or institutions) struggling over status and resources to maximise their position. Its structure is given by relations between these positions, ‘like a magnetic field’:

the constituting agents or systems of agents may be described as so many forces which, by their existence, opposition or combination, determine its specific structure at a given moment in time.

(1971a: 161)

Conversely, agents are defined by their relational position within the field’s distribution of capital and from which they derive ‘positional properties’ (1993c: 46) irreducible to characteristics of the agents themselves. This highlights a second thinking tool: ‘capital’ conceptualises resources which confer power, authority or status upon their holders. Fields are structured homologously to social space as a whole, namely by:

• **volume of capital**: the amount of status and resources possessed by agents distinguishes dominant and dominated classes; and

• **species of capital**: the type of capital distinguishes dominant and dominated class fractions within the dominant class.

In Figure 2.1 classes and fractions are illustrated by vertical and horizontal ‘+/−’ respectively. In other words, fields are structured into, first, ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ and, second, by competing ideas of what should count as ‘having’. Bourdieu defines two principal species of capital: economic capital (finance, wealth, etc.) and cultural capital

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68 In his empirical studies Bourdieu often tends towards methodological individualism by treating institutions as the sum of individual actors (e.g. 1988). However such concepts as habitus can be extended to other categories of agent, such as institutions; see, for example, Reay et al. (2001).
(legitimate knowledge and know-how). Each expresses a different principle of hierarchisation (attainment of economic profits or symbolic profits accruing from refined cultural judgement) and agents are oriented towards accumulating one or the other, creating opposing poles of the field.

Figure 2.1:
Bourdieu’s basic conceptualisation of society and of social fields

This chiastic structuring is echoed in different fields in distinctive forms. Each field is structured by two principal competing principles of hierarchisation: a heteronomous principle looking beyond the specific activities of the field (such as towards monetary success) and an autonomous principle looking inwards to its ostensibly disinterested activities (such as ‘knowledge for its own sake’). However, the specific forms of capital differ. For example, Bourdieu (1988) describes late 1960s French higher education as structured by an opposition between agents possessing heteronomous ‘academic capital’

69 Bourdieu also identifies ‘social capital’ or networks of contacts and connections (1997: 51-53). Social capital is distinguished from the other two capitals by not circulating in fields, and Bourdieu rarely uses ‘social capital’ in any systematic way as the basis of a principle of hierarchisation when analysing the structuring of fields.
institutional power in the form of control over departments, appointments, funding, etc.) and autonomous ‘scholastic capital’ (scientific prestige and intellectual renown). In each of these ‘field of struggles’ agents aim at preserving or transforming the established relations of power in order to maximise their position. They attempt to both increase their volume of capital and make the species of capital underpinning their position the dominant measure of achievement within the field. For example, agents whose position depends on academic capital attempt to make institutional recognition (such as professorial status) the basis of achievement, while those defined by scholastic capital strive to make such markers as citations and intellectual recognition the measure of success. Struggles are thus not only over gaining as much currency as possible but also over which currency should be the Gold Standard.

The strategies taken by agents in these struggles are understood by Bourdieu in terms of a third thinking tool: ‘habitus’. Each position within a field is associated with dispositions giving rise to practices, texts, works, mission statements, and so forth. These stances or ‘position-taking’ are strategies by agents aiming to maximise their capital. Taken together they form a field of relational position-takings that mirrors the field of positions. Each field is thus two fields in one: a field of positions (or social system) and a field of position-takings (or cultural system). Relations between the two fields are mediated by ‘habitus’, a system of durable and transposable dispositions and cognitive structures possessed by agents which generate perceptions, appreciations and practices. A habitus is both a structured and structuring structure: it results from past conditioning and in turn helps shape one’s present practices. The position-takings or practices of agents is understood by Bourdieu (1986: 101) in terms of the following formula:

\[ \text{[(habitus)(capital)] + field} = \text{practice} \]

In other words, the meeting of one’s dispositions and position (given by one’s capital) with the current state of play of a field gives rise to one’s practices (understood relationally). Thus the field exerts a power of its own over its agents by helping to shape practices occurring within it.

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70 Bourdieu also describes the field of position-takings as ‘the structured system of practices and expressions of agents’ (1992: 105) or a ‘system of relations between themes and problems’ (1971a: 161).
Capturing the missing field

Bourdieu’s relational sociology offers a way of seeing and thinking about higher education whose advantages are twofold. First, his approach objectifies higher education as an irreducible social structure in a way that avoids internalism and externalism.  
Understood as a relatively autonomous field, changes in higher education are neither a reflection of dominant external interests nor of the unfolding of an intrinsic cultural dynamic. Instead, higher education is considered a distinctive field irreducible to both other arenas of practices and its constituent parts and possessing *sui generis* properties that are real in the sense of having effects. Bourdieu thereby enables higher education to be seen as an object of study: the field is the thing. Secondly, this objectification of higher education embraces dynamism and change. Bourdieu’s focus on struggles of relationally positioned agents subsumes an objectivist emphasis on structural factors and a subjectivist emphasis on agency, as well as conceptualising relations between them. In this approach, structural change in higher education is emergent from but irreducible to the actions of agents. Thus, Bourdieu’s ‘thinking tools’ provide a basis for the relationalist approach required for the substantive study.

Limitations of Bourdieu’s approach

Though valuable as a way of seeing, Bourdieu’s conceptual framework is incomplete. Specifically, there are three principal limitations:

(i) position-takings are viewed as epiphenomena, obscuring their structuring significance for change in a field;

(ii) changes in the structuring principles of a field cannot be systematically analysed; and

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71 See, for example, Naidoo’s analysis of admissions policies in two South African universities (1999). By placing the case studies within the context of the university field, Naidoo avoids both abstracting each institution from its relational position within higher education and short-circuiting its relationship to the wider social context.

72 Bourdieu emphasises the field’s mediation of *external* changes and says little of the mediation of internal changes (in culture itself). This reflects a tendency to neglect the significance of an intrinsic cultural dynamic (see below). His concept of field suggests, I argue, that *both* intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics are mediated through the field.

73 That higher education *is* relatively autonomous and thus amenable to analysis as a social field cannot be defined *a priori* but is shown only through empirical research.
(iii) how these principles are themselves generated, reproduced and changed is not conceptualised.\textsuperscript{74}

\textit{(i) Position-takings as epiphenomenal}

Bourdieu claims that sociology ‘discovers the arbitrary and the contingent where we like to see necessity or nature’ (1994: 14). His basic argument is that the practices of cultural fields obscure the arbitrary nature of their social base and hierarchical structure of power; the transformation of relations of power into ostensibly disinterested cultural terms within such fields enables their basis to be misrecognised.\textsuperscript{75} The main aim of analysis is to reveal the arbitrary nature of the content of the field and so recognise the workings of social power. Bourdieu thus holds an ‘absolute substantive theory of arbitrariness’ (LiPuma 1993: 17): cultural contents and practices are viewed as \textit{historically} arbitrary - any practice could have served the same function within the field’s evolution. Position-takings are thus viewed as epiphenomena of the play of positions within a field; their only structuring significance for the field is in masking their nature as transformations of social relations of power. Bourdieu emphasises that ‘\textit{the space of positions tends to command the space of position-takings}’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 105, original emphasis), and that ‘the principle of position-takings lies in the structure and functioning of the field of positions’ (1993a: 35). Actors are held to be inclined towards conservative or subversive strategies depending on whether they occupy dominant or dominated positions, and the form of position-takings adopted is contingent on what has historically been associated with these positions.\textsuperscript{76}

For Bourdieu, a field analysis of change in higher education, therefore, need not analyse the structural history of educational knowledge and practices - the evolution of possibilities within higher education lies solely within its social relations of power. Accordingly, Bourdieu’s studies focus on the differential positioning of social groups in relation to educational discourse or struggles within the academic game rather than the

\textsuperscript{74} See Maton (1999, 2000a) for discussion of these limitations in the context of my foundational research.


\textsuperscript{76} See, for example, Bourdieu (1988: 128, 1991a: 7).
structure of educational discourse itself.77 As Bernstein (1996: 175) argues, Bourdieu analyses ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘how’ and ‘why’, but not ‘what’. However, as studies of educational and intellectual fields show, the structuring of knowledge and practices has an intrinsic dynamic irreducible to the field of positions and capable of acting upon that field; 78 conducting the current study in a straightforwardly Bourdieuan fashion would fail to grasp the role they play in the unfolding of possibilities within higher education. Returning to the problem-field discussed in chapter 1, Bourdieu’s thoroughgoing arbitrariness in effect shifts rather than replaces externalism from the macro-societal level to the meso-level of the field, and throws the internalist baby out with its bathwater. While highlighting the field’s relative autonomy with respect to other social fields of practice, Bourdieu neglects the relative autonomy of position-takings within the field.

(ii) Conceptualising change and possibilities
Within Bourdieu’s framework, the principle underlying the field of positions (and so position-takings) is inadequately conceptualised such that changes in a field’s structure cannot be analysed. This point can be clarified by using Bernstein’s distinction between different languages of description (1996). Bernstein defines an internal language of description (L1) as ‘the syntax whereby a conceptual language is created’ and an external language of description or (L2) as ‘the syntax whereby the internal language can describe something other than itself’ (1996: 135-6). Each language can be strong or weak so a theory can be, for example, internally coherent (strong L1) but divorced from empirical reality (weak L2). Bourdieu’s concepts are interlocking, relationally defined and together represent a strong L1. However, their L2 is weaker; the framework lacks a means for systematically translating between its conceptual relations and empirical referents in a non-circular manner - for empirical research they can be ‘like paths in a wood that end without any way out’.79 This is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the concept of habitus.


78 See, for example, Bernstein (1996, 1999), Maton (2000a, 2000b, 2004a, 2004b) and Moore & Maton (2001).

79 This is true not only of the ‘thinking tools’ I am discussing but also concepts Bourdieu develops in his studies of education, such as ‘pedagogic authority’ and ‘cultural arbitrary’ (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, 1979), which cannot generate empirical descriptions of specific forms of educational institutions, curricula or teaching practices.
Bourdieu describes an ‘unconscious relationship between a *habitus* and a field’ (1993c: 76) as providing the principles underlying agents’ strategies. Against the charge of reducing position-takings to positions he argues:

however great the effect of position … it never operates mechanically, and the relationship between positions and position-takings is mediated by the dispositions of the agents (1993a: 62).

Though for Bourdieu position-takings are arbitrary, ‘habitus’ provides a means of analysing the structuring of practices. However, a habitus is described only in terms of the practices to which it does or does not give rise (as relations amongst possible practices) - there is no discursive gap between a habitus and the practices characterising it. One cannot replace habitus by a description of its structuring principles; as Bernstein suggests: ‘This means that once an illustration is challenged or an alternative interpretation given, there are problems’ (1996: 136).80 Bourdieu does acknowledge that ‘habitus’ could lead to circularity and *ad hoc* explanation (‘why does someone make petty-bourgeois choices? Because he has a petty bourgeois habitus!’), and claims to be ‘keenly aware of this danger’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 129).81 However, this leaves open the question of whether, if we envisage a specific habitus as the structure X, Bourdieu describes X so as to enable comparison with the possible structures W, Y and Z. Though habitus is defined as a structured and structuring structure, unless one can state unambiguously what this structure comprises (‘X’) and how it differs from other possible structurings (W, Y, Z), then such a definition remains metaphysical.82 (Similar points can be made about the *principle* underlying ‘principles of hierarchisation’ and the

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80 Bourdieu emphasises the *habitus* of the sociological researcher over the elaboration of a strong L² (e.g. Bourdieu *et al.* 1991). This problematises the use of Bourdieu’s concepts in empirical research by actors other than himself. Though numerous studies apply individual concepts to empirical data, the number of studies, other than those conducted or overseen by Bourdieu, that systematically use the framework as a whole to conduct a field analysis is relatively small.

81 I am not questioning Bourdieu’s awareness but the capacity of his concepts. This is an important distinction as Bourdieu relies heavily on notions of vigilance and awareness in outlining his ‘epistemic reflexivity’ (see Maton 2003). I am also not judging the role the concept of habitus plays in overcoming false epistemological dichotomies.

82 Boudon distinguishes between ‘the intention to construct or present a theory analysing the interdependence of the elements of an object system’ and the implementation of this intention, which may not be possible ‘because the object itself does not permit it or because the necessary mental tools are not available’ (1971: 51). I am arguing here that Bourdieu’s mental tools require development.
structure of capitals.\(^{83}\) Though highlighting something of significance, the concepts simply add another layer, albeit more delicate and subtle, of ethnographic description to analyses of practices.\(^{84}\)

This lack of an X represents two significant limitations for this study. First, one cannot conceptualise change within the field of higher education because one cannot state of any set of practices that, as Bernstein (1990: 170) put it, ‘‘This is the same,’’ ‘‘This is a variation,’’ ‘‘This is a change.’’ Secondly, it restricts analysis to practices that already exist. One cannot describe a set of practices as exhibiting X and then, through systematic variation of the settings of this structure, generate descriptions of possible alternative structurings W, Y and Z. Bourdieu calls the positions within a field a ‘space of possibles’ (1993a: 30) but in his approach this space comprises only recognised and realised possibles; because the concepts have no generative capacity beyond the practices they describe one cannot analyse a field as a dynamic system of latent possibilities. These limitations are crucial because my analysis must be able to grasp the possibility of something prior to its emergence and the changes that enable this possibility to come into being.

(iii) What generates fields?
Bourdieu’s notion of a field is not only epistemologically flat in having no discursive gap between empirical and conceptual descriptions but also ontologically flat in positing no means whereby the field is generated. According to Bourdieu the structure of a field is given by the rate of exchange between its species of capital, and their relative values reflects the relational positions of agents possessing the capitals. This raises the question of the means whereby the relative status of these capitals is determined at any moment in time. If struggles aim at imposing one particular capital (and thus a specific viewpoint) as the dominant measure of achievement within the field, then what is it that agents are

\(^{83}\) Bourdieu describes the structure of fields in terms of different forms of capital and associated (autonomous / heteronomous) principles of hierarchisation. Though offering valuable descriptors of the basic topology of fields, using these concepts to analyse change in higher education would not reveal systematically whether the underlying structuring principles of a field have changed, varied or remained the same.

\(^{84}\) This does not preclude valuable research into education using the concept of ‘habitus’; see, for example Reay (2004) and Reay \textit{et al} (2001).
struggling over? Bourdieu (1994: 143) offers a flat ontology: the limits of the field (and of legitimate participation) is at once what is at stake in struggles, the ground over which struggles are fought, and what is used in struggles. The field (of positions) is not only the thing, it is the only thing. Bourdieu typically uses this definition to argue that empirical research is required into the limits of a field, but stating that a field’s structure is changeable and subject to contestation leaves open the question of what enables these changes and what agents are objectively struggling over. This is not to look for an empirical object nor to suggest concerted orchestration; the notion of the invisible hand of the market in a field’s economy of capitals is not incompatible with conceptualising that hand. Without the notion of an underlying generative mechanism over which agents are struggling and which serves to bring together their strategies there is no sense of the means whereby the evolving system of possibilities constituting a field is generated, reproduced, transformed and changed.

Summary

Bourdieu’s approach provides a way of thinking about or ‘new gaze’ for seeing higher education that underlies the conceptual framework used in this thesis. It is ‘something good to think with, or about’ and alerts us ‘to new possibilities, new assemblies, new ways of seeing relationships’ (Bernstein 1996: 136). Chief among these is an objectification of higher education that offers a sense of dynamism and change by understanding fields as relational struggles over resources. However, Bourdieu’s concepts as currently formulated are insufficient for my purposes because they obscure the role played by knowledge and practices in the creation of possibilities, are unable to generatively conceptualise possible positions that are unrecognised or unrealised, are unable to state whether the structuring principles of the field have changed, varied or remained the same (and thus when new possibilities have emerged), and cannot conceptualise how changes in this structure are generated. They are, in short, sociologically reductive, non-generative and flat ontologically. Returning to the three requirements I began the chapter with, Bourdieu’s tools cannot (i) fully capture higher

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85 I am asking, as Bourdieu does, what agents are objectively struggling over, not their subjective intentions or conscious strategies.

86 Two criticisms often made by Bourdieu of accounts of practices are empiricism - looking for an empirical object when the object is real but not empirical - and for suggesting that practices are deterministically structured.
education as a social structure, (ii) grasp the possibility of cultural studies prior to its emergence, nor (iii) systematically analyse the changes that enable this possibility to emerge. Thus, Bourdieu offers a way of seeing the field; what is next required is a way of better conceptualising the field.

[3] Bernstein’s Codes and Devices

Having climbed the rung offered by Bourdieu’s thinking tools, the second stage of developing a conceptual framework approaches the work of Basil Bernstein with three principal requirements:
(i) a non-reductive means of conceptualising practices;
(ii) that both systematically shows when they have changed, varied or remained the same and generatively conceptualises possibilities; and
(iii) a means of conceptualising the basis of change in higher education. These, I argue, can be addressed by developing Bernstein’s notions of codes and devices. As before, I discuss Bernstein’s approach in relation to the specific purposes of this study at this point.87

Educational knowledge codes and the pedagogic device

Like Bourdieu, Bernstein (1977, 1990) highlights the relative autonomy of educational fields from external influences. However, Bernstein’s approach also emphasises that what Bourdieu calls position-taking have their own irreducible and distinctive properties and, distinguishing between surface practices and underlying structure, focuses on excavating the principles underlying practices and their social contexts. Here I shall focus on two aspects of this approach: the concepts of ‘code’, which provides a means of analysing the structuring of practices, and of the ‘pedagogic device’, which conceptualises the generative mechanism underlying practices.

87 I am thus not directly offering an exegesis of Bernstein’s work, a review of existing uses of his approach or a comparative analysis of Bernstein and Bourdieu. For accounts of Bernstein’s approach, see: Atkinson (1985), Atkinson et al. (1995), British Journal of Sociology of Education 23(4), 2002, Muller (2000), and Sadovnik (1995). I highlight examples of studies illustrating the value of the concepts in the course of the discussion. For comparisons of the two approaches, see Bernstein (1995), Gorder (1980), Harker & May (1993), Maton (2000a) and Menchik (2004).
Codes

Bernstein analytically distinguishes between power and control. For Bernstein power creates, legitimizes and reproduces boundaries between different categories of social groups, discourse and agents, and control establishes legitimate forms of communication within these categories. Bernstein conceptualises power and control in terms of the concepts of classification and framing, respectively, where:

- strength of classification (C) refers to the relative strength of boundaries between categories or contexts (such as academic subjects in a curriculum); and
- strength of framing (F) refers to the relative strength of control within these categories or contexts (relatively strong framing indicating strong control ‘from above’, such as by a teacher in a classroom).

Classification establishes and relays power relations; framing relays the principles of practices sustaining given power relations. Bernstein argues that a given structure of power relations may have different principles of control such that a change in the form of control may not necessarily signal a change in power relations, and vice versa. So the relative strengths of C and F may vary independently of each other, giving four possible modalities which give the code (where ‘+-‘ is relatively strong/weak): +C,+F; +C,-F; -C,+F; -C,-F.

Applying these concepts to education, Bernstein describes the educational knowledge code as the underlying principle shaping such practices as curriculum, pedagogy and assessment; they are in turn realisations of the code. Bernstein (1975) identifies two modalities as the most commonly realised educational knowledge codes: collection code (+C,+F) and integrated code (-C,-F). (Though C and F can vary independently, there are pressures within their realisations to align their relative strengths). These structurings of practices have effects for the fields they are situated within. Using the example of moves from a collection towards an integrated code, Bernstein (1975) shows how changing codes impact on educational identities, working relations, property relationships, organisational structures and pedagogic practices. Similarly, discussing different knowledge structures (see below), Bernstein argues that the forms they take ‘create specific classifications and framings of consciousness, identity and relation and in this

88 In the language used in Bourdieu’s framework, power produces boundaries between positions (occupied by social groups, institutions or agents) or position-takings (discourses, practices) and control regulates the appropriate form for each resulting position or position-taking.
way specialise habitus’ (1996: 174-175). In other words, the structuring of discourse and practices has implications for the relations between positions and the strategies of agents.

The value for this study of these concepts lies in their applicability and generative capacity. First, classification and framing enable knowledge and practices within higher education to be conceptualised in a non-reductive manner. Position-takings are here not epiphenomenal; their structuring cannot be ‘read off’ from the play of positions within a field.89 Rather, they are integral to and exert their own structuring significance on the field. Secondly, the concepts exhibit a strong external language of description.90 Put in terms of Bourdieu’s definition ‘[(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice’, Bernstein’s code modalities enable the structurings of habitus, capital, field and practices to each be conceptualised in terms of an ‘X’ (a specific structure among a range of possible structurings). This ‘X’ is not simply known by the empirical practices to which it gives rise but rather the framework identifies the empirical relations that are to count as conceptual relations (strength of boundaries between categories and the locus of control within them) and transforms them into a specific structuring (code modality) comparable to other possible structurings.91 One can thereby state unambiguously when the underlying principles of practices within higher education have changed, varied or remained the same. The concepts are also generative: one can analyse a specific empirical situation in terms of its underlying structuring principles (such as -C,-F) and then systematically vary their settings to generate and describe possibilities that may not yet be recognised or realised (e.g. +C,+F; +C,-F; -C,+F).92 Thus higher education can be

89 The use of Bourdieuan terms in discussing the ideas of Bernstein is for the sake of ease of exposition within the chapter’s narrative. I am not suggesting that, for example, Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of ‘position-takings’ is superior to Bernstein’s definition of ‘discourses’ nor that Bernstein developed his concepts to augment or develop those of Bourdieu.

90 The robustness of these concepts in varied empirical research of different empirical domains is illustrated by studies collected in Bernstein (1973), Christie (1999a), Morais et al. (2001) and Muller et al. (2004).

91 For examples of the delicacy in empirical research of which these concepts are capable, see Morais & Neves (2001) and Morais (2002).

92 A clear example is seen in Bernstein’s paper ‘Class and pedagogies: visible and invisible’ (1977) which begins with an empirical description of a classroom situation and moves first to analyse the principles underlying that situation and then to generate principles underlying other kinds of situations and how those situations would empirically be structured. This generative capacity also distinguishes Bernstein’s distinctions from ideal types. On Bernstein’s principles of description see Moore (2001), Moore & Muller (2002) and Moss (2001, 2002).
constructed as a field of latent possibilities, enabling the analysis of the emergence of new positions. The concept of codes thereby meets the first two of the three requirements outlined above.

The pedagogic device

The third requirement, a means of conceptualising how fields are generated, can be reached via Bernstein’s notion of the ‘pedagogic device’. Bernstein (1990, 1996) argues many other approaches treat education as a ‘relay’ for social relations of power and neglect the analysis of the intrinsic features of pedagogic discourse. ‘It is as if’, Bernstein writes, ‘pedagogic discourse is itself no more than a relay for power relations external to itself; a relay whose form has no consequences for what is relayed’ (1990: 166). Bernstein thereby distinguishes between what is relayed and the relay itself, between a message and the grammar making that message possible. Where code conceptualises the structuring principles of practices, the pedagogic device conceptualises the means whereby these principles are created, reproduced and changed - it constitutes the grammar of pedagogic discourse. The pedagogic device is the condition for pedagogic discourses which are, in turn, realisations of the device’s rules and ‘resources for the construction of code modalities’ (1995: 13). Bernstein’s theory, therefore, exhibits a depth ontology: the device is not something visible directly but rather can be known through its effects in structuring practices (conceptualised in terms of code). In effect, the device is a hypothesised generative mechanism for code modalities which in turn structure fields (or, in Bernstein’s terms, ‘arenas’).

The pedagogic device creates an ‘arena of struggle’ (1990: 206) comprising three fields of practice: a field of production where ‘new’ knowledge is constructed and positioned; a field of reproduction where pedagogic practice takes place; and a field of recontextualisation where discourses from the field of production are selected, appropriated and transformed to become pedagogic discourse within the field of reproduction. By ‘recontextualisation’ Bernstein highlights that the structuring of educational knowledge is not a simple reflection of the practices of knowledge producers

93 On the pedagogic device see Bernstein (1990, chapter 5; 1996, chapter 2) and Singh (2002).

94 Bernstein repeatedly emphasises the distinction between codes and the distributive, recontextualising and evaluative rules regulated by the pedagogic device, the realisations of which are the resources for codes. To confuse the two reflects an empiricist tendency to grasp tangible entities rather than invisible structural relations; generative principles are realised not in space but in time (see Moore & Maton 2001).
within a discipline; pedagogic discourse, Bernstein states, is a principle for appropriating
other discourses from the field of production and subordinating them to a different
principle of organisation and relation. The grammar constituting the pedagogic device is
provided by three interrelated, hierarchically organised rules which underpin these three
fields: distributive rules which regulate access to the ‘unthinkable’ (or the means of
producing new knowledge); recontextualising rules which regulate the delocation,
relocation and refocusing of knowledge to become pedagogic discourse or the thinkable;
and evaluative rules which regulate the transmission and acquisition of the thinkable in
pedagogic practices.95

This summarises what the pedagogic device comprises; to explicate how it generates
fields I shall use it to rewrite the position I brought to discussing Bernstein’s ideas.
Bernstein’s conception of ‘resources’ (understood as code modalities) is broadly similar
to Bourdieu’s ‘capital’ and his notion of an ‘arena of struggle’ is analogous to Bourdieu’s
‘field’. Bernstein’s concept of ‘code’ can be used to conceptualise the capital agents
bring to struggles within a field, the form taken by their habitus, and the structure of the
field. The code modality announces what should count as a legitimate principle of
hierarchisation within the field and the pedagogic device is the means whereby this
principle is created, reproduced, transformed and changed. Bernstein describes the
pedagogic device as a ‘symbolic ruler of consciousness’ in both senses of having power
over it and of measuring the legitimacy of its realisations:

    Groups attempt to appropriate the device to impose their rule by the
    construction of particular code modalities. Thus the device or apparatus
    becomes the focus of challenge, resistance and conflict

A dominant code is both privileged in the sense of having priority in the field and
privileging by conferring power upon protagonists. Those in positions of power are able
to metaphorically ‘set’ the device such that the dominant, higher status code modality of
the field favours their own. Conversely, agents whose dispositions and practices are
characterised by a different code may experience difficulty in recognising and realising
practices deemed successful within the field. Agents’ strategies are thereby shaped by

95 Bernstein’s use of the term ‘rules’ has led some commentators to suggest his theory argues practices are
deterministically rule-governed (e.g. Harker & May 1993). For Bernstein rules do not by themselves cause
anything but rather direct our attention to the controls on the form take by pedagogic discourse, i.e. to the
principles which give rise to its structuring (Bernstein 1995).
relations between their code modality and that characterising the field. The means for establishing these relations is the pedagogic device: to control the device is (using Bourdieuan terms) to decisively influence the conversion rates of capitals. As Bernstein puts it, the ‘function of the device is to translate power relations into discourse and discourse into power relations’ (1996: 193). Thus agents in educational fields struggle for control of the pedagogic device, using their code modalities as resources in the struggles. So, where Bourdieu describes the field as the object, means and stakes of struggles, Bernstein would describe the pedagogic device as the object, code modalities as the means, and the field as the stakes. The question Bernstein posits as crucial for research is: ‘Whose ruler, what consciousness?’ (1996: 193); i.e. who controls the pedagogic device and what kind of principle of hierarchisation (code modality) are they attempting to impose as the only legitimate viewpoint? The notion of a device thereby retains the sense of dynamism, struggles and change offered by Bourdieu’s approach but also conceptualises what agents are struggling over and how fields are generated and changed. Between them the concepts of code and device thereby enable a subtle account of power and discursive practices without reducing one to the other.96

Knowledge structures and the epistemic device

For the purposes of this study, however, educational knowledge codes and the pedagogic device do not reveal the full story. Higher education is a field of not only recontextualisation and reproduction but also knowledge production. The concept of the pedagogic device was developed primarily to explore processes underlying the construction of pedagogic discourse and, as Bernstein’s conception of recontextualisation makes apparent, fields of knowledge production are irreducible to fields of reproduction - they have their own specificities. This raises the question of how to conceptualise structures of knowledge production and their generative basis.

A first step can be found in Bernstein’s analysis of the intellectual fields from which knowledge is recontextualised to become pedagogic discourse. Here he distinguishes between ‘hierarchical knowledge structures’ and ‘horizontal knowledge structures’. A hierarchical knowledge structure (exemplified by natural science) is defined as ‘an

96 I am focusing on the relatively macro level of higher education as a whole; for examples of empirical studies using the concept at such a level, see Neves & Morais (2001), Parker (2004) and Thomas (2004). It can also be used at the more micro level of classrooms; see, for example, Christie (1999b), Singh (1993, 2001), and G. Williams (1999).
explicit, coherent, systematically principled and hierarchical organisation of knowledge’ (1996: 172) which develops through the creation of propositions and theories which ‘integrate knowledge at lower levels’ and ‘across an expanding range of apparently differently phenomena’ (1999: 162). In contrast, horizontal knowledge structures (exemplified by the humanities and social sciences) are a series of specialised languages, each with its own specialised modes of interrogation and specialised criteria ... with non-comparable principles of description based on different, often opposed, assumptions (1996: 172-3).

They comprise a series of segmented languages (such as functionalism, post-structuralism, Marxism, etc.) and develop through the addition of a new segment. Bernstein makes a further distinction within horizontal knowledge structures between those with relatively strong grammars, which have ‘an explicit conceptual syntax capable of “relatively” precise empirical descriptions and/or of generating formal modelling of empirical relations’, such as mathematics and logic, and relatively weak grammars where these powers are much weaker, such as cultural studies and sociology (1999: 164).

These concepts provide a means of systematically describing differences between intellectual fields in terms of their organising principles – a step towards an analogue of educational knowledge codes for intellectual fields of knowledge production. As Moore & Maton (2001) argue, this represents a crucial first step but does not offer a means of conceptualising the underlying generative principles which enable the creation, reproduction and change of intellectual fields - i.e., an equivalent of the pedagogic device. This can be found in published individual and collaborative work where I elaborate a framework centred on the concepts of ‘specialisation codes’ and the ‘epistemic device’.

**Specialisation codes and the epistemic device**

In Moore and Maton (2001) we postulated the epistemic device as the basis of intellectual fields. The epistemic device is a ruler of legitimate claims to knowledge. Analogously to the pedagogic device, whoever controls the epistemic device possesses the means to ‘set’ the knowledge structure of an intellectual field of knowledge production in their favour. Through comparative analysis of mathematics and literary criticism, we showed how different settings of this device generate different knowledge structures and grammars and so shape their intellectual fields. Empirical study of the workings of the device is
enabled by the concepts of *specialisation codes* which analyse the underlying principles structuring the practices of agents within intellectual fields.\(^{97}\)

To situate these ideas within the narrative of this chapter, I shall return to one starting point for their development. During my foundational research I used Bernstein’s concepts of educational knowledge codes and knowledge structures to analyse British cultural studies and found they described an integrated code (-C, -F) and a collection code (+C, +F), respectively (Maton 2000a, 2000b). This *prima facie* contradiction between code modalities was resolved by distinguishing between the ‘epistemic relation’ and the ‘social relation’. These relations refer to two empirically co-existing but analytically distinguishable dimensions of knowledge and practice, namely that knowledge claims are *by somebody and about something*:

- the *epistemic relation* (ER) is between knowledge and its proclaimed object of study;
- the *social relation* (SR) is between knowledge and its author, the subject making the claim to knowledge.

Each relation may be relatively strongly (+) or weakly (-) classified and framed. So, practices can be conceptualised in terms of the strength of classification and framing they announce for *what* may be claimed knowledge of and *how* (ER+/−), and for *who* may claim knowledge (SR+/−). These modalities of ER and SR together give what I term the *specialisation code* or specific ‘setting’ of the epistemic device. (The notation condenses, for example, ‘ER = +C +F’ to become ‘ER+’).\(^{98}\) As well as possessing a strong external language of description (thanks to classification and framing), this is a generative conceptualisation. Cultural studies was conceptualised as exhibiting -C, -F of its epistemic relation and +C, +F of its social relation, resolving the apparent contradiction of codes. Varying the relative strengths of SR and ER generates four possible specialisation codes (ER-, SR-; ER+, SR-; ER-, SR+; ER+, SR+), revealing alternative

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\(^{97}\) In the published papers cited above these are referred to as ‘legitimation codes’. In the thesis I have reserved this term for the workings of the more encompassing ‘legitimation device’ (see chapter 4).

\(^{98}\) Though the model can be expanded to include contrasting strengths of classification and framing, such as ER(+C-F) or SR(-C,+F), I restrict modalities here to aligned strengths for three reasons: conceptual economy; Bernstein’s account of codes and applications of the concepts suggest these as the most commonly found modalities; and Dowling (1999) argues C and F appear to vary independently only where they have different referents.
structures of fields that may not be realised. Studies of intellectual fields have thus far suggested two codes predominate:99

• a knowledge code (ER+, SR-) emphasising mastery of specialised procedures, techniques or skills; and

• a knower code (ER-, SR+) emphasising the dispositions of the subject, whether portrayed as ‘natural’ abilities, cultivated sensibilities or resulting from the subject’s social position (depending on the model of the knower).100

In more general terms, the knowledge code is predicated upon the rule ‘What matters is what you know’, and the knower code is predicated upon the rule ‘What matters is who you are’.

This new concept of specialisation code augments Bernstein’s concepts to analyse the underlying principles generating knowledge structures; and the epistemic device analyses the means whereby these codes are generated, reproduced, transformed and changed in the course of struggles within intellectual fields. The nature of the relationship to Bernstein’s framework is crucial: the epistemic device is intended to complement rather than replace the pedagogic device and to do so for all practices, not just for knowledge production. The analysis of knowledge production highlighted an issue - the epistemological basis of knowledge claims - that is typically muted and secondary to pedagogic concerns in fields of recontextualisation and reproduction. In the pedagogic device ‘evaluative rules’ regulate the work of the reproduction field and ‘recontextualising rules’ that of the recontextualisation field but ‘distributive rules’ regulate access to fields of reproduction and production rather than regulating the work of the production field itself. The regulation of practices in the field in production is thus not conceptualised within the pedagogic device. I suggest one can add epistemic rules, understood as articulations of the arbitrary (social relation) and non-arbitrary (epistemic relation) in the construction of new knowledge. These conceptual developments,


100 Examples of these three understandings of dispositions include: the focus in music education research on notions of ‘genius’ and ‘natural ability’; the emphasis in forms of literary and art criticism on the cultivated sensibility of the reader (or viewer) immersed in great works; and standpoint epistemologies basing claims to privileged insight on being a member of a specific social group. These represent different, often competing and antagonistic models of the knower; the concepts reveal their common basis and shared investment in knower code specialisation.
However, have implications for practices in all three fields: both devices together (or all four rules) form the basis of the ‘arena of struggle’ that the three fields comprise. Just as Bernstein has shown the pedagogical nature of social relations well beyond the classroom, the epistemological nature of social relations is similarly universal and ubiquitous; they are both epistemological and pedagogic in nature. One could therefore talk of an ‘epistemic-pedagogic device’.

Summary

Bernstein’s concept of codes provides a means of conceptualising educational knowledge and practices that enables analysis of change and generates unrecognised and unrealised possibilities; and his concept of the pedagogic device provides insight into the generative basis of higher education as a field. However, the focus of these concepts on pedagogic discourse occludes an essential dimension of higher education: the construction of new knowledge. The new concepts of specialisation codes and the epistemic device build on Bernstein’s approach to capture epistemological issues highlighted by knowledge production. Being based on Bernstein’s concepts, these ideas also enable change to be analysed in a generative manner. Once developed in this way, Bernstein’s ideas of codes and devices provide the ingredients needed to not only be able to see but also to conceptualise higher education as an intellectual and an educational field.

Together the concepts offered by Bourdieu and by Bernstein provide a new, relational way of thinking that enables higher education to be objectified as a field without succumbing to the substantialism inherent in many existing approaches to higher education. Bourdieu’s concepts of field, capital and habitus provide the basis for viewing higher education as a relational field of struggles over resources between agents. Bernstein’s concepts of educational knowledge codes and the pedagogic device enable the structures underlying these struggles and the field to be systematically and generatively conceptualised. My concepts of specialisation codes and the epistemic device augment these by extending their range to include intellectual fields of knowledge production. These concepts comprise the working conceptual framework with which I began the empirical research for the thesis (see chapter 3). Taken as a whole, these concepts are able to objectify higher education as an irreducible social structure,

101 In personal communication Bernstein coined the acronym ‘P.E.D.’ to refer to the ‘pedagogic-epistemic device’ (correspondence with author, 2000). I reverse the order here, as the work of the epistemic device is logically prior to that of the pedagogic device.
generatively explore possibilities and unambiguously conceptualise reproduction, variation and change. I refer to a ‘working’ framework because they are drawn from two different theories and thus far they have been discussed theoretically; their integration into a fully elaborated conceptual framework requires theoretical development in the context of concrete empirical application - all theories must be forged in the fire of research.

[4] Conclusion

This chapter outlined the working conceptual framework with which I began my empirical research in two main stages. First, evaluating the conceptual tools of Pierre Bourdieu showed they offer a way of thinking about higher education as a distinctive field possessing *sui generis* properties irreducible to other arenas of practices or its components, advancing beyond the tendencies to reductionism prevalent among many alternative approaches. Bourdieu’s account of fields as emergent from struggles over status and resources between relationally positioned agents represents a key foundation stone for my theoretical framework. Nonetheless, Bourdieu’s concepts are insufficiently developed for the current study: an inbuilt tendency to sociological reductionism negates the significance of knowledge and practices; a weak external language of description and lack of generative capacity problematises the analysis of possibilities and change; and the lack of a depth ontology obscures the generative basis of fields. Secondly, I discussed the approach of Basil Bernstein with these requirements in mind. Where Bourdieu enables higher education to be seen as a field, Bernstein enables that field to be more fully conceptualised; the concept of ‘codes’ conceptualises practices in a non-reductive and generative manner, and the ‘pedagogic device’ highlights the generative basis of fields. To these conceptions of pedagogic discourse I added the new notions of ‘specialisation codes’ and the ‘epistemic device’ as highlighting the basis of knowledge production. Together the conceptual frameworks of Bourdieu and Bernstein, alongside my own concepts building on their work, provide the thinking tools required to conceptualise higher education as a distinctive object of study and grasp changes within that enabled the possibility of emergence for cultural studies. Having climbed the two significant rungs in the ladder represented by these theorists, the next step is to discuss how this working conceptual framework methodologically shaped the empirical research and the theoretical developments resulting from this engagement. These form the basis
of chapters 3 and 4 which describe why and how a final rung was climbed to reach the approach to be used in the substantive study.
Chapter 3
Field Work: Methodology, methods and analysis

The classic social analyst ... has not been inhibited by method and technique; the classic way has been the way of the intellectual craftsman. ... Without insight into the way the craft is carried on, the results of study are infirm; without a determination that study shall come to significant results, all method is meaningless pretense.
C. Wright Mills (1959)
The Sociological Imagination (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p.120

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1946/1980)
Culture and Value (Oxford, Basil Blackwell), p. 65e

[1] Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodological dimensions of constructing the object of study. In chapter 2 I outlined a working conceptual framework for analysing how higher education enabled the possibility of cultural studies, using the approaches of Bourdieu and Bernstein as theoretical rungs in a ladder. In this chapter I discuss why and how a further rung was climbed to reach the final conceptual framework (chapter 4) that will be used in the substantive study (chapters 5-9). This climb comprises the use of the working framework in the empirical research. Here I discuss the methodology, research design, methods and mode of analysis employed in the research in three main parts. First, I draw out the methodological implications of the working conceptual framework for the research design. Second, I outline the methods used in the data collection and sources consulted in terms of an unfolding research process. Third, I explicate the process of conceptual development and application characterising the data analysis through which the final conceptual framework was developed.

Standing guard as Scylla and Charybdis between researchers and their research problems are theoreticism and methodologism or what Mills (1959) called fetishisms of Concept and Method. Theoreticism would impose a conceptual framework upon the empirical object; methodologism, separating reflection on methods from their use in substantive research, would impose specific methods. Both treat the empirical as grist to their own kind of mill. In contrast the current research is characterised by realist methodological pluralism; ‘realist’ highlights the regulating role played by theory in helping construct the object of study and ‘pluralism’ emphasises the need to be sensitive to the specificities of that object.102 This follows the thrust of the theories drawn on for the working conceptual framework: both Bourdieu and Bernstein emphasise the active work required to theoretically construct the object of study and critique beliefs that the empirical is simply ‘out there’ and transparently perceivable; yet both argue that, as Bernstein puts it, ‘the specific application of the concepts requires at every point empirical evidence’ (1977: 112, original emphasis). They hold the position that empirical research without an explicit theory is blind and theory without empirical research is deaf and dumb. Both theorists also eschew offering recipes of methods for research, instead declaring (as Bourdieu proclaimed):

We must try, in every case, to mobilize all the techniques that are relevant and practically usable, given the definition of the object and the practical conditions of data collection.


The emphases highlight how this approach suggests a relation of mutual regulation (rather than unidirectional determinism) between theory and its object, with methodology playing a crucial mediating role:

Theory <------> Methodology <------> Practical empirical research103

In other words, the methods used in the research depend on both the theory and the object.104 In discussing the methodology for my research I shall, therefore, explore a

102 Such a position is widely called for, from within the positivism of Comte to the phenomenology of Schutz (see Bourdieu et al. 1991), though it is more often espoused than enacted. The philosophical basis for my position is most explicitly formulated in critical realist accounts of social science; see, for example, Sayer (1992) and Danermark et al. (2002).

103 I am drawing here on Archer (1995) who sets out analogous relations for ‘social ontology’, ‘explanatory methodology’ and ‘practical social theorising’.
dialectical process of interaction or dialogue between the theoretical and the empirical undertaken in addressing my research question. I begin in this section by drawing out the methodological implications of the theory for the research design.

The general methodological principles underlying my empirical research can be described in terms of two principal dimensions that reflect the research question. To explore how higher education created conditions of possibility for cultural studies requires analysing higher education as a distinctive object of study and analysing changes within that object that enabled the possibility of cultural studies (see chapter 1). The way in which these two requirements are enabled by the working conceptual framework can be understood in terms of what I shall term a field dimension and a dynamic dimension, respectively.

Field dimension
Constructing higher education as a field has a number of related methodological implications for empirical research. First, the conception of field in the working conceptual framework (henceforth ‘CF1’) highlights its relatively autonomous status. In contrast to externalist perspectives, a field approach holds that the influence of wider changes must be understood as refracted through this mediating context and that this process is shaped by those in dominant positions within the field.105 It thereby highlights the significance of beginning from the views of participants within the field, rather than from the concerns or practices of other social contexts. Where the object of study lies in the past (as is the case here) this point can also be made diachronically. Retrospective or secondary accounts are by actors occupying positions temporally outside the field; such accounts may rewrite the field according to present concerns leading to a teleological, partial and recontextualised vision. Thus the notion of field implies the need to focus on contemporary views expressed in primary sources. In short, CF1 suggests attempting to reconstitute the contemporary field in its historical moment, by reconstructing the

104 Concepts from the frameworks of both theorists have been used within the context of a number of different research methods. Bernstein’s concepts, for example, have been used alongside interviews, surveys, ethnography and discourse analysis of documents and speech, among others (see Christie 1999a, Morais 2002 and Muller et al. 2004). On the varied methods used alongside Bourdieu’s approach, see Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992) and Grenfell & James (1998, 2004).

105 See chapter 1 on externalism and chapter 5 on the role played by academics in higher education policy during the early postwar period.
principal contours of the field as collectively seen by participants at the time, rather than as viewed from without or in hindsight.

A second implication of viewing higher education as a field is to highlight its actively constructed and changing nature, where the definition of, for example, ‘science’ or ‘university’ is part of the struggles among actors for status. This necessitates, as Bourdieu argues, one eschew ‘operational definitions’ prior to empirical research as to what constitutes the field, its constituent parts, principal terms, leading positions, and so forth, for this imposes fixed definitions on the object from without (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). It also augurs against randomised sampling because a field is not a uniform system of positions or position-takings - a small group of agents or issues may dominate the whole structure (Ibid.). Contemporary, primary sources should thus serve as the starting point and guide for an unfolding research process rather than representing a fixed dataset for pre-determined analysis. One must allow space for the field itself to direct the flow of the research. This suggests adopting a process of ‘theoretical sampling’, an iterative process of data collection and analysis where the results of progressive excavation of the object of study helps shape the direction of further enquiry.  

Third, the concept of ‘field’ also highlights the significance of what Durkheim termed ‘collective representations’ (1912/1995). Both the main theories comprising CF1 view collective representations as a kind of energy flowing through social fields. Rather than being overlooked as simply rhetoric, the views of actors are seen as having their own reality, serving as the means of strategies in struggles. Whoever is able to define and hierarchise the meanings of practices and characteristics in higher education is able to control the basis of status within the field. Participants’ collective representations of ‘science’ or ‘culture’ or ‘the university’ thereby shape the field - ‘mental representations are not mere ghostly pictures but real things with real effects’ (Schmaus 1994: 46). As Durkheim put it:

The principal social phenomena ... are nothing more than systems of values and hence of ideals. Sociology moves from the beginning in the field of ideals. The ideal is in fact its peculiar field of study ... It ... accepts them as given facts, as objects of study, and it tries to analyse and explain them.

This foregrounds the views of participants within the contemporary field, their ideas and ideals, and the need to analyse the field talking to itself about itself. However, these views are not freely floating but related to agents occupying the relational positions within a field which structure and are in turn structured by these stances or position-takings. One must, therefore, address the structuring of both participants’ views and the positions from which they are expressed. In analysing fields Bourdieu often uses a form of correspondence analysis that focuses on establishing relations between the positions occupied by agents in terms of such variables as social class and educational backgrounds, citation indices, awards, institutional positions, and qualifications. This method follows his theoretical focus on the field of positions and reduction of the field of position-takings to a reflective role (see chapter 2). The methodological corollary of the theoretical argument that position-takings have their own structuring significance is a need to supplement analysis of the positions of agents with materialist forms of discourse analysis that allow for the structuring significance of position-takings.

Lastly, a field approach highlights the need to begin by reconstituting the field of higher education as a relational whole. Bourdieu argues that research is often confronted by a choice between ‘intensive analysis of a practically graspable fragment of the object’, for example a pre-defined sample of journal articles or case study of specific institutions, and ‘the extensive analysis of the true object’ which may be much broader and less clearly definable prior to research, such as higher education as a whole (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 232). The former offers, he argues, a sense of precise investigation of a well-circumscribed object but from a relational perspective neglects that which underpins the characteristics of the object: the field. In contrast, extensive analysis enables one to know the reality of the space from which one may then isolate and abstract a specific object for further study. For my research this suggests attempting to analyse the whole field of higher education before focusing in on specific areas for more detailed investigation. In terms of what this ‘field’ comprises, the idea of reconstituting the field as a whole implies beginning with publicly available sources that would have been available to the whole

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107 This is not a ‘metadiscourse’ as it is not just talk about talk but debates over perceived changes in reality.

108 Compare Naidoo (2004). On qualitative discourse analysis, see Gee (1999) and Jorgenson & Philips (2002); on their compatibility with structuralist analyses, see Macdonell (1986).
contemporary field rather than archival or unpublished documents reflecting less visible discussion confined to parts of the field.

Dynamic dimension
Though CF1 suggests the research should begin from the contemporary views of participants it also suggests this is by itself not enough. If the field dimension follows the interpretative imperative that one must understand the social world through the eyes of its participants, the dynamic dimension emphasises that interpretivism alone cannot grasp the underlying generative principles shaping that world and which may not be empirically perceivable to its inhabitants. Put another way, against objectivism, ‘field’ theories highlight the significance of the active contribution of participants; however, unlike subjectivism, they also underline the need to analyse structural relations shaping the actions of agents and to which they contribute. Change within higher education as a field is viewed as emergent from the structured actions of agents. This has two principal methodological implications. First, it necessitates what Bourdieu (1990) describes as an epistemological ‘break’ from the views of participants. This is particularly significant for studies of higher education where researchers’ membership of the social universe being examined brings with it the temptation to treat categories that should be the focus of analysis (such as groupings of institutions or regions of the disciplinary map) as transparent and self-evident. Such empiricism negates analysing the possibility of cultural studies prior to its emergence for it remains confined to that which already exists. To grasp an unrealised possibility requires analysing the underlying structuring principles of participants’ collective representations; ethnographic or historical description is insufficient. Rather than reconstructing life as it was lived, the aim is, therefore, to theoretically reconstitute the field in its historical moment. Moreover, though collective representations may have effects, this is not automatic - whether specific representations or changes within them have effects, how and in what ways all depend on the determinate conditions within which they are located. Thus analysis of participants’ views is not naive but rather focuses, among other things, on the relationship of representations to the realities they purport to describe.

Secondly, CF1 highlights the need to analyse the interaction of agents and structures. A relational field approach embodies the social realist position of analytical dualism.109

Both the principal theorists drawn on for CF1 emphasise the significance of the interaction of structural relations and the agency of actors for understanding social practices. However, neither Bourdieu nor Bernstein extensively discuss how these can be brought together within empirical research. Such an explanatory methodology can be found, I suggest, elaborated by Archer (1988, 1995) in terms of a ‘morphogenetic’ approach. In contrast to subjectivism, which reduces structures to agents, and objectivism, which reduces agents to structures, one must, Archer suggests, analytically distinguish these two aspects in order to appreciate their interaction. Here time plays a key role, for the social structure temporally precedes actions that then lead to its reproduction, transformation or change. This means relations between structure and agency are analysable in terms of three-part cycles as illustrated in Figure 3.1 (overleaf).

The morphogenetic sequence begins with a social structure that enables and constrains the actions of agents (at time T1), moves into a phase of social action within these conditions (T2 - T3), and concludes with the reproduction, transformation or change of the social structure (T4). The timings, span and nature of these phases depend on the substantive question. For my research this suggests: analysing the structure of higher education during a period of relative stability (structural conditioning); exploring major changes or debates within the field (social interaction); and establishing the structure of the field resulting from those actions (structural elaboration). As Figure 3.1 shows, these are not discrete moments in time but rather analytically distinguished phases that overlap but establish an overall temporal sequence.

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110 Bourdieu considers structure and agency as integrated within his concept of ‘habitus’ but, as I have argued (chapter 2), a weak external language of description problematises its explanatory value for this research.

111 I should emphasise Archer does not describe her morphogenetic approach as a complement to the theories of Bourdieu or Bernstein. Indeed, it has been portrayed as by itself providing the basis for empirical research into change in education (Willmott 2002). This ignores Archer’s admonition that the approach performs merely a regulatory role as an explanatory methodology (1995: 6) and overlooks its lack of an external language of description for unambiguously conceptualising similarity, variation and change.

112 Archer refers to subjectivism as ‘upwards conflation’ and objectivism as ‘downwards conflation’. Archer (1995) also critiques the ‘central conflation’ of the structuration theory of Giddens which by conflating structure and agency prevents analysis of their interaction.

113 One cannot change or maintain something that does not already exist in some form, and so social structure must analytically precede agency in research. Whatever the ontological veracity of this argument it has a more practical impetus in this research: my focus is changes within higher education as a social structure.
Figure 3.1:
The morphogenetic sequence

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{structural conditioning} \\
\hline
T1 \\
\text{social interaction} \\
\hline
T2 \quad T3 \\
\text{structural elaboration} \\
\hline
T4
\end{array}
\]


This approach also suggests the kinds of events for analysis: periods of stability and change prior to the emergence of cultural studies. This is not to posit empiricist causation between historical events (“change X caused cultural studies”), for the purpose of the analysis is to excavate the field of higher education to discover how its generative mechanisms created conditions of possibility. Rather it suggests that periods of transition or crisis enable the underlying structuring principles of the field to be examined, what has been called ‘the methodological primacy of the pathological’ (Collier 1994: 163); as Bhaskar (1979: 48) argues, in such periods previously tacit beliefs and ideas may become more explicit and previously opaque generative structures may become more visible.

**Summary of research design**

These two cross-cutting dimensions together shape the design for the substantive study. The research is a qualitative study of publicly available, published documentary data comprising the contemporary views on English higher education during the early 1960s of participants as expressed in primary accounts. The data sources, therefore, primarily comprise such documentary evidence as journal articles, books, manifestos, reports, plans and mission statements.\(^\text{114}\) In a form of ‘theoretical sampling’, the iterative research process of data collection and analysis begins from published sources that approximate to the whole field talking to itself about itself. Having identified a starting corpus, this data

\(^{114}\text{See Hodder (2003) on the use of documents in qualitative research.}\)
(together with that provided by the foundational research, discussed below) provides a starting point for the empirical research and sets the agenda for its unfolding focus. A qualitative thematic analysis of this data highlights periods of conditioning, interaction and elaboration prior to the emergence of cultural studies and so identifies for more detailed investigation nodal points of change affecting higher education and highlights those areas of the field involved in negotiating these changes (the agents engaged in the ‘social interaction’ phase). Further research then focuses on three principal issues equating to the phases of the morphogenetic sequence:

1. mapping external relations and underlying structuring principles of the entire contextual field;

2. exploring debates over change highlighted by the unfolding research, focusing on examining the perceived threats to the field, the responses of agents (particularly those in dominant positions with access to levers of change) and the relation to reality of these representations; and

3. examining the resulting structure of the field as a whole in terms of relations to the emergence of cultural studies.

[3] Methods and Data Sources

Having established the implications of the approach for the research design, the next step is to address how these were realised in the research practice. This requires first taking a step backwards. Prior to the thesis research I conducted a substantial amount of research on the emergence and development of cultural studies within English higher education (see Prolegomena). This research included constructing a nationwide database of courses in the postwar period, collecting unpublished archival sources detailing the development of pioneering courses, compiling large-scale datasets on the social profile of the student body, conducting over forty semi-structured interviews with practitioners, and analysing a large number of primary and secondary accounts of cultural studies. This research underpins the subsequent thesis research in two ways. Most generally, it served as an extended ethnographic immersion in the culture of postwar higher education, providing the ‘feel for the game’ that can only come from prolonged exposure to a field. More specifically, data on the pre-history and emergence of cultural studies established the institutional and disciplinary sites where cultural studies did and did not emerge as a

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115 See further below on the significance of such immersion.
named subject area within higher education, the intellectual and educational forms this emergence took, its prior ontological status (as founding texts, for example), its stances and practices, and when emergence occurred. This defines both the thing to be explained or destination for the analysis and the starting point of the mid 1960s for the empirical research of the thesis (T4 of the morphogenetic sequence).

**Thesis research**

The empirical research comprised repeated movements between data collection and analysis over an extended time period, in which not only the theory and nature of the object but also serendipity, unanticipated discoveries, detours and dead ends played their part. I shall explicate the process of collection in terms of the three (overlapping and often simultaneous) phases outlined in the research design.

(1) *Establishing the contextual field*

The process of data collection began with identifying sources for analysis through bibliographic searches, working backwards from the mid-1960s in decreasing depth and breadth towards the beginning of the modern English university system (mid-nineteenth century). The data included three principal kinds of documentary sources:

- Official reports, by governmental committees (e.g. Robbins Report 1963), and funding bodies (e.g. University Grants Committee).\(^{116}\) (See Table A.1, Appendix A for a list of the principal reports consulted).

- Published texts by academics - including institutional and disciplinary histories, normative accounts and studies of higher education, and conference proceedings - that were available to members of the contemporary field.\(^{117}\)

- Periodicals on issues related to the practices of English higher education, including academic journals, discipline-specific journals, trades union publications, and cultural and non-academic periodicals (see Table A.2, Appendix A).

This extensive corpus provided the basis for mapping the contextual field and ensuring credibility through triangulation of data focused on in more detail within the analysis of

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\(^{116}\) Though often government-sponsored, committees into higher education were managed and their reports written by leading academics (see chapter 5).

\(^{117}\) Histories of the field drawn on as primary sources comprised accounts published by the early 1960s and thus available to participants in the field under study.
key debates over change.\textsuperscript{118} Within this dataset two principal sets of sources were of particular relevance.

First, two related texts offer a unique insight into English higher education during the early 1960s. Before the Robbins Report (1963) there was little information on higher education and few explicit studies;\textsuperscript{119} its multi-volume study was a seminal moment and provides a level of social arithmetic detail unmatched for decades. Crucially, it represented the outcome of a period of intense self-reflection on the current and future form of higher education by leading participants in the field, resulting from six major sample surveys, wide consultation, government statistics, specially commissioned studies, and numerous submissions.\textsuperscript{120} Complementary to the report is a major survey of the attitudes of British academics to university education conducted in 1963-64 by Halsey and Trow (1971) and based on 114 interviews and a national questionnaire of the sample of university teachers used by the Robbins Report. Together these texts represent a detailed account of the state of and view from within the field.

Second, the journal \textit{Universities Quarterly} was widely viewed by participants as the central forum for debate over higher education. It brought together leading participants in dedicated symposia on, for example, the contemporary popularity of the ancients (in 1961) and organised and reported at length on the Gulbenkian Educational Discussions (GEDs). The GEDs were a series of annual conferences during 1960-1965 on specific themes on higher education (see Table A.3, Appendix A for a list of GED topics and sources). They comprised invited, ‘select but widely representative’ groups of ‘disinterested Top People’ (including two of the founders of cultural studies, Richard Hoggart and Stuart Hall) who were ‘influential in the re-formation of higher education in the Robbins era’.\textsuperscript{121} This rich source of insight into leading contemporary opinion of all

\textsuperscript{118} See Guba & Lincoln (1994).

\textsuperscript{119} ‘Until 1962,’ one commentator highlighted, ‘we did not even know how many students there were in higher education’ (Rosselli 1963: 148). The Robbins Committee itself declared: ‘When we first approached our task, we were at once struck by the paucity of information on higher education in general’ (Robbins Report, 1963: 3).


\textsuperscript{121} Quotes regarding the composition of the GEDs are from S. Morris (1961: 189), an unattributed introduction to the first GED in \textit{Universities Quarterly} 15 (2) March 1961, p.119, and Shattock (1996: x), respectively.
areas of higher education has been largely overlooked by secondary accounts. More than conferences in the current conventional sense, they include edited transcriptions of what are often disarmingly frank discussions and open exchanges between the Great and the Good of English higher education that are at times ethnographic in their reporting of tone, mood and actors’ behaviour. These conferences represent a kind of workshop among leading participants on changes in higher education during the early 1960s.

Taken together these sources provide the basis for a detailed, rich and in-depth insight into the contemporary field of higher education during my period of focus, are drawn on extensively throughout the substantive study, and were central to identifying the three phases of the morphogenetic sequence and mapping the contextual field (structural conditioning phase).

(2) Key debates over changes
The second stage draws on the above data to focus on the phase of social interaction. From a thematic analysis of the above corpus I identified two key debates over perceived changes to the field:

• the ‘new student’ debate over the impact of anticipated expansion on the shape of the institutional map and the creation of ‘new’ campus universities; and
• debates over the effects on the disciplinary map of a division between ‘two cultures’ of science and the humanities and a ‘crisis in the humanities’.

In thematically analysing the corpus (which necessitated reading every journal and periodical article as abstracts were rarely included and titles often oblique during this period) the focus was not merely on quantity of references to specific issues but also on the intensity, passion and degree of concern expressed by participants. Having identified the terms of and key protagonists in the debates I pursued a documentary form of ‘snowball sampling’ by conducting bibliographic searches on these topics and authors. For example, having identified the new student debate as a potential debate

122 A GED comprised a series of sessions of various topics, each typically composed of a short talk by one or two speakers followed by often undirected discussion among participants (rather than questions directed at the speaker). They were reported by invited ‘scribes’ (including Stuart Hall).

123 See Gee (1999), Jorgenson & Philips (2002) and Titscher et al. (2000) regarding the qualitative focus of discourse analysis.

124 On snowball sampling, see Arber (1993). The sources located in this way are referenced in the relevant chapters.
over change, I conducted searches for further references to ‘the new student’, public information about new universities, and other published proclamations by principal protagonists in the debate, and then, in turn, followed leads where these sources referenced further sources. In order to compare the collective representations of participants to their reality further research then focused on establishing whether contemporary views of events were corroborated by specialist and relatively more objective analyses of higher education, in both contemporary and retrospective secondary studies of the field.

(3) The possibility of cultural studies
The third phase of data collection returned to the foundational research. Having analysed each of the key debates over the field, I brought them together to address their effects on the field of higher education in terms of the emergence of cultural studies. I drew on data collected prior to the thesis research, focusing on establishing, first, the stances propounded in the ‘founding texts’ and by the ‘founding fathers’ of cultural studies prior to its emergence as a named subject area, and second, the institutional and disciplinary locations and forms taken by this emergence.

Triangulation
The aforementioned documentary sources represent the principal data drawn on for the thesis. Three further sources were consulted for contextual background and triangulation: first, a large number of secondary and retrospective published accounts of postwar English higher education; second, several informal interviews with contemporary participants and unpublished archival sources (for the previously under-researched ‘new student debate’);125 and, third, statistically based analyses of institutions. These latter sources comprise multivariate and factorial analyses of publicly available data on individual universities to construct institutional typologies. Though relatively rare and post-dating my object of study, they offered further insight into the basis of maps of

125 I am particularly indebted to Ray Jobling, one of the earliest of the few analysts of new universities, and to the late Professor Frank Thistlethwaite, founding Vice-Chancellor of UEA. Professor Thistlethwaite allowed me access to his private contemporary chronicles. Though, as he requested, I do not quote directly from these sources, they provided a rich resource for triangulating published accounts of the character, process and rationale of decision-making at the time. Because my primary data already exists in the public domain questions of ethics regarding access and making material public did not take centre-stage in the research with the exception of the interviews and unpublished archives.
higher education. For reasons discussed further above, these secondary sources remain in the background of the substantive study.


Having discussed the methods used in the data collection, I now turn to focus on the process of data analysis. This is not simply to describe how theory was applied to data to produce results but also to address a method of conceptual development. The empirical research began from CF1 but this research itself necessitated theoretical developments, resulting in the concept of the legitimation device (chapter 4) that forms the basis for the substantive study (chapters 5-9):

To explain this process I begin by clarifying the mode of theoretical development adopted before exploring the form of analysis this entailed.

Modes of conceptual development

It is valuable to distinguish the form taken by the conceptual development in this study from alternative possibilities often found in empirical sociological research. One common mode is to highlight an empirical phenomenon ‘left over’ after applying a theory and account for it separately with an additional concept or concepts recontextualised from another theory. Such conceptual development is empiricist; the analysis operates on a single, flat level where specific concepts and an empirical phenomenon are equated. Rather than enabling the empirical phenomenon and


127 This mode includes approaches claiming not to apply a theory at all. Such claims fail to recognise there is no data without theory, that, as Goethe puts it, with every attentive look at the world we are theorising, and that it is simply a question of how explicitly formulated one’s theory is.

128 In chapter 2 I described how the specificities of higher education (such as knowledge production) led to the notion of the ‘epistemic device’. In the mode of development described above this would represent
concepts to be *integrated into*, they are *added onto* the analysis - the original theory is ‘patched’.\textsuperscript{129} Crucially, this does not entail a dialogue between the theoretical and the empirical. The empirical may ‘speak back’ to the original theory by refusing to conform to its categories but the theory is deaf, or at least hard of hearing - it may be acknowledged that the framework is inadequate in this *specific* kind of case requiring this *specific* conceptual addition but the theory itself remains fundamentally untouched. A second mode also develops segmentally but at the relatively macro level of general approaches rather than specific problems. Here, the empirical application of a theory always leads to its abandonment and displacement by a new theory. This is more likely where the theory with which the researcher approaches the empirical is not explicitly formulated, enabling the specificities of new contexts to completely rewrite the theory. Again, the theory does not actively engage in dialogue with the empirical.\textsuperscript{130} (A third mode one could highlight is of *non*-development, where empirical studies apply, apparently unproblematically, a theory and proclaim its value over alternative theories. The lack of conceptual development here reflects the author’s allegiance to an approach rather to exploring a problematic or problem. The result is that the theoretical engages in a monologue directed at the empirical.\textsuperscript{131})

‘Patching’ or displacing one’s original theory represent another methodological Scylla and Charybdis facing researchers.\textsuperscript{132} Both modes share a lack of dialogue between theory and empirical phenomenon which limits practical adequacy to their objects of

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\textsuperscript{129} This represents what Bernstein (2000) described as the segmental development characterising ‘horizontal knowledge structures’ and is underpinned by the workings of their intellectual fields. Retaining without significant modification the ‘core’ theory enables the status of its author to be maintained, while ‘patches’ turn ‘users’ into ‘contributors’, enabling mutual capital accumulation where both authors’ contribution is identifiable.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{130} One also finds displacement by another *pre-existing* theory, though this is less likely to be found in substantial empirical studies than in theoretical evaluations of how a theory *would* fare if it were to be used. If the original theory is explicit and known to the researcher, then once empirical research begins in earnest the researcher’s investment in the theory makes wholesale rejection of that theory less likely, and the ‘patching’ mode of development more likely.
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\textsuperscript{131} This is more self-effacing for the author than the first mode of conceptual development I have outlined and may be found in the products of apprenticeship relations, such as postgraduate research dissertations.
\end{flushright}

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\textsuperscript{132} Given so many potential dangers waiting to snare the researcher on this journey it is perhaps unsurprising that their successful circumnavigation may take as long as Odysseus himself.
\end{flushright}
study. In the first mode theory is deaf to the empirical; in the second mode theory is
deafened by the empirical. The application of the conceptual framework in this study
aimed to avoid this false dichotomy by, in Bernstein’s phrase, evolving a language of
description (quoted Moss 2001). Crucially this involved creating a dialogue between the
theoretical and the empirical and, if required, the integration of both ‘surplus’ empirical
phenomena and the original conceptual framework within a developed theory. Central to
these processes is the notion of what Bernstein calls a ‘discursive gap’ between a theory’s
internal and external languages or principles of description. A theory’s internal
language (L₁) is the basis of its inner monologue and its external language (L²) is the
means for describing things outside itself, the translator enabling dialogue between
theoretical and empirical descriptions (between L₁ and the empirical data). Principles of
description (L²) thus ‘constructs what is to count as an empirical referent, how such
referents relate to each other to produce a specific text, and translates these referential
relations into theoretical objects or potential theoretical objects’ (Bernstein 1996: 136).
The key to evolving this language of description lies in creating both sufficient space and
lines of communication between theory and data. As Moss (2001) describes, it is a
difficult task: applying the theory prematurely limits the data’s potential, but lingering
too long in the data’s specificities problematises analysis of its underlying principles. It
requires a dialogic movement between the theoretical and the empirical in which one
begins with a theory but then must be

prepared to live with the muddle which is the unordered data, and enjoy the
pleasure of its potential, in order to be able to generate the theoretical
apparatus which is specific to it.

(Bernstein, quoted in Moss 2001: 18).
This ‘interactionist stance’ (Lincoln & Guba 1985) is akin to that elaborated in the
methodological procedures of grounded theory whereby a continuous movement between
theory and data seeks to enable each to inform the other. I define the resulting
principles of description theoretically in chapter 4; here I discuss how this language was
evolved in terms of three analytically distinguishable phases.

133 See chapter 2; for more detailed exposition see Bernstein (1996, 2000), Moore & Muller (2002) and

134 See, for example, Strauss & Corbin (1990).

135 I focus on the thesis research and the creation of the concept of the legitimisation device. The
foundational research also involved conceptual development (culminating in ‘specialisation codes’ and the
Evolving a language of description

- Phase I: the need for development
The data was first collated into conventional historical narratives focused on the views of contemporary participants of both the contextual postwar field of higher education and the debates over higher education, providing a first description of the surface terrain of the field.\(^{136}\) Phase I of the analysis comprised the application of CF1 to this (theory-laden) empirical description in order to explore the structuring principles of the contextual field. While specific concepts highlighted key issues for further analysis (see Phase II), applying CF1 was unable to fully capture these structuring principles. The clearest example was the issue of temporality. The positions of actors, institutions and discourses in and on time were viewed by participants as crucial to the field: maps of higher education abound with temporal indicators (such as ‘ancient’ and ‘new’ universities); higher status positions were legitimated as old, looking to the venerable past for current practices and unchanging, while lower status positions were characterised as young, forward-looking and revolutionary.\(^{137}\) However, though the conceptual tools offered by the frameworks of Bourdieu and Bernstein highlight temporal issues, neither conceptualises temporality as a structuring principle in itself. As this example illustrates, applying CF1 was akin to conducting a multivariate analysis and discovering variables are unaccounted for; the field as viewed by participants remained just beyond reach. This is perhaps unsurprising: CF1 comprises concepts from two frameworks and any theory, however well elaborated its L\(^1\), needs to be forged in the fire of the empirical. To excavate the field I needed, as Bernstein polemically puts it (1996: 140-141), to ‘ignore the theory’ and concentrate instead on exploring the empirical object in order to develop a language of description appropriate to this specific object. Crucial to this procedure is that it is constructed relatively independently of the theory but that the resultant

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\(^{136}\) This first description totalled over a quarter of a million words of prose (excluding paper-based data and the results of the foundational research).

\(^{137}\) Explicit typologies of universities acknowledge age as a key institutional variable by either including it as a variable (Dolton & Makepeace 1982) or excluding it as confounding on the basis that many other characteristics are related to institutional age (Tight 1988, 1996a). This was also the case for debates over higher education, in which the newness of the ‘new student’ and the futuristic nature of science and sense of the humanities as dated were a central focus of discussion.
theoretical description must also achieve relative independence of the empirical - a process of generative abstraction. This comprised the second phase of the analysis.

- **Phase II: creating a new language**

To evolve a language of description I focused primarily on excavating the contextual field. Establishing the basic structure of the field was relatively straightforward: participants’ accounts mapped higher education as a polarised field comprising hierarchised typologies of institutions and disciplines (see chapter 5). These maps represent a simultaneous, intuitive and tacit comparison of a host of different variables. The aim of the analysis was to identify these variables, reveal their underlying structure and show their systematic variation across the field; i.e. to create a theoretical description of the field empirically described by participants. The process whereby this was achieved in the analysis can be broken into three principal stages.

(1) The first stage identified variables through a qualitative content analysis of the account created for Phase I, focusing on recurrent themes in beliefs about the structure of higher education.\(^{138}\) Contemporary references to landmarks within the field, for example types of institutions in higher education, highlighted such factors as age (‘ancients’), regional locations (‘civics’) and organisational structure (‘federal’); and explicit discussion of the field’s structure revolved around a series of hierarchised and polarising markers of status, for example education-training, generalists-specialists and ancient-modern.\(^{139}\) The results of the thematic analysis, taking the form of paired oppositional categories, are presented in Figure 3.2 (‘Stage 1’), where each pair is presented in order of higher-lower status. As I show in chapter 5, the dichotomising nature of these distinctions emerged from the data and reflect participants’ views of the field rather than predispositions of the theory: their polarised map of higher education was reflected in polarising markers of higher and lower status.

\(^{138}\) On qualitative content analysis, see Bryman (2001), Miles & Huberman (1994) and Titscher et al. (2000).

\(^{139}\) Ideal-typical models of university education and contemporary studies of the beliefs of academics (especially Halsey & Trow 1971) were particularly rich sources for both generating and triangulating these themes (see chapter 5). Explicit typologies of institutions provided a supplementary source of insight. Their multivariate and factorial analysis corroborates ‘the folklore and the generalisations frequently made about universities’ (King 1970: 60) by producing similar clusters and so helps make explicit variables underpinning commonsense typologies.
**Figure 3.2:**
**Phase II of analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Stage 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical thematic analysis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Snapshot of conceptual development</strong></td>
<td><strong>Settings for the field</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- older - younger
- education – training
- liberal - vocational
- institutional autonomy - external funding
- academic freedom - political control
- national – provincial
- cosmopolitan – local
- elite - mass
- small - large
- quality - quantity
- sensibility - qualifications
- common culture – diversity
- breadth - depth
- culture - specialist knowledge
- intimacy - distance
- cultural - economic
- gentlemen – scholars
- generalists - specialists
- exclusive - open
- amateur - professional
- institution - discipline
- cultivation - specialist training
- knowledge for own sake - useful knowledge
- integrated - separate
- inner (knower) - outer (skills)
- culture - civilisation / barbarism
- pure - applied
- individual tuition - lectures
- informality - procedures
- clerisy - technocracy
- conservative - revolutionary
- custodians of past - inventors of future
- reproducers - producers
- form - function
- human - technology
- democratic - bureaucratic governance
- teaching - research
- life - standard of living
- whole student - distinct skills
- past - future
- conservative - innovative
- full curriculum - specialist
- residential - non-residential

- relations to state
  (e.g. institutional autonomy)
- relations to economy
  (e.g. liberal - vocational)
- relations to social structure
  (e.g. elite - mass)
- relations to locality
  (e.g. cosmopolitan - local)

- scale: material density
- beliefs: moral density
- degree of division of labour

- higher – lower autonomy
  Autonomy
  ($\pm C^e, \pm F^e$)

- higher - lower density
  Density
  ($\pm C^1, \pm F^1$)

- breadth - depth
- teaching – research
- generalists - specialists
- institution - discipline

- knowledge - knower
  Specialisation
  (ER$/-\$, SR$+/\$)

- age (older – younger)
- past - future
- conservative - innovative

- retrospective - prospective temporality
  Temporality
  ($\pm C^t, \pm F^t$)

**Note:**
Stage 1 themes are unordered.
(2) The second stage excavated the underlying basis of these empirical distinctions, i.e. the structuring principles realised by the variables. To do so one needs to view higher education not as something flat to be carved up but as a multi-dimensional object where the empirical variables of Stage 1 represent different axes through this object and each axis may go through points shared by other axes. (Thus, the analysis eschewed generating generalisations by gathering distinctions into discrete groups sharing empirical resemblances, as this creates empiricist, ideal-typical models).\(^{140}\) To ascertain these axes I conducted the qualitative equivalent of a factor analysis. In order to enable theory-data dialogue this comprised, on the one hand, the tentative application of concepts from CF1 to identify possible factors within the data and, on the other hand, developing the theory where necessary to capture unanticipated factors emergent from the data. The analysis thereby involved a repeated recursive movement between data and theory, the distance of these oscillations growing smaller until reaching a degree of equilibrium in a core set of theoretical constructs. The aim was for each factor to encompass as many thematic distinctions as possible, where each distinction could appear within any number of factors, and to bring working factors together into the minimal number of constructs required to describe the field’s structure. It was a process of abstraction aiming to capture the maximum number of empirical phenomenon within the minimum number of theoretical concepts.\(^{141}\) Figure 3.2 offers an illustrative snapshot from during this process (‘Stage 2’). At the point in time illustrated by this snapshot some factors retain the names of thematic distinctions (e.g. ‘breadth-depth’), while others echo concepts (e.g. ‘moral density’), and they have been provisionally grouped to work towards overarching theoretical constructs. For example, an early factor to emerge was relations with the state; this was both widely referred to by participants (‘institutional autonomy’) and a central aspect of Bourdieu’s definition of a relatively autonomous field (see chapter 2). In the snapshot this factor has been brought together with other similar factors (such as relations with social structure) under the influence of Bourdieu’s notion of autonomous / heteronomous principles of hierarchisation. In contrast, an emphasis on size and volume was widely discussed in participants’ ideals of university education but less obviously

\(^140\) Empiricist ideal types are what is offered by contemporary studies of ‘ideas’ of university education (see chapter 5) and by many studies of higher education more generally (see chapter 1). The limitations of such an approach is summarised by Becher’s comment: ‘Almost every generalization that can be made about it [British higher education] is subject to one or more qualifications’ (1987a: 2).

\(^141\) Compare Bernstein’s description of the verticality of hierarchical knowledge structures such as natural science (1996, 1999).
accounted for by existing concepts; Durkheim’s idea of ‘density’ has been provisionally adapted to address this. The final destination of this stage of analysis represent the four polarised settings, such as higher / lower autonomy, shown in Figure 3.2 and which provide the basis of theoretically describing the structure of the postwar field of higher education.

(3) Where Stage 2 works from the concrete to the abstract on the basis of a specific object of study, Stage 3 involves a break with this empirical object in order to create generative concepts. A generative conceptualisation is required for two reasons: first, to create concepts capable of application beyond the specific object of study and thus able to shed light, for example, on contemporary developments in higher education; and, second, to conceptualise cultural studies before it emerges. During the process of concept formation orthogonal variables were created (such as stronger / weaker epistemic relation and social relation) that each address a cross-cutting dimension of a structuring principle and which through systematic variation enable the creation of new possible modalities. These provide the basis for the four structuring principles of Autonomy, Density, Specialisation and Temporality (see Figure 3.2). In order to integrate these concepts within a coherent overall framework based on a strong L² these dimensions were all conceptualised in terms of different forms of classification and framing. For example, original concepts of temporal classification and temporal framing were developed to analyse the structuring principle of Temporality. From variation of their strengths at least two further possible temporal modalities can be revealed that are unrealised within the postwar contextual field (see chapter 4). The final development comprised bringing together these concepts within an overarching theorisation building on the approaches underpinning CF1. This theoretical work integrated the new concepts within a relational sociological approach that draws on the notions of ‘field’ and ‘devices’ (chapter 2) to describe a ‘legitimation device’ as underlying higher education understood as a dynamic field of possibilities (see chapter 4).

• Phase III: application and elaboration
The final phase of analysis represents the application of the new conceptual framework in a discourse analysis of the empirical descriptions generated by Phase I. (It is worth emphasising that the analysis of the substantive study in chapters 5-9 uses the new conceptual framework, rather than applying CF1, discussing limitations and then suggesting theoretical development). The principal development of this phase comprises using the new framework to create a model of the processes involved in the creation
within the field of higher education of possibilities of emergence for cultural studies. This analysis had two principal aspects reflecting the methodological dimensions of the research design. First, the field was analysed in terms of a morphogenetic sequence, explicating: the contextual field (chapter 5), debates over the institutional (chapter 6) and disciplinary (chapters 7-8) fields of higher education, and their effects on the contextual field (chapter 9). This used the new concepts to explore change and continuity within higher education. Second, analyses of each of the debates focused on the problems perceived as threatening the field and proposed solutions within the proclamations of participants, and then related each debate as a whole (problem and solution together) to the reality of threats facing the field - what I call the messages in the debate and the medium of the debate as a whole. This used the concepts to create a model of how change was negotiated within the field. Together these two aspects provide the basis for an analysis of reproduction, transformation and change within higher education.

Summary
The mode of analysis undertaken in the research was designed to enable a creative and ongoing dialogue between theory and data. One could describe Phase I as the theory speaking to the empirical, Phase II as the empirical speaking back to the theory, and Phase III as the theory, enlightened by what it has learnt, speaking again to the empirical. Of course, such metaphors (and analytical distinctions between phases) only stretch so far: the analysis was not a simple turn-taking conversation on a number of counts. First, the theoretical and empirical are not discrete; empirical descriptions are always theory-laden. Second, the dialogue had already begun in my foundational research. Third, the analysis involved repeated, recursive and iterative movements between theoretical and empirical descriptions, ‘a protracted and exacting task that is accomplished little by little, through a whole series of small rectifications and amendments’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 228). It traced a spiral whereby each return was to a developed empirical or theoretical description, each ‘speech’ was given in the light of what had been learnt, and in itself shed light backwards as well as forwards. So, phases were overlapping and often simultaneous and both empirical research and theoretical elaboration enjoyed their own dynamics. Overall, the analysis was akin to translating a text that itself was undergoing revision and extension in the light of the translation. The process itself is never complete: the text can become longer and its messages more intricate, the translation more faithful and suggestive. Rather than whether complete, the question posed by this process is that of the reliability of the translation process and the translator. Bernstein (1996) suggests
two principal criteria for judging reliability: first, that the possibilities or options described in the theory (e.g. knowledge / knower specialisation) be as unambiguous and explicit as possible; second, that the translator be conversant with the culture of the researched - ‘knowledge of the rules is not enough’ (Bernstein 1996: 142), one needs, as Bourdieu would put it, a ‘feel for the game’. The former is described in the next chapter where I outline the concepts in more detail; the latter was aided by the extended nature of the research (including the foundational research) and my immersion in the culture of the period well beyond the requirements of the study itself.142

[5] Conclusion

This chapter addressed how the working conceptual framework shaped the empirical research, the process of data collection, and the mode of theoretical development that resulted in the new conceptual framework to be used in presenting the substantive study. I began by drawing out the methodological implications of the working framework for the research design. I argued that conceptualising higher education as a field emphasised the significance of theoretically reconstituting the field in its historical moment. This suggested focusing on the contemporary views on higher education of participants but objectifying these collective representations within the context of a dynamic morphogenetic analysis. The resulting research design comprised a qualitative content analysis of published documents comprising the contemporary views of participants on higher education, one developing through an iterative process of data collection and analysis. I then outlined the methods and principal sources used in the research in terms of the three stages of the morphogenetic sequence. This comprised: first establishing an extensive documentary corpus and key sources as a starting point for the research; second, identifying from a thematic analysis of this data key debates over changes within the field for further data collection and analysis; and, third, selected use of the foundational research to address the emergence of cultural studies. In the final section of the chapter I discussed the mode of conceptual development employed in the study in terms of a dialogue between theory and data that aimed to evolve a language of description appropriate to the field of higher education. I described three phases of

142 As part of my general interest in the period I extensively consumed novels, plays, biographies, histories and films from the 1950s and 1960s. References to this material are kept to a minimum as the principal thesis focus lies within the field of higher education. Together the foundational and thesis research covered a period of ten years.
analysis comprising the application of the working conceptual framework, the creation of a new conceptual framework through a qualitative factor analysis, and the use of these generative concepts to model processes of change in higher education. Having outlined how the approach used in this thesis was assembled, operationalised and developed, the task becomes that of defining the resulting conceptual framework more formally, to which I now turn in the next chapter.
Chapter 4  
Conceptualising a Field of Possibilities: The legitimation device

[1] Introduction

This chapter completes the task of theoretically and methodologically constructing the object of study by formally defining the conceptual framework to be used in the substantive study. In chapter 1 I argued that the research required a relational means of objectifying higher education as a social structure. I outlined a working conceptual framework drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Basil Bernstein (chapter 2) and discussed its methodological implications for the empirical research and the conceptual development undertaken during the course of that research (chapter 3). Here I define the resulting conceptual framework. I begin by discussing how higher education will be viewed as a dynamic field of possibilities and introduce the notion of the ‘legitimation device’ as the basis of reproduction, transformation and change in higher education. I then define the principles of Autonomy, Density, Specialisation and Temporality that comprise the legitimation device. I briefly relate each concept to the working conceptual framework (chapter 2), highlight their basis in the empirical research (chapter 3) and use examples from the substantive study (chapters 5-9) to illustrate their modalities.


To address the research question of how higher education created conditions of possibility for the emergence of cultural studies requires analysing higher education as a distinctive object of study and exploring changes within that object enabling the possibility of cultural studies to come into being. This in turn necessitates an approach capable of objectifying higher education as an irreducible social structure, unambiguously conceptualising change, and generatively conceptualising possibilities prior to their empirical emergence. These three criteria were the basis for developing a working conceptual framework, shaped its development in the course of empirical research and remain central to the resulting framework. This framework is centred on the concept of the legitimation device. Upon developing the notion of the ‘epistemic device’ (chapter 2), Moore and Maton (2001) hypothesised that the pedagogic and epistemic devices represented two facets of a more complex and overarching device. I conjecture
that the legitimation device represents that device. In outlining the concept, however, the substantive research question remains central; I thus keep theoretical exposition to the minimum required for understanding its use in the substantive study. The following formal account of the framework constitutes a condensed conceptual description of that which the substantive study (chapters 5-9) provides an expanded, empirically richer description. Its value and rationale in the current research is shown less through this conceptual outline than in the empirical study.

The legitimation device
The approach underpinning the conceptual framework is a relational sociology that integrates and extends the insights of the theories of Bourdieu and Bernstein. It builds on Bourdieu’s ideas to conceive higher education as a relatively autonomous, relational field of struggles, and on Bernstein’s notions of codes and devices in conceptualising the structuring and underlying principles of the field. The following concepts thus assume the discussion of these approaches outlined in chapter 2. Analysing higher education as a relatively autonomous field highlights the significance of the viewpoints and practices of participants within the field; these are understood here as embodying languages of legitimation. That is, the ways in which participants represent themselves and the field in their beliefs and practices are understood as embodying claims for knowledge, status, and resources. These languages of legitimation may be explicit (such as claims made when advocating a position) or tacit (routinised or institutionalised practices). All practices (or ‘position-takings’) thereby embody messages as to what should be considered legitimate. I conceptualise these messages as articulating principles of legitimation which set out ways of conceiving the field and thus propose both rulers for participation within its struggles and criteria by which achievement or success should be measured. The ‘settings’ or modalities of these principles of legitimation are regulated by the legitimation device.

143 It also assumes the advantages of these frameworks over many existing approaches, such as how the relational notion of field overcomes the problems created by a substantivist mode of thinking (see chapters 1 and 2).

144 The term ‘legitimation’ is preferred to: (i) ‘pedagogic’ because higher education comprises (as do other fields of social practices) more than the pedagogic; (ii) ‘epistemic’ because not all ‘epistemologies’ are epistemological in nature (some are sociologies of knowledge); and (iii) ‘hierarchisation’ in order to distinguish these concepts from the underdeveloped notion of ‘principles of hierarchisation’ in Bourdieu’s framework. ‘Legitimation’ also highlights the (sociological) struggles of fields while allowing the (epistemological) possibility that claims to knowledge and insight may be legitimate.
The legitimation device is posited as the generative principle underlying higher education; it is the means whereby the field is created, reproduced, transformed and changed. It does so through the creation, distribution, recontextualisation and evaluation of legitimacy in the field. The legitimation device is a ruler (in both senses) of the field: whoever controls the device has the means to set the ‘rules of the game’ by making those attributes characterising their own practices the basis of legitimate participation, achievement, hierarchy and status. It is thus the focus of struggles among agents within the field. To control the device is to establish specific principles of legitimation as dominant, valorising certain practices and attributes over others and so hierarchically structuring relations between positions within the field. The principles of legitimation of the device are Autonomy, Density, Specialisation and Temporality (see Figure 4.1). In brief, these conceptualise the structuring of external relations to the field (Autonomy), relations within the field (Density), relations between the social and symbolic or cultural dimensions of the field (Specialisation), and temporal aspects of these relations (Temporality). Each principle can be ‘set’ to different modalities and these together form the legitimation code.

To analyse change in higher education using these concepts is to view higher education as a dynamic field of possibilities. The legitimation device is the means of generating and distributing what is and is not possible within the field. Positions and position-taking are conceived of as representing possibilities, where some possibilities may be recognised, some realised, but others remain latent (unrecognised and unrealised). A possibility exists within a structured system or field of possibilities; conversely, a field is a structured space of possibilities. The structure of a field (and so the range and distribution of possibilities) is given by its legitimation code modality. Changes in legitimation code thereby represent changes in the structuring of the field and so the space of possibilities. To examine the emergence of new possibilities (such as cultural studies) is to analyse the effects of changes in legitimation code on the field.

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145 The epistemic device was originally defined in similar terms (see Moore & Maton 2001). I now define the epistemic device as the regulator not of legitimacy but of epistemological privilege or ‘truth’ within fields, which is but one aspect of legitimacy in social fields of practice. I conjecture that the legitimation device subsumes the workings of the pedagogic and epistemic devices. Space and my empirical priority precludes the elaboration of this relationship here.

146 Principles are capitalised to distinguish them from terms encountered in the discourse of the object of study, such as ‘overspecialisation’ and ‘institutional autonomy’.
Principles of legitimation
The legitimation principles are the means for analysing the effects of the device. In short, languages of legitimation are the empirical realisations of the practices of the field; principles of legitimation are their underlying structuring principles; legitimation code modalities are the form taken by these principles; and the legitimation device is the generative mechanism of those principles. Four features are worth noting to clarify the nature of legitimation principles.

(i) The principles are not ideal types.\textsuperscript{147} Ideal types remain at the level of the empirical by gathering together characteristics often associated together. In contrast, each principle underlies all empirical characteristics within the field; each provides a conceptual description of different aspects of the same object of study. Together they provide a four-dimensional analysis; describing the four principles of the device is akin to viewing the same scene through four differently coloured filter lenses which when combined portray the scene in full colour.

\textsuperscript{147} I use ideal types employed by participants (of the university, culture, new students, science) as data for analysis; they represent an \textit{explanandum} rather than an \textit{explanans}.
(ii) The principles possess the quality of fractal application: they can be used to analyse a whole field, groups of positions, specific institutions or disciplines, classrooms, and so forth. They thereby also enable movement between macro, meso and micro levels of analysis.

(iii) All four principles are built on the conceptual foundations of (different forms of) classification and framing.\textsuperscript{148} This contributes to strengthening their external language of description and to enabling a generative conceptualisation. Each modality or setting for each principle condenses a specific empirical description (such as characteristics from the field of English higher education during the early 1960s) and can then, through systematic variation of the settings of that principle, generate other possible realisations and empirical possibilities. This enables as yet unrealised possibilities to be analysed.

(iv) The device offers a depth ontology that goes beyond the empirical to both capture the underlying generative mechanisms of realised possibilities and generatively conceptualise unrecognised and unrealised possibilities.

I shall now define each principle in turn. Using examples from the substantive study I briefly discuss their antecedents in the working conceptual framework and the need for conceptual development. I then define the principle, showing how it both conceptualises these examples and generatively goes beyond them to reveal other possibilities. Finally I highlight the main modalities that will be encountered in the substantive study.\textsuperscript{149}

\textit{Autonomy}

The principle of Autonomy addresses relations between higher education and other arenas of social practice, such as fields of economic production and political power. It establishes the status of higher education as a field. Bourdieu highlights the critical issue of relative autonomy for both the field’s existence and its structure; not every position within a field is as autonomous as every other, and this differential distribution is central to its status hierarchies. This significance was evident in the substantive study (chapter

\textsuperscript{148} The strengths of classification and framing for all four legitimating principles are aligned for reasons outlined in chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{149} The conceptual framework generates far more possible modalities than are encountered in this study. Space precludes detailed exploration of all modalities. For the sake of familiarity and analytical economy I focus on those featured in the subsequent substantive study.
5): autonomy and independence from external involvement and influence are repeatedly emphasised in such hierarchising distinctions as ‘liberal - vocational’ and the valorisation by participants of such attributes as ‘institutional autonomy’ and ‘knowledge for its own sake’. While highlighting its significance, however, Bourdieu does not provide the means for systematically conceptualising degrees of relative autonomy (chapter 2) and elides questions of institutional distanciation with those of the principles underlying practices. This second point can be clarified by analytically distinguishing two dimensions that arose from analysing the language of legitimation of postwar English higher education:

- *positional autonomy*, referring to relations between *positions* (whether agents or discourses) within a category or context and positions outside the category; and
- *relational autonomy*, referring to relations between the *principles of relation* (or ways of working, practices, aims, measures of achievement, etc.) within a context and those emanating from other contexts.

This distinguishes between, for example, relations between actors in universities and state-sponsored funding bodies (positional autonomy or PA) and relations between ways of working in higher education and those found in the field of economic production (relational autonomy or RA). The nature of each dimension can be analysed using Bernstein’s concepts of *external classification* and *external framing* (Ce, Fe): the relative strength of external boundaries and locus of control across them. (While Bourdieu highlights but cannot conceptualise autonomy, though Bernstein provides the means for analysing this principle he does not conceptualise autonomy as a structuring principle in its own right). Each dimension of autonomy can be relatively stronger (+) or weaker (-), indicating stronger / weaker external boundaries between, and stronger/weaker control from within the field over positions (PA+-) and principles of relation (RA+-).

In the study, for example, the high status ‘English university’ idea espoused independence from governmental and industrial involvement (+Ce, +Fe of PA, or PA+) and valorised ‘knowledge for its own sake’ over vocationalism (+Ce, +Fe of RA or RA+). Conversely, low status institutions were characterised by direct control by

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150 These concepts are inspired by Bernstein’s distinction between ‘systemic relations’ and ‘classificatory relations’ between education and production (1975).

151 Note that it is not the case that classification equates to PA and framing to RA. Classification and framing are applied to both PA and RA.
external agents (PA-) and oriented towards meeting the needs of the economy (RA-). The strengths of each dimension can vary independently such that one can identify in the first instance (keeping C/F strengths aligned) four modalities of Autonomy (see Table 4.1). In the substantive study the main modalities encountered are where PA and RA values are aligned as relatively stronger or weaker, or what I refer to for the sake of brevity as higher autonomy (PA+, RA+ or strongly insulated, autonomous principles) and lower autonomy (PA-, RA- or weakly insulated, heteronomous principles). In addition, as Table 4.1 shows, one can identify two further possible modalities: PA+, RA- and PA-, RA+. Consider, for example, the possibility of universities managed by academics but according to principles derived from the commercial or political fields (PA+, RA-) or universities governed by agents from industry or politics but on purely ‘academic’ lines (PA-, RA+). Bourdieu does not distinguish between positional and relational autonomy in conceptualising ‘autonomous’ / ‘heteronomous’ principles of hierarchisation and so these two possible modalities of Autonomy lie beyond the reach of his theorisation; this is crucial for this study, for (as I discuss in chapter 9) cultural studies would be associated during its emergence with PA-, RA+.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positional autonomy</th>
<th>PA+</th>
<th>RA+</th>
<th>RA-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strongly insulated,</td>
<td>strongly insulated,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PA-</td>
<td>autonomous principles</td>
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<td>weakly insulated,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>autonomous principles</td>
<td>heteronomous principles</td>
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</table>

**Density**

Where Autonomy describes the differentiation of higher education from other fields, Density addresses differentiation among positions *within* the field. The significance of density was evident within the language of legitimation encountered in the study, wherein size, quantity and scale were frequently encountered in attributions of status in English higher education. The high status idea of university education, for example, defined the university as a small-scale, residential community offering intimate interaction between teachers and taught in the preservation of a single, common culture based on shared
social and educational backgrounds (see chapter 5). In contrast, lower status positions were defined as being larger, more anomic institutions offering numerous forms of knowledge to a diverse student population. Bernstein emphasises the significance of the ways in which positions and position-takings are arranged in terms of their underlying rules (such as ‘things must be put together’ or ‘things must be kept apart’). To take the high status idea, the underlying rule exhibited here is not only that ‘things must be put together’ but also that ‘there should be few things to arrange and the minimal number of ways of doing so’; conversely the low status idea can be characterised by the rules: ‘there should be more things to arrange and in more different arrangements where things should be kept apart’.

Though such issues of density are not directly addressed in either Bourdieu’s or Bernstein’s frameworks, they can be broached using terms drawn from a theorist who forms a common source of inspiration: Emile Durkheim. Briefly, Durkheim (1893/1984) demonstrated that changes in the ratio of population to territory (material density) tend to bring changes in the number of belief systems and/or their intensity of interaction within that space (moral density), which in turn affects the degree of the division of labour or differentiation between its constituent members. I use these terms here as follows:

- **material density** refers to the number of units within a context or category (such as population of a university or texts within a canon); and
- **moral density** refers to the number of structuring principles within the context (such as habitues or canonic hierarchies).

(In the study the ‘contexts’ primarily comprise the institutional and disciplinary fields of higher education). These dimensions impact on a third dimension: **differentiation** refers to the relations between the units within a context. The degree of concentration of a population (material density) and of the degree of diversity of belief systems (moral density) within a context affects relations between the constituents of that context (differentiation). The degree of material density and moral density can be conceptualised using Bernstein’s concepts of **internal classification** and **internal framing** (C^1, F^1): the

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152 See Lukes (1973), Poggi (1972). The following conceptualisation is inspired by Bernstein’s analyses of educational knowledge codes (1975) and transposes Durkheim’s analysis of whole societies to examine the relatively micro level of changes within a field. Something similar to Density is described by Becher’s studies of ‘disciplinary cultures’ (1981, 1987b, 1994, 2001) in terms of ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ research styles, though with a significantly weaker L^2; using Becher’s terms one cannot generatively conceptualise practices.
relative strength of internal boundaries and locus of control within them. Both material density (MaD) and moral density (MoD) exhibit relatively stronger (+) or weaker (-) internal classification and framing.

In the study, for example, the higher status university idea comprised a small integrated and democratic community of actors (-C₁, -F₁ of material density or MaD-) sharing a homogeneous set of fixed beliefs (-Cᵢ, -Fᵢ of moral density or MaD-). The strengths of each dimension can vary independently such that one can identify in the first instance (keeping C/F strengths aligned) four modalities of Density (see Table 4.2). In the study the density modalities primarily encountered are where both are lower (small population sharing homogeneous beliefs) or higher (large population with heterogeneous beliefs). In addition to these modalities (which I shall refer to for brevity as higher / lower Density), there are also two further modalities, where material and moral densities are not aligned (MaD+, MoD- and MaD-, MoD+).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2: Density modalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material density</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material density</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MaD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MaD-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Specialisation**
Where Density describes the degree of differentiation within the field, Specialisation addresses the basis of this differentiation. Specialisation establishes the ways agents and discourses within a field are constructed as special, different or unique and thus deserving of distinction and status. This can be illustrated from the study by the emphasis placed within higher education on the virtue of generalists over specialists, breadth over depth of knowledge and cultivated sensibilities over scholasticism (chapter 5). The English

---

153 Again, the dimensions do not equate to classification and framing but rather their strengths are analysed for each dimension.
university idea described an amateur generalist with a breadth of culture engaging in the cultivation of specialised sensibilities among students hand-picked for their ability to fit into the established life and character of the university. Analysing such characteristics in terms of ‘specialisation codes’ (see chapter 2) highlights how participants ascribe differential status to articulations of the institutional and disciplinary fields as the basis of positions within higher education.

Bourdieu highlights how educational fields structure educational practices and Bernstein highlights the structuring significance of educational practices for fields. The concept of specialisation code subsumes and integrates these ideas to suggest one can view agents as not only positioned in a structure of knowers (or field of positions) and in a structure of knowledges (or field of position-takings) but also as establishing in their practices different forms of relations to these two structures. As discussed in chapter 2, these can be conceptualised in terms of the classification and framing strengths exhibited in languages of legitimisation of:

- the epistemic relation (ER) to structures of knowledge; and
- the social relation (SR) to structures of knowers.154

When analysing the field of higher education as a whole these structures are the disciplinary field and institutional fields, respectively. Each relation can be relatively strongly (+) or weakly (-) classified and framed. Varying the strengths of each relation independently generates four possible modalities (where C/F values are aligned): ER+/−, SR+/− (see Table 4.3). In other words, agents may emphasise one structure or the other (or neither or both) as the basis of distinctiveness, authority and status; conversely, their identity, relations and consciousness is shaped in different ways by these two kinds of structures

These modalities describe: an elite modality (ER+, SR+) where insight and membership is based not only on possessing the correct knowledge but also having the right kinds of dispositions; a knowledge modality (ER+, SR−) emphasising mastery of specialised procedures, techniques or skills; a knower modality (ER−, SR+) emphasising the

154 I am broadening the definition of epistemic relation and social relation from their original definition of the concepts (chapter 2) which reflected their basis in highlighting a specific issue: the significance of epistemological considerations in knowledge production. I argued that the epistemic device is also active in fields of recontextualisation and reproduction; analysing these fields (e.g. Maton 2004a, Lamont 2004, the current study) has helped refine the concepts to the broader definitions given here. In other words, all discursive practices can be analysed in terms of the distinction between epistemic and social relations.
dispositions of the subject, whether portrayed as ‘natural’ abilities, cultivated sensibilities or resulting from the subject’s social position; and a relativist modality (ER-, SR-) where identity and consciousness is ostensibly determined by neither one’s knowledge nor one’s dispositions. In the substantive study two modalities predominate: knower specialisation (as in the example of the English university idea mentioned above) where the disciplinary map is viewed as a negative influence (ER-) and what matters is not what one knows but who one is, as guaranteed by one’s university (SR+); and knowledge specialisation, where one’s discipline is the basis of identity, consciousness and relation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation to knowledge structure</th>
<th>Relation to knower structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ER+</td>
<td>SR+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elite</td>
<td>knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knower</td>
<td>relativist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Temporality**

The issue of time is relatively tacit in the working conceptual framework. Bourdieu emphasises agents’ trajectories within a field as central to its structure, highlights strategies of conservation and change, and in, his analysis of 1960s French higher education (1988) describes the age of actors as its second structuring principle.155 Bernstein models ‘prospective’ and ‘retrospective’ identities when mapping contemporary educational identities (2000), highlights issues of change, and explores the temporal orientations of knowledge structures. Both approaches thereby alert us to temporal issues; however, neither fully conceptualises temporality as a structuring principle in itself.156

---

155 Bourdieu tends to reduce what I shall define as ‘orientation’ to temporal positions as expressions of the field’s dominant / dominated relations rather than conceptualising them as a principle structuring the field; see, for example, Bourdieu (1993a: 105-6).

156 Recent work has used Bernstein’s mapping of identities to explore questions of time in educational policy (e.g. Leaton Gray 2004, Beck 2004). These reveal the way in which temporal issues are opened up for question by Bernstein’s framework. However, though insightful, such studies do not conceptualise temporal issues in terms of underlying structuring principles; they describe temporal positions but not the systematic temporal principles such positions embody. This illustrates that Bernstein’s description of
Substantive analysis brought this issue to the fore (see chapter 3); higher status positions, for example, were legitimated as ancient and as looking to this venerable past for current practices. My analysis of such representations identified two principal temporal dimensions:

(i) *Age*: agents’ relational positions *in* a temporal field, understood as delineating an axis from relatively older to relatively younger (onto ‘yet to be born’).

(ii) *Orientation*: agents’ positions *on* this temporal field, considered as a continuum from forward-looking to backward-looking.

(When substantively discussing Orientation I distinguish between *external orientation* to perceived conditions *beyond* the field, such as contemporary culture, and *internal orientation* to characteristics *within* the field, such as teaching practices).

I suggest ‘Age’ reflects the effects of punctuations or divisions in time (power); and ‘Orientation’ reflects principles governing the appropriate relations within these temporal categories (control). The structuring principles highlighted by these dimensions can thus be conceptualised in terms of temporal equivalents of classification and framing, where:

- the strength of *temporal classification* (+/-C1) refers to the strength of boundaries between temporal categories, such as between the present and the specific temporal location associated with the agent or text (such as date of birth);

- the strength of *temporal framing* (+/-F1) refers to the orientation of control within the resulting temporal category, where strong temporal framing refers to strong control from the already established (the past).157

For example, where age is significant in the field a long established position exhibits relatively strong temporal classification between its genesis and the present, and a position oriented towards the conservation of established practices exhibits relatively strong framing by its history. Conceptualising Age and Orientation in terms of +/-C1, ...

---

157 Temporal classification and temporal framing should *not* be confused with temporal features within the classification and framing of educational knowledge codes. For example, classification of a curriculum will involve temporal distribution of subjects within a timetable, and framing of pedagogic practices involves questions of pacing. These are temporal features *within* an educational knowledge code modality. In contrast, C1 and F1 are an *extension* of the framework through application of the concepts of classification and framing to time as an independent feature or object of study.
+/F^t gives the modality of Temporality.\textsuperscript{158} Varying independently the strengths of C^t and F^t gives four possible temporal modalities, named in Table 4.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Backward (+F^t)</th>
<th>Forward (-F^t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older (+C^t)</td>
<td>archaeo-retrospective</td>
<td>archaeo-prospective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger (-C^t)</td>
<td>neo-retrospective</td>
<td>neo-prospective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In brief, these describe: more established positions (archaeo-) whose characterising attributes are based on inheritance from the past (retrospective) or oriented towards newer forms (prospective); and newer positions (neo-) influenced by traditional practices (retrospective) or inaugurating new forms (prospective). In the substantive study archaeo-retrospective (+C^t, +F^t) and neo-prospective (-C^t, -F^t) temporalities (referred to in the study for the sake of brevity as ‘retrospective’ and ‘prospective’) are the main traditional modalities within postwar English higher education (chapter 5), and neo-retrospective becomes evident in debates over the future of the field (chapters 6-8).

Finally, to these two dimensions I add a third that emerged from the analysis: (iii) \textit{Rate of change}, marking a continuum from relatively unchanging or static to rapid revolution.

This can be understood as emerging from the interaction of the first two dimensions. For example, ancient universities were characterised by participants as relatively old, emphasising convention and custom, and thus conservative and reluctant to embrace any form of change. This can be redescribed as “older, past orientation, slow to change”: retrospective temporality. The principle of Temporality is, therefore, a three-dimensional positioning system, providing the co-ordinates of agents in a field in terms of their relative position (age), the direction they face (orientation) and speed of travel (rate of

\textsuperscript{158} One could further distinguish between \textit{internal} and \textit{external} temporal classification and temporal framing. I have not developed this further within the thesis for reasons of analytical economy.
change). It is analogous to locating someone’s position along a line, ascertaining which
direction they are facing, and describing the pace they are moving along that line.

**Summary: Legitimation codes**

The four principles conceptualise relations to the field (Autonomy), relations within the
field (Density), relations between the constituent dimensions of the field (Specialisation),
and temporal relations (Temporality). As the definitions illustrate, each legitimation
principle may be ‘set’ to differing modalities. Table 4.5 overleaf summarises these
possible modalities, sets out the ways each legitimation principle is based on
development of the concepts of classification and framing, and (for the sake of
familiarity) the main modalities encountered in the starting point for the substantive
study, the field of English higher education during the early 1960s. The modalities
realised by the four legitimation principles together give the legitimation code (see Figure
4.2). The legitimation code in turn provides the structuring of possibilities within the
field. Because of their generative capacity, each legitimation principle provides the basis
for conceptualising at least 256 legitimation code modalities (when strengths of
classification and framing for each legitimation principle are aligned; exploring non-
aligned strengths would expand the framework considerably). The framework enables a
degree of delicacy that the substantive study comes nowhere near to exhausting. As
already mentioned, for brevity of exposition I refer to higher / lower modalities of
Autonomy and Density and to retrospective / prospective Temporality (rather than ‘neo-
prospective’ Temporality or ‘strongly insulated, autonomous principles’ Autonomy).

---

**Figure 4.2:**
**Legitimation device and code**

**Modalities of legitimation principles**

```
Legitimation device
  /---------------------------------/
  |                                  |
  | Autonomy                          |
  | PA+/-, RA+/-                       |
  | Density                           |
  | MaD+/-, MoD+/-                     |
  | Specialisation                    |
  | SR+/-, ER+/-                      |
  | Temporality                       |
  | +/-Ct, +/-Ft                       |
  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

---
Table 4.5:
Principles of the legitimation device

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimation principle</th>
<th>Possible modalities</th>
<th>Classification &amp; framing values</th>
<th>Modalities of higher education field by early 1960s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>PA+/-, RA+/-</td>
<td>+/-C^e, +/-F^e (PA), +/-C^e, +/-F^e (RA)</td>
<td>higher / lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>MaD+/-, MoD+/-</td>
<td>+/-C^i, +/-F^i (MaD), +/-C^i, +/-F^i (MoD)</td>
<td>lower / higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>ER+/-, SR+/-</td>
<td>+/-C, +/-F (ER), +/-C, +/-F (SR)</td>
<td>knower / knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporality</td>
<td>+/-C^t, +/-F^t</td>
<td>+/-C^t, +/-F^t</td>
<td>retrospective / prospective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
PA = positional autonomy; RA = relational autonomy
MaD = material density; MoD = moral density
SR = social relation; ER = epistemic relation
C = classification; F = framing; i = internal; e= external; t = temporal
+/- = relatively stronger/weaker

[3] Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the conceptual framework that resulted from the empirical research and which is used to analyse the substantive study. This framework centres on the concept of the legitimation device, the generative principle underlying the field of higher education. This constructs higher education as a dynamic field of possibilities where the structure of possibilities is given by the legitimation code modality of the field. The constituent structuring principles of the device - Autonomy, Density, Specialisation and Temporality - were each defined and their different modalities described in terms of concepts building on and developing classification and framing. To return to the three criteria I described at the outset as necessitated by the research question:
(i) evolving this language of description has, I believe, helped better objectify higher education as a social structure;
(ii) by being generative, the resulting framework is able to grasp the possibility of
cultural studies (as well as other unrecognised and unrealised possibilities) prior to its
emergence; and
(iii) by possessing a strong $L^2$ and a conceptualisation of the underlying generative
principle of the field (the device) the framework can systematically analyse the
changes that enabled the possibility of cultural studies to emerge.
In short, the legitimation device enables higher education to be conceptualised as an
object of study and changes in that object to be systematically examined. Having now
climbed the rungs in the metaphorical ladder offered by Bourdieu, Bernstein and the
empirical research, the main task is that of describing the view of the object of study this
position enables, to which I now turn in Part II of the thesis.
PART II

TRANSFORMATIONS IN ENGLISH HIGHER EDUCATION DURING THE EARLY 1960S

You’re very well read, it’s well known
But something is happening and you don’t know what it is
Do you, Mr Jones?
Bob Dylan
(1965)
Ballad of a thin man, *Highway 61 Revisited* (Columbia)

The English have long elevated compromise to the status of a moral principle.
G.K.T. Conn
(1961)
The popularity of Oxford and Cambridge? Ilc: Finishing or beginning school?

If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.
Giuseppe di Lampedusa
(1957)

Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.
Alphonse Karr
Chapter 5:  
The Field of English Higher Education by the 1960s

_The English have a penchant for living on untested myths which they call the lessons of experience._  
A.H. Halsey (1961a)  

... _the vestigial but persisting traces of the barrier between the Two Nations within the intellectual class - the Nation of London, Cambridge, Oxford, of the higher civil service, of the genteel and sophisticated; and the Nation of the provinces, of petit-bourgeois and upper-working-class origin, of bourgeois environment, studious, diligent and specialised_  
Edward Shils (1955)  
The British intellectuals. _Encounter_, 4(4), p.15

[1] **Introduction**

In 1955 three influential studies of British cultural élites were published: Noel Annan revealed the interweaving family trees of an ‘intellectual aristocracy’, Edward Shils surveyed the state of British intellectuals, and Henry Fairlie brought ‘the Establishment’ into common usage.159 All three portrayed higher education as stable, settled and based on a deep-seated consensus within the field and between intellectuals and political and industrial élites. In an ‘extraordinary state of collective self-satisfaction’ (Shils 1955: 7) dissident voices and radical criticism were rare. ‘Never has an intellectual class,’ Shils concluded, ‘found its society and its culture so much to its satisfaction’ (1955: 6). This was soon to appear the calm before the storm. During the early 1960s participants were painting a picture of turmoil, change, impending doom and crisis: higher education was facing a ‘short term emergency’ necessitating dramatic expansion of the institutional map (see chapter 6) and ‘crisis in the humanities’ and ‘scientific revolution’ were redrawing the disciplinary map (chapters 7-8). What Halsey (1961a: 342) called the ‘untested

159 All three accounts were widely cited at the time (see Hewison 1995).
myths’ underlying higher education were being questioned and complacency and secrecy were giving way to urgent calls for research into, intense debates over, and an unprecedented government-initiated study of higher education (the Robbins Committee 1961-3). By the mid 1960s areas of study and institutions such as cultural studies and the polytechnics were emerging that were avowedly interdisciplinary, radical, critical and innovative. Dissident voices and radical criticism were finding footholds within Academe.

These changes in the state of higher education raise a series of questions which form the focus of Part II of the thesis:
(1) what the structure of higher education was during this proclaimed consensus;
(2) what threatened to disrupt this stability and how it was responded to; and
(3) how these events created conditions enabling the emergence of cultural studies.
These equate to addressing the stages of structural conditioning, social interaction and structural elaboration, respectively (chapter 3). I address question (2) in chapters 6-8 and question (3) in chapter 9. In this chapter I answer question (1). My focus is English higher education during the late 1950s and early 1960s, a period characterised by participants as one of relative stability.160 The study is geographically limited because Scottish higher education, commonly considered a separate entity within contemporary accounts, is sufficiently different in external relations and internal structure to warrant its own analysis.161 The aim is to analyse the structure of the field within which subsequent developments were framed.

The chapter comprises two main stages. First, I outline the principal contours of higher education according to participants and the ‘ideas’ underpinning its hierarchical structure.

160 This period lies roughly between the designation of Colleges of Advanced Technology (CATs) (1956) and chartering of redbrick universities (1948-57) on the one hand, and the publication of the Robbins Report (1963), announcement of a ‘binary system’ (1965) and chartering of CATs as universities (1966-7) on the other. It was not a period of stasis (universities were expanding and undergoing change) but rather characterised by participants as one of consensus and stability.

161 See, for example, Robbins Report (1963), Hale Report (1964). On Scottish higher education, see Davie (1961). I include the University of Wales within the analysis but refer to ‘English higher education’ rather than ‘higher education in England and Wales’. The term ‘English’ is used here not simply geographically nor to denote nationality but rather to adjectivally distinguish the field from other distinct fields, such as Scottish higher education. One aspect of the field’s defining characteristics was the widespread belief that they were distinctively ‘English’ (such as the ‘English university idea’, see further below); in contrast, ‘Welsh higher education’ was rarely discussed as a separate or distinct entity.
These portrayed higher education as a polarised field structured by two hierarchically arranged measures of achievement. Second, I analyse this field in terms of the legitimation device, identifying two legitimation codes as structuring higher education, with ownership of the device resting with actors in the ancient universities and the humanities. Lastly, in the main part of the chapter I explore and illustrate the modalities of the dominant and dominated legitimation codes for each principle of legitimation: Autonomy, Density, Specialisation and Temporality.

[2] Participants’ Maps of and Guides to the Field

For to Oxbridge all the best people continually gravitate, whereas to Redbrick no one, if he can help it, ever comes at all.
Bruce Truscot (1951)
Red Brick University (Harmondsworth, Penguin) p.44.162

Contemporary accounts of higher education by participants can be heuristically divided into two principal kinds: (i) maps of the field’s institutional and disciplinary positions, and (ii) guides to the field or ideal-type models said to underpin these maps. These equate to actors’ descriptions of the field and of its organising principles. I shall discuss each in turn.

(1) Maps: Subfields and typologies
In discussions of higher education among participants explicit mapping of the entire field is rare; more frequent are passing references to isolated landmarks such as ‘the ancient universities’. Attempts to sketch the contours of the whole field are typically found in studies or official reports when setting out the basic terms to be used and, where justified, their basis in common sense is emphasised.163 Participants’ maps thereby outline a ‘common, traditional typology’ using ‘commonsense’ ideas to construct ‘intuitively reasonable’ groupings on the basis of ‘a simultaneous comparison of a whole host of...

162 In all substantive chapters the original use of gendered pronouns within quotations are retained; as I shall highlight, their use is itself of interest.

163 See, for example, Robbins Report (1963) and Hale Report (1964).
different variables’. Their bases thus ‘go without saying’: they represent the doxic categories or ‘untested myths’ of the field. These maps can be distinguished according to whether they address the institutional or the disciplinary fields of higher education. These two fields had evolved relatively autonomously and the loosely co-ordinated development of higher education (see Autonomy, below) gave rise to a variegated field where institutional and disciplinary distinctions cross-cut. Though maps portray these fields as homologously structured into subfields and polarised typologies, each comprises its own distinctive terrain.

Institutional maps

The principal institutional distinction made by participants was between ‘universities’ and ‘colleges’. Both could offer degree-level higher education but only universities had powers to award degree-level qualifications and only institutions that received a Royal Charter from the Privy Council could be universities. This effectively created a binary structure with university and non-university subfields. Of the two, the university subfield monopolised esteem, reflecting what was described as ‘our snobbish caste-ridden hierarchical obsession with university status’ (Crosland, 1965, quoted Pratt and Burgess 1974: 203) - the term ‘university’ was the key to distinction. In comparison colleges were an unspoken Other that aspired to university status and relied on universities for degree-level curricula. However, though the charter distinction was a


165 Counting universities is ‘a specialised art’ and a host of characteristics have been used in statistics and reports (Carswell 1985: 3, n5; 176). Two alternative means of counting used in secondary accounts deserve comment. First, ‘higher education’ and ‘further education’ are often distinguished by level of educational qualification. However, this distinction did not correspond to universities and colleges: by the early 1960s nearly two-thirds of full-time and a quarter of part-time students at regional colleges were studying for degree-level qualifications (Robbins Report 1963: 30-2). Second, universities are often associated with the grant list of the Universities Grant Committee, but these funding arrangements themselves depend on the possession of a Royal Charter (rather than vice versa). As the Percy Report (1945: 25) made clear: ‘In all civilized countries the power to confer degrees is the distinguishing mark of a university’.

166 This binary distinction was later codified in governmental policy in a White Paper of May 1966 (DES 1966) with the two subfields labelled ‘autonomous sector’ (universities) and ‘public sector’ (polytechnics and colleges). These terms refer specifically to the ‘binary system’ of 1965-1992, between the creation of polytechnics and their later chartering as universities. Though secondary accounts often imply that a distinction between two institutional subfields existed only during this period, a binary structure predated (and outlived) the binary system, and the latter can be distinguished by being an explicit and codified policy and administration - the key term of difference is not ‘binary’ but ‘system’.
glass ceiling for status, it contained a hatch that was occasionally opened to allow through a limited number of carefully chosen institutions deemed worthy of promotion from college status: university colleges had been chartered at the turn of century and in the 1950s (see Table 5.1, p.103).

The second principal distinction was within the university subfield. Participants grouped together institutions into clusters bearing family resemblances and arranged into a hierarchical typology of status, a practice viewed as ‘inevitable’, ‘unavoidable’ and ‘in the nature of things’ (Robbins Report 1963: 8-9). By the early 1960s ‘the stable pyramid of institutions which has emerged from the history of the development of higher learning’ (Halsey 1964: 135) comprised: Ancients, Federal (especially London), Civics, and Redbricks. The distribution of institutions among clusters was remarkably consistent among contemporary accounts and the status hierarchy widely shared across the field. This ‘commonsense’ hierarchy had two key features. First, typologising primarily focused on universities; colleges were typically viewed as a miscellany. Second, the university subfield was polarised: participants distinguished within the ‘pyramid of prestige’ (Halsey 1961a) between ‘ancients’ and ‘moderns’ (comprising civics and redbricks). The ancients were treated as constituting ‘an entirely distinct species, a distinct genus, even a distinct family of the Order of Institutions of Higher Education’ (Rose & Ziman, 1964: 13, original emphases). To use a footballing metaphor, if the non-university subfield represented the non-professional league and universities comprised a separate professional league (into which selected amateur clubs might achieve

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167 The federal university of Wales was sometimes clustered with London but came far lower in status hierarchies (e.g. Halsey & Trow 1971: 230-1).

168 The main difference between typologies is the names given to civics and redbricks. These are sometimes used interchangeably for either or both groups, or the two groups are differentiated as ‘older’ and ‘younger’ civics (Robbins Report 1963), ‘larger’ and ‘smaller’ civics (Hale Report 1964) or ‘major’ and ‘minor’ redbricks (Halsey & Trow 1971).

169 Attempts were made to codify a college typology. A governmental White Paper on Technical Education in 1956 designated ten technical colleges as Colleges of Advanced Technology and outlined a pyramid where regional colleges, area colleges and local colleges formed the base and CATs its apex. With the notable exception of the CATs, tellingly viewed as apprentice universities (Halsey & Trow 1971: 469), such distinctions were not widely discussed.
promotion), then the ancient universities were longstanding champions of international renown. In 1955 Shils claimed:

If a young man, talking to an educated stranger, refers to his university studies, he is asked ‘Oxford or Cambridge?’ And if he says Aberystwyth or Nottingham, there is disappointment on the one side and embarrassment on the other.

(1955: 11-12).

Or as a later study put it: ‘They are not merely great and famous Universities. They are The Universities.’ (Rose & Ziman 1964: 131).

(Several clusters have subsequently been added to this typology: ‘new’ universities, polytechnics and the Open University. I shall briefly discuss these clusters later in the study. For familiarity, Table 5.1 summarises selected characteristics commonly associated with all clusters and Table B.1 in Appendix B provides a full list of universities, organised according to the conventional typology, that outlines their historical nomenclature.)

**Disciplinary maps**

Maps of the disciplinary field exhibit a homologous structure to institutional maps, though distinctions were fuzzier and names less formalised. Official reports, such as the Hale Report (1964: 4), attested to the difficulty of classifying subject areas even at the institutionalised level of undergraduate courses. Nonetheless, two longstanding distinctions dominated the mental landscape by the 1960s. First, two subfields of the map were conventionally identified: the humanities and the sciences. The division between what would become known as ‘the two cultures’ was already well established; it was the focus, for example, of a famous debate between T.H. Huxley and Matthew Arnold in the early 1880s. Of the two subfields the humanities traditionally assumed higher status. The key term of distinction was ‘culture’ or, in Matthew Arnold’s famous

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171 Following common contemporary usage (e.g. Plumb 1964b), I use ‘humanities’ to refer to both arts and humanities disciplines.

172 See Jaki (1975), Stewart (1970) and Trilling (1962). Though enjoying growing recognition (see chapter 7), the social sciences were as yet not commonly viewed as a discrete major region within this disciplinary map.
phrases, ‘the best that has been known and thought in the world’ and ‘the pursuit of sweetness and light’ (1869). Participants overwhelmingly portrayed culture as exemplified by humanist knowledge; the best that had been known was born of literature and language while science (especially applied science and technology) was deemed at best a pale imitation.

Table 5.1:
Brief descriptions of clusters in the conventional institutional typology of postwar higher education in England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster name</th>
<th>Date chartered</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Brief description of institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ancient</td>
<td>12th-13th centuries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Collegiate universities of Oxford and Cambridge ('Oxbridge').</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>19th century</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Large universities formed by federal relation of existing colleges, chartered in 1836 (London) and 1893 (Wales).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Former university colleges in major provincial industrial cities in 1850s-1880s and chartered at the turn of the twentieth century (except Durham, 1836).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redbrick</td>
<td>1948-57</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Former university colleges, in smaller provincial cities and towns, chartered in the decade following World War II (except Reading, 1926).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New (1960s)</td>
<td>1961-65</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Universities established ab initio on campus sites on outskirts of cities. Also known as ‘whitebrick’ or ‘plateglass’ universities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological</td>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ten technical colleges designated Colleges of Advanced Technology (CATs) in 1956; eight were chartered as universities in 1996-67 (two became affiliated colleges of London and Wales).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Open University</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>National distance-learning university for adults. Differs from university extra-mural departments and University Extension Movement by being chartered in its own right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges of higher education</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>‘00s</td>
<td>Very diverse and historically varying groups of colleges offering inter alia teaching at degree level but neither designated as CATs or polytechnics nor chartered. Names have included colleges, schools, polytechnics, and mechanics institutes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the subfield of humanist culture participants drew a second polarising distinction between Classics and other disciplines. Though typologies of disciplines could become
extensive, the place of Latin and Greek as the archetypal humanist disciplines and pinnacle of culture had been firmly established during the mid nineteenth century:

... classics reigned supreme throughout the whole sphere of higher education. There were no rivals ... its domination at the universities was only challenged by the narrow discipline of mathematics.

(Whitehead 1932: 93)

Though Classics was slowly giving way to newer humanist disciplines (chapter 7), the inherited status hierarchy comprised a polarisation within the higher status subfield between Classics as the epitome of culture and newer humanist disciplines.

(2) Guides: Ideas of the university and of culture

Though, as Halsey & Trow (1971: 73) concluded, there was among participants ‘no obvious agreement about what exactly determines the pre-eminence of the ancient English foundations’ and of Classics, a tradition of literature offered studies of and normative models for higher education. These explicit attempts to account for and influence the workings of the field represent contemporary guides to the maps and were much discussed as having shaped and continuing to orient practices within the field. According to these guides, the field was structured by two ideas of the university and two ideas of culture that offered competing visions of higher education.

Ideas of the university

A survey of attitudes among academics in the early 1960s concluded that ‘few would deny that there is a distinctive English idea of a university’ (Halsey & Trow 1971: 70). Two such idealised images of university life dominated thinking in and on higher education: this higher status ‘English idea’ of the liberal university and a lower status, supposedly Germanic, technological idea. The English idea was identified with the ancients or at least ‘a conception, whether accurate or not, of the essential characteristics of Oxford or Cambridge’ (Halsey & Trow 1971: 72; emphases added). This ‘Oxbridge model’ was classically outlined by such liberal humanist thinkers as Cardinal

173 By the early 1960s the number of subjects listed by the UGC approached three hundred (Hale Report 1964: 4).

174 See Cameron (1956), Halsey (1961b) and Powell (1965).

Newman (1852/1965), F. R. Leavis (1948) and Karl Jaspers (1959) and had dominated literature on the university since the late nineteenth century.\(^{176}\) Contemporary commentators described how this model ‘still generates a good deal of educational practice’ (Powell 1965: 103) and was what ‘the English universities seek in both official policy and student opinion’ (Halsey 1961b: 55).\(^{177}\) The model comprised an assortment of empirical characteristics based on an idealised version of mid-nineteenth century Oxford and Cambridge, including: ancient origins; national and international student recruitment; student selection according to ‘the established life and character of the university’; provision of ‘education’ rather than ‘training’; a small-scale residential community offering close interaction between teachers and taught ‘in a shared domestic life’; individualised tuition; democratic self-governance; and political autonomy provided by non-state sources of income (Halsey & Trow 1971: 67-83).

The principal alternative idea was a version of the German technological university and comprised an antithesis to the English idea: a new, non-residential institution, subject to control from external industrial and political interests, offering vocational training to local students in specialised technical competencies to anyone with sufficient educational qualifications. This ‘technological’ idea was identified primarily with colleges and, by historical association, with modern universities.\(^{178}\) The conditions of chartering tacitly held by the Privy Council were based on the English idea and once chartered modern universities embraced ‘academic drift’, emulating further the characteristics of the English idea and erasing traits associated with the technological model.\(^{179}\) In institutional hierarchies the two ideas of the university thereby outlined an evolutionary trajectory: universities (excepting the ancients) began by resembling the technological idea but grew towards the English idea. The ‘commonsense’ hierarchy depended on

\(^{176}\) See Sparrow (1967) and Wyatt (1990).

\(^{177}\) Its preeminence was widely asserted; see Armytage (1955), Rowe (1960) and Niblett (1963).

\(^{178}\) Published institutional histories of ‘modern’ universities kept their college origins in public view. At the time of my focus here these included: Lapworth 1884, Vincent & Hinton 1947 (Birmingham); Fowler 1904, Whiting 1932 (Durham); Hetherington 1963 (Exeter); Shimmin 1954 (Leeds); Simmonds 1958 (Leicester); Brown 1892, Ramsay 1907, Dumbell 1953 (Liverpool); Thompson 1886, Hartod 1900, Charlton 1951 (Manchester); Lane 1907 (Newcastle); Wood 1953 (Nottingham); Childs 1933 (Reading); Chapman 1955 (Sheffield); Patterson 1962 (Southampton);

\(^{179}\) On conditions of chartering, see Shinn (1986); on the origins and early years of civic and redbrick universities see Armytage (1955), Barker (1963a, 1963b), Jones (1988) and Lowe (1987).
approximation to the English idea and distance from its technological antithesis and was reflected in ‘the conspicuousness of Oxford and Cambridge and the vagueness bordering on invisibility of “Redbrick” universities’ in conceptions of status (Halsey & Trow 1971: 72). Even among their members ‘modern universities are facts but not realities ... they do not easily admit them to their minds’, while the ancients were ‘invisible presences’ embodying the consensual ideal (Shils 1955: 11, 15).

**Ideas of culture**

In higher education during the early 1960s two principal educational ideologies offered competing ideas of ‘culture’: liberal humanism and instrumentalism. These are well summarised by Weber’s account of ‘the field of educational ends’ (1946). Weber described ‘two polar opposites’, one seeking ‘to awaken charisma’ in the student, the other ‘to impart specialised expert training’, between which he posited a continuum of ‘all those types which aim at cultivating the pupil for a conduct of life ... the conduct of a status group’, one which would instil or reinforce the ways of knowing and being requisite to their future way of life (1946: 426-7). This latter group adopts a ‘pedagogy of cultivation’ which ‘attempts to educate a cultivated type of man’, the nature of this ‘type’ depending upon the ideal of the stratum of society in control of education (*Ibid.*). These positions on the field thereby posited conflicting definitions of the aims of culture: the (re)production of the charismatic, the cultivated individual and the technical specialist. By the 1960s the latter two were predominant in participants’ accounts of English higher education and equated with liberal humanism and instrumentalism. Liberal humanism, associated with the nineteenth century writings of J.H. Newman and Mark Pattison, among others, remained deeply influential and formed the basis for the English university idea. This posited the purpose and role of university education to be the cultivation of dispositions within students to produce the ‘English gentleman’, whose habitus fitted him (usually him) to rule, politically, economically, culturally or spiritually. This aim was, liberal humanists argued, achieved through the study of culture for its own sake, where culture (epitomised by Classics) was universal knowledge that represented the best of what has been known and thought and encapsulated a civilised

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180 This invisibility is illustrated by Halsey and Trow’s (1971) major survey itself where the technological idea warrants two brief asides compared to seventy pages devoted to describing the English idea.

181 One commentator claimed ‘modern thinking on university education is a series of footnotes’ to Newman’s *The Idea of a University* (Cameron 1956: 24-5).
way of life. Disciplinary status depended on approximation to the classical idea of culture; claims for status by practitioners of emergent disciplines were made on liberal humanist grounds, not only by humanists (by which I mean actors in the humanities) but also by scientists.\textsuperscript{182} In contrast, instrumentalism was portrayed as comprising the vocational training of technical specialists and enjoyed a relatively shadowy presence in discussions of higher education. Identified with applied science and technology, whose development during the Industrial Revolution had occurred largely beyond the universities, instrumentalism tended to be cast beyond the field, into non-university education.

**Summary: A polarised field**

Having outlined the principal landmarks and signposts of the field according to participants, the question becomes what these maps and guides show about the structuring of English higher education. First, maps of the field outline the contours of its structure. I discussed institutional and disciplinary maps separately, reflecting their specificity of terms and foci, but they were also interconstitutive; the higher status the university, for example, the greater its curricular emphasis on Classics.\textsuperscript{183} Moreover, they were homologous and can be understood as realisations of the same underlying structuring principles. Reflecting what Shils termed ‘the two nations of British culture’ (1955: 13), higher education was portrayed as a polarised and chiastically structured field of positions and of position-takings. Maps posited two subfields of institutions (universities / colleges) and of disciplines (humanities / science) and, within their higher status subfields, polarised typologies. Drawing on Bourdieu’s approach (see chapter 2), these distinctions can be rewritten as referring to volume of capital and species of capital, respectively (as illustrated by the vertical and horizontal dimensions of Figure 5.1). In other words, the distinction between subfields highlights differences in total resources and status enjoyed by groups of positions within the field (vertical +/-); and the polarised

\textsuperscript{182} Though in social debates reaching beyond higher education ‘there seem to be as many different varieties of Humanism as there are grades of wine and cheese’ (Kurtz 1973: 6), I follow the common practice of participants within higher education in using the adjective and noun ‘humanist’ in equivalent relations to the humanities as ‘scientific’ and ‘scientist’ have to ‘science’. On the liberal humanist basis of claims made for science see Mathieson (1975).

\textsuperscript{183} This is shown by comparing two universities of similar size: in 1965 Oxford University (9,800 students) had 116 dons described as *Literae Humaniores* and 88 lecturers of social studies (Oxford University 1966); and Manchester University (9,700 students) had 27 lecturers and professors in Latin, Greek and Philosophy and 121 in social studies disciplines (Manchester University 1965).
typologies within higher status subfields (horizontal +/-) points to the operation of competing measures of status. In short, higher education was structured, first, into haves and have-nots, and, second, by two competing ideas of what should count as ‘having’. The field was thus characterised by two main, hierarchically arranged ‘rulers’ of achievement.

Figure 5.1:  
The polarised and chiastic structure of the higher education field

Where maps highlight the existence of two principal rulers of success, guides to the field offer insight into the empirical realisations of these rulers. Participants’ accounts claimed that measures of status centred on the definitions of ‘university’ and ‘culture’ offered by competing ‘ideas’. As summarised in Table 5.2, these ideas were differentially valorised and associated with polar positions within higher education. Like the typologies, they were interconstitutive: the English university idea was portrayed as the institutional expression of liberal humanist ideas of culture, and the technological model as embodying instrumentalism. Taken together these ideals were portrayed as the poles of the higher status subfield between whose contrasting gravitational pulls were positioned the various clusters of disciplines and institutions identified by commonsense typologies and towards which positions gravitated (principally as ‘academic drift’ towards the
dominant pole). Though ‘untested myths’, they were real in their effects: the magnetism and power of the liberal humanist English idea was widely asserted; it represents a realisation of the dominant ruler by which positions within the field were measured and was, as Durkheim described the sacred, ‘an object of love and aspiration that we are drawn toward’ (quoted Lukes 1973: 25).

Table 5.2:
Ideas and associated positions in maps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key term of distinction</th>
<th>Institutional map</th>
<th>Disciplinary map</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher status ideal</td>
<td>university</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(associated position)</td>
<td>‘English idea’</td>
<td>liberal humanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ancients)</td>
<td>(Classics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower status ideal</td>
<td>technological model</td>
<td>Instrumentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(associated position)</td>
<td>(university colleges)</td>
<td>(applied science)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[3] Analysing the Field

Contemporary accounts offer normative ideal types rather than analysis of the field’s structuring principles. Maps outline the surface structure of the field and guides represent empirical descriptions of realisations of competing rulers of achievement active within the field. The underlying structuring principles of these rulers remain unexamined. Maps and guides are thus part of the object to be analysed, the explanandum rather than the explanans. The question remains: what are the structuring principles underlying the rulers of achievement shaping the field? To answer this I shall analyse the field in terms of the legitimation device. Using the conceptual framework one can rewrite the above description of the field as showing the following:

(i) Within higher education the legitimation device was realised as competing ideas of ‘the university’ and ‘culture’; whoever was able to define ‘the university’ and ‘culture’ was able to set the legitimation device (in terms of what codes are active in the field and their relative values) to their own advantage.
(ii) The consensus described by contemporary commentators does not portray a uniform or homogeneous field but rather one in which a widespread consensus was said to exist as to the legitimation codes used in struggles and the balance of power between them. This state of play was established, stable, and involved hegemonic dominance of the field by one code.

(iii) The legitimation device underlying the postwar field of higher education had two principal code modalities: a dominant code associated with higher status positions (ancients and humanities) and a dominated code associated with the lower status pole (colleges and applied science).

(iv) Control of the device rested with actors located in the ancients and in the humanities; the legitimation code associated with both their positions was dominant.

I shall term the two legitimation codes ‘U’ and ‘non-U’ to reflect their association with the university and non-university subfields and (mirroring contemporary popular usage) a hierarchy of higher and lower status. The two codes of U and non-U are the principal ‘settings’ of the device within higher education and represent its underlying structuring principles. The codes were empirically realised within the field as competing definitions of ‘university’ and ‘culture’, crystallised by participants as institutional and educational ideal types and associated with the characteristics of specific positions and position-takings within the field. The question thus becomes: what are the settings of the principles of the legitimation device that comprise the U and non-U codes structuring the field of higher education?

In the next section of the chapter I show the U code underlying higher status positions to be characterised by relatively high autonomy, relatively low density, knower specialisation and retrospective temporality (see Table 5.3). In contrast, the non-U code underlying lower status positions comprised lower autonomy, higher density, knowledge specialisation and prospective temporality. I shall selectively illustrate the empirical characteristics that show most clearly the modalities of each principle for the two codes. As emphasised in chapters 3 and 4, the principles are not ideal types: each principle underlies all empirical characteristics within higher education and all the field’s features could be discussed under the heading of each principle. (For example, emphasis on institutional autonomy retained the locus of allegiance, identity and practices within the strongly bounded institution and thus promoted knower specialisation). For each
principle I focus first on the dominant modality for the field as a whole, then discuss how modalities were distributed both between and within institutions and across the disciplinary map.

Table 5.3:
Modalities of the legitimation device in postwar English higher education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimation principle</th>
<th>U code</th>
<th>Non-U code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>higher (PA+, RA+)</td>
<td>lower (PA-, RA-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>lower (MaD-, MoD-)</td>
<td>higher (MaD+, MoD+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>knower (ER-, SR+)</td>
<td>knowledge (ER+, SR-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporality</td>
<td>retrospective (+C\textsuperscript{t}, +F\textsuperscript{t})</td>
<td>prospective (-C\textsuperscript{t}, -F\textsuperscript{t})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
PA = positional autonomy; RA = relational autonomy
MaD = material density; MoD = moral density
SR = social relation; ER = epistemic relation
C = classification; F = framing; t = temporal; +/- = relatively stronger/weaker


Autonomy: Uselessness versus utility
Addressing the external relations of English higher education establishes the appropriateness of a field analysis by showing the field was *relatively* autonomous: higher education was neither independent of nor irreducible to other social fields. Participants’ accounts posit a polarised structure of autonomous and heteronomous positions and position-takings, reflecting a fundamental opposition between intrinsic principles of legitimation, which gave the field its specificity, and extrinsic principles of legitimation emanating from the fields of economic and political power. The English university idea proclaimed that the external was profane and measured status in terms of distance from external involvement and control (positional autonomy) and distinction from extrinsic principles of hierarchisation (relational autonomy): relatively *strong autonomy*. 
Positional autonomy

‘No one,’ wrote Thomas Arnold, ‘ought to meddle with the universities, who does not know them well and love them well’, to which Sir Walter Moberley, postwar Chairman of the University Grants Committee, added: ‘This principle should be regarded as axiomatic’ (1949: 7). This neatly summarises relations of positional autonomy between the university subfield and external interests. The principal external relations of higher education are with the fields of political power, economic power and social relations, or (for brevity) the state, economy and society. In postwar higher education positional relations with these fields were mediated through bodies formally responsible to the state (specifically Parliament) but comprising actors from within higher education whose central axiom was autonomy. Industry and higher education had developed separately; the Industrial Revolution had occurred beyond and with little input from actors in universities.184 Though industrialists were central to the founding of university colleges, and voluntary local groups helped create mechanics institutes and polytechnics during the nineteenth century, neither industrial nor community universities emerged. At the same time, however, universities became increasingly dependent on government financing and ad hoc committees for administering funding, set up from 1889 onwards, coalesced into the University Grants Committee (UGC) in 1919.185 As its funding role grew Parliament became the most significant potential source of external influence in higher education. The universities were related to the economy via their graduates and research, and to society via the social origins and destinations of students, but in terms of involvement in the affairs of universities external relations were mediated through state institutions. This included relations with Parliament. Though Royal Commissions investigated universities and Parliamentary Acts had ruled on higher education throughout the preceding century, there was no legislation comparable to the nationalisation of schooling begun by the 1870, 1902 and 1944 Acts.186 Instead, a network of bodies slowly emerged without

184 See Ashby (1958) and Sanderson (1972).


186 Royal Commissions investigated the ancients (1852-3), London (1909) and Wales (1916) but their recommendations were rarely enforced (Simon 1946). In schooling the 1870 Elementary Education Act began in earnest the process of creating a universal system of elementary education and the 1902 Education Act similarly focused on secondary education.
centralised planning (see Figure 5.2, p.116), of which the UGC was central.\textsuperscript{187} Regarded by universities as the guardian of institutional autonomy and by government as responsible for ensuring public money was used in the ‘national interest’, the UGC was characterised as a ‘buffer’, ‘coupling’ or ‘broker’ between the two.\textsuperscript{188} This unique idea kept the state at one remove from the university subfield as a whole: relatively strong external classification.\textsuperscript{189} Indeed, the UGC was not a permanent, statutory body, as if the state’s interest in universities should remain informal and temporary.

Though a ‘buffer’, the UGC’s composition and practice placed it within the university camp. Its membership overwhelmingly comprised academics who were part-time to avoid ‘managing’ universities.\textsuperscript{190} It enjoyed considerable support among academics and was widely praised as representing ‘the most enlightened principles of state conduct towards universities’ (Berdahl 1959: 194). Though responsible to a Ministry of State, the UGC enjoyed considerable freedom to interpret its vague founding terms of reference.\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{187} The UGC was the only body with an allocatory and executive role in policy, represented a model followed by other agencies, and was widely viewed as the principal central body in university-state relations (Berdahl 1959, Vaizey 1959). As shown in Figure 5.2, other principal bodies and their roles were:

- \textit{Privy Council}: formally approved applications for charters (and major amendments of existing charters), but referred university colleges to the UGC for advice and only after meeting the UGC’s requirements were applications considered.

- \textit{Visitor}: usually the Lord President of the Privy Council on behalf of the Queen, the Visitor’s role was limited to ensuring that a university’s statutes had been upheld in cases of (usually contractual) dispute over their interpretation.

- \textit{Statutory commissioners}: often academics, these were appointed by the government to act on the recommendations of Royal Commissions and typically left decision-making to the universities.

- \textit{Research Councils}: under the ‘dual support’ system the UGC provided grants for capital equipment and support staff, the majority of research funding, and the Research Councils provided grants for projects and personnel. Like the UGC, they enjoyed considerable freedom in determining the size and allocation of their budgets, set the universities at least one remove from political influence and were typically dominated by academics.

\textsuperscript{188} See, for example, Berdahl (1959) and Vaizey (1959). Research Councils similarly followed what was known as the ‘Haldane principle’ of separating the funding of direct research costs from the executive functions of government through a complicated framework of committees.

\textsuperscript{189} These relations are historically related to the comparatively weak nature of the central state formation in Britain (Archer 1979, Eustace 1994, Neave 1986).

\textsuperscript{190} See UGC (1968).

\textsuperscript{191} The UGC reported to the Treasury from 1919 to 1964, when it was transferred to the newly created Department of Education and Science. Its founding terms of reference were:
Its autonomy from political interference was so ingrained within the mindset of those in government that MPs disqualified themselves from membership and Treasury officials ‘defended with all their acumen and experience the autonomy of the universities, and of the Committee, against every attack from whatever quarter’ (UGC 1968: 182). This consensus reflects how the ancients not only populated the UGC but fertilised those bodies whose influence the UGC mediated. The consensus between economic, political and cultural élites identified by commentators such as Shils (1955) was enabled by a longstanding and thorough-going penetration of the Establishment by graduates from Oxford and Cambridge. ‘Without the Oxbridge tradition,’ one contemporary claimed, ‘the University Grants Committee idea would hardly have been conceived, let alone have proved to be workable’ (Niblett 1963: 166). As institutions dedicated to socialising knowers Oxbridge produced graduates whose identity depended on their institution and these graduates propagated the idea of the university this reflected; as another observer commented: ‘the success of the UGC rests fundamentally upon unwritten conventions and the personal and social relations of a homogeneous community of university men, in and out of government, who share common tastes and a common outlook’ (Dodds et al. 1952: 73). The basis of external relations for universities was thus created and shaped from within: relatively strong external framing. This extended to relations with non-university institutions: universities and colleges were strongly distinguished in terms of name, external relations, characteristics and so forth, and control of this boundary lay with the universities thanks to the UGC’s strong influence over institutional chartering. Actors in the ancients were thus guardians of the ‘university’.

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192 Serving Members of Parliament were disqualified from membership of the UGC by the House of Commons Disqualification Act of 1957.
In contrast, other institutions offering higher education were subject to direct external control. As reflected in their sobriquets, ‘civic’ universities were founded as university colleges in industrial cities and towns by a mixture of civic pride and local business and religious wealth. They were manufactured by manufacturers rather than the apparently organic creation of scholars. In contrast with the ancients - which were independent of local communities, national in student recruitment, residential and observed rituals of difference between ‘town and gown’ - colleges were funded by local grants and benefactions, attended by part-time local students, oriented to local economic and social needs, and included local laypeople in their governance. These origins still coloured modern universities and remained the reality of colleges. By the postwar period college funding was formalised through local authorities (Figure 5.2) that comprised

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193 See Table B.1, Appendix B for the institutional origins of civic and redbrick universities.

194 For contemporary perceptions of ciovics and redbricks see Armtage (1955), Rowe (1960), Simmonds (1958) and Truscott (1951), and of technical colleges see Buchanan (1966), Federation of British Industries (1956), National Advisory Council (1950), W. Palmer (1959), Venables (1959) and Wyatt (1964).
politicians and civil servants without the fellow-feeling experienced by the ancients.\textsuperscript{195} In short, lower status positions were those profaned by the presence of laity. Similarly, in relations with society status was associated with stronger boundaries and control in relation to social classes. Not only did the university subfield exclude the majority of the population (see Density) but the field represented a hierarchy of exclusivity. A social class hierarchy among both staff and students of institutions and disciplines (see Specialisation) meant that the higher in status, the stronger the perception of social exclusivity and distinction; as one study put it, ‘there are some people who feel that their children will become socially soiled if they go to Redbrick’ (Rose & Ziman 1964: 22).

\textit{Relational autonomy}

One of the first major studies of civic universities summarised a common conception thus:

\begin{quote}
A University is a corporation or society which devotes itself to a search after knowledge for the sake of its intrinsic value.
(Truscot 1951: 65).
\end{quote}

In other words, a university was not only a society in itself but also operated according to its own principles that emphasised the intrinsic value of its activities. Autonomy from the values of other social fields was a recurring theme within legitimation of higher education. ‘Institutional autonomy’ and ‘academic freedom’ were widely valorised as necessary conditions for excellence; both were vague, negatively defined against the unholy trinity of state, economy and society, and proclaimed academics should practice higher education according to principles intrinsic to the field.\textsuperscript{196} They were also central to UGC policy. If the UGC idea depended on the Oxbridge tradition, without the UGC tradition the autonomy central to the Oxbridge idea might not have proved so pervasive. Commentators frequently highlighted that no planned or co-ordinated ‘system’ of higher education existed.\textsuperscript{197} The quinquennial system (established 1947), whereby universities

\textsuperscript{195} The 1944 Education Act gave Local Education Authorities responsibility for provision of further education (Locke 1978).

\textsuperscript{196} The terms are conventionally traced to breaking free from religious dogmatism (Fuchs 1964, Minogue 1973) but came to be used against any external pressures. For examples of their contemporary significance see Ashby (1966), Berdahl (1959), Fuchs (1964) and Robbins Report (1963, ch. XVI).

\textsuperscript{197} Relatively small governmental grants and independent sources of university income had shaped a pre-war policy of minimal intervention that the UGC maintained despite the growing significance of its grants
received block grants for recurrent expenses for five year periods, minimised its involvement to an advisory role. ¹⁹⁸ The UGC eschewed manpower planning and maintained that economic progress was best served by university independence; as one commentator concluded: ‘it is inconceivable that the national interest could be defined in terms of a formula equating “a little more efficiency” with “a little less autonomy”’ (Berdahl 1959: 4). Manpower planning, with the exception of specific professional categories of public sector employment, namely teaching and health, was widely viewed with scepticism. Similarly, in relations to the social structure a formula equating ‘a little more equality’ with ‘a little less autonomy’ remained inconceivable. Indeed, higher education, and especially the ancients, remained shrouded in secrecy. ²⁰⁰

Taken alongside the Royal Charter, giving institutions the right to create and run degree-level courses, the UGC’s approach allowed universities control over their finances, staff and student selection and curricular practices. Together they were benchmarks of status within the field, devalorising colleges and, by historical association, modern universities. Local authorities exerted influence over colleges through control of finance, buildings, staffing and course approval and were far less laissez faire than the UGC. ²⁰⁰ Colleges were thus relatively heteronomous: oriented to the policy needs of and shaped by their local funding bodies and dependent on universities for their degree-level courses. The entry of institutions into the university subfield was thus marked by both rising status and rising autonomy across a widening range of practices.

Participants in higher education characterised and ranked their practices according to whether they were disinterested, autonomous and ends in themselves, or oriented to agendas, values, purposes and beliefs from outside the field. This distinction between autonomous and heteronomous principles of legitimation underpins a series of oppositions prevalent within contemporary accounts, including liberal / vocational, education / training and pure / applied. In every case the autonomous was valorised over

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¹⁹⁸ Capital grants were negotiated separately.

¹⁹⁹ The ancients were notorious for veiling staffing numbers and funding, problematising the findings of governmental reports and academic studies (Halsey & Trow 1971; Robbins Report 1963).

²⁰⁰ See Locke (1978).
the heteronomous. Nowhere was this more clearly expressed than in relations with the economy. If the industrial and commercial middle class was largely characterised by economic individualism and utilitarianism, then higher education contributed to an alternative vision, one based on liberal humanism.\textsuperscript{201} This outlook represented what Bourdieu (1993a) calls ‘the economic world reversed’: it stood opposed to perceived beliefs and practices of the economic field. Against the utility of products in the marketplace, the value of culture and university education resided in their uselessness. Vocational and professional training were anathema to the university ideal:

It is no part of the proper business of a university to be a professional school. Universities are not to fit men for some special mode of gaining a livelihood.

(Mark Pattison 1876, quoted in Sparrow, 1967: 140).

Though graduates of the ancients were associated with specific professions, notably the Church and Civil Service, the Oxbridge model valorised classical university education as providing character development and producing an ‘English gentleman’ who could lead in any walk of life rather than as offering skills for specific occupations.\textsuperscript{202} ‘Education’ was thereby valorised over ‘training’. The self-conception of intellectuals was of forming what Coleridge had called a ‘clerisy’, preachers of culture who civilised the imperial ruling class, rather than a technocracy oriented to providing practical solutions to policy problems or technical training of specialists.\textsuperscript{203} Culture was not for something beyond itself - though proponents were quick to highlight its civilising and moralising value, such functions were accessible only through immersion in culture for its own sake.

Institutions and disciplines were lauded depending on their distance from occupational relevance, practical application and instrumentalism. University curricula favoured the ‘non-applied’ disciplinary regions of humanities and pure science rather than applied

\textsuperscript{201} Whether the industrial middle class did subscribe to utilitarianism or not, academics believed this outlook to be prevalent among actors engaged in commercial activity.

\textsuperscript{202} As one commentator wrote of the public schools, the ancient universities ‘pursued an amateur ideal, the notion that manners (signifying virtue) and classical culture (signifying a well-tuned mind) were better credentials for leadership than any amount of expert, practical training’ (Wilkinson 1964: 126).

\textsuperscript{203} On English intellectuals, see Hickox (1986), Kearney (1970) and Musgrove (1979).
science, engineering and technology. Technical education was widely reported to be ad hoc, part-time, largely uncoordinated and excluded from established universities but little action was taken to improve its position. Among institutions the higher up the status hierarchy the less ‘vocational’ the curriculum. Lowest in status, colleges had developed as ‘the handmaiden of employment … virtually everything that exists in it has come into existence as the conscious answer to a demand arising from industry or from individual workers’ (Crowther Report 1959: 333). This chiastic economic / cultural opposition was also reproduced within the university subfield. Modern universities had emerged as university colleges oriented towards training the industrial middle class and the sciences and specific industrial interests were well represented in their curricula. In contrast, the ancients resisted professional education, viewed industry as unsuitable for their ‘gentleman’ graduates and were widely held ‘to teach people how to cock a snook at the values of the world outside’ (Rose & Ziman 1964: 77). Similarly, in the disciplinary map humanists looked ‘down, with Olympian contempt, on the engineers and with respectful incomprehension at scientists’ (M. Morris 1959: 374). As this suggests, while ‘pure’ science was acceptably autonomous, applied (and by implication ‘impure’) science was viewed as profane, even among scientists; as C.P. Snow remarked:

We prided ourselves that the science we were doing could not, in any conceivable circumstances, have any practical use. The more firmly one could make that claim, the more superior one felt.

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204 In terms of full-time students in universities in 1961/2 the humanities (28%) and pure science (25%) together accounted for more than half the undergraduate population (53%), compared to technology (including engineering) 15%, medical subjects 15%, social sciences (including law) 11%, education 4%, and agriculture 2% (Robbins Report, 1963: 26).

205 For official positions on technical education, see Percy Report (1945), National Advisory Council (1950), UGC (1950), Ministry of Education (1956) and McMeeking Report (1959); for the attitude of business leaders to technical colleges, see Federation of British Industries (1956); and for accounts of perceptions of technical education during this period, see Halsey & Trow (1971), W. Palmer (1959), Perry (1976) and Sanderson (1972). The Percy Report (1945) set the postwar position by calling for clear distinction of functions between universities and technical colleges.

206 As well as offering pure and applied sciences, civic universities included local industrial specialisms in their curricula, such as metallurgy at Sheffield, mining at Newcastle and Birmingham, and industrial chemistry at Manchester and Leeds (Lowe 1987, Stewart 1989).

207 According to one estimate, during 1800-99 only 7% of all Cambridge undergraduates entered business, less than half the percentage coming from business backgrounds (Rothblatt 1968: 268).
Antipathy towards the values of the economic field was reflected in the social composition of higher education. Status hierarchies reflected distance from the presence of actors associated with such heteronomous dispositions, namely the industrial middle class and working class. Higher status positions were associated with social classes whose ‘distance from necessity’, as Bourdieu has put it (1984), predisposed them to a belief in ‘education for its own sake’. This presents an apparent contradiction: valorising of autonomous principles accompanied by status hierarchies reflecting the principles of another field (society). Indeed, social class had been an explicit structuring principle of higher education. In terms of the disciplinary map, expansion during the nineteenth century was framed within ‘the singular notion that the content of higher education in Britain should be stratified according to class’ (Ashby 1957: 422). Institutionally, the ancient universities ‘gave an intellectual sanction to the domination of the gentry’ (Dibelius 1929: 409) and modern universities, as ‘colleges for people beyond the pale of the Establishment’ (Rose & Ziman 1964: 22), had claimed chartered status on the basis of catering for different social groups. However, postwar legitimation emphasised social neutrality and disinterestedness. Student selection, for example, focused on how well applicants would fit into the established character of the university - relations to society were thus mediated via schooling, recontextualised into the field’s own terms and veneered by a rhetoric of ‘excellence’ (see Specialisation). Moreover, though the ‘clerisy’ role was legitimated as civilising rulers, it was not tied to one specific class but said to rely on intellectuals being what Karl Mannheim (1936) called ‘freefloating’, above the fray of social difference, and was adapted to regional élites by actors at civics and thence to other social classes. Relations to the social structure were thus what Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) call ‘dependence through independence’: the ‘social reproduction function of cultural reproduction’ was tacit, a concealed ‘interest in disinterestedness’.

208 The marginal status of science and technology within the universities was widely commented upon; see Ashby (1958), Cotgrove (1958), Ministry of Education (1956), M. Morris (1959), W. Palmer (1959) and UGC (1950).

209 There was an absence of discussion of gender or race in contemporary accounts of higher education.

210 ‘What Oxbridge did for the national elite, the large civic universities of Manchester, Birmingham and Leeds, did for the various regional élites’ (Jackson & Young 1965: 61-2).
Density: Quality versus quantity
The philosopher William James described ‘the ancient problem of “the one and the many”’ as ‘the most central of all philosophic problems, central because so pregnant... To believe in the one or the many, that is the classification with the maximum number of consequences’ (quoted Gellner 1974: 1-2). In English higher education status resided with the one rather than the many: universities comprised an ‘élite’ rather than ‘mass’ system where participants proclaimed quality precluded quantity and defined the university as a small, residential and intimate community focused on the preservation of a common culture based on shared dispositions. Small-scale, homogeneity, singularity and the shared were valorised over large-scale, heterogeneity, multiplicity and difference. Though relations with external influences proclaimed ‘things must be kept apart’, relations within higher education were based on the rule that ‘things must be put together’ (C↓, F↓). The basis of legitimation thereby resided with attributes characterised by lower material density, lower moral density, and non-differentiation.

Material density
In postwar higher education a key maxim was ‘small is beautiful’. The inherited consensual position in public debate was that quality and quantity were mutually exclusive and that ‘[i]n few other fields are numbers of so little value compared to quality properly developed’ (Barlow Report 1946: 8-9).211 These two characteristics were differentially distributed: quality resided with the universities; quantity lay with the colleges. The university subfield in the late 1950s was an élite system of seventeen universities with a comparatively small student population and low participation rate; the non-university subfield was twice as large and comprised hundreds of colleges of varying kinds.212 Not only university education but culture generally was defined as something of limited availability which conferred distinction upon those possessing it through being difficult to access and master - ‘mass’ or ‘popular’ and ‘culture’ were antonyms. A

211 Expansion of the field through chartering new institutions was only accepted reluctantly; in the period 1909-1948 only one university (Reading 1926) was chartered.

212 Participation rates for 1958-9 were: Britain 4.5% of age group compared to USSR 5%, France 7%, Sweden 10%, and USA 20% (Sanderson 1972: 362). The student population was 98,200 in universities and 195,000 in colleges (calculated from Robbins Report (1963: 13-15) for 1961-2). In terms of numbers of institutions, the Robbins Report (1963: 30-32) counted ten CATs, 25 regional colleges, 160 area colleges and an undisclosed number of local colleges, in addition to 165 art schools, other miscellaneous specialist colleges (of music, commerce, etc) and 146 teacher training colleges.
tradition in liberal thinking running through the work of Matthew Arnold, T. S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis, pronounced: ‘You can have equality; you can have culture, but you cannot have both’ (Eliot, quoted Bantock 1970: 92).

Similarly, in terms of individual universities ‘the English tradition has been opposed to great size’ (James 1965: 24). *Prima facie* this contradicts the facts: higher status institutions were larger. However, the largest universities comprised groups of relatively autonomous institutions of much smaller size.\(^{213}\) Moreover, participants often emphasised avoiding excessive growth: greater quantity would both bring in lower quality students and damage the quality of university education. Large scale institutions (notably the modern universities and non-university subfield as a whole) were associated with mass production, accelerating division of labour and creating overspecialisation, alienation and anomie.\(^{214}\) Such ideas drew strength from anti-industrial contrasts with the factory and, by association, the technological idea of the university. Newman, for example, defined a university as ‘an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill’ (1852/1965, p.122). Tellingly it was widely commented that modern universities had grown dramatically over the preceding half century, as if expansion and excellence were antithetical.\(^{215}\) In all this the central issue was less numerical size than material density. Pedagogy was often portrayed as a mystical meeting of minds between teacher and taught requiring the intimate personal relations of small-scale departments, tutorials and high staff to student ratios.\(^{216}\) The social paradigm was the shared domestic life of Oxbridge colleges; Moberley, for example, claimed that

\(^{213}\) As Halsey & Trow remarked (1971: 79): ‘perhaps the most significant characteristic of the institutional setting of British university life is its small scale’.

\(^{214}\) Much was made of the comparatively very low wastage rates of early dropouts in universities compared to technical colleges (e.g. Crowther Report 1959).

\(^{215}\) During 1861-1931, Oxford, Cambridge, Durham and London grew eightfold, whereas new provincial university colleges grew by thirty times their original figure (Lowe 1982); the rate of expansion for redbricks during the 1940s and 1950s was similarly high. These differences partly reflect differences in initial size, but disparities of growth were noted by contemporary studies (e.g. Robbins Report 1963). Expansion was even more dramatic beyond the universities: from as little as under 2,000 in 1861 to 1.8 million in 1921 (Lowe 1982).

\(^{216}\) British universities enjoyed comparatively favourable staff/student ratios (Robbins Report 1963: 41). Studies suggest this was relatively consistent across the university sector (Robbins Report, Appendix 3: 7), though in popular conception the ancients enjoyed better staff/student ratios (Rose & Ziman 1964: 23).
the most potent educational influence of Oxford and Cambridge has been found outside lecture room or laboratory and even outside the private hour with the tutor. It arises, indirectly, from the character of the community life.
(1949: 33).
The ideal university was full-time and included ‘the widespread and deeply held conviction in all the universities of the role that university residence can play in university education’ (UGC 1961: 15). This contributed to status hierarchies for, beyond the ancients, the realisation of this conviction varied in practice. Most ‘modern’ universities remained shaped by their origins as urban colleges with a high proportion of local, part-time students living at home or in lodgings, while the common conception was that ‘the boozy squalor to which Saturday night in the Union might sometimes descend, was no substitute for civilised collegiate life’ (Halsey & Trow 1971: 74).

*Moral density*
In terms of belief systems the inherited maxim was ‘less is more’: one legitimate university idea centred on the preservation of a singular culture. Given the relatively high autonomy enjoyed by universities one might expect heterogeneous outlooks and practices to flourish within the field. Instead what Moberley called ‘the British tradition of spontaneous cohesion’ (1949: 229-230) ensured a remarkable consensus among universities, while colleges were diverse and heterogeneous. The cohesion was not entirely spontaneous. In terms of positions on the field, debates typically treated the two ideas of university education as exhaustive, obscuring such possible positions as ‘the people’s university’ exemplified by Regent Polytechnic. Moreover, this false dichotomy rested on an underlying complicity: the technological idea was a liberal humanist interpretation of German technical education and claims made for science and colleges emphasised their liberal credentials.\(^{217}\) The dissensus was underpinned by a liberal humanist consensus. The English idea of university education was also propagated across positions in the field throughout the career paths of institutions. First, the University of London played a homogeneising role through its external degree

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\(^{217}\) The technological idea was influenced by nineteenth century German ideas of technical education (Haines 1958) but bore little resemblance to the reality of German technological universities (Ringer 1967) and was influenced by the Oxbridge model (Halsey 1958). The result was that when civic universities were chartered ‘what emerged was something rather baffling to observers accustomed to using the German “idea of the university” as a yardstick of measuring educational accomplishment’ (Ben-David & Zloczower 1962: 62).
programme which provided a syllabus and examiners for higher education qualifications offered in modern universities prior to being chartered. Second, existing universities exercised through the UGC control over the chartering process and depended on the Oxbridge idea as the marker of institutional excellence. Third, the high status of the ancients proved magnetic for actors within newly chartered universities seeking to raise their profile, leading to ‘academic drift’. Fourth, appointments in modern universities were influenced by the ancients and colonised by Oxbridge graduates who carried the English idea with them, orienting these institutions to reflect the education they received. The result was that while colleges were varied, diverse and heterogeneous, universities exhibited a common stamp which set them apart from and above the diverse and incoherent multitude and reflected a unified conception of university education: lower moral density.

This relatively homogeneous belief system was reflected within institutions. The ‘collegiate ideal’ painted a portrait of an organic community of teachers and taught ‘co-operating with leisurely confidence in the task of preserving and transmitting a cultured way of life’ (Halsey 1961b: 55). The shared nature of this way of life was underscored in the ideal by its emphasis on intimate forms of pedagogy, high staff/student ratios, residence and (among staff) democratic governance; unlike the top-down managerialism and fiefdoms associated with colleges, the ancients were held to exemplify a classical city-state democracy.\(^\text{218}\) The aim of university study, as Moberley approvingly quoted (1949: 22), was

the creation, generation by generation in a continuous flow, of a body of men and women who share a sense of civilised values, who feel responsible for developing them, who are united by their culture.

The culture this community preserved and was united by was itself a whole. The curriculum of the English idea was dominated by Classics and mathematics and humanist culture was viewed as singular. The array of humanities disciplines emerging during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were legitimatized as building upon classical literacy (see Temporality) and it was assumed in curricular debates that ‘there must be a liberal, truly humanising, morally improving subject at its centre’ (Mathieson 1975: 26). New disciplines thereby assumed their place within a single common culture with

\(^\text{218}\) The oligarchic power structure of modern universities was a source of extensive dissatisfaction among their members (Halsey & Trow 1971: 377-378).
Classics as its core. Moreover, this one humanist culture was, or should be, common to all who entered university - one (intellectual) culture underpinned one (anthropological) culture. Classics was said to have represented a ‘common culture’ (Burn 1955: 237) or ‘unifying force’ (Lee 1955: 138) through the shared educational experience, dispositions and cultural capital it provided for a relatively small and homogeneous social group. Those who possessed humanist culture, ‘English gentlemen’, recognised one another, spoke the same language and shared a common outlook on life. At the other end of the disciplinary hierarchy, scientific and especially technical subjects were viewed as being in practice fragmented and incoherent - ‘The fantastic variety of technical education almost defies analysis’ (Burgess 1963: 20) - and the common perception was that no single community emerged from such fast-moving, extrinsic, skills-based disciplines.

Differentiation
The English idea of the university and humanist culture were legitimated not only as being singular but also as integrated, seamless and indivisible: they offered a whole education. The university ideal produced the ‘English gentleman’, a Renaissance man equally at home everywhere, and was a total institution encompassing the whole life of the student. The common stamp across universities was also one of non-differentiation; though universities varied in their curricular orientation, the belief was that all universities should offer all subjects (or all those deemed worthwhile) and include both teaching and research. Lower status colleges and technology were viewed as comprising a series of differentiated and specialised sites and skills. Higher status was thus associated with positions legitimated by the underlying rule that ‘things must be put together’ (-C₁, -F₁).

Specialisation: Knowers versus knowledge
Postwar higher education reflected what C.P. Snow (1959c: 17) called ‘our fanatical belief in educational specialisation’: the conventional degree course was single-subject, opportunities for students to change subjects were rare, general or multi-subject courses were held in low esteem and the idealised Oxbridge model comprised a narrow,

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219 For example, at the 1960 GED ‘no one had any doubt that a university worthy of the name had to research as well as teach’ (David 1961: 178).
specialised curriculum. This suggests positions within the field were specialised by the university’s studies (knowledge specialisation). However, what really mattered was not ‘what you know’ but ‘who you are’: university education was legitimated as cultivating cultured dispositions within carefully selected knowers rather than training specialist skills; institutional and disciplinary hierarchies reflected a social hierarchy rather than educational excellence; privileged insight was based on one’s socialised gaze rather than knowledge of specific methods; and the basis of identity and status was one’s institution rather than one’s discipline. In terms of Specialisation the language of legitimation thereby tended to downplay the significance of specialist disciplinary knowledge (ER-) and emphasise the importance of the university as a socialising context (SR+): knower specialisation.

**Epistemic relation**

By the 1960s concern about ‘overspecialisation’ of students and ‘departmentalism’ among staff was rife. Influential liberal thinkers during the preceding century had valorised ‘breadth’ over ‘depth’ and contributed to the belief that any influence of the disciplinary map in specialisation was deleterious (‘overspecialisation’). Reports such as Barlow (1946), UGC (1958) and Robbins (1963) emphasised breadth as essential for both institutions and individuals. Lower status institutions were typically more specialist (such as technical colleges and art colleges), official reports maintained that universities must offer a broad range of subject areas and newly chartered institutions quickly broadened their curriculum; an early prospectus for Birmingham University made clear it is ‘a school of general culture ... It is not a technical school’. Similarly, breadth was said to represent all-round education of the whole pupil and depth portrayed as causing

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220 In 1961-2 single-subject courses represented 80% of honours degrees and 60% of all degrees (Robbins Report 1963: 91); on general courses and transferring subjects, see Hale Report (1964: 12-18) and on the specialised nature of the late nineteenth century Oxbridge curriculum, see Powell (1965) and Winstanley (1947).

221 Within contemporary debate the term ‘specialisation’ was reserved for relations with the disciplinary map. Drawing on the conceptual framework, however, one can describe actors within a field as specialised by either its social or symbolic dimensions. Thus, what was defined as a ‘generalist’ was an actor relatively unspecialised with respect to the disciplinary map but specialised by the field of institutional positions. The narrower and specific use of the term in higher education reflects the taken-for-granted role of the institution in specialisation.

222 *Birmingham University Prospectus*, 1904, quoted Lowe (1987: 164). The UGC (1958) was resistant to the idea of technological universities on the basis that narrow specialisation of the curriculum was inimical to institutional excellence.
one-sided, restricted and distorted development. The *prima facie* contradiction between this rhetoric and the reality of single-subject degree courses was resolved through several widely echoed arguments portraying humanist disciplines as embodying and inculcating ‘breadth’. First, following Newman (1852/1965), culture was defined as ‘universal knowledge’ comprising transhistorical and trans-social truths. Second, humanists claimed that through the inherently civilising nature of the disinterested study of canonic works this universal knowledge cultivated the underlying ‘character’ of the learner. Matthew Arnold (1869), for example, asserted that the study of the ‘best that has been thought and said’ broadened and refined the sensibility and spirit - the humanities humanised and could make us more humane. Third, the faculty theory of psychology was frequently invoked to claim a subject’s value lay in the mental discipline it provided that could be taken into every avenue of the knower’s life. Developing the habitus of the knower was thus more important than imparting specialised knowledge and this was held to favour humanist culture rather than science: the study of language was regarded as the best stimulus to mental faculties and Classics possessed both rich literatures and systematic syntaxes. Specialised study could thus nourish the student as a whole: breadth *through* depth (when humanist culture). In addition, students were assumed to already enjoy a breadth of culture as part of their upbringing and so depth was also predicated on breadth.

Research presents a similar *prima facie* contradiction. Though research was deemed essential to the university ideal and higher status institutions had greater numbers of research students, the advancement of knowledge as a professional activity for specialised scholars remained tarnished. The ideal academic was a gentleman amateur who pursued (usually) his studies ‘for the love of it’, viewing them secondary to his clerisy role of cultivating a cultured sensibility among students. The ‘generalist’ was widely valorised over the ‘specialist’, for legitimate knowledge resulted from an

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223 The faculty theory came to prominence during the late nineteenth century and was still widely proclaimed during the postwar period (e.g. IAAM 1962, IAPS 1965).

224 In 1959 Oxford and Cambridge had more graduate students (2,842) than Manchester, Birmingham and Leeds combined (2,426) (Halsey & Trow 1971: 75). See Cardwell (1957), Curtis (1959) and Powell (1965) on the acceptance of research as central to higher education during the nineteenth century.

225 Only 10% of university teachers were women (Halsey 1964) and were even less visible in accounts of the field. The attitude survey of Halsey & Trow (1971: 279-287) showed strong support for teaching over research shared across the institutional field and especially in humanities subjects.
immediate and unmediated connection of knower with known; it was the knower’s sensibility that underpinned claims to privileged insight rather than knowledge of procedures specialised to a discrete object of study. As Gellner argued, humanists ‘make a curious tacit transition’ from praising ‘many-sidedness’ or ‘all-roundedness’ to concluding that they themselves are the exemplars par excellence of it ‘presumably in virtue of not being skilled at anything specific’ (1964: 63n). Similarly, pedagogy was portrayed as a quasi-mystical meeting of minds that initiated students into ways of knowing rather than states of knowledge. At the ancients teaching was amateurish, only a small part of ‘education’ (see below), and discipline-based Faculties were a distant second in resources and status to colleges.\(^{226}\) Modern universities, in contrast, pioneered the formalisation of graduate studies and were portrayed as considering pedagogy an explicitly principled practice.\(^{227}\) In terms of disciplines, students in the sciences were viewed as apprentices to be taught both the subject and how to do research; and the research was typically set by the supervisor as part of a research team with whom the student enjoyed intimate working relations. In contrast, humanities students chose their own subject and methodology and received little training, and conducted their research with little contact with other students or even their supervisor. If teaching and research divided the loyalties of academics, for those in higher status positions these loyalties shared an emphasis on knowers rather than knowledge.

**Social relation**

The social basis of status within higher education was perhaps its most widely discussed characteristic. It was common knowledge that the preeminence of Oxbridge rested ‘on the basis of an enormous social prestige and not at all for its pedagogical excellence, which may not exist and is in any case not known’ (Halsey 1961a: 343).\(^{228}\) Social prestige was itself based on a widely held vision of university education as selecting, cultivating and certifying privileged knowers. In terms of selection, higher education exhibited what Turner (1971) defines as sponsored mobility, where status is bestowed

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\(^{226}\) On Oxbridge pedagogy see C. Morris (1961a) and Niblett (1963). In the early 1960s some Oxbridge faculties had ‘no premises, no offices, no seminar rooms, no lecture rooms, no common rooms’ and ‘owned’ no undergraduates (Rose & Ziman 1964: 138).

\(^{227}\) For example, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds and Sheffield (all civics) were the first, in 1917, to offer the PhD degree; Oxford (1918) and then Cambridge (1920) followed their lead.

upon hand-picked apprentices by established élites, rather than contest mobility, where status is earned by the candidates’ own efforts in open competition. The ‘traditional sentiment’ that students should be selected on the basis of the fit between their dispositions and ‘the established life and character of the university’ rather than their educational qualifications remained ‘deeply rooted’ (Halsey & Trow 1971: 77, 67, 77). This valorised the academic as a sponsor able to recognise the legitimate knower over the impersonal, more objective and discipline-based credential - habitus was more important than qualifications. In practice student selection often relied on ‘family ties and immemorial school alliances’ (Rose & Ziman 1964: 28); specific social and educational backgrounds guaranteed the requisite dispositions for succeeding; as Shils commented: The “old school tie” has ceased to be an accusation of British injustice; it is now taken as evidence of British quality (1955: 7).

University clusters were associated with specific kinds of schools and so social class backgrounds. By the twentieth century the failure of the Oxbridge scholarship system to provide access to poorer families and the lower fees of civic colleges had helped forge strong associations between different strata of the school system and university clusters: the ancients remained dominated by public school pupils and cics were largely populated by students from modern secondary and grammar schools. This contributed to an acknowledged social class hierarchy within the field. Analyses of the early 1960s show that the higher up the university hierarchy, the more likely students and staff came from professional, managerial or white-collar backgrounds. Institutional positions

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229 See Lowe (1987) on the minimal educational achievements required of entrants by the ancient universities.

230 Institutions were also subject to sponsored rather than contest mobility: chartering depended on approval from actors from high status positions on the basis of a vague and tacit institutional ideal rather than explicit educational criteria. The Privy Council did not publish a Model Charter until 1963 and even then it was vague, emphasising that a university should be a centre of academic excellence, sustained by sound finances, with a reasonably sized body of students and faculty, strong local community support, and committed to freedom of thought (see Shinn 1986).

231 On scholarships, see Bryce Report (1895), Ellis (1924) and Glass & Gray (1938); on the relations between schools and universities, see Lowe (1987).

232 See Halsey & Trow (1971: 213-224, especially Tables 10.3, 10.4 and 10.7) on the social and educational backgrounds of university teachers by university group, and Rose & Ziman (1964: 30) on the social class backgrounds of students. As Halsey & Trow (1971: 73) summarised: in the 1950s ‘Oxford and Cambridge students had fathers who were predominantly well-to-do, southern, professional and managerial, conservative and Church of England’, and they were taught by their ilk.
were, therefore, distinguished by the social coordinates of their members: a hierarchy of knowers.

In terms of cultivating and certifying these knowers, the English idea emphasised the university as a socialising context that provided an education enveloping the whole life of the student within a total community. The ideal were the ancients whose colleges aimed ‘to nurture the social as well as the intellectual life of the college’, were residential, included students from across disciplines, and provided ‘communities for living as well as learning’ (Rose & Ziman 1964: 28). Here teaching was what Weber termed ‘the pedagogy of cultivation’; small-group or individual tutorials were legitimated as enabling a master-apprentice relationship in which ‘not merely a skill but an entire way of life was transmitted’ (Eliot 1948: 43). Moreover, formal teaching was considered only a small part of a wider education, particularly within the humanities. Describing the typical attitude of staff at the ancients, one study described:

*In loco parentis* is never far from their lips; their favourite image for the college is familial; they see themselves as fathers or wise elder brothers.

(Rose & Ziman 1964: 87).

Education was thus a tacit *socialising* process: ‘the essence of an Oxbridge education is its unconscious, autodidact quality’ (Rose & Ziman 1964: 60). The degree of specialisation of courses was less significant than the nature of the institution, such as being residential and full-time; indeed, what one was taught or learnt mattered less than being there at all. According to the dominant modality of Specialisation, one’s institution was therefore more significant for status and identity than one’s discipline. When Shils (1955) imagined a student asked about his studies, it was his university and not his discipline that was the focus of the question (see earlier above). This was particularly true for humanists: that claims to insight depended on one’s privileged gaze accentuated the significance of those social contexts which recognised the legitimacy of one’s

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233 At the ancients undergraduates in the humanities spent far less time in the faculties than those in science whose timetables were heavily loaded with disciplinary work (Rose & Ziman 1964: 68).

234 See also Conn (1961), C. Morris (1961a) and Niblett (1963).

235 In terms of relations between the institutional and disciplinary fields of higher education, it was thus the institutional field that dominated perceptions of status and accounts of the field. For example, a major study of British academics during the early 1960s focuses primarily upon universities as institutions of reproduction and academics as university teachers, and offers little discussion of the disciplinary map except as curriculum (Halsey & Trow 1971).
habit. The converse held for those in dominated positions: actors in modern universities and science were often described as being more loyal to their discipline or department. Where one’s loyalty lay was thus itself a marker of status.

Temporality: Ancients versus Moderns
The struggle between the Ancients and the Moderns, between the past and the present, has raged since the beginnings of literate society; in English higher education the balance of power was overwhelmingly in favour of the Ancients. The past was venerated: the older the university or object of study the better, institutional and disciplinary practices were said to be time-honoured and rapid change was eschewed. The new, contemporary and revolutionary were associated with lower status positions and devalourised as antithetical to excellence. In terms of age, orientation and rate of change, the dominant ideals of higher education were legitimated by retrospective temporality.

Age
Within higher education elders were considered betters (+ Ct). The English idea of the university was one of antiquity and institutional hierarchies were replete with references to age. An influential study declared the main issue structuring higher education to be ‘[t]he battle of the ancients and the moderns’ (Truscot 1951, inside cover), categories well-established in the field. The commonsense hierarchy was a historical narrative of the field’s development, with clusters in order of chartering: Oxford and Cambridge (in that order), London, civics (late nineteenth century) and redbricks (1948-57). Upon chartering ‘new’ universities, CATs and polytechnics have subsequently assumed their place in this chronological pecking order, based not on the age of the institution per se but the date of chartering (see Table 5.1). The name ‘new’ or ‘modern’ university was pressed into service for every cluster as a label for the newest members of the subfield.

236 See Moberley (1949) and Truscot (1951).

237 For example Liverpool (civic) and Nottingham (redbrick) were both founded as colleges in 1881 but the key distinction between them was their charter date: 1903 and 1948, respectively.

238 Studies of individual universities, for example, refer to:
- Alsop (1903) A New University (Liverpool University, civic)
- Chapman (1955) The Story of a Modern University (University of Sheffield, civic)
- Simmonds (1958) New University (Leicester University, redbrick)
- Gallie (1960) A New University (Keele, ‘new’)
Entry to the university subfield was thus a coming of age and on this criterion the ancients had an unassailable advantage.

Antiquity was also central to the disciplinary map. ‘Ancients’ and ‘moderns’ take their names from the ‘battle of the books’ of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries between advocates of Classics and of new areas of enquiry including science, an opposition that remained embedded and reenacted within the field. The epitome of culture was the study of classical antiquity and among newer disciplines proponents tended to assume or proclaim their longevity. English literary studies, for example, emerged in universities during the early twentieth century, but studies continue to note the astonishment of undergraduates upon learning ‘the comparative novelty of their chosen subject within the history of higher education’ (Balick 1983: 3), and argue ‘an essential part of the activity of legitimation and establishment’ is that ‘the subject “English” has always seemed more ancient than it is’ (Evans 1993: 3). Rather than proclaiming the newness of their disciplines as a virtue, humanists tended to adopt the role - which has been almost de rigueur for anyone educated in the classics since at least Alexandrian times - of a partisan for the Ancients in the battle of the Ancients versus the Moderns (Leon 1952: 175)

So, where longevity could not easily be proclaimed, proponents highlighted their classical basis, such that the notion that a man could study modern literature ... without having the classical background, would have seemed shocking and implausible (Steiner 1965: 77).

Orientation
Higher status was also associated with looking backwards to this past (+F). In terms of external orientation, the modern world was kept at arm’s length. ‘Culture’ was contrasted with modern ‘civilisation’ and status depended on proclaiming autonomy from contemporary developments. Indeed classical university education had been legitimated as equipping its students to withstand ‘mechanised, commercialised, industrialised existence’ (Livingstone 1917: 75) and commentators claimed that feudalism and anti-industrialisation remained prevalent among university academics (Halsey 1961c). In terms of internal orientation, the consensus within 1950s higher education was largely based on convention and the status quo rather than a programme of radical reform. Although the basis of this status quo, the English idea of the university, was largely a
Victorian invention, it was presented as a longstanding tradition.\textsuperscript{239} Moreover, its consensual nature gave a gloss of historical accretion and organic development to the nature of change within the field. Everything was legitimated as building on the past and in a way in keeping with its traditions.

Within the field, the more forward thinking the institution, the lower its status. Newer universities were associated with emergent disciplines and social groups of students new to higher education. Older institutions were viewed as having built up tried and tested traditions. With age came wisdom and maturity such that praise for modern universities was often qualified as being in spite of their relative youth; as the Minister of Education stated:

\begin{quote}
I simply do not believe, as a matter of fact, that a new group of teachers, brought together for the first time without any of the ordinary sort of institutional traditions, can in the first ten years produce a product as good as a university already in being [Lord Hailsham 1960: 136].
\end{quote}

So that present practice could develop organically from the past, traditions were actively cultivated. Though rarely mentioned within existing accounts of higher education, it is significant that each new cluster of universities was preceded by a test case: Durham (1836) preceded other ‘civics’ (1900-1909); Reading (1926) predated fellow redbricks (1948-57); and the University College of North Staffordshire at Keele (created 1950) was the ‘experiment’ on which ‘new’ universities (1961-65) were based.\textsuperscript{240} Not only does this allow a trial member into an exclusive club to see whether they will behave themselves appropriately, such moves also establish a tradition for each new cluster to follow.

The past experiences of actors within higher education also played a key role in their current practices. The university ideal was promulgated in part by the staffing of modern universities by Oxbridge graduates who sought to recreate the educational and social environments they knew and loved:

\textsuperscript{239} Though studies showed the reality of medieval Oxford and Cambridge to be very different to the Oxbridge model (Ashby 1966, Rashdall 1895/1936), this image retained its sheen of longevity.

\textsuperscript{240} One can argue that the CATs were chartered in 1966-7 without such a precedent, but their status as CATs since 1956 had effectively made them ‘universities-in-waiting’; rather than a single test site the whole cluster had spent nearly a decade in an institutional anteroom.
Old Oxbridge men and women are peculiarly prone to that peculiarly English habit of mind, nostalgia (Rose & Ziman 1964: 86). For students, university education represented a continuation of their social and educational backgrounds rather than preparation for future employment. Chosen to fit and so maintain institutional traditions from ‘feeder’ schools that resembled their associated universities, students were said to view university education as a means of social certification or finishing school (see chapter 6).

Turning to the disciplinary map, culture was defined in the past tense as ‘the best that has been thought and said’, a repository of past wisdom, filtered by history and hallowed by time; as one public school headmaster put it:

Classical learning is the inheritance of all former ages ... it puts a person into the possession of all the inherited wisdom of the ages (quoted Connell 1950: 188).

This belief rested on the historical thesis that ancient Greece and Rome were the cradle of modern European civilisation and thus Classics was the ‘magic key’ (Bolgar 1954: 1) to both the past and the present worlds. Indeed claims made for science typically shared this orientation, arguing they too built on a longstanding legacy of wisdom. More widely, the task of universities was held to be ‘preserving and transmitting a cultured way of life’ (Halsey 1961b: 55) - reproduction rather than production of new knowledge (see Specialisation). Across the humanities ‘research’ was dismissed ‘as a new-fangled Teutonic barbarism’ and scholarship and learning praised for ‘they imply the preservation and consolidation of traditional wisdom’ (Rose & Ziman 1964: 103).

Rate of change
That the higher status pole of higher education was resistant to change was deemed part of their charm; Oxford and Cambridge were the prisoners of a wider public opinion. It pleases the world to think of them as museum pieces ... immune from the ravages of time. They must be, as far as possible, the unchanging substance of an unchanging image. (Rose & Ziman 1964: 56)

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241 See Ashby (1958) and Mathieson (1975).
But they were ‘Willing prisoners, willing guardians of the treasure, willing keepers of the shrine!’ (Ibid.). The conservatism of Oxbridge was a well-established and oft-bemoaned tradition; criticisms of their brittle unchanging curricula had been made in earnest since the early nineteenth century and every attempt to modernise them was met with strong opposition.\textsuperscript{242} The older universities also acted as a brake upon change more widely. The ancients were slow to join the UGC list, a centralised admissions system, admit women, and other changes during the twentieth century. More directly, the London External degree was inflexible, slow to change and increasingly acknowledged as fettering both innovation and aspirations to chartered status of university colleges for whom it catered for many decades.\textsuperscript{243} In contrast, modern universities were portrayed as forward-looking and able and willing to embrace innovation and respond to changing circumstances such as the changing needs of the economy or new fields of study.

Like the university idea, the humanities were characterised by cautious conservatism: ‘modesty of claim and limitation of aim are at the very core of the Graeco-Roman tradition’ (Leon 1952: 177). Typically focused on canonic traditions, their paradigmatic objects of study were the dead and unchanging languages and cultures of antiquity. ‘Culture’ thus comprised ageless truths and eternal verities; it was to be preserved rather than changed. As with institutions, the legitimate mode of change in knowledge was viewed (at least within the humanities) as a slow accretion of detail. Modern philosophy, for example, was famously described by Whitehead (1929) as comprising little more than a series of footnotes to Plato and the humanist image of science was still influenced by Baconian ideas of filling out established frameworks.\textsuperscript{244} Truth, once established, was unchanging.

\textbf{[5] Conclusion}

\textsuperscript{242} Of many accounts of resistance to change, see Mark Pattison’s very influential book of 1868 \textit{Suggestions on Academical Organisation} and Lord Curzon’s \textit{Principles and Methods of University Reform} (1909).

\textsuperscript{243} London University provided external degrees to institutions that became Nottingham, Southampton and Leicester universities for sixty-seven, fifty and forty years, respectively.

\textsuperscript{244} Scientific revolutions of science were only slowly coming to be recognised outside science; see chapter 7.
This chapter analysed the field of English higher education prior to the proclamations of ‘crisis’ and ‘revolution’ that characterised debates over the field during the early 1960s and which preceded the emergence of cultural studies. The aim was to ascertain the underlying structuring principles of the field. Participants’ accounts of higher education portrayed a polarised and chiastically structured field and outlined two principal competing measures of status based on ideas of ‘the university’ and of ‘culture’. I analysed these accounts in terms of the legitimization device to show the field as structured by the state of play between two legitimization codes: the U code associated with higher status positions (ancients and humanities) and the non-U code associated with dominated positions (colleges and technology). Contemporary commentaries highlight a consensus about the dominance of the U code: control of the device rested with actors located within the ancients and humanities who were, so to speak, managers of ‘the university’ and ‘culture’. Drawing on participants’ accounts I then analysed and illustrated the modalities of the legitimization principles of these codes. First, analysis of external relations showed higher education to be a relatively autonomous field where the dominant U code modality measured status in terms of distance from external involvement and control and of distinction from extrinsic principles of hierarchisation: strong autonomy. Second, participants ranked positions within the field according to whether they exhibited quality or quantity where higher status was associated with weakening internal classification and framing: lower density. Third, when valorising breadth over depth, education over training or generalists over specialists, participants valorised the university as a social context for cultivating privileged knowers (stronger social relation) and downplayed the significance of disciplinary knowledge (weaker epistemic relation): knower specialisation. Fourth, temporally status within postwar English higher education reflected a belief summed by the Book of Job (12:12): ‘With the ancient is wisdom; and in length of days understanding’. In terms of age, orientation and rate of change the higher status ideas of the university and culture emphasised antiquity, inherited traditions and conservatism, and devaloured youth, looking forward and dynamism: retrospective temporality. In short, the dominant U code can be summarised as legitimating the following rules of thumb: externally “things must be kept apart” (stronger autonomy); internally “things must be put together” (lower density); “‘who you are’ matters more than ‘what you know’” (knower specialisation); and “always look back” (retrospective temporality). In contrast, the dominated non-U code was characterised by lower autonomy, higher density, knowledge specialisation, and prospective temporality.
Having summarised the structure of the field during the relative consensus preceding the early 1960s, the remaining questions are:

- what threatened to transform the field such that participants could replace talk of consensus with descriptions of ‘crisis’ and ‘revolution’;
- how these threats were responded to and with what effects for the field; and
- how these events created conditions of emergence for cultural studies.

I address these questions in the following four chapters. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 examine perceived threats to the field and proclaimed resolutions to the resultant crises. Debates over crises facing the institutional and disciplinary fields of higher education took different forms, each with its own specific focus, logic and lexicon: chapter 6 addresses the ‘new student debate’ over changes to the institutional field; chapters 7 and 8 analyse the ‘two cultures’ debate over the disciplinary field. Chapter 9 brings these analyses together to examine the ways these debates opened up spaces for cultural studies.
Chapter 6
Transforming the Institutional Field:
‘Barbarians at the gates of Academe!’

For there is no doubt that in our headlong rush to educate everybody, we are lowering our standards ... destroying our ancient edifices to make ready the ground upon which the barbarian nomads of the future will encamp in their mechanised caravans.
T.S. Eliot (1948)
Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (London, Faber & Faber), p.108.

They start off in the position of the barbarian outside the gates.
The problem is to get them inside the citadel of civilisation so that they will understand and love what they see when they get there.
R.S. Peters (1965)

[1] Introduction

This chapter addresses academic debates during the early 1960s over changes to the institutional field of English higher education. Chapter 5 established the structuring principles underlying the field during a period characterised by participants as stable. In this chapter I begin analysing perceived threats to this consensus, how they were responded to, and with what effects for higher education by focusing on debates over the institutional field. Public debate among leading actors overseeing changes focused on the problems for university education posed by the imminent arrival of a new kind of student expansion was expected to bring and the resolution of these problems in the form of new universities. After setting this debate in the context of wider changes facing higher education I explore this ‘new student debate’ in three main stages. I analyse in terms of the legitimation device, first, the model of the new student offered by participants and, second, proposals for the rationale, form and functions of the new universities put forward by their planners. Thirdly, I analyse the structure of the debate as a whole. After showing new students and plans for new universities to be more rhetoric than reality, I argue that the debate represents a struggle for control of the legitimation device in the
face of external threats to the field’s established structuring principles. I show that the way the debate portrayed problems and solutions offered a response to external changes. I conclude by arguing that trumpeted changes in the early 1960s enabled the revalorisation and renewal of the established structuring principles of the institutional field.

[2] Educational Expansion and the New Student Debate

The case for expansion

By the early 1960s higher education in England and Wales was the focus of unprecedented attention and on the cusp of dramatic expansion. Academic studies into higher education were proliferating after years of resistance and ‘primitive ignorance’ (Vaizey, in Rosselli 1963: 139). The widest-ranging enquiry into higher education to date, the Robbins Committee (1961-3), was preparing to publish its landmark multi-volume report in which it claimed:

> the problems of the next ten years will not be symptomatic of a passing crisis to be met by temporary expedients: they will rather mark the dawn of a new era in British higher education,

(Robbins Report 1963: 70)

Over the next few years two new clusters of universities comprising sixteen institutions would be chartered (‘new’ universities in 1961-65 and ‘technological’ universities or former CATs in 1966-7), national student grants introduced (1962), and plans for designation of polytechnics (1965) and initial ideas for the creation of an Open University (1963) announced. The increase in student numbers for the mid 1960s was bigger than that for the preceding twenty five years and the number of university graduates more than doubled.245

The acceptance of the need for such expansion had arrived with startling rapidity. ‘Indeed,’ as a later commentator put it, ‘the existence of a “public opinion” about higher education in Britain cannot itself be dated further back than the early sixties’ (Driver 1971: 176). Previously expansion had been discussed in terms of a trade-off between quantity and quality where more meant worse (chapter 5). In the mid 1950s there had been little academic support for expansion and in 1954 the UGC had decided against the

245 See Layard et al. (1969: 13) and UGC (1963, 1971), respectively.
creation of any new universities. However, by the early 1960s a convergence of demographic, economic, social and political pressures made expansion the centre of public debate. Demographically, the rise in demand for university places was expected to exceed the rise in supply. The post-war population ‘bulge’ was reaching maturity and lengthening school careers among pupils suggested more of this age cohort would apply to university. The Robbins Report (1963) concluded that during the late 1950s pressure for places had ‘intensified almost beyond recognition’ producing a ‘crisis’ (1963: 75, 257-64). Moreover, a broad consensus of political opinion believed these applicants should be accommodated. With almost full employment and a placid political landscape, governments turned their attention to education as a space for social democratic reform promoting a meritocratic vision of society. The poor record of social representativeness in higher education was increasingly being noted and claims for an untapped ‘pool of talent’ were gaining momentum. The inclusion of this ‘pool’ was also becoming perceived by policy-makers and employers as necessary for economic growth. Comparatively poor national economic performance was increasingly related by commentators to comparatively low participation rates in higher education, and economic

246 In 1960 Lord Simon, who moved the motion in the House of Lords leading to the establishment of the Robbins Committee, declared that ‘the number of dons who care passionately for some reform of the universities, either administrative or academic, has proved to be disappointingly small’ (Simon 1960: 42).

247 See Layard et al. (1969) and Zuckerman (1958).

248 See Crowther Report (1959: 226-7) and Robbins Report (1963: passim) for evidence of a mismatch between demand and supply; as one commentator reported of a GED on expansion: ‘it was only too obvious that the increasing number of well-qualified candidates would become more and more of an embarrassment’ (David 1963a: 124).

249 Governments appointed committees of enquiry to address all levels of the education system: the Robbins Committee (1961-3) on higher education was matched by reports under the chairmanship of Plowden (1963-67) on primary schools, Newsom (1961-63) on lower-ability 13-16 year olds, and Crowther (1956-59) on 15-18 year olds. In addition, government-commissioned reports were published into: teachers in technical colleges (Willis Jackson Report 1957), vocational training (Carr Report 1958), commercial education (McMeeking Report 1959), business schools (Franks Report 1963), university teaching methods (Hale Report 1964), day release in further education (Henniker-Heaton Report 1964), and further education (Pilkington Reports 1966), as well as White Papers issued on Technical Education (1956), Industrial Training (1962) and Polytechnics (1966).

250 Highlighting social inequalities in access to higher education was a major aspect of the work of the Robbins Committee.
trends (particularly a movement from manual to non-manual occupations) and rapid technological change were held to require a better qualified workforce.\textsuperscript{251}

In short, by the 1960s a widely shared view among policy-makers, employers and academic commentators was that of a growing youth population more would be qualified to enter university, more would want to enter, and more should be able to enter. This became enshrined in the Robbins Report’s ‘guiding principle’ or ‘axiom’ of ‘social demand’, that ‘courses of higher education should be available for all those who are qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so’ (1963: 8). When the Report recommended a ‘massive expansion of higher education’ (1963: 87) it was simply setting an official seal on accepted policy.\textsuperscript{252} Belief in an opposition between quantity and quality had swiftly shifted in only a few years towards an advocacy of expansion.\textsuperscript{253}

Managing expansion: New students and new universities

Though secondary accounts of the early 1960s typically focus upon relations to the state, relative autonomy meant ‘the university teachers themselves are the managers of expansion’ (Halsey & Trow 1971: 26). Among these actors though expansion was accepted questions of who should have access to what and where were the subjects of intense debate. Widened access was accepted, but what type of education and in what kind of institution the ‘pool of talent’ should access were still open to contention and contestation. Asking whether higher education was ‘Before the Bombardment?’’, Noel Annan (1961: 351) evocatively described how ‘one can hear the rumble of the artillery being brought into position’. The battlelines were drawn in what was commonly termed the ‘new student debate’.

\textsuperscript{251} For example, Nash (1966) and Robbins Report (1963: 5).

\textsuperscript{252} Contrary to many secondary accounts, acceptance of expansion and planning of new universities began before the Robbins Committee was appointed. The Report’s conclusions were accepted by Government within twenty four hours.

\textsuperscript{253} Lord Hailsham, for example, described how he started at the Ministry of Education in 1957 believing ‘that quality in education was all-important’ but ‘came ultimately to the conclusion … that the thing which is damaging the quality of our education is its inadequacy in point of quantity’ (1961: 126).
In the early 1960s a spectre was haunting English universities: the new student. This student was defined as the first of (usually) his family to enter university and typically of working-class or lower-middle-class origin. It was assumed such students represented the ‘pool of talent’ expansion would bring into higher education. New students were portrayed as bringing ‘their own problems for which the universities have to find the appropriate answers’ (Fulton 1966: 26) and defining these problems and finding their answers was not only a key debate but also directly associated with dramatic institutional change. Huge financial investment from central and local government was ploughed into creating eight new, fully chartered universities in England: Sussex (chartered 1961), Keele (1962), University of East Anglia (1963), York (1963), Essex (1964), Lancaster (1964), Kent at Canterbury (1965) and Warwick (1965). This unprecedented endeavour excited considerable academic debate and captured the public’s imagination. These ‘new’ universities were heralded as radical, progressive and initiating ‘a sort of revolution within a revolution ... the redrawing of the map of knowledge itself’ (Hall 1965: 117). Crucially, they were publicly legitimated by planners as providing solutions to problems presented by new students. Though lobbying for new universities began from the late 1950s, in public debates during the early 1960s the rationale for their existence, form and function focused firmly on the proclaimed needs of new students. Plans, proposals and public explanations of their unfolding shape by those overseeing their creation, including their founding Vice-Chancellors, included diagnoses of the educational diseases afflicting new students to which the new universities were the cure.


Summarising a Gulbenkian Educational Discussion (GED) on the new student, Stuart Hall stated that the ‘new problems are problems of quality as well as of quantity’ (1961: 1965)

254 Gender and ethnicity were almost entirely absent from the debate.

255 Keele University was first founded as a university college in 1950 before being chartered in 1962 and the ‘Keele experiment’ served as a precedent for other ‘new’ universities.

256 For identifying their quotes, the founding Vice-Chancellors were: Fulton (Sussex), Lindsay (Keele), Thistlethwaite (UEA), James (York), Sloman (Essex), Carter (Lancaster), Templeman (Kent) and Butterworth (Warwick). Lindsay was founding Principal (1949-52) of University College of North Staffordshire (chartered 1949) until his death in 1952; though Keele was chartered as a university in 1962, Lindsay was widely recognised as its founding influence (e.g. Vick 1959, Mountford 1972).
Expansion would, the managers of expansion claimed, bring change in the kind of student and these new students would bring into higher education dispositions and beliefs at odds with the cherished values of the field. As the founding Vice-Chancellor of York put it:

Concealed behind so many more of our university entrants now is the struggle between the home or the sub-culture and the life that you are trying to make him lead and the values that you are trying to give him.

(Lord James of Rusholme [henceforth, James], in Hall 1961: 155).

In terms of my conceptual framework, this culture clash comprises a perceived mismatch between the legitimation code underlying the dominant English university idea and that realised by the habituses of new students. The latter represented a threat to the dominant status of the U code of legitimation and thus to the field’s underlying structuring principles. In this section I analyse this threat in terms of the legitimation device, showing that the model of the new student described in debates over expansion represented lower autonomy, higher density, knowledge specialisation and prospective temporality (Table 6.1).

### Table 6.1:
**Modalities of legitimation for the new student**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimation principle</th>
<th>The new student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(PA-, RA-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(MaD+, MoD+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ER+, SR-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporality</td>
<td>prospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-Ct, -Ft)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
- PA = positional autonomy; RA = relational autonomy
- MaD = material density; MoD = moral density
- SR = social relation; ER = epistemic relation
- C = classification; F = framing; t = temporal
- +/- = relatively stronger/weaker

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257 On the GEDs, see chapter 3.

258 The following examines the constructed new student; I return to discuss the empirical characteristics of actual new students later in the chapter.
**Autonomy**

Coming from non-traditional backgrounds, the arrival of new students would represent lower positional autonomy - the (socially) profane would enter the sacred. Such students were state-educated (rather than from public schools) and state-sponsored (thanks to mandatory student grants, introduced in 1962). They thus entered the field from outside its traditional ‘feeder’ schools and social backgrounds and were dependent on external funding. Just as significantly, new students were portrayed as bringing relational heteronomy into the field. They came from homes ‘which have had difficulty over the problems of independence at the rise of adolescence’ (James, in Hall 1961: 155). They were thus vulnerable to the corrupting influences of the mass media and peers outside higher education:

> the subculture, the life of the street ... friends, leaving school at fifteen, 
> earning large wages, buying guitars, taking girl-friends out and living the 
> sort of ‘Baby Cham life’, can, on a working-class boy exercise a really 
> disruptive influence. 
> (James, in Hall 1961: 155)

New students were also pragmatic, utilitarian and careerist. Rather than accepting the value of education for its own sake, they saw it as merely the means to social and occupational gain. James, for example, spoke of

> your very ordinary person who is going to do technology, for example, who 
> really does not like learning at all ... he is on the whole envisaging the 
> university as the place from which the best jobs in electrical engineering 
> are to be obtained. 

Though it was acknowledged that traditional students viewed higher education pragmatically, this was as a means of social certification, a relatively tacit relationship to the social structure that was compatible with academic claims to social neutrality and disinterestedness. In contrast, new students embodied a form of careerism that would valorise heteronomous principles of legitimation on two fronts. First, they viewed higher education as a means of social mobility. ‘The new student will,’ the managers of expansion believed, ‘feel the pressure of the meritocracy more directly, perhaps, than any previous generation’ (Hall 1961: 153). New students saw higher education ‘not only in and for itself, but for what it can bring and give, the opportunities for social advancement which it endows’ (Hall 1961: 153). Relations to the social structure would be made not
only explicit but also the basis for practices within the field. Secondly, as Halsey (1961: 56) wrote, such students ‘seek a degree course to earn a living rather than college residence to complete their induction into a style of life’. They were said to value the utility of credentials in the occupational marketplace and were associated with vocational training and applied subjects. Under such a barbarous gaze extrinsic function would displace intrinsic form as the measure of status; new students would, many managers of expansion feared, bring increasing pressure on universities to provide vocational courses. Worse, new students were said to be attracted to higher-status universities and so would bring those pressures into the heart of the university ideal. New students thereby embodied weaker external classification and framing, a move towards lower autonomy.

**Density**

Though postwar debates over expansion devoted considerable energy to proving the existence of a ‘pool of talent’ untapped by higher education, once expansion was widely accepted the pool was portrayed as a tidal wave threatening to wash away the defining characteristics of the university by replacing a small community of shared beliefs, conditions and experiences with a larger and diversifying population with proliferating beliefs: raising material density, moral density and differentiation within the field.

**Material density**

‘How many and to where?’ were the questions in educational debate over expansion, a central concern being that higher status universities would bear the brunt of expansion.\(^{259}\) New students would, commentators feared, aim for higher status institutions, their expectations fuelled by ambitious parents or grammar schools obsessed with ‘Oxbridge’.\(^{260}\) Should this flood of anticipated applications be accepted without a commensurate expansion of space and staffing, the material density of universities would rise, disabling the intimate social and pedagogical relations upon which collegiate life was said to depend. Sloman (founding Vice-Chancellor of Essex), for example, argued that ‘the cohesion of an academic community is threatened by sheer size’ (1963: 11). The belief was that larger institutions would fail to generate a sense of common enterprise, strengthen boundaries ‘between the administrator, the academic and the

\(^{259}\) See, for example, Ashby et al. (1964), David (1963a, 1963b), Fulton (1962), Hailsham (1961), James (1965) and S. Morris (1961).

\(^{260}\) Boyle (1962) and C. Morris (1961a), respectively.
student’ and lead to anomie, ‘an atmosphere of distrust and even of enmity’ (James 1965: 25). As Halsey & Trow (1971: 243-275) show, university academics hoped expansion would happen elsewhere, in other disciplines and other institutions.

*Moral density*

A rapid expansion of student numbers also threatened the relatively homogeneous belief system of universities. A wider range of social origins would ‘no longer guarantee the backgrounds of family and school on which the traditional collegiate life has depended’ (Halsey 1961: 56). In comparison to existing students, new students would bring different forms of cultural capital and dispositions towards university study into the field, raising the moral density of universities. These dispositions were different but not equal; new students were portrayed as suffering from a double cultural deficit: the lack of what Bourdieu (1976) terms an aristocratic culture and an aristocratic relation to aristocratic culture. First, they came from ‘narrow, uncomprehending’ homes where ‘there are not a great many good books read, there is very little good music, there is above all not a great deal of very intelligent conversation’ (James, in Hall 1961: 155), the latter amounting to ‘family matters and football pools’ (Rowe 1961: 248). Moreover, this lack of cultural capital ‘has been worsened through the pervasiveness of the cultural trash brought about by the mass media’ (Beynon, in Ford 1962: 15). New students possessed little legitimate cultural capital - it was often assumed they had considerable knowledge of and interest in ‘mass’ culture but little background in traditional forms of ‘high’ culture. Secondly, added to this lack of appropriate cultural capital was a lack of familiarity with its acquisition. New students did not possess the social ease that comes from sustained interaction with ‘high’ culture, rendering them socially dysfunctional within the university environment; indeed:

> they are not mature enough to talk intelligently with a stranger or behave with social ease with someone not of their own group.

(James, in Hall 1961: 155).

Thus, new students would both raise the moral density of universities and struggle to successfully integrate into this socially diversified atmosphere.

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261 Concern over anomie was shared by student representatives; see NUS in Hale Report (1964: 128).
**Differentiation**

The harbinger of a *proliferation* of numbers and dispositions, the new student also threatened to create *fragmentation* in higher education. Within institutions new students were said to be in danger of ‘culture shock’ and anomic.\(^{262}\) Between institutions, new students threatened to erase the common stamp said to characterise universities through their anticipated demands for vocational, specialised courses. A homogeneous and shared belief system and institutional pattern would thereby be increasingly displaced by heterogeneity and difference in attitudes and practices, fragmenting the university subfield into specialised sites. This would increase internal classification and framing - a move towards higher density.

**Specialisation**

New students threatened not only to increase differentiation but also to change the *basis* of specialisation within higher education. According to the managers of expansion they brought dispositions that would disadvantage them within universities and believed that what mattered in education was specialist knowledge.

*The wrong kind of knower*

The cultural background of new students was, founding Vice-Chancellors argued, likely to have deleterious consequences for their chances of success. The conventional single-subject honours degree course at university derived, as the founding Vice-Chancellor of UEA put it, ‘from a time when it was reasonable to suppose that students entered the university after liberal education, and, in most cases, from cultivated or bookish homes’ (Thistletwaite 1966: 58). New students were portrayed as coming from culturally impoverished homes, their only *legitimate* cultural capital derived from school education, which was portrayed as narrow and overly scholastic. Though meeting credentialised requirements for university entry, new students were said to lack the requisite breadth of cultural experience; they had the ‘technical but not normally the cultural background necessary for an easy transition to university style study’ (*Times Educational Supplement* 1964, quoted Jobling 1972: 326). This cultural background could not be learnt at school (or at least state school) and was not measurable by examination results. Indeed, some academics argued that one had to distinguish between ‘cleverness and intelligence’ as the number of school qualifications students achieve ‘doesn’t seem to imply intelligence or

\(^{262}\) On this aspect of the new student debate, see Jackson (1969).
the capacity to apply it’ (Ford, in Boyle 1962: 138). So, expansion would bring into universities ‘boys who are not able enough to win any kind of Award ... very beta material indeed’ (James 1960, in Hall 1961: 154). Their narrow base of culture left new students particularly vulnerable to overspecialisation when taking a single-subject degree course at university.263 New students, therefore, suffered from a cultural deficit that no amount of further schooling could rectify - they were the wrong kind of knower.

Knowledge specialists
Not only did new students fail in terms of the existing ruler (knower specialisation), their arrival threatened to change that ruler. Coming from working- or lower-middle-class homes was not held to be in itself the problem; working-class ‘scholarship boys’ had been entering universities for some time. However, such students had been hand-picked on the basis of the ‘fit’ between their habitus and the institution. In contrast new students would be eligible for entry on the basis of displaying mastery of disciplinary knowledge. Where past students owed their position, identity and allegiance to their institution, scholastically-minded new students would focus on their discipline. The problem of ‘overspecialisation’ was thereby not of specialisation per se but of the specialisation of students to disciplines rather than to institutions. To reiterate Halsey, they would ‘seek a degree course to earn a living rather than college residence to complete their induction into a style of life’ (1961: 56, emphases added). This threatened the established clerisy role of the university in favour of training technocrats. Pressures towards the technological idea of the university would see specialists replace generalists, depth usurp breadth, and imparting knowledge supplant cultivating the knower as the basis of achievement within the field. The arrival of new students would thus replace the academic as sponsor with the impersonal credential, the university don with the research specialist and the university as socialising institution with the discipline as vocational trainer: a move towards knowledge specialisation.264

263 See Briggs (1964), Hutchinson (1961) and Sloman (1963).

264 Alongside the new student, a fundamental change in the character of academics was being widely reported: from amateur generalists devoted to teaching and loyal to their institution, to professional, highly specialised scholars focused on research, loyal to their academic subject and who suffered from a disease known as ‘departmentalism’. Sir John Fulton (founding Vice-Chancellor of Sussex), for example, compared the amateur pre-war Oxford tutor to contemporary academics (in N. Mackenzie 1961); see also Bradbury (1965), David (1961) and Wilson (1965). Junior staff were thus portrayed as embodying knowledge specialisation.
Temporality
A temporal dimension was embedded in the name ‘new student’. Anticipated entrants represented a ‘first generation’ (-C\textsuperscript{1}) who valorised the present (-F\textsuperscript{1}) and embodied rapid change within higher education. Coming from families without a history of university education and schools lacking an ancestral line of university entrants, they arrived, it was assumed, with little appreciation of the time-honoured traditions of university education. The English idea of the university looked to the past; new students were said to be preoccupied by fashion, the ephemeral, the new and the now. They were associated with new areas of society, such as commercial culture, and newer subject areas, particularly science and sociology. They sought, it was said, ‘relevance’ to their current preoccupations, which was ‘a generational subculture, promoted by mass media, with values largely alien to those of the academic and cultural tradition’ (Wilson 1965: 9). New students thus not only symbolised the future but also embodied an orientation towards the future. Seeing higher education as a means of social mobility - an initial sign of recognition on a social ladder rather than a finishing school - new students were considered short-term thinkers, demanding an immediate return on their educational investment:

Middle class students and their parents may value higher education in its own right, rather than only as a means to a piece of paper which will be the key to an occupational door. For working class youth it is more generally a means to an economic end.
(Couper 1965: 12)

In this account one kind of student measures the educational present in terms of the continuation of the past, the other in terms of its capacity for breaking with the personal past and for future utility. New students had no organic relationship with the ‘best that has been thought and said in the world’. They came from ‘homes with no tradition of culture or learning’ (Sloman 1963: 11) or ‘homes which are culturally pretty dim’ (James, in Hall 1961: 155) and from schools where they were unlikely to study Classics.\textsuperscript{265} New students thus exhibited prospectively specialised identities oriented to future occupational position.

\textsuperscript{265} On the decline of Classics in modern schools and universities see Kitto (1955), Leon (1952) and Pym (1955).

_institutions are like fortresses; they must be well designed and manned._

Karl Popper
(quoted by R.S. Peters, 1959: 105).

The ‘new problems’ said to be facing higher education in the face of expansion amounted to a cultural clash between the dispositions attributed to new students and the English university ideal. A question often asked by senior figures within higher education was how this mismatch could be bridged. Their answer was to provide ‘in the atmosphere of the institutions in which the students live and work, influences that in some measure compensate for inequalities of home background’ (Robbins Report 1963: 7). This argument had two principal components: new students must be accommodated within universities rather than colleges (for only universities could provide cultural compensation), and this required new forms of higher education within new kinds of institutions.266 Such thinking eschewed the established route of institutional apprenticeship as a university college offering the London External degree in favour of a fresh canvas; as the UGC explained:

New institutions starting without traditions with which the innovator must come to terms might well be more favourably situated for such experimentation than established universities.

(1964: 74).

Existing universities were said to be too staid, sclerotic, hierarchised, conservative and mired in vested interests; innovation was required and this in turn needed a blank slate.267 To this end eight ‘new’ universities were created ‘to break the seller’s market in higher education’ (Hall 1965: 117) and explicitly legitimated by the perceived needs of new students. I shall now analyse the form taken by this ‘total design strategy’ (Jobling 1972: 328), showing that plans for these universities exhibited higher autonomy, lower density, knower specialisation and neo-retrospective temporality (see Table 6.2 overleaf).268

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266 See, for example, the 1960 and 1962 GEDs (Hall 1961 and David 1963a).


268 Like all institutional clusters, individual institutions shared family resemblances rather than being identical. For example, in terms of relations to industry Kent, Sussex, UEA and York were disengaged,
Table 6.2:
Modalities of legitimation for new universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimation principle</th>
<th>New universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>higher (PA+, RA+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>lower (MaD-, MoD-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>knower (ER-, SR+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporality</td>
<td>neo-retrospective (-C\textsuperscript{t}, +F\textsuperscript{t})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
PA = positional autonomy; RA = relational autonomy
MaD = material density; MoD = moral density
SR = social relation; ER = epistemic relation
C = classification; F = framing; t = temporal
+/- = relatively stronger/weaker

**Autonomy**
An emphasis on autonomy suffused plans for the new universities, informing their relations to the state, economy, and their location. Planners argued that for new students to learn ‘mastery over self ... what it is to be moving, self-driven, autonomous agents’ (Fulton 1966: 30), they needed to be protected from corrupting influences, necessitating institutions that were autonomous of both external involvement and extrinsic principles of hierarchisation. The first priority was to separate new students from their originating social contexts and keep them away from outside influences. The location of new universities helped fulfil this role by representing a new version of the monastic seat of learning. The UGC chose locations near provincial cathedral cities and on dedicated, stand-alone ‘greenfield’ sites. New universities were intended to be a world apart, away from the glitzy distractions of peer groups and urban youth culture; as one member of the UGC put it: ‘our aim is to encourage dons to look outwards [to new students] and undergraduates to look inwards’ (quoted Beloff 1968: 29). They were also planned to be residential for, as Fulton argued:

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while Essex, Lancaster and Warwick were more closely involved. I highlight these empirical differences below.
With the change in the social composition of the universities, the right thing is to get the student under one roof. Digs may well be commercial versions of inadequate homes. (in N. Mackenzie 1961: 150-1).

Each university was designed to be what Goffman (1961) terms a ‘total institution’, a ‘university town’ (Sloman 1963: 66) that would help avoid a ‘nine-to-five’ mentality by providing an all-embracing world for the whole life of the student so that ‘no undergraduates need know any other world outside their University township’ (quoted from The Builder, Jobling 1970: 133).269

New universities were also themselves relatively autonomous. Though conceived by local initiative (from Local Promotion Committees applications to the UGC), they were created as fully-fledged universities with university academics centrally involved from the outset.270 The UGC insisted on local financial backing before allocating capital investments from central government and beginning recurrent funding, so that these sources of funding (local, state and UGC) counterbalanced one another.271 Local influence was also distanced by institutional governance remaining firmly in academic hands. The planning of each new university was overseen by an Academic Planning Board (APB) which established early blueprints and appointed the first Vice-Chancellor - they ‘had the principal hand in shaping the character of the university’ (Thistlethwaite 1966: 56).272 They comprised leading academics from existing universities and excluded members of local sponsoring committees.273 Once up and running the university’s

269 See also Boyle (1962), Fox & Barker (1965) and N. Mackenzie (1961). A later study described how: ‘When you leave your lecture room, go shopping, visiting or even walking, you are still in the university and you are not necessarily in contact with any other kind of life’ (Birks 1972: 43).

270 Local Promotion Committees lobbied the UGC, with applications typically supported by local government (through rates) and local business and private contributions (see Fulton 1966, James 1966, Stone 1964, Thistlethwaite 1966 and UGC 1964). See Appendix B, Table B.1 for a brief summary of the inception of a new university using the example of Warwick.


272 APBs echoed the experience of Keele, where representatives from Oxford, Birmingham and Manchester universities oversaw its foundation as an university college in the 1950s (Vick 1959, Mountford 1972).

273 APBs were appointed under UGC guidance, who proposed they should include: a spokesperson for the arts, one for the social sciences and one for pure science (the lack of a spokesperson for applied science is
institutional government followed the civic university pattern of two tiers, with a majority of lay members overseeing financial matters, but academic policy entirely kept within academic staff control.274

The economic world was also kept at bay. New universities were typically located on rural sites, often on country estates, near beautiful historic cities, and in regions unassociated with heavy industry.275 Their planned curricula reflected this distance by emphasising liberal over vocational and pure over applied. Under UGC guidance (1964), new universities eschewed applied science and technology in favour of the humanities, social sciences and pure science; as senior staff at Kent stated, ‘the primary aim of a university is emphatically not vocational’ (Fox & Barker 1965: 9).276 As A.J.P Taylor put it, new universities ‘all assert the doctrine that university is a way of escape from life, and not a preparation for it’ (quoted Beloff 1968: 28). Principles drawn from industry were also inimical to their planning. ‘A university is not like a factory’, declared James (1967: 8) and so, as the Minister for Science and Technology argued:

You cannot put down a university block like a new motor manufacturing plant. A university is a living thing, perhaps almost a biological phenomenon.

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274 The administration of Essex University, for example, comprised: (i) an upper tier of a Council and a Court, overseeing finances; and (ii) a lower tier of a Senate, General Assembly and Students’ Council, which embraced all academic staff and elected student representatives and oversaw admissions, courses of study, degree standards, research, staff nominations, and student welfare (Sloman 1963). (See Appendix B, Table B.1 for an example of how planning of a new university shifted to APBs and thence Vice-Chancellors).

275 Keele, Sussex, Essex, York and UEA were all located in parkland with accompanying country houses. Consider, for example, Fulton’s description of Sussex: located in the former private estate of the Earls of Chichester and including the former family home,

an unpretentious house of great architectural merit and beauty ... The university is thus situated in an area designated as one of outstanding natural beauty in which the folds of the South Downs are shown off to their best advantage by many venerable and beautifully placed trees.


276 At Sussex University, for example, of six Schools of Study created in its first three years, only one (Physical Sciences) was in the natural sciences (Fulton 1966). Similarly, Essex began with Schools of Social Studies, Comparative Studies and Physical Sciences (Sloman 1963), Kent began with Faculties of Humanities, Natural Sciences and Social Sciences, and at York nearly half the first-year intake was in social science (James 1966).
Not only were new universities intended to be independent of external involvement and oriented towards autonomous principles of hierarchisation but their dynamic of development should be along its own lines: relatively strong autonomy.

**Density**
New students required more than isolation from temptation, they needed ‘continuous education ... positive guidance, which is both intellectual and cultural’ (James in Hall, 1961: 155-6). Accordingly, new universities were designed to provide an education of the whole person that enveloped their whole life. The internal relations of new universities declared ‘things must be put together’ by embodying relatively low material and moral density and eschewing differentiation.

**Material density**
Size of universities was ‘among the more controversial elements’ of expansion (James 1965: 24). Planners of new universities argued that scale was inimical to successfully integrating new students and they planned growth to maintain comparatively favourable staff/student ratios. This low material density extended to social and pedagogical relations. New universities adopted features of the Oxbridge collegiate system, with building layouts imitating quadrangle courts and cloisters and student residences emulating colleges. Collegiate organisation was viewed as a means of dividing universities into small social units and enabling ‘organic’ cumulative growth by adding

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277 Lord Hailsham was Minister of Education 1957-60 and Minister for Science & Technology 1960-64.

278 For example, planned expansion of Sussex over its first ten years was based on a 1:8 teacher/student ratio (Fulton, 1966: 20-21), and of Warwick on a ratio of 1:7 (UWPC 1964: 14).

279 Collegiate organisation differed among the new universities (Cross & Jobling 1969, McClintock 1974: 322-357). Though adopted from the outset by York, Kent and Lancaster, they had differing emphases: ‘If a Lancaster college is in concept a headquarters, and a York college a club, a Kent college is a family home’ (Beloff 1968: 133). Warwick and Essex comprised ‘quasi-colleges’. Where the cost of colleges was prohibitive, affordable aspects of the collegiate ideal were adapted. UEA and Sussex used the ‘secret strength’ of collegiate organisation: the “staircase” principle (Thistletwaite 1966: 64), as well as including Junior Common Rooms and having compulsory evening meals in emulation of ‘Hall’ (Windsor & Wansell 1965). Unlike the ancients, colleges at new universities were not financially independent. In contrast Schools of Study, which were often devolved, had their own budgets and responsibility for admissions (Fox & Barker 1965, Thistletwaite 1966).
new colleges. Pedagogically, there was considerable support ‘for any attempt to stop
the flood of numbers turning university teaching into a conveyor-belt system’ (N.
Mackenzie 1961: 150). The proclaimed belief was that
it is the duty of any large university to overcome some of the dangers
inherent in its size by organising as much of its teaching as possible on a
personal basis.
(James 1965: 25).
This was an apprenticeship model of pedagogy; the Chairman of Kent’s Academic
Planning Board, for example, praised the ‘magic’ that came from ‘the close association
between the apprentice and the master’ (Christopherson, in Nash 1966: 187). Thus
practices such as small-group tutorials and coursework assessment were lauded for
encouraging ‘the goodwill that is generated by frequent meetings between teachers and
students’ (Fox & Barker 1965: 11).

Moral density
The need for small numbers flowed from a desire to generate a shared sense of
community among staff and students:
It is fundamental to the well-being of the University as a community that
all members of the University see themselves as belonging to a single
society. .... the University is essentially an integrated academic society
(University of Warwick Promotion Committee [UWPC] 1964: 4, 26).
New universities were planned to be organic communities sharing a singular set of beliefs
and values: relatively low moral density. However, given new students would struggle to
integrate successfully, it was vital that new universities be places
where personal influence and personal contacts could replace the wrong
kind of fragmentation and the creation of boundaries of incomprehension
between subject and subject, between student and teacher, and between ‘the
administration’ and the rest of the university.
(James 1965: 25)
In order to integrate new students, new universities were themselves internally integrated.
Campus layouts were designed to maximise internal interaction: sites had to be
undispersed and were designed with integrated learning and living areas and an openness

280 See James (1965: 25) and Fox & Barker (1965), respectively.
and plateglass construction that gave the surveillance potential of a panopticon.281 Intimate social and pedagogical relations were legitimated as opening up more of the new student for surveillance and discipline and engendering familiarity, interest and social ease.282 Small group teaching, collegiate organisation and the representation of students on administrative committees were all propagated as engendering shared belief in and commitment to traditional values of university education.283

**Differentiation**

Differentiation of function both within and between universities was minimised. All students within Schools of Study took common first year courses (see below), students from across disciplines shared accommodation in colleges, and great emphasis was placed on new universities embracing a broad range of disciplines and being centres of research and teaching.284 New universities were thereby intended to be a relatively homogeneous group of institutions that were fully integrated into the university community from the outset: relatively low density.

**Specialisation**

‘The aim,’ the Robbins Report stated, ‘should be to produce not mere specialists but rather cultivated men and women’ (1963: 6). A common conception was that with traditional students this ‘could be left to look after itself’ but ‘owing to the change in the social background of students’ greater care was needed to ensure teaching was undertaken ‘without risk to the whole man’ (UGC 1958: 39). In response new universities were designed to downplay specialised disciplinary knowledge (weaker epistemic relation) and to inculcate institutional loyalty (stronger social relation): knower specialisation.

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281 In considering proposals from Local Promotion Committees, the UGC (1964: para 267-287) demanded a site of an undispersed two hundred or more acres for a university of over 3,000 people, so all facilities could be in one place.


283 See Sloman (1963) and UWPC (1964) on student participation in administration.

Discouraging knowledge specialisation

For university planners new students problematised conventional single-honours courses and necessitated new forms of curriculum ‘to give the student a more liberal education ... broad enough for them to emerge as educated human beings’ (Thistlethwaite 1966: 58). This restructuring of curriculum and pedagogy towards integration was widely advocated; the UGC, for example, stated:

we declare our main interest to be in the general broadening of the undergraduate curriculum, in the breaking down of the rigidities of departmental organisation, and in the strengthening of the relationships between teacher and taught.
(1964: 105).

At new universities planners argued that ‘knowledge is undivided’ and ‘cannot be fitted neatly into departmental pigeon-holes’ and emphasised ‘the fundamental unity of human knowledge’ (Sloman 1963: 27, 35). Drawing a ‘new map of learning’ (Briggs 1964), many APBs adopted multi-disciplinary ‘studies’ or Schools of Study that brought together cognate fields and within which students typically studied a common foundation course before taking multi-subject honours degrees.\(^{285}\) The plan was to teach several subjects in relation - ‘In all our schemes of study we stand by the principles of integration’ (Sloman 1963: 41) to minimise students’ contact with disciplinary boundaries, ameliorate overspecialisation, and weaken the influence of discipline-departments on their identity and allegiance.\(^{286}\) Accordingly, requirements for applicants’ qualifications to match their chosen subject areas were relaxed, pedagogy emphasised ways of knowing rather than states of knowledge, and examinations were minimised.

However, disciplinary specialisation was delayed rather than dispensed with. In order ‘to broaden the base without blunting the point of the pyramid’ (Thistlethwaite 1966: 60) new universities often embraced a fourth year or taught Masters course for more able

\(^{285}\) At Sussex students took a common foundation course for two terms, then a core subject and two contextual subjects; York, UEA, Lancaster and Warwick combined major and minor subjects; Essex provided a broad-based preliminary course; Kent had a four-term foundation course; and at Keele a Foundation Year began a four year degree course. Commitment to multi-disciplinary programmes varied between institutions (Jobling 1972: 328-329), but all shared a preliminary period of study in multiple subject areas (Beloff 1968: 38-55).

\(^{286}\) See, for example, Briggs (1964), Fox & Barker (1965), James (1966) and Thistlethwaite (1966).
students wishing to pursue an academic career. Access to the unthinkable was thus moved upwards - a form of epistemic inflation. Only once resocialised into being the right kind of knower could new students gain access to disciplinary specialisation; as the Hale Report declared:

Whereas postgraduate study must necessarily be subject-centred, undergraduate teaching should be student-centred.
(1964: 9).

Encouraging knower specialisation
‘Institutions of higher education,’ stated the Robbins Report, ‘are not merely places of instruction. They are communities.’ (1963: 93). New universities were designed to inculcate a sense of membership of and attachment to the university. They aimed to ‘show the student what it is to be a university man’ (Fulton, in N. Mackenzie 1961: 151) and to shape them in such a way that, as the founder of Keele argued, it ‘would be apparent in the university man’s conduct and conversation for the rest of his life’ (Lindsay, in Gallie 1960: 66). The adoption of elements of a collegiate-tutorial system emphasised the institution as a social and socialising space extending beyond transmission of knowledge in lecture halls towards shaping the whole knower within a total community. Collegiate organisation, for example, was supported by the UGC as providing:

a focus for a genuine common life in which its members, senior and junior, could feel they shared and to which they could develop real loyalties
(1964: 110).

Similarly, Vice-Chancellors emphasised the significance of campus design and architects were exhorted to inculcate in students the idea that university life as well as educating a man in his profession, should develop the universal man, who spends his time not only in the laboratory and lecture-room but participating in a unique way of life ... and that he must in his turn appreciate university values and possess a sense of commitment to them.

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287 The compensatory nature of integrated first-year courses was emphasised by the extension of degree study to four years at Keele. Planners at Sussex and UEA envisaged about one third of all undergraduate students would take four year degrees (Fulton 1966, Thistlethwaite 1966), while at Essex, Sloman (1963) argued that a student programme should be a pyramid with its apex in a Master’s year. Such plans suggest it would take four years to achieve the requisite ‘depth’ for an honours degree when the first year was required for ‘breadth’.
The institutional and curricular plans for new universities amounted to attempts to shift the locus of identity and allegiance of new students away from disciplinary boundaries and to the institution: knower specialisation.

**Temporality**

In terms of age, orientation and rate of change plans for the new universities appear, *prima facie*, to exhibit prospective temporality. Labelled ‘new’ and legitimated as designed for ‘new’ students, their status as the first institutions to be created as universities *de novo* was widely trumpeted. As resocialising institutions they aimed to break the influence of the past social class of new students in favour of new dispositions. In terms of external orientation new universities were quickly viewed as illustrating the confident, strident ‘new Britain’ widely heralded in the early 1960s. Their curricula proclaimed moves away from Classics towards such modish and self-consciously ‘relevant’ subjects as ‘Britain in the contemporary world’ (Kent) or ‘Contemporary Britain’ (Sussex). They were associated with emergent and fashionable subjects such as sociology and with new professions in the welfare state and service sector. In terms of internal orientation, they were portrayed as a radical departure from the traditions of higher education and representing the future of the field. Contemporary accounts emphasise new universities as the source of forward-looking educational innovation. Lastly, in terms of rate of change, new universities were described as revolutionising the disciplinary map and planners emphasised flexibility of curricula for future development (rather than a settled new map of learning) and the need to produce flexible graduates capable of continually adjusting to a rapidly changing world. They were new, contemporary and geared to change.

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288 Sir Hugh Casson was appointed architect to several new universities. See also Fry (1964), Cassidy (1964), Spence (1964) on architecture at Sussex, Taylor (1965) on the design of residences, and Dormer & Muthesius (2001) on UEA. On the importance of the architect’s contribution to the plans of new universities, see Fulton (1966), James (1966) and Thistlethwaite (1966).

289 See Fox & Barker (1965) on Kent and Briggs (1964), Daiches (1964) and Riesman (1966) on Sussex.

290 At Sussex, Briggs (1964: 67) stated: ‘we were more interested in establishing conditions for growth than in plotting a map of learning for the 1960s’. See also UWPC (1964) on the need for curricular flexibility at Warwick.
Nonetheless, this portrait was tempered; new universities did not straightforwardly exhibit prospective temporality. First, the synonymic name of ‘modern university’ had been used for every university cluster chartered since the ancients - it was itself a tradition (see chapter 5). Secondly, such ‘radical’ practices as broadening degree courses were already established in existing universities; as Hoggart argued:

The new universities sometimes claim to be doing, and are praised in the press for doing, “new” things which have in fact been quietly done for years at older places.

(1966a: 165).291

Thirdly, plans for the newest universities intentionally imitated many features of the oldest; their collegiate organisation, architecture, tutorials, cathedral city locales and course structures were intentionally designed to reproduce ‘those close and informal relations between teachers and students that are a characteristic feature of this country’s tradition’ (Robbins Report 1963: 24) and to enable new students to ‘enjoy the same intense and immediate undergraduate experience’ as at the ancients (Thistlthwaite 1966: 68). Sussex University, for example, was nicknamed ‘Balliol by the sea’ and its School of Social Studies was directly influenced by pre-war Oxford University courses in Greats and Modern Greats and proclaimed ‘a modified P.P.E.’ (Fulton 1962).

However, planners were recontextualising rather than reproducing the past, often claiming that they were being true to an ideal which the ancients themselves had fallen from.292 Ancient universities were not imitated; rather planners aimed to revive and re-enliven the spirit of an Oxbridge education in the strident, optimistic and modernist image of the 1960s and within its economic constraints. Ideas such as seminars and Schools of Study were imported from America and Scotland as more cost-effective forms of the Oxbridge tutorial and tripos.293 Pragmatism too played its part. To attract senior

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291 Optional subjects and joint and combined courses were well established (Robbins Report 1963); attempts to overcome ‘overspecialisation’ were being instituted, such as a common first year for all degree students in Arts at Leicester University (Little 1963a); the tutorial was common practice in civic universities (Sloman 1963); and the collegiate ideal influenced the design of new halls of residence built in older universities to accommodate their expansion (CVCP 1948, UGC 1957).

292 See Gallie (1960: 65-80) on how the ‘Keele experiment’ was motivated by the desire to recreate Oxford in a modern setting.

293 In contemporary discussions the ideal size of the seminar varies from under four to over twenty students with little justification beyond institutional budget (e.g. Watt 1964). Schools of Study at least
staff planners ensured new universities offered the familiar environment of collegiate life near historic cities with good schools and the freedom to innovate and so re-enliven the spirit of the ‘English idea’. New universities were thus an accommodation of the traditions of the field to contemporary exigencies, offering wherever possible updated versions (-C?) of established practices (+F?): neo-retrospective temporality.

[5] The New Student Debate: Controlling the legitimation device

The only real people are the people who never existed

Concern over ‘crisis’ and ‘revolution’ in the institutional field of higher education centred on the symbiotic issues of problems presented by new students and solutions proposed in plans for new universities. Having discussed what these comprised in terms of their modalities of legitimation, I shall now analyse the debate as a whole to examine the nature of the threat and its resolution. I begin by comparing these collective representations - the ideas of the new student and the new university - with the empirical reality of early 1960s higher education.

Myths and realities
On several counts the new student was one of the great ‘myths of university expansion’ (Little 1963b: 185). First, new students were not about to flood universities. The social class composition of the student population in English higher education was neither undergoing nor about to experience great change; as a proportion of the student body, working-class university entrance remained relatively unchanged since the 1910s. By the mid 1960s it was clear the rapid expansion of university places had ‘benefited children of the upper and middle strata more than those from the lower stratum’ (Westergaard & Little 1967: 232) and that ‘middle class pupils have retained, almost intact, their historic partly arose from the need to quickly offer a wide portfolio of disciplines worthy of the ‘university’ title (Thistilthwaite 1966).

294 National salary scales restricted wage differentials. Staff recruitment was a major factor in the UGC’s considerations of locations (N. Mackenzie 1961). Founding Vice-Chancellors shared this stance, focusing on school provision and housing (see N. Mackenzie 1961: 141-143).
advantage over the manual working class’ (Douglas et al. 1968: xii). The existence of a ‘pool of talent’ did not necessarily mean these able young people were waiting to enter. Secondly, when new students did enter higher education they tended not to choose new universities; indeed, working-class students were under-represented even compared to established universities. New universities were popular among traditional students; as total institutions in rural locales they offered a continuation of the public boarding school experience while curricula emphasising the humanities attracted female students. By the late 1960s new universities were characterised as ‘an alternative choice, albeit a second choice, for the type of undergraduate found at Oxford and Cambridge’ (Cross & Jobling 1969: 178). New students opted instead for such educational experiences as sandwich courses (with industrial placements suggestive of work and job training) at technical colleges. Thirdly, actually existing new students resembled little the portrait painted by the managers of expansion; they were a survivor population who had passed numerous formal and informal selection processes and arrived already well socialised into the legitimate educational habitus.

New students did not flood higher education, did not choose new universities when they did enter, and did not possess the characteristics attributed to them. In short, the ‘new student’ constructed by managers of expansion did not exist - the barbarian horde was a fiction. So were the new universities. Not only did their raison d’être fail to materialise but the portrait painted by planners was rhetorical and subject to ‘academic drift’. Within a decade criticisms abounded that innovative practices had either failed to appear or been undermined leaving them ‘old wine in new bottles’. The reality failed to fulfil the rhetoric of curricular revolution:

295 See also Couper (1965), Little & Westergaard (1964) and Robbins Report (1963, Appendix 1: 42).

296 A study of student intake in 1966 concluded that only Lancaster matched the percentage of working-class students predicted by the Robbins Report and had a smaller percentage coming from independent ‘public school’ sector (Perkin 1969). See also Cross (1966) and Cross & Jobling (1969) on UEA and James (1967) on York.

297 See Hodgson (1960) and Jobling (1972).

298 See, for example, studies by O. Banks (1968), Halsey et al. (1980), Jackson & Marsden (1962) and Jobling (1969).

299 Examples of such critical surveys include: Beloff (1968: 32, 60) on Sussex as a ‘9-5’ university; Inkster (1971) on coursework assessment at UEA; Irwin (1972) on interdisciplinary work at Kent; Mountford (1972) on Keele; and Church (1974) on colleges at Lancaster.
There is little, and often no, contact between disciplines within schools of study, let alone between disciplines in different schools. Day to day teaching rarely refers beyond a narrowly defined range of specialised problems (Osborne 1970: 4).

That both new students and planned new universities were myths raises questions of what the threat actually comprised, how the new universities served as a response to this threat, and what effects the debate as a whole had for higher education.

**The real threat of non-U**

The public face of the debate was of pastoral concern for the educational success of new students. Its key question was avowedly how the identified cultural gap with universities could be bridged in the interests of new students and, though often expressed in what can today appear elitist or parochial language, participants legitimated stances as helping new students. While not doubting their sincerity, I argue the debate can also be understood as a realisation of struggles for control of the legitimation device. The new student was an updated fear of the barbarian tide, the threat of the profane entering the realm of the sacred. The ‘problems’ presented by new students comprised a competing definition of the ‘university’ to that dominating the field. As I have shown, characteristics attributed to new students can be rewritten as realisations of lower autonomy, higher density, knowledge specialisation and prospective temporality (see Table 6.3 overleaf). Returning to the structure of higher education analysed in chapter 5 shows these modalities to be the same as the non-U legitimation code that was underlying the technological idea of the university and associated with lower status positions (such as colleges). The idea of the new student was thus an anthropomorphised ‘idea of the university’ at odds with that dominating the field. If as widely anticipated new students entered universities in large numbers they could change the distribution of legitimation codes across the field and the state of play between them, valorising non-U at the expense of U. This would amount to a loss of control by high status positions over definitions of achievement and status. The spectre of the new student can be understood as a fear of a loss of ownership of the legitimation device.
Table 6.3:
Legitimation modalities and codes for English university idea, new student and new universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimation principle</th>
<th>English idea</th>
<th>New student</th>
<th>New university</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>higher</td>
<td>lower</td>
<td>higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>lower</td>
<td>higher</td>
<td>lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>knower</td>
<td>knowledge</td>
<td>knower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporality</td>
<td>retrospective</td>
<td>prospective</td>
<td>neo-retrospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code:</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>non-U</td>
<td>neo-U</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the new student was a myth, occasioning a moral panic. This begs the question: what was the actual source of this threat? Gellner (1964: 50) put such a position succinctly:

When people erect disproportionately elaborate barriers against X, though X is no real danger to them; when they are quite untroubled by X when it is thinly, indeed transparently disguised; under such conditions we must suspect that, whatever they may say or think, they are not really worried by X at all, but by Y.

In this case X is the entry into universities of new students and Y, I argue, represents pressures to control higher education. The factors discussed at the beginning of this chapter as having made expansion inevitable by the early 1960s also contained within them potential threats to the existing structure of higher education. These included: growing state involvement in financing and policy; closer ties between higher education and economic interests; the effects of expansion at lower levels of education; meritocratic inclusion on the basis of educational ability; and the widespread perception of the necessity for reform. Rewriting these in terms of the device, they become: lower autonomy (from state and economy), higher density (massification), knowledge specialisation (contest mobility) and prospective temporality (change) - a move towards a non-U legitimation code. Control of the device by actors in dominant positions within the field was being challenged by anticipated expansion whose causes lay beyond the
field, in economic, political, social and cultural changes. Such pressures were often expressed in terms of a diffuse and ill-defined threat to established values in higher education; commentators claimed that economic and political changes meant ‘the Idea of a University ... is frequently the subject of ridicule’ (Mackerness 1960: 14) and university teachers:

feel that society itself is “changing like mad”; they feel a pressure on them to make universities merely functional.

(Hoggart in Rosselli 1963: 144).

Thus Sir Charles Morris claimed at the 1960 GED:

We are rebels...against practically everything which on the educational side they all say and do, and against the whole of their concept of what a university is for and what its prime purpose is.


‘They’ in this case meant ‘the authorities of the universities’ (Ibid.). Given that Morris was Vice-Chancellor of Leeds University (1948-63), Chairman of the Advisory Board of University Quarterly, a former tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, and former Chairman of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (1951-55), and that the ‘we’ he refers to include Directors of departments and research centres and Masters of Oxbridge colleges, then who the ‘authorities’ they were rebelling against might be is open to question (and left undefined by Morris). Senior managers of expansion thereby felt embattled, encircled by profane notions of the ‘university’ threatening to redefine the field. The new student embodied fear of changes to the field emanating from beyond its boundaries.

The new universities were a solution to the threat of non-U entering higher education. Their creation added a new cluster of positions to the institutional field characterised as innovative, radical and revolutionary. However, this concealed a more ambivalent relationship to change, one that recurs in terms of their underlying structuring principles. The characteristics of new universities can be rewritten as exhibiting higher autonomy, lower density, knower specialisation and neo-retrospective temporality. In all but Temporality new universities thereby shared modalities exhibited by the English university idea (Table 6.3). They thus represent neither change nor reproduction of the

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300 See also Berdahl (1963) and Wilson (1965).

status quo but rather a variation, an updated or ‘neo-U’. The idea of the new university was a new version of the traditional English idea rather than a new idea of the university. Something of this compromise between continuity and change was expressed in Stuart Hall’s summation of the question facing the universities as whether they could ‘by some devious method, salvage the concept of “education” from the pressures of a merit-minded society ... Can they educate by stealth?’ (1961: 153). In conceptual terms, Hall’s question asks whether the U code could be maintained in the face of a potential threat from the new student’s competing code of legitimation. The answer was to refresh and renew U; as Sloman put it, ‘traditional ends will have to be sought by new means’ (1963: 12).

Retaining control of the legitimation device

The new student debate was about more than a specific group of students and institutions. The new student embodied anxieties over the rise of a measure of achievement (non-U) that would restructure higher education. The neo-U code underlying plans for new universities can be understood as a response by actors in dominant positions within higher education to this embodied threat; it provided an antidote to new students. This leaves the question of what the solution to the external threat of non-U from beyond higher education comprised. This response was the structure of the new student debate as a whole. Thus far I have analysed specific positions advanced in the debate, its messages; I now move the level of analysis to the medium of the debate. I argue that the medium is itself a message, one helping to retain control of the device and so maintain the established underlying principles of the field in four main ways: maintaining autonomy, restricting positions, resocialising new knowers, and renewing principles.

(i) Maintaining autonomy

The Robbins Report was based on the assumption that increased state financing would lead to the creation of a ‘system’ of higher education with greater coordination (1963: 5). Who would coordinate higher education was less clear. As discussed at the outset of this chapter, the tenor of academic debate changed rapidly at the dawn of the 1960s from strong resistance to acceptance of expansion and reform. By accepting expansion and turning to the question of how it should be managed, actors within higher education put themselves forward as the managers of expansion and helped ensure the field’s relatively high autonomy. They also stressed the importance of the field’s autonomy, repeating often, for example, that institutional hierarchies should emerge spontaneously from
within the field. Indeed, though the building of new universities involved enormous sums of public money, they were created without a single Parliamentary debate and with almost no ministerial involvement. New universities were instead planned, supervised and managed by academics; as Hoggart later commented:

It is easy to underestimate the nature of such an achievement. It was inspired by the British academics’ natural wish not to hand themselves over to “an administration” ... One had to go on doing things oneself.

(1977: 15).

By discussing expansion in terms of new students and new universities, issues from beyond the field were recontextualised into terms from within the field. What could have been posed as a question *inter alia* of social class and economic growth was translated into an educational issue: the needs of new students for success at university level. It was, for example, the impact not of ‘working-class’ students on the social reproduction function of higher education but of ‘new’ students on cultural reproduction that was the ostensible cause for concern in the debate. External threats to ownership of the device thereby became a manageable set of specifically educational problems with specifically educational solutions, bringing them within the control of academics on their own terms and so maintaining relatively strong relational autonomy between the principles of higher education and those of other social fields.

*(ii) Creating a safety valve and restricting positions*

Expansion threatened to massify the élite system of higher education. Plans to accommodate expansion within new universities (rather than colleges or existing universities) maintained the centrality of the university while insulating existing universities from excessive growth. New universities were intended to channel new students away from established, higher status positions and towards specially constructed positions. They were effectively intended as a safety valve for university expansion, enabling pressures to be released in a controlled manner. Thus Morris claimed ‘the main

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302 Claims that any artificial scheme to alter institutional hierarchies would be ‘futile’, that they are ‘good for the profession and for the place given to learning in our society’ (Annan 1961: 358), and being clearly ‘in the interests of everybody’ (C. Morris 1961a: 331) were widely repeated. When the binary system was announced in 1965, taking expansion beyond the direct control of universities, actors involved in the new student debate denounced the policy (see Nash 1966: 207-8).

303 This is rarely noted by secondary accounts, despite their tendency to focus on relations to the state.
problem’ was ‘how to get the right students to go to the right universities’, those which would best suit their ‘needs and interests’ (1961b: 359). However, new students could not be directed towards specific institutions. What could be managed, and what the new student debate attempted in effect to control, was the range of options available within the field. In terms of spaces, new universities did not rapidly expand the field’s capacity. Instead colleges bore the brunt of expansion, effectively acting as dumping grounds for actual new students. The debate’s exclusive focus on new universities (ignoring other institutions) thus retained an emphasis on quality over quantity supposedly abandoned with the acceptance of expansion.

The debate was also restricted in terms of the number of positions represented by its protagonists. Investigation of their biographies reveals that almost to a man (and almost all were men), they shared the same higher educational experiences. The Minister of Education overseeing policy developments was Lord Hailsham, a graduate of Modern Greats and Greats at Christ College and Fellow of All Souls, both Oxford. Table 6.4 shows the institutional positions of APB Chairmen, all but one of whom came from ancients and civics. Table 6.5 shows that most founding Vice-Chancellors were appointed from senior positions at the ancients and civics. Furthermore, they came from a relatively homogeneous educational background: all but one APB Chairmen and all but one Vice-Chancellor were graduates or former staff of the ancients (Tables 6.4 and 6.5 overleaf). (See Table C.2, Appendix C for full details of the higher educational trajectories of the founding Vice-Chancellors). This profile was not restricted to these leading protagonists. All of the first ten professors appointed to Warwick had been educated at the ancients (Table C.3, Appendix C). Similarly, six of seven members of Lancaster APB were Oxbridge graduates and the Chairman was Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford; while of sixteen initial members of staff in post at the university in

304 The exceptional Chairman (Charles Wilson at UEA) had overseen the chartering of Leicester University. As a member of the UGC (1949-59) Lord James was more senior within the field than his institutional position suggests.

305 Though not atypical - half of all Vice-Chancellors in 1966-67 were Oxbridge alumni (Szreter 1968) - contemporary accounts suggest higher levels at new universities than redbricks (compare Niblett 1963: 161-170 with Cross & Jobling 1969: 179).
1964-5, four were former fellows of, and a further seven held degrees from the ancients.\footnote{306}

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Table 6.4:
Institutional positions and backgrounds of Chairmen of Academic Planning Boards
(in order of charter date)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New university</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Institutional position</th>
<th>Ancient university associations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keele*</td>
<td>Dr W.T.S Stallybrass</td>
<td>Oxford (Vice-Chancellor)</td>
<td>Oxford (Vice-Chancellor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir John Stopford</td>
<td>Birmingham (Vice-Chancellor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Raymond Priestley</td>
<td>Manchester (Vice-Chancellor)</td>
<td>Clare College, Cambridge (Fellow), Scott Polar Research Institute (founding Director)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>Sir James F. Duff</td>
<td>Durham (Vice-Chancellor, 1937-60)</td>
<td>Trinity College, Cambridge (undergraduate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEA</td>
<td>Charles H. Wilson</td>
<td>Leicester (Vice-Chancellor, 1957-61)</td>
<td>Corpus Christi College, Oxford (Fellow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York</td>
<td>Lord Robbins</td>
<td>London School of Economics (Professor, 1929-61)</td>
<td>New College, Oxford (Lecturer, 1924-29 &amp; Fellow, 1927-29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>Noel Annan</td>
<td>King’s College, Cambridge (Provost)</td>
<td>King’s College, Cambridge (Fellow, 1944-56 &amp; Provost, 1956-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>Sir Noel F. Hall</td>
<td>Brasenose College, Oxford (Principal)</td>
<td>Brasenose College, Oxford (Principal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>D.G. Christopherson</td>
<td>Durham (Vice-Chancellor, 1960-)</td>
<td>University College, Oxford (undergraduate); Magdalene College, Cambridge (Fellow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>Edgar T. Williams</td>
<td>Balliol College, Oxford (Fellow)</td>
<td>Balliol College, Oxford (Fellow)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
* Keele’s Academic Advisory Council included representatives of its three sponsor universities with their Vice-Chancellors ultimately responsible.

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\footnote{306} Calculated from information presented in McClintock (1974: 23-4 and 408-9). Lancaster was not unique: four of the first five senior posts at Sussex were filled by former Oxbridge fellows, the fifth coming from LSE (Fulton, 1966: 27n1-5); and over 75% of professors at UEA during the 1960s had a degree from either Cambridge or Oxford (Jobling 1972: 330-331).
Table 6.5:  
Institutional backgrounds of founding Vice-Chancellors  
(in order of charter date)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New University</th>
<th>Founding Vice-Chancellor</th>
<th>Institutional position prior to appointment</th>
<th>Ancient university associations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keele</td>
<td>A.D. Lindsay</td>
<td>Balliol College, Oxford (Master)</td>
<td>University College, Oxford (undergraduate); Balliol College, Oxford (Fellow, Master); Oxford University (Vice-Chancellor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>Sir John Fulton</td>
<td>University College, Swansea (Principal)</td>
<td>Balliol College, Oxford (undergraduate &amp; Fellow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEA</td>
<td>Frank Thistlethwaite</td>
<td>St. John’s College, Cambridge (Tutor)</td>
<td>St. John’s College, Cambridge (undergraduate &amp; Fellow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York</td>
<td>Lord James of Rusholme</td>
<td>Manchester Grammar School (High Master)</td>
<td>Queen’s College, Oxford (undergraduate &amp; postgraduate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>Albert E. Sloman</td>
<td>Liverpool (Dean of Faculty)</td>
<td>Wadham College, Oxford (undergraduate &amp; postgraduate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>Charles F. Carter</td>
<td>Manchester (Professor)</td>
<td>St. John’s College, Cambridge (undergraduate &amp; Lecturer); Emmanuel College (Fellow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>Geoffrey Templeman</td>
<td>Birmingham (Registrar)</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>Jack Butterworth</td>
<td>New College, Oxford (Fellow, Dean, Bursar)</td>
<td>Queen’s College, Oxford (undergraduate); New College, Oxford (Fellow, Dean, Bursar)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They were also often former colleagues. The two earliest and most influential new universities (Keele and Sussex) were created by former tutor and pupil (Lindsay and Fulton) and members of Sussex’s APB went on to shape UEA, Kent and Lancaster. In turn these actors appointed senior staff from similar educational backgrounds as themselves. The debate thus principally involved a small, homogeneous and interlocking group of actors from institutional positions characterised by U code legitimation.

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307 Lindsay and Fulton co-authored early policy documents (1946) outlining a ‘proposed University College for North Staffordshire’ (Lowe 1969: 43-44), had both taken Classical Moderns as undergraduates, and were former tutors in Greats at Balliol College where Fulton previously had been Lindsay’s pupil. Members of Sussex APB went on to become: Chairman of UEA’s APB (Charles Wilson), Chairman of Kent’s APB (D.G. Christopherson), a member of APBs at both Lancaster and Kent (Noel Hall) and founding Vice Chancellor of Lancaster (Charles Carter). Similarly, the Chairman of Essex University’s APB (Noel Annan) has previously served on UEA’s APB, and the Vice-Chancellor of Kent (Geoffrey Templeman) had been Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee and heavily involved in the creation of Warwick.
(iii) Resocialising new students

New students were symbolic of a wider shift in control over the field in terms of selection. Policy-makers argued that the growing tide of potential university applicants should be accommodated, codified in the Robbins Report’s ‘guiding principle’ that higher education should be available for everyone qualified to attend (1963: 8). From sponsored mobility, where status is bestowed upon hand-picked apprentices by established élites, expansion would thus encourage moves towards contest mobility, where status is earned by the candidates’ own efforts in open competition (Turner 1971). This move from knower to knowledge specialisation would change the social role and position of intellectuals and elevate the technological university idea. The focus of the new student debate maintained knower specialisation as the basis of selection in two ways. First, though debate ostensibly focused on how a cultural gap between new students and universities could be overcome, it was taken for granted new students should be changed to fit the idea of the university and (despite rhetoric of innovation) not the idea of the university changed to fit the new student. They did not meet halfway; though the new university represented a new modality of legitimation this variation was for the purpose of enabling the (non-U) habitus of new students to be restructured. Second, new universities were designed as specially-built total institutions where the habitus of new students could be reconfigured in the image of the English university idea. As descriptions of their problematic backgrounds make clear, it was not ‘new’ students per se that concerned managers of expansion but rather working-class students. The new student was simply the wrong kind of knower and the price of entry to university education was to become the right kind of knower: to enter Academe barbarians had to be civilised. New students thereby faced the choice of resocialisation within higher status universities or relegation to lower status, knowledge code institutions. (Many working-class students chose the latter by opting instead for colleges and, later, polytechnics.) In either case the threat of new settings of the legitimation device was neutralised.

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308 The Robbins Report recommended that selection focus on school records, research be conducted into using American-style Scholastic Aptitude Tests (1963: 83–4) and ‘the academic grading of individuals should depend upon their academic accomplishment rather than upon the status of the institution in which they have studied’ (1963: 8). Administrative arrangements that could enable this shift were being created: the Universities’ Central Council on Admissions in 1961 and the Central Register and Clearing House in 1962.

309 Couper (1965) reports a study of students at Bristol College of Science and Technology which shows working-class students choosing to take a Diploma in Technology at a CAT: they were less likely to apply to university even when eligible and very few had unsuccessfully applied to university. The CAT was an institution with an ‘image which working class students are able to accept’ (Couper 1965: 13). Little was
(iv) Renewing structuring principles
Growing governmental and industrial interest in higher education had by the early 1960s generated pressure to reform and the new student debate made change the very centre of academic discussion: new students needing new forms of university education in new universities. Beneath the surface rhetoric, however, the underlying positions of the debate were not new in two principal ways. First, the debate was between the two legitimisation codes already structuring the field of higher education (see chapter 5). As I have shown, the new student was characterised by a non-U code and new universities represented a variant modality of U (Table 6.3). Other possible positions were excluded. In terms of ideas of the university the debate effectively reduced choice to the English and technological ideas. Other forms, such as large-scale community colleges, satellite colleges (both found in the USA) or egalitarian ‘polytechnics’ based on ideas of the ‘people’s university’, were not extensively discussed. Lindsay had originally conceived the ‘Keele experiment’ in 1925 as ‘a real people’s University’ catering for adult education and directly rising out of the local University Extension and Workers’ Educational Association teaching. However, when formed in the late 1940s the new university college was oriented towards national interests and the English idea. This set the precedent for the new student debate. Second, of the two codes non-U was not associated within the debate with existing institutional examples; it was the idea of the university that dare not speak its name. Technical education was barely mentioned; the Robbins Committee (1963), for example, devoted roughly one per cent of its report to the Colleges of Advanced Technology, despite their advancement on the road to being chartered. Instead, non-U was realised within public debate in the form of the new student. The debate was thus hardly a debate: alternatives to the two codes already structuring the field were excluded and of these the non-U was misrecognised, externalised and delegitimated. The new student debate was, in short, a new form of an old struggle; it clothed established positions on the field in new terms and arrayed them in an established pattern.

done to actively encourage new students; York was unusual in targeting grammar schools by sending a personally signed letter from the Vice-Chancellor (James 1966: 25). The new university with the highest percentage of students with working-class parents (in the late 1960s) was that most closely associated with technology, industry and engineering: Lancaster (Perkin 1969).
Summary
It is now possible to also apply the conceptual framework at a macro level to the new student debate as a whole:

- autonomy Accepting expansion worked to maintain independence (positional autonomy) and the new student debate recontextualised social into cultural terms (relational autonomy). Expansion was thereby managed from within the field and on its own terms.

- density Managing the shape of expansion controlled density within the field. The ‘safety valve’ of new universities and restriction of positions within the debate worked to maintain low material and moral density within higher education.

- specialisation The debate focused on legitimate knowers: the problem was the new student being the wrong kind of knower and the solution was to resocialise new students within total institutions.

- temporality The English university idea remained fundamentally unquestioned; the debate was an updated variation of the established structure of the field.

The debate as a whole was thus characterised by higher autonomy, lower density, knower specialisation and neo-retrospective temporality: a neo-U code. The new student debate was not just about its messages (new universities for new students); the medium of the debate was itself a message. It pronounced: “This is how the field is to be perceived, understood, discussed, debated, categorised, organised and so forth. This is the lens through which changes to the field are to be understood and responded to.” In short it declares how legitimacy should be distributed, recontextualised and evaluated within the field. The lens was structured by a neo-U code: a variant modality of the dominant code of the field. This code effectively announced: “The state of the field is to change but the legitimisation device is to remain under our control”. The position is one of continuity through change: faced with inevitable and rapid expansion, for things to stay as they were something had to change. And something had to legitimate that change. Though fought at the level of rhetoric, the new student debate had real effects and the myth of the new student helped senior managers of expansion retain control of the legitimisation device.
[6] Conclusion

This chapter analysed participants’ perceptions of changes to the institutional field of English higher education during the early 1960s. Leading actors in the field portrayed imminent expansion using apocalyptic pronouncements of impending crisis and revolution. These focused on problems posed by new students and on new universities as offering the solution. The debate was analysed in three main stages. First, I addressed the model of the new student, who was portrayed as: dependent yet careerist and instrumental; overambitious and unsuited to social mixing; narrowly scholastic and lacking in cultural breadth; and with eyes firmly fixed on the future. This collective representation represents lower autonomy, higher density, knowledge specialisation and prospective temporality - a non-U code. Second, I discussed new universities, whose plans aimed to distance new students from influences beyond higher education, integrate them within a single community, provide a compensatory breadth of culture, and offer the essence of an Oxbridge education. These plans exhibited higher autonomy, lower density, knower specialisation and neo-retrospective temporality: a neo-U code. Thirdly, having analysed the messages of the debate, I focused on the medium of the debate itself. I argued that neither new students nor new universities were empirically realised in the form they took in the debate and that the actual threat was valorisation of the non-U legitimation code by pressures emanating from beyond higher education. Analysing the structure of the debate as a whole, I highlighted how it maintained autonomy for the field, restricted possible positions within it, made socialising knowers its central concern, and in so doing renewed the established principles of the field: a neo-U code. The new student debate thereby enabled dominant positions within the field to maintain control of the legitimation device. Having addressed changes facing the institutional field, the next question for the study concerns changes said to be reshaping the disciplinary field in the early 1960s, which forms the focus of the next two chapters.
Chapter 7
Transforming the Disciplinary Field I:
Crisis in the humanities and scientific revolution

The crisis of a style of thought, and of a once proud caste which is defined by skill at it, is no trivial matter.
Ernest Gellner (1964)
The crisis in the humanities and the mainstream of philosophy. In: J. H. Plumb (Ed.)
Crisis in the Humanities (Harmondsworth, Penguin), p.74.

Why aren’t we coping with the scientific revolution?
C. P. Snow (1959c)

[1] Introduction

In this and the following chapter I address academic debates during the early 1960s over changes to the disciplinary field of English higher education. Having established the structuring principles of the field during a period characterised as calm and consensual (chapter 5), these two chapters continue the analysis begun in chapter 6 of perceived threats to this stability, how these were responded to, and with what effects for higher education, by focusing on debates over the disciplinary field. In these public debates participants focused on the contrasting fortunes of what C. P. Snow famously described as ‘the two cultures’: humanities disciplines were portrayed as in crisis while the rise in profile and status of natural and social sciences (especially sociology) was represented as instigating a scientific revolution in notions of what constitutes culture. I explore these debates in three main parts. First, in this chapter I discuss how debates over these trajectories of the two cultures interrelate and analyse the threats posed by humanist crisis and scientific ascendancy to the established structure of the disciplinary field. Second, in chapter 8 I analyse solutions proposed by actors within the humanities to these problems. Lastly, I analyse the structure of the debate as a whole in terms of a struggle for control of the legitimation device and examine its effects for the structuring of the disciplinary field of higher education.
[2] A Tale of Two Cultures: Crisis & revolution

... for reasons which I completely fail to understand, Sir Charles’s very moderate indication of danger arouses very high passions. To me his diagnosis seems obvious
Lord Robbins (quoted by Leavis 1966: 99)

The explosion of culture
Higher education during the late 1950s had been characterised as enjoying a consensus over both what culture comprised and its role and position in society (chapter 5). Culture was viewed as defined by the humanities (and, above all Classics) and as relatively stable and circumscribed. By the early 1960s, however, the term ‘culture’ was increasingly subject to contestation, debate and concern. Reviewing the decade, Leavis argued:

‘Culture’, in these days of the ‘debate about the two cultures’, Ministers of Culture and the Arts, high-level international conferences about culture, and leaders in The Times about the ‘pollution of culture’, is one of those indispensable words whose use and behaviour have to be kept under observation.
(1972: 174).

Culture was widely portrayed as massifying, diversifying, being marketised and renewed, and as controversial. The seeds of this explosion had been growing since at least the late nineteenth century as the introduction of universal elementary education began creating the possibility of a vast literate public and technological advances in the production and dissemination of printed texts, photographs, and radio and television waves were making mass production of culture possible. By the 1960s economic, political and social changes were bringing mass audiences and mass cultural production together. Relatively strong economic growth, consistently full employment and rapid productivity rises during the 1950s had given rise to an ‘age of affluence’. Unparalleled increases in disposable income and leisure time fuelled a demand for cultural products that was met and encouraged by the expansion of markets in hitherto restricted forms of culture and the emergence of new forms. English translations of classical texts, popularisations and paperback series of intellectual work (such as published by Allen Lane) were bringing ‘high’ culture to an expanded audience. ‘Culture’ itself was diversifying thanks to the

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emergence of new mass produced, commercial goods; and the market was becoming a basis of cultural authority.\textsuperscript{311} Culture was also being renewed: movements of novelists, poets and dramatists such as the ‘Angry Young Men’, were heralded as revitalising established culture and ‘mass’ culture was portrayed as new, fast-changing, futuristic and associated with youth and the new category of ‘teenager’.\textsuperscript{312} Above all, culture was controversial. In 1960, for example, Penguin Books was the subject of a famous obscenity trial over the paperback publication of Lady Chatterley’s Lover; the parliamentary Pilkington Committee on Broadcasting addressed increasing concerns over standards in television; and the National Union of Teachers held a Special Conference on ‘Popular Culture and Personal Responsibility’ that attracted over five hundred delegates representing nearly three hundred organisations.\textsuperscript{313} This was, then, the moment of culture. The established notion of ‘culture’ as the preserve of a small organic community within the humanities was under increasing pressure by a ‘huge, culture-hungry public’ (Plumb 1959: 69) consuming more of a wider range of cultural artefacts than ever before. The meaning of ‘culture’, the basis of status within the disciplinary field of higher education, was facing challenge and change.

Managing culture: The two cultures debates

Though ‘culture’ was the focus of intense debates within higher education during the early 1960s, the key issue was not commercial culture or mass media but rather the contrasting fortunes of ‘two cultures’ within higher education.\textsuperscript{314} Academic debate revolved around two related issues: claims made by C. P. Snow and vigorously rebuffed

\textsuperscript{311} Television ownership, for example, rose from 650,000 sets in 1951 to 13 million by 1964 (Young & Willmott 1973: 23)

\textsuperscript{312} See Allsop (1958), Cooper (1970) and Maschler (1957).

\textsuperscript{313} For a report of the conference see NUT (1960). Numerous publications, journals, conferences and societies dedicated to discussing the question of education and the media were emerging. For example, the Society for Education in Film and Television organised a conference on ‘Film, Television and the Child’ in 1958 and launched the journal Screen Education in October 1959. By 1962 one commentator could describe the ‘tantalising regularity’ with which ‘material comes thudding through our letter-boxes ... announcing film courses, conferences and lectures’ (Knight 1962: 48).

\textsuperscript{314} The growth of ‘mass’ media was the centre of much debate over schooling rather than higher education. Even where academics, notably F.R. Leavis, discussed media and higher education, their principal audience and influence was in debates over schooling. This is not to say that commercial culture was not engaged with in the academy but that debates over the disciplinary field focused on issues within the field.
by F. R. Leavis that science constituted a rival culture to the humanities; and widespread proclamations of a ‘crisis in the humanities’.

The Snow-Leavis debate
In 1959 C.P. Snow gave a lecture on ‘The two cultures and the scientific revolution’ in which he claimed the intellectual life of ‘the whole of western society’ was increasingly being split into ‘two polar groups’, literary intellectuals and scientists, representing two distinct cultures: ‘traditional culture’ and ‘scientific culture’ (1959c: 3). These two groups ‘had almost ceased to communicate at all’ (1959c: 2):

Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension - sometimes ... hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding.

(1959c: 4)

Scientists saw non-scientists as reactionary, pessimistic and irrational; literary intellectuals saw scientists as shallowly optimistic, anti-humanist, arrogant and narrow-minded. This polarisation was, Snow argued, ‘sheer loss to us all’ (1959c: 11).

It is difficult to overestimate the debate which raged following the publication of Snow’s lecture.\(^{315}\) It set in motion ‘a controversy which was to be remarkable for its scope, its duration, and, at least at times, its intensity’ (Collini 1993: vii), one reaching beyond the walls of Academe and shores of Britain.\(^{316}\) This debate comprised a mixture of both rapid acceptance and fundamental disagreement. On the one hand, within months Snow could claim the existence of two cultures to be ‘generally accepted’ (1960: 64).\(^{317}\) As the

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\(^{315}\) Snow first aired the idea of ‘two cultures’ several years before (1956), but it was not until his Rede Lecture of 7 May 1959 at Cambridge University that the furore broke out. The lecture was reprinted in the journal *Encounter* (1959a, 1959b) and published as a book (1959c). Quotes here are from the slightly fuller and more widely referenced book version.

\(^{316}\) Contemporary discussion can be found *inter alia* in: specialist academic journals (such as *Higher Education Review*, e.g. *Fores* 1971), trades union journals (*The Universities Review*, Mackerness 1960), cultural journals (*Encounter*, Polanyi 1959), and wider circulation, non-specialist periodicals (*The Listener*, Bantock 1959). In all these contexts the appearance of an article on the ‘two cultures’ is typically followed by lively and engaged correspondence from readers; see, for example, *The Listener* LXII (1589) September 10, 1959, and *Encounter* XIII(3) Sept 1959: 83-4; XIV(6) June 1960: 91-3.

\(^{317}\) Contemporary articles are replete with such statements as: ‘I accept Snow’s diagnosis of the situation absolutely, and I am sure its urgency is no less than he says.’ (Allen 1959: 68), or ‘The situation ... is, I am fully convinced, every bit as extreme as Sir Charles Snow would persuade us’ (Mackerness 1960: 15). Such assent is found in articles from such varied disciplinary sources as physicist Sir John Cockcroft (1959), philosopher Bertrand Russell (1959), the Director of Jodrell Bank, A.C.B. Lovell (1959), historian J. H. Plumb (1959), sociologist David Riesman (1959) and Lord Robbins (quoted Leavis 1966: 99).
BBC’s weekly magazine *The Listener* put it, Snow had diagnosed ‘a central problem of our time’ and there was ‘general agreement on the reality of this division in our culture’ (Editorial, Sept 3, 1959: 344). On the other hand, controversy raged over Snow’s views on the nature of this divide and its solution. Snow argued that a ‘scientific revolution’ had occurred, that science constituted a ‘culture’ and that the principal problem for society was the obstacle presented to science’s growth by literary intellectuals (exemplified by modernist authors such as D. H. Lawrence, T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound) and the control their ‘traditional culture’ continued to exert. This evoked both ferocious denunciation and plaintive soul-searching among humanists; as Snow put it, ‘a nerve had been touched’ (1964: 54). Most notoriously, F. R. Leavis launched a scathing counterattack on Snow in 1962 which saw the controversy rechristened ‘the Snow-Leavis debate’.318 The ensuing public discussion was marked by unprecedented levels of passionate intensity and name-calling.319

The issues of the debate following Snow’s lecture were not exactly as he had put them. Though Snow referred to a lack of communication between two groups in society whose outlooks were shaped by modernist writers and technology, the ‘two cultures’ were almost universally identified with the humanities and sciences and the debate construed as a struggle over which could lay claim to ‘culture’.320 (I henceforth use ‘humanist culture’ and ‘scientific culture’ to highlight these competing ideas of culture). The nerve Snow touched was a perception within the humanities that these two cultures were experiencing contrasting fortunes: the humanities were said to be in crisis and science was in the ascendant.

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318 Leavis’s response was given as the Richmond Lecture at Darwin College, Cambridge, and published in both *The Spectator* (9 March 1962) and book form in 1962. Other less widely cited criticisms of Snow’s ideas included Bernard (1964-5), Murray (1966), Polanyi (1959), Stanford (1962-3) and Yudkin (1962).

319 Leavis’s lecture was publicly derided as ‘bemused drivel’, ‘a silly exhibition’, ‘reptilian venom’, ‘laughable’, ‘a welter of abuse’, ‘ugly’, characterised by ‘dogmatism’, and ‘self-delusion’, and ‘ill-mannered, self-centred and destructive adolescent behaviour’; Leavis himself was characterised as ‘the Himmler of Literature’, ‘a bit of an ass’, ‘ignoramus’, ‘pathetic’, and ‘pitiable’. His supporters were just as overblown: Leavis was ‘the truly qualified man’, ‘characteristically independent’, ‘entirely justified, self-evident and life-enhancing’, ‘basic truth’; his critical reception was said to be ‘fatuous .... an outpouring of niminy-piminy, mealy-mouthed stuff and nonsense’. (All quotes are from letters published in *The Spectator*: Bernal et al. 1962, Gerhardi et al. 1962).

320 Ironically, the exception was Leavis (1962), who highlighted that the ‘two cultures’ referred specifically to technology and middle-brow literary culture or ‘scientism’ and ‘literarism’.
Crisis in the humanities: The fall of humanist culture

That Snow’s ‘traditional culture’, which he described as obsolete, was taken as referring to the humanities partly reflected a crisis of self-confidence among humanists; as Gellner argued:

The issue of the ‘two cultures’ is utterly misconceived when it is seen, as it often is, as a problem of communication between two cultures. ... The real and deeper problem concerns just what, if anything, it is that the humanities have to communicate.

(1964: 79).

Related to and overlapping with the Snow-Leavis debate was a debate over ‘crisis in the humanities’. The early 1960s saw widespread contemplation of the raison d’être of humanities disciplines and reports of crises of confidence in their position and role within higher education, culture and society. First to fall from grace was Classics, the foundation stone of humanist culture. By the 1950s university teachers were said to be hawking their wares around other faculties offering subsidiary courses; a decade later the position of Classics was officially described as ‘precarious’. By the 1960s this sense of decline was increasingly common across the humanities. English, for example, was experiencing ‘a distinct malaise in the field’ (Steiner 1965: 75): it ‘has lost confidence and it has lost touch’ (Hough 1964: 97). An influential collection of essays entitled Crisis in the Humanities (Plumb 1964c) included accounts of crises within Classics, history, philosophy, Divinity, literary education, sociology, the fine arts, and economics, as well as the humanities in schools. Each account reported intense debate within their discipline as to its rationale and purpose and a profound loss of self-confidence. In History, for example, E. H. Carr had influentially asked What is History? (1961),

321 Several essays in Crisis in the Humanities (Plumb 1964c) refer to Snow’s ideas (e.g. Hough 1964: 96-97).

322 See, for example, Bardsley (1959), Bolgar (1954), Bowra (1955), Burn (1955), Finley (1964), Grant (1955), Incorporated Association of Assistant Masters (1962), Joint Association of Classical Teachers (1964), Kitto (1955), Knights (1955), Lee (1955), Leon (1952), Ogilvie (1964), Pym (1955) and Verity (1960).

323 Leon (1952) and JACT (1964), respectively.

324 The essays were authored by M. I. Finley, J. H. Plumb, Ernest Gellner, Alec Vidler, Graham Hough, D. G. MacRae, Quentin Bell, J. R. Sargent and Ian Lister, respectively. The collection ‘attracted considerable attention’ (Collini 1993: xli) at the time, though it has become almost completely neglected by secondary accounts of disciplinary change.
alternative *Approaches to History* were being discussed (Finberg 1962), and Plumb (1964b: 25) claimed that as many as ninety per cent of professional historians believed their subject to be ‘meaningless in any ultimate sense’.

What can appear *prima facie* as a series of separate crises (because named approaches, positions and authors vary between disciplines) represents, I argue, the working through according to the language and logic of each discipline of a deeper issue: a crisis in the liberal humanist idea of ‘culture’. In English, for example, Hough described how:

The old Christian-humanist ideal is looking remarkably worn and battered; and with its erosion the inherited pattern of literary education has fallen into a dismal confusion.

(1964: 97).

In other words, these crises reflected the same deeper malaise, a belief that the status of humanists as the fount of wisdom in society had dissipated; as Gellner stated: the ‘underlying problem is the crisis of the caste of humanist intellectuals’ (1964: 73). The humanities were said to be unwanted by students, deemed irrelevant to a modern economy by employers, excluded from the corridors of power by politicians, and publicly ridiculed as passé and providing little genuine knowledge. Such profound changes in their social position were inextricably entwined with the rise of science which was usurping the position humanists had held. The various diagnoses by humanists of their own discipline’s specific diseases were set within a shared sense of being out of synch with an age shaped by science. Plumb (1964a: 7), for example, introduced his collection with the lament:

Alas, the rising tide of scientific and industrial societies ... has shattered the confidence of humanists in their capacity to lead or to instruct.

In short, the humanities were being dethroned by a second culture.

*Scientific revolution: Rise of a new culture*

By the early 1960s a spectre was haunting the humanities: science. Often broad-brushed and ill-defined, the term had become ‘one of the chief shibboleths of the present age’ (Winch 1958: 2). Science was perceived within the humanities as experiencing a meteoric rise in stature; as one commentator tartly expressed:

You cannot open a newspaper, let alone the ‘quality’ journals, without the importance of science and technology being trumpeted at you from the headlines.

(M. Morris 1959: 374).
Science was said to have caught the popular imagination as the deliverer of wartime success and peacetime prosperity; the term ‘science’ had about it something of the sacred or mystical, ‘for non-scientists it is magic’ (Allen 1959: 67). Within higher education science had grown dramatically since the Second World War and was expected to grow faster still, fuelled by governments calling for more science graduates and pouring funding into scientific research. 325 Feted and funded by industry and politics, revered by the media, worshipped by the public, scientists were felt to be enjoying unprecedented prestige:

Rarely has the man in the laboratory been so widely respected; never has he commanded so ready an access to public and private funds.
(Handlin 1965: 253).

A key dimension of this ascendancy was the emergence of a new region of the disciplinary field bearing its name: social science. At the forefront of this expansion and the focus of intense discussion in the humanities was sociology. 326 Though previously sociology had met ‘a cold welcome ... a raw deal’ (Cole 1953: 26, 29), by the 1960s it had ‘arrived’: ‘What was a few years ago a term of abuse, ridicule or contempt is now a word of virtue and of power’ (MacRae 1960: 433). 327 Within higher education sociology was growing with ‘explosive force’ (Heyworth Report 1965: 11). Contemporary surveys of the field contrasted a single named degree at one university in 1945 to the early 1960s profile of social science, sociology or social studies as: a degree or a main subject at eleven English universities; studied by 11.5% of all university entrants; taught by 190 university teachers; offered as an ‘A’ level for the first time; experiencing a rise from 5 to 29 dedicated Chairs in only two years; enjoying a 450% increase in graduates; recognised

325 See Conn (1961) on expectations of science’s growth, and Autonomy (below) on governmental attitudes to and funding of science.

326 Economics was comparatively little discussed, psychology was rarely mentioned, and though political science had been the focus of debate during the early 1950s this had comprised practitioners’ calls to better establish the nascent discipline (e.g. Cole 1953, Finer 1953, Hanson 1953, W. Mackenzie 1955). As the Heyworth Committee on Social Sciences put it: ‘Sociology is perhaps the discipline which people find most puzzling of the major social sciences’ (Heyworth Report 1965: 3).

327 See Barnes (1927), Beveridge (1937), Harper (1935), and the Clapham Report (1946: 8) on previous hostility. During the 1950s articles on sociology had borne such titles as ‘The sociologist in a hostile world’ (Kaye 1956) and ‘Friends and enemies’ (Birnbaum 1960).
in reports by the UGC; and having its own Social Science Research Council (SSRC).\textsuperscript{328}
Like science, sociology was also portrayed as enjoying rising status beyond higher education:

the words ‘sociologist’, ‘sociological’ and ‘sociology’ are now part of the vocabulary of reviewers and critics in the weekly magazines and papers.

(Little 1963a: 64).

While the sun set on the humanities, a second culture of science, both natural and social, was enjoying a new-found place in the sun.

Relations between the two cultures

The immediate and widespread adoption of Snow’s notion of ‘two cultures’ and its recontextualisation to science and humanities reflects a collective state of mind within higher education during the early 1960s. Snow himself acknowledged:

It was clear that many people had been thinking on this assembly of topics.
The ideas were in the air. Anyone, anywhere, had only to choose a form of words. Then - click, the trigger was pressed.

(1964: 54).

The idea of two cultures was nothing new; it had been prefigured in, for example, exchanges between Matthew Arnold and T.H. Huxley in the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{329}

What was new and aroused such controversy was a widespread feeling in the humanities that science was now winning the cultural war. The scientist rather than the humanist now stood as the delphic fount of knowledge in society, even where the record of the ‘science’ was questionable:

\textsuperscript{328} This sketch reflects contemporary narratives by comparing ‘sociology’ in 1945 to sociology and several ‘social’ prefixed subject areas including ‘social science’ as a whole. Facts cited are from contemporary sources: the singular postwar course in BA (Hons) Sociology was at the London School of Economics from 1920; courses identified and university entrants for 1961-62 estimated by Little (1963a: 65 and 66); university teachers listed in Commonwealth Universities Yearbook as social scientists, sociologists or social administrators; ‘A’ level in sociology introduced by the Oxford Examinations Board in 1964, followed in 1967 by the Associated Examinations Board (Stewart 1989); dedicated chairs identified by MacRae (1964b: 79); graduate output calculated for 1952-1966 by Abbott (1969); UGC began listing students reading ‘Social Studies’ degrees separately to Arts degrees in 1959 (UGC 1961); Social Science Research Council created by Royal Charter under the terms of the 1965 Science and Technology Act. On the emergence of sociology in British higher education during the 1950s and 1960s, see \textit{inter alia} J. Banks (1967), Collison & Webber (1971), Fincham (1975), Gould (1963, 1965), Halliday (1968), Halsey (1987), and Kent (1981).

\textsuperscript{329} See Cherry (1966), Jaki (1975), Stewart (1970) and Trilling (1962) on this earlier debate.
It suffices that the specialist is part of a discipline which itself is incorporated into the wider body of what is recognized as “science” (Gellner 1964: 72, 73). Snow’s bid to claim for science the defining attribute of status within higher education – ‘culture’ – brought the revolution home. Not only was science on the rise beyond higher education but it also threatened to displace the humanities from their rightful position atop the status hierarchy of the disciplinary field.

A scientific revolution within higher education was thus threatening the humanities. Humanists displayed a siege mentality, believing ‘there are active enemies all about’ (Finley 1964: 22). Natural science was the enemy at the gates, offering a competing model of ‘culture’; sociology was the enemy within, an offspring of the humanities with scientific pretensions.330 Proclamations by postwar English sociologists of a positivist inheritance and aspirations to be an applied ‘science of society’ contributed to perceptions that sociologists believed ‘we must’, as Winch summarised it, ‘follow the methods of natural science rather than philosophy if we are to make any significant progress’ (1958: 1).331 Sociology’s perceived position as ‘between science and the arts’ (MacRae 1960) gave it strategic significance as a potential conduit across the Snow line for the claims of science to enter the humanist domain; its position evoked both fear and fascination: it may have arrived but to ‘an ambivalence of respect and contempt for its possibilities and achievements’ (Halsey, in Pakenham 1963: 166).332 Sociology also formed a key focus for solutions proposed by actors in the humanities to the threats faced by humanist ideas of culture, perhaps most famously exemplified in Peter Winch’s

330 A secondary reason for hostility was that a growing sociology attracted students and resources away from established disciplines; hostility was strongest where sociology avant la lettre had emerged (Birnbaum 1960, Chens 1963).

331 See, for example, Abrams (1968), Acton (1962), Bottomore (1962) and Rummey (1945) on nineteenth century traditions of social thought in Britain; and Anderson (1964) and Beavan et al. (1960) on the scientific claims of contemporary sociology. Sociologists did not identify themselves as ‘positivist’ or discuss the ideas of logical positivism; rather they proclaimed what a later study called ‘a diffuse attachment to the idea, or at any rate the name, of “science”’ (Platt 1981: 84).

332 The ambivalent reception of sociology has been explained in various way. Primary accounts argue sociology is associated with socialism or sex (MacRae 1960) and viewed as foreign in origins (Shils 1960). Secondary accounts of sociology’s institutional emergence typically highlight border disputes and neglect the effects of the discipline’s structural position. The struggle between the two cultures was echoed within sociology. Sociologists were said to be suffering from an ‘identity crisis’ (Frankenberg 1963: 22) and to the question of naturalism one leading sociologist could only answer: ‘I am unsure’ (MacRae 1964a: 138).
(1958) *The Idea of a Social Science* (see chapter 8). It thus represented a crucial battleground in the struggle between the two ideas of culture.

[3] **The Threat of Science and Crisis of Humanities**

These three interrelated public debates - ‘Snow-Leavis’, ‘crisis in the humanities’ and the rise of sociology - together formed the focus of academic discussion over the disciplinary map during the early 1960s. The discussion painted the humanities as a sacred citadel weakened by defeatism within its own ranks and besieged from without by barbaric natural science, an enemy attempting to infiltrate the city (in the form of sociology) and so threatening to overthrow the humanist idea of culture as the basis of study of the human world. In the remainder of the chapter I analyse this collective representation in terms of the legitimation device and show that a changing balance of power towards science represents the rise of an idea of culture characterised by: lower autonomy, higher density, knowledge specialisation and prospective temporality (see Table 7.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimation principle</th>
<th>Scientific culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>lower (PA-, RA-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>higher (MaD+, MoD+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>knowledge (ER+, SR-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporality</td>
<td>prospective (-Cₜ, -Fₜ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Table 7.1:**
Modalities of legitimation for scientific culture

**Key:**
PA = positional autonomy; RA = relational autonomy
MaD = material density; MoD = moral density
SR = social relation; ER = epistemic relation
C = classification; F = framing; e/i = external/internal; t = temporal
+/- = relatively stronger/weaker

**Autonomy: From uselessness to utility**

Snow made external relations central to differences between the two cultures; ‘the application of real science to industry’ (1959c: 29) or ‘Scientific-Revolution-in-Industry’ (1960: 68) was, he claimed, transforming the disciplinary field. The natural and social
sciences were portrayed in the debate as conduits for external involvement and extrinsic beliefs and practices, and humanists described a loss of faith in their role as a civilising force based on belief in knowledge for knowledge’s sake. The overall picture was of outer walls being breached (lower positional autonomy) and uselessness giving way to utility (lower relational autonomy).

*Positional autonomy*

The Two World Wars ‘gave a mighty push to the sciences’ and ‘had the effect of destroying for good the old canons’ in the humanities (Marwick 1963: 22). After the War relations between university science and both government and industry flowered such that commentators could describe science as ‘an estate of the realm’ (Marwick 1963: 103) and claim ‘[i]ndustry has replaced teaching as an occupation of the natural scientists’ (Cardwell 1957: 177-8). Natural scientists were brought into government and ministers charged with overseeing science: Churchill’s government of 1951-55 included Lord Cherwell, the first professional natural scientist to hold Cabinet office, as one of four co-ordinating ministers and in 1964 the post of Minister of Technology was created.333 Similarly, social scientists were brought into Ministry research units, formal funding links established through the creation of the SSRC in 1965 and sociology enjoyed high profile political sponsors.334 The 1960s also witnessed unprecedented growth in cooperative arrangements between university science and industry.335 As Leavis declared, the scientist ‘has inhabited the Corridors of Powers; that is what really matters; that is what qualifies him to look down upon these dons’ (1962: 14).336

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333 Snow was a highly visible example of the changing public profile of scientists: a physicist and Fellow of Christ’s College in prewar Cambridge, he served in the Ministry of Labour and National Service during the War, worked for the Civil Service Commission (1945-59), became Parliamentary Secretary (second-in-command) at the Ministry of Technology (1964-6) and then entered the House of Lords as Baron Snow of the City of Leicester and government spokesman on technology in 1966, as well as receiving a CBE (1947) and being knighted (1957). (See Boytinc 1980, Cooper 1959, Davis 1965, Halperin 1983, Schusterman 1975, P. Snow 1982 and Thale 1964).

334 For example, in his influential manifesto *The Future of Socialism*, Antony Crosland (Secretary of State for Education and Science under Harold Wilson) argued that sociology was the field ‘in which the significant issues for socialism and welfare will increasingly be found to lie’ (1956: 12). Crosland established the SSRC under the chairmanship of the sociologist Michael Young, who had helped him write the text (see Crosland 1956: 167n).


336 Leavis is referring to Lewis Eliot, the hero of C. P. Snow’s ‘Strangers and Brothers’ novels, though he intended this description to include their author.
comparison humanists had retreated ‘into their own private professional world’ (Plumb 1964: a 8) and become a narrow guild, a self-contained world of specialists communicating with each other alone’ (Finley 1964: 21). Snow’s claim that humanist culture ‘manages the western world’ (1959c: 11) was widely derided; instead, humanists saw themselves as marginalised by and excluded from economic and political power.

**Relational autonomy**

Wartime also cross-pollinated beliefs and practices, reshaping the mindsets of university scientists, who gained experience of industry’s utilitarian demands and science’s application potential - the War ‘opened their eyes’ (Snow 1959c: 33) - and leaders in industry and government, who gained respect for science’s ability to deliver economic development. Postwar governments identified science with the national interest and in the early 1960s Harold Wilson (Prime Minister 1964-70) coined the widely used phrase ‘white heat of the scientific revolution’ to characterise a ‘new Britain’ and identified socialism ‘in the modern age’ with science. Science both appeared to draw its rising status from beyond higher education and was increasingly legitimated heteronomously as fulfilling instrumental needs. A central theme of Snow’s lecture was valorising science as a force for economic progress and social advance. Fond of quoting Brecht’s phrase ‘Erst komm das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral’, proponents of science argued that scientific progress enabled economic development that brought greater social equality. Similarly, sociologists were said to ‘often see as their main job that of persuading policy-makers that sociology can be useful - that their expertise can control social forces’ (Gould 1963: 39). In turn policy-makers and businessmen were looking to sociology for applicable solutions to practical problems. Sociological research focused on the utilitarian problems of industry and government and taught courses were promoted as providing teachers, social workers, public administrators and leaders of industry. In terms of both demand and supply of teaching and research

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338 ‘Food comes first, then morals’ (Bertolt Brecht, 1928, The Threepenny Opera, Act 2, Scene 3) was quoted by, among others, Snow (1960: 66) and Waddington (1960: 72).

339 See Crosland (1964: 19) and MacRae (1964a: 133).

340 An SSRC survey in the mid 1960s reports the main interests of university sociologists as: social stratification; industrial sociology or sociology of work; local communities; and the sociology of education
the majority of people who come to sociology do so not out of desire to submit to an academic discipline but because they expect sociology is going to fulfil their hopes about society in general. (MacRae 1964b: 79).341

Portrayals of science by proponents and critics thereby shared lower relational autonomy; as Leavis succinctly put it: ‘Science is a means to an end and not an end in itself. That end is a rising standard of living’ (1966: 90).

Accounts of crisis in the humanities focused on two issues Leavis’s quote highlights. First, when measured as ‘a means to an end’, humanists felt diminished because the humanities do not make anything explode or travel faster, and the powers that be are not at present much interested in anything else (Hough 1964: 96).

In comparison, humanists looked ‘anti-intellectualist’, even ‘irrationalist’, and gave the impression of ‘being wilfully self-retarded’ (Kermode 1959: 76). Where science provided useful knowledge, the humanities ‘illustrate the Faustian awareness of the futility of the quest for knowledge’ (Gellner 1959: 207) and focus on ‘topics that bewilder most outsiders and often reduce others to uncomprehending mirth’ (Plumb 1964a: 9). If science trained scientists, engineers and technicians, and social science trained administrators and welfare professionals, the question was what, if anything, the humanities educated students for.342 The spreading of ‘sweetness and light’ appeared saccharine and insubstantial.

Secondly, belief in humanist culture as an end in itself was contested. That the humanities failed to prevent two World Wars and ‘in notable instances the high places of humanistic learning and art actually welcomed and aided the new terror’ (Steiner 1964: 23) undermined claims to being a civilising force. Belief among humanists in their clerisy role was failing. History, for example, was said to have ‘lost all faith in itself as a

(Carter 1968; see also J. Banks 1967, Cherns 1963 and Collison & Webber 1971). The identification of sociology teaching with a training in social administration was said to be ‘almost irresistible’ (MacRae 1964a: 135) and a survey of taught first degree sociology courses during the late 1960s found industrial sociology to be the most frequently offered option (Fincham 1972). See Clapham Report (1946), Cole (1944) and Horwood (1947) for examples of how new courses were legitimated.

341 See also Gould (1965), Kaye (1956) and Sprott (1957).

342 See the 1965 GED in Nash (1966). It was also believed a proclaimed scarcity of students would be worsened by the imminent arrival of career-minded ‘new students’ (see chapter 6).
guide to the actions of men ... professional historians have failed in their social purpose’ (Plumb 1964a: 9, 32). Indeed, Snow controversially suggested Auschwitz was the responsibility of literary intellectuals who in peacetime could manage only ‘screams of horror’ at industrialisation and would deny its fruits to the poor (1959c: 7-8, 25). The rise of science and crisis in the humanities were, therefore, contributing towards lower autonomy as the basis of legitimacy.

Density: From Culture to sub-cultures
Accounts of crisis in the humanities described a decline and fall from an ‘illiterate, unscientific golden age’ (Kermode 1959: 76), when an organic community shared a common culture, towards an age of discord and dissonance with a babble of competing voices speak different tongues. This Tower of Babel story represented a movement from one to many: a proliferation of new forms of knowledge (rising material density) and of communities of practitioners (rising moral density) was fragmenting culture into numerous, segmented sub-cultures (rising differentiation). This narrative cited two principal sources: a common culture based on Classics was in decline and science was claiming to be a second culture. In leading such claims Snow deliberately made a play for the key term ‘culture’ along two fronts: ‘its refined sense’ as ‘intellectual development’ and the ‘anthropological’ sense of a group sharing common customs and practices (1959c: 9, 1964: 62-5).

Material density
On the ‘refined’ sense of culture, Snow claimed literary intellectuals ‘still like to pretend that the traditional culture is the whole of “culture”, as though the natural order does not exist’ (1959c: 4, 14). Science was, he declared, a part of capitalised Culture, it was ‘in its intellectual depth, complexity and articulation, the most beautiful and wonderful collective work of the mind of man’ (1959c: 12). Such claims announced a rise in the number of cultures, cleaving culture in two. Where new humanities disciplines built upon classical literacy, scientists were said to

have their own culture, intensive, rigorous and constantly in action ... the whole literature of the traditional culture doesn’t seem to them relevant.
(Snow 1959c: 12, 13-14).

For humanists it was not a gap between two cultures but this lack of humanist knowledge among scientists that was of concern; the introduction to Crisis in the Humanities begins by observing: ‘Quips from Cicero are uncommon in the engineers’ lab; Ahab and Jael
rarely provide a parable for biologists’ (Plumb 1964a: 7). Moreover, the fragmenting
effects of allowing science into a humanist domain were clearly shown by sociology.
This ‘vast and amorphous, disjointed and self-contradictory’ (Birnbaum 1960: 460)
discipline was proliferating sub-disciplinary specialisms. Locked onto their empirical
focus, ‘sociologies of’ were considered ‘the problem child’ of social science (Cherns
1963: 110); or as Halsey put it: ‘There is a sociology of everything!’ (in Pakenham 1963:
166). 343

Cracks were also showing in humanist culture. Classics was said to be in serious decline
because modern universities did not set classical entrance requirements and their ‘feeder’
schools offered little classical education. 344 As the Classics ‘ceased to be a binding
element or common core holding competing claims together’ (Lee 1955: 137), the
humanities were fragmenting. While scientists could shorten taught courses by teaching
fundamentals linking disparate elements, humanists lacked knowledge of ‘the essential
principles’ (Halsey 1962: 172). Similarly in research, disciplines were reaching critical
mass, saturated by new facts, theories, topics and ideas. New knowledge was thus being
bolted onto existing knowledge rather than integrated into a common culture.

**Moral density**

Snow argued science constituted a proper culture because scientists were a community of
common ideas and outlooks. While humanists were riven by disagreement and thought
and acted differently, ‘the scientific culture really is a culture’: ‘Without thinking about
it, they respond alike. That is what a culture means’ (1959c: 9, 10). Snow thereby
anthropologised the notion of ‘culture’ to mean ‘a common way of life’ (1964: 64), and
equated this definition with capitalised Culture; as one popular periodical noted, Snow’s
argument ‘contains a view of the nature of culture which is deeply controversial’ (Editor,
The Spectator, 1962: 387). On this definition, science and not the humanities could claim
to be a ‘common culture’.

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343 Sociology was held to be typical of social science. For example, UGC reports had initially referred to
economics as a subject area, but had increasingly subdivided the subject into economics, industrial
economics, econometrics and econometric history (Halsey & Trow 1971: 155).

344 See Kitto (1955), Lee (1955), Leon (1952) and Pym (1955).
Snow himself stated that ‘the number 2 is a very dangerous number’ (1959c: 9), but two was just a beginning. Snow encountered pressure to increase the number from social scientists who ‘vigorously refuse to be corralled in a cultural box with people they wouldn’t be seen dead with’ and shared ‘a good deal of the scientific feeling’ (1959c: 9, 8). Social science was, some commentators argued, a ‘third culture’ (Robson 1962). Indeed, critics argued that the anthropological definition of culture could be applied to any group sharing ideas or practices; as one put it: ‘There are, regrettably, dozens of cultures in Sir Charles’s use of the term’ (Yudkin 1962: 35). Within the humanities the decline of Classics was considered ‘a serious threat to a whole way of life’ (Powell 1965: 104), for without this guarantee of shared knowledge, cultural references and educational experiences, whether humanists still formed a single culture was uncertain - even within humanist culture worldviews were proliferating, raising moral density.

Differentiation
Culture in both senses was not only proliferating but also fragmenting. An argument shared across the debate was that the two cultures were strongly bounded from one another. The implication was that where previously intellectuals had been equally at home in both spheres, now they were being replaced by two separate communities of specialists expressing incommensurable worldviews in mutually incomprehensible language: ‘in our society’, Snow declared, ‘...we have lost even the pretence of a common culture’ (1964: 60) and each of the two cultures ‘only deserves the name of sub-culture’ (1964: 62). From being characterised as an integrated community sharing a singular, common culture, by the early 1960s the disciplinary field was portrayed as a series of sharply differentiated sub-cultures, each with its own intellectual specialism and belief system. The decline of Classics and rise of science represented rising material density (more ‘intellectual’ cultures), moral density (more ‘anthropological’ cultures) and differentiation (greater specialisation), strengthening internal classification and framing.

Specialisation: From knowers to knowledge
Not only did humanists and scientists ‘speak different languages’ (Editorial, The Listener September 3, 1959: 344), but the grammars of these languages were also different, as

345 Snow (1964: 69-70) described how a group of social science disciplines was ‘forming itself, without organisation, without any kind of lead or conscious direction, under the surface of debate’ to become ‘something like a third culture’ and though ‘too early to speak of a third culture already in existence’, he was convinced it was coming (1964: 70-71).
vividly illustrated by the principal contributions to the Snow-Leavis debate. Snow began his lecture by briefly mentioning his personal credentials (‘By training I was a scientist: by vocation I was a writer’; 1959c: 1); Leavis’s riposte focused almost entirely on this issue declaring ‘Snow is, of course, a - no, I can’t say that; he isn’t: Snow thinks of himself as a novelist’ and arguing he showed no signs of scientific training (1962: 12). Leavis was concerned with Snow as a legitimate knower:

It is not any challenge he thinks of himself as uttering, but the challenge he is, that demands our attention.

(1962: 10-11).

In contrast, Snow repeatedly emphasised:

On these issues our personalities mean nothing: but the issues themselves mean a great deal ... The important thing is to take the personalities, so far as we are able, out of the discussion.

(1964: 56, 59).

Where for Snow the focus and rules of debate were central to generating knowledge, for Leavis the personal was epistemological. As Gellner highlighted, it ‘is the chasm perhaps intolerable, between real knowledge and identity which is the fundamental issue’ (1964: 79). Scientific insight was portrayed as based on specialised procedures accessing external reality (stronger epistemic relation) rather than the identity of its speakers (weaker social relation): knowledge specialisation.

Epistemic relation

Humanist ideas of culture emphasised the cultivation of inner sensibility and dispositions, and downplayed the significance of disciplinary knowledge. Science was viewed as turning such priorities upside down. Scientists were characterised as ‘in the grip of the facts’ (Bantock 1959: 427), possessing ‘a sense of loyalty to an abstraction called “knowledge”’ (Mackerness 1960: 15), committed to ‘truth’ (Bronowski 1961, Vick 1963), and owing allegiance and identity to their discipline rather than their university (Pakenham 1963). Similarly, sociologists publicly aspired to the accumulation of ‘facts, facts, facts’ (Beavan et al. 1960: 387). While the humanities explored personal

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346 Leavis stated: ‘A judgement is personal or it is nothing; you cannot take over someone else’s’ (1962: 28); Snow (1964) claimed Leavis could not be trusted to abide by the impersonal rules of civilised debate. Snow’s supporters described Leavis’s lecture as ‘ten thousand words of total defamation’ and ‘cheap jibes and highly personal statements … about Snow the man’ and accused Leavis of attempting to assassinate Snow’s reputation, launching ‘a barren malevolent attack’ of an ad hominem nature. (Quotes are by Gerhardi, Hill and Lord Boothby, respectively, in Gerhardi et al., 1962: 331, 332, 331).
subjective reality where the knower was also the known, science studied impersonal, objective reality through the use of impersonal, objective procedures - a double movement away from knowers. Science was portrayed as anti-humanist and inhumane, the triumph of hard facts and Reason over intuition and imagination; for example, a much quoted passage in the debate defended

the old spontaneous intuitive faculties, the direct sensuous awareness of the external world in immediate contact before perception was clouded by the abstractness of modern rationalism

(Bantock 1959: 428).

Real knowledge was, humanists feared, becoming defined as practicable, applicable knowledge of the world achieved through the experiment and expressed in mathematics. The mathematisation of the sciences was heralded as the ‘most decisive change in the tenor of Western intellectual life since the seventeenth century’, one which had ‘divided the experience and perception of reality into separate domains’ (Steiner 1961: 33).

Mathematisation was widely viewed as signalling disciplinary evolution - in the beginning was the word but the mathematical symbol showed maturity. ‘To use numbers’, a senior sociologist declared, ‘is to claim a power almost magical in our time’ (MacRae 1964a: 136). Accordingly, aspirant social scientists aimed to be mathematical in approach. Mathematisation devalued the basis of the humanist idea of culture - the study of language and literature - by promoting a ‘retreat from the word’ (Steiner 1961: 33). It also distanced the concepts of science from common language, making specialist knowledge (rather than cultivated dispositions) the basis of legitimate insight. The natural scientist B. C. Brookes, for example, provoked lively public debate by claiming ‘it will never be possible’ to translate scientific terms into everyday language (1959a: 521) and declaring:

the learning of science is the learning of a first, not a foreign, language; that there are no ‘bridges’, no short cuts, no cheap excursions to understanding science.

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347 Bantock’s argument was originally broadcast on the BBC Third Programme in 1959, then published in The Listener. The quoted passage was widely cited, e.g. Snow (1960) and Waddington (1960).

348 Mathematics was the most discussed exemplar of non-verbal languages which included symbolic logic and some computer programming languages such as LISP. The actual extent to which postwar natural sciences was based upon or using non-verbal languages requires empirical study in its own right (see Whitley, 1977).
Moving from everyday understanding to scientific insight thereby necessitated ‘a lengthy and ruthless indoctrination’ (Brookes 1959a: 520) whereas the humanities could be picked up ‘simply by soaking in the ambience’ (Gellner 1964: 70). In science “what you know and how” mattered more than “who you are” (a stronger epistemic relation), and by this measure the humanities appeared nothing special.

Social relation
While the humanist intellectual’s ‘ability is a personal matter, which on the whole he does not owe to his advanced training’, scientific knowledge was widely portrayed as ‘fairly independent of the personal merits of its possessor’ (Gellner 1964: 75-6). Snow compared science as a democratic and meritocratic endeavour to the social snobbery of humanist culture (1959c: 48). Science was, Snow claimed, blind to colour, race, creed; it cut ‘across other mental patterns, such as those of religion or politics or class’ (1959c: 9). Indeed, science was portrayed as thoroughly asocial and ahistorical, a search for transhistorical, culturally independent rules or laws, untouched by social or historical context through procedures that held universally. As such science comprised an extended community reaching globally across geo-cultural contexts. Mathematics, for example, helped transcend cultural differences; even a polyglot humanist such as George Steiner was moved by this feature of science:

I have watched topologists, knowing no syllable of each other’s language, working effectively together at a blackboard in the silent speech common to their craft.
(1961: 33).

The reproducible experiment similarly reduced the significance of context. The humanities were typically portrayed as the intimate and solitary meeting of the individual author and the individual reader (guided, in teaching, by the individual tutor). In contrast, scientific discoveries could be reproduced by others in a semi-mechanical manner to obtain correct results. The unique, irreproducible and idiosyncratic work of the

349 Brookes first made the argument on BBC Radio and a transcript of the programme was published in The Listener (1959a, 1959b), which evoked an Editorial (October 1, 1959) and weeks of correspondence.

350 Gender was little discussed by Snow or his critics.

351 See Moore & Maton (2001) on how the knowledge modality of specialisation characterising mathematics enables the creation of an epistemic community extended across space and time.
individual humanist artisan was, therefore, being replaced by mechanical scientific reproduction rendering humanists ‘the artisanate of cognition’ (Gellner 1964: 75). These procedures were portrayed as the basis for a ‘common culture’ among scientists who consequently shared ‘common attitudes, common standards and patterns of behaviour, common approaches and assumptions’ (Snow 1959c: 9). In comparison humanist ideas of culture looked small, local and divisive. Many humanities disciplines had been legitimated in the late nineteenth century as valorising national identity on the argument that there was (for example) a definable ‘Englishness’ about ‘English literature’ the study of which provides insight into the English people.\footnote{352} A truly global ‘republic of science’ (Polanyi 1962) was thereby making humanist culture appear a factional, provincial and decaying republic of letters restricted to a small country. In short, science represented a Copernican revolution in specialisation, decentering privileged knowers in favour of specialist knowledge.

**Temporality: Facing the future**

In the battle between Ancients and Moderns the humanities were associated with the past (chapter 5); by the early 1960s they were portrayed as fighting for the losing side. In terms of age, orientation and rate of change, science was characterised as young, oriented to the future and dynamic, and the humanities portrayed as old, backward-looking and unwilling to change.

**Age**

Science appeared to enjoy the vitality of youth: scientists were characterised as *The New Men* (Snow 1954) and identified with a nascent consumer society and new technology; and social science was related to the new welfare state, service professions, ‘new’ universities and a young professoriate.\footnote{353} In comparison, the lack of utilitarian application of the humanities saw them painted as an outdated form of conspicuous cultural consumption with little relevance for the modern world. Proponents of science suggested humanists were living ‘a cloistered existence’ which ‘belongs to a past age’ (Lovell 1959: 68). Within the humanities concerns that a yawning gap had arisen with contemporary students were frequently expressed; English, for example, which had been

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\footnote{352} See e.g. Board of Education (1921), Mathieson (1975), D. Palmer (1965) and Tillyard (1958).

\footnote{353} The ‘new’ universities were at the forefront of the spread of sociology and widely associated, through their named Schools, with ‘social studies’ (Beloff 1968).
‘something of a revolutionary force’ when it emerged, was now ‘as remote as the ancient classics’ from the student’s living experience (Hough 1964: 104).

**Orientation**

Science was not only new but also forward looking. Scientists, Snow famously claimed, ‘had the future in their bones’ (1959c: 10) and were optimistic about scientifically-based social progress. The socio-historical past was dead to them and their work was creating tomorrow’s world - a prospective external orientation. The relationship of science to its own past, Snow later claimed, was the defining difference between the two cultures:

One is cumulative, incorporative, collective, consensual, so designed that it must progress through time. The other is non-cumulative, non-inciporative, unable to abandon its past but also unable to embody it. (1970: 739).

Proponents portrayed science as a successful search for consensus embodied in a cumulative body of agreed knowledge that incorporated past insights into the present. Its social field was characterised as an epistemic community extended across space and over time, one in which living members interact with the dead to produce contributions which, when they die, will be in turn the living concern of future members. Science was thereby said to show the direction of time’s arrow from the past into the present and towards the future: a progressive internal orientation.

In contrast the humanities were increasingly criticised as backward-looking, conservative and reactionary. In terms of external orientation, Snow claimed humanists refused to accept modern industrial society - they were ‘natural Luddites’ who wished ‘the future did not exist’ (1959c: 22, 11) - and looked longingly backwards as though there was ‘a much better society, somewhere, or at some time’ (Snow 1960: 67). What had been a positive attribute, the rootedness of humanist culture in the past, was now painted as escapism into the fiction of a lost Golden Age. For humanists this past seemed less a source of current insight: ‘no longer do historians investigate the past in the hope that it may enable their fellow men to control the future’ (Plumb 1964a: 9). In terms of internal orientation, not only were the humanities focused on excavating established canons rather
than new works but were suffering under the weight of accumulated knowledge.\textsuperscript{354} The humanities were locked into their own past and unable to integrate this into the present.

\textit{Rate of change}

This stagnation of humanist culture contrasted with the proclaimed dynamism of scientific culture. By the early 1960s scientific progress was widely portrayed as dynamic and ever-changing: the phrase ‘scientific revolution’ was common currency, and science appeared oriented to the production of \textit{new} knowledge, with ‘truth’ a dynamic category. As a recent presence within higher education, sociology was similarly portrayed as flexible, exciting, fast moving and unencumbered by the dead weight of canons. In contrast, the humanities spoke in a ‘subdued voice’ (Snow 1959c: 4) and focused on canonic traditions. This slow rate of change was becoming doubly negative, for not only was the ‘traditional culture’ misguided, it was also unlikely to rectify its error; Snow, for example, claimed:

\begin{quote}
Literature changes more slowly than science. It hasn’t the same automatic corrective, and so its misguided periods are longer.
\end{quote}

(1959c: 8).

Within the humanities, commentators warned that their gradual pace of change meant time was against them in even recognising the need to change. Unwillingness to adapt had been portrayed as a cause of decline in Classics,\textsuperscript{355} and as Plumb put it: ‘Adaptation is the great difficulty’ (1964a: 7-8).

In summary, science and the humanities were portrayed as representing different temporalities: the humanities appeared antiquated, backward-looking and stagnant, while science represented a new, progressive, dynamic future. In short, the retrospective temporality of the humanities was being devalourised and the prospective temporality of science valorised. For many humanists, they were running out of time in more than one sense.

\textbf{[4] Conclusion: Legitimation crisis}

\textsuperscript{354} Classicists, for example, had already complained that disciplinary longevity was a burden as scholarship had reached saturation point (Bowra 1955: 124; Kitto 1955: 130-1).

\textsuperscript{355} See Bowra (1955) and JACT (1964).
This chapter has focused on debates during the early 1960s over perceived threats to the established structure of the disciplinary field. Public academic discussion focused on the contrasting fortunes of ‘two cultures’. The humanist idea of culture was suffering a crisis of legitimation brought on by an ascendant science that threatened to usurp its position and (in the form of sociology) take over study of the human world. The scientific idea of culture was portrayed as a conduit for external influence and beliefs within higher education, fragmenting an organic community that shared a common culture into numerous, segmented, specialist sub-cultures, making specialist procedures the basis of ahistorical, asocial and inhuman knowledge, and dismissing traditional ideas in favour of change. The characteristics of crisis in the humanities reflect how they fared when compared to science. They were said to be unwanted by students, ignored by industrialists and politicians, no longer the only repository of culture, ridiculed as providing no real knowledge and considered passé. Analysing these characteristics in terms of the legitimation device, this scientific revolution can be understood as moving towards a ruler of legitimacy based on lower autonomy, higher density, knowledge specialisation and prospective temporality. Humanist crisis and scientific revolution were thus two sides of the same coin: science was changing the rules of the game in its favour. For many within the humanities, they faced a stark choice:

humanists are at a cross-roads, at a crisis in their existence: they must either change the image that they present ... or retreat into social triviality.

(Plumb 1964a: 8)

How this challenge was met by humanists and with what consequences for the disciplinary field are the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter 8
Transforming the Disciplinary Field II:
A humanist counter-revolution

... for the sake of our humanity - our humanness, for the sake of a human future, we must do ... all we can to maintain the full life in the present ... of our transmitted culture.
F. R. Leavis (1962)
Two Cultures: The significance of C. P. Snow (London, Chatto & Windus), p.28

We are all sociologists now
Julius Gould (1965)

[1] Introduction

This chapter continues the preceding analysis of debates over the disciplinary field of English higher education during the early 1960s. Chapter 7 discussed participants’ portrayal of changes to the disciplinary field in terms of the contrasting fortunes of the two cultures of science and the humanities and analysed the threat this represented to the established structure of the field. In this chapter I firstly analyse solutions proposed by actors within the humanities to the problems this threat presented to the dominant status of humanist ideas of culture. These centred on reaffirming differences between science and the humanities, enveloping sociology within the humanities, a sociological turn, and revalorising the humanist idea of culture. Secondly, I analyse the two cultures debate as a whole. I show that proclamations of crisis in the humanities and scientific revolution in the disciplinary map and proposals for reorienting the humanities were not reflected in empirical reality and argue that the debate represents instead a struggle for control of the legitimation device. I show how the structure of the debate can be understood as a humanist response to perceived threats to ‘culture’, the basis of the disciplinary field’s status hierarchy, from beyond higher education. I conclude by arguing that proclaimed crisis, revolution and renewal in the early 1960s enabled the revalorisation of the established underlying structuring principles of the disciplinary field, retaining control of the device within the field.
[2] Counter-Revolutionary Legitimation

By the early 1960s many practitioners argued that the humanities urgently required revitalised legitimation - inaction was ‘suicidal’. No longer could they take for granted their place in the sun: ‘Every subject must earn its place. It must serve a recognized, legitimate purpose’ (Finley 1964: 23). Questions were being posed of their use and definition; Carr, for example, claimed: ‘Today the awkward question can no longer be evaded ... “What is history?”’ (1961: 20), while ‘the use of English’ was a regular motif within literary studies (Knights 1958: 155). Moreover, the humanities required not merely explicit but new forms of legitimation. The questions raised by the two cultures debate were how the humanities could be revitalised and scientific revolution countered.

The answers to these questions were symbiotically entwined with diagnoses of the problems purportedly facing the humanities; accounts of crisis typically offered diagnosis and cure simultaneously. Thus the proposed solutions mirror, in terms of name, terms and participants, the diversity of accounts of crises across the humanities (see chapter 7). Nonetheless, proposals for ways forward shared common underlying themes: they revolved around a remapping of relations between science and the humanities and focused on the key battleground of sociology. The threat facing the humanities can be understood as posing the question: can the social world be studied in the same way as the natural world? The answer associated with sociology was a positivist ‘yes’; the humanist response was an anti-positivist ‘no’. If the rise of science threatened a Copernican revolution within the disciplinary field, then the response was humanist counter-revolution. This ‘anthropomorphism’ took the form of pleas by actors in the humanities for ‘humanist’ forms of the social sciences, such as humanist sociology, and claims of a ‘sociological turn’ in humanities disciplines. Their tenor was to declare that though the natural world may be subject to materialistic, mechanistic, determinist, external causal explanations, human society was a human tale to be told by its participants in a humanist register. ‘They wish,’ as Gellner put it, ‘to defend the anthropomorphic image of man himself’ (1968a: 52, original emphasis). Such arguments aimed at an anti-Copernican replacing of humankind at the centre of the social world and thus the humanities as the archetypal knowledge of that world. This was ‘a war on two fronts’ (Winch 1958: 3): rebuff the encroachments of science into the humanist domain and envelop the strategic

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356 See, for example, Plumb (1964a: 7-8) and Steiner (1965: 84).
ground of sociology within the humanities. In this chapter I analyse these responses in terms of the legitimation device and show they represent moves towards an idea of culture characterised by higher autonomy, lower density, knower specialisation and neo-retrospective temporality (Table 8.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimation principle</th>
<th>Humanist counter-revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>higher (PA+, RA+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>lower (MaD-, MoD-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>knower (ER-, SR+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporality</td>
<td>neo-retrospective (-Ct, +Ft)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
PA = positional autonomy; RA = relational autonomy
MaD = material density; MoD = moral density
SR = social relation; ER = epistemic relation
C = classification; F = framing; t = temporal
+/− = relatively stronger/weaker

**Autonomy: Strengthening the Snow line**
Proposed ways forward for the humanities overwhelmingly reinforced strong boundaries with science on two fronts: the claims of scientists to be engaged in ‘culture’ were countered; and scientific principles (including the heteronomy of science) were held to be incompatible with the study of the human world. Relatively strong autonomy of ‘culture’ from science was thereby emphasised both in terms of positional and relational autonomy.

**Positional autonomy**
In a text that aroused considerable debate and which exemplifies stances often less coherently formulated across humanities disciplines during the early 1960s, Peter Winch emphasised that to denigrate science would be self-defeating because of its public popularity and ‘likely to meet a similar reaction to that met by someone who criticizes the
monarchy’ (1958: 2). However, he argued, the humanities must be on their ‘guard against the extra-scientific pretensions of science’ (1958: 2, original emphasis). For many humanist commentators this included the idea that scientists were engaged in culture. Against Snow’s claim that science represented an intellectual culture, humanists reiterated that culture was by definition an end in itself and gained moral and civilising force from this lack of utility. Thus science could not be part of culture as it was oriented towards economic rather than cultural ends. Leavis, for example, argued:

The scientist very well may ... derive great satisfaction from his work. But he cannot derive from it all that a human being needs - intellectually, spiritually, culturally ... It is obviously absurd to posit a ‘culture’ that scientist has qua scientist.

(1966: 87-88).

Snow’s claim that science also represented an ‘anthropological’ culture was deemed inconsequential. ‘Culture’ involved training and refinement of mind, tastes and manners; that scientists shared assumptions and practices was derided as of little import. ‘That sort of “culture”’, one commentator remarked, ‘joins the dwellers in suburban semi’s all over Britain’ (Symons 1959: 84). Social contextualist arguments being discussed in the humanities during the early 1960s (see Specialisation, below) brought similar conclusions. Winch (1964), for example, claimed science was one of many diverse but equal ‘forms of life’ each of which bestowed meaning on its language and had to be understood from the inside. They were, he argued, all equal for there was no neutral standpoint outside of a form of life from which to compare them - scientific rationality was thus not superior to witchcraft. Claims made for science’s anthropological status as a ‘culture’ were thus banal: not only were there many such cultures but they were equally valid because incommensurable. On both definitions, humanists were thereby proclaiming that ‘culture’ as a term of status was not the province of scientists; as a widely proclaimed argument in History ran:

If the truths of science require a scientist to discover them, history requires a historian to write it.

(Kitson Clark 1967: 32).  


358 Kitson Clark presented his arguments at lectures and conference papers in the humanities and social sciences on numerous occasions throughout the early 1960s (1967: ix).
Relational autonomy

The application of scientific practices to the object domain of the humanities was another key ‘extra-scientific pretension’. Illustrative of humanist responses was the way Winch (1958) strongly demarcated the legitimate domains of enquiry of the humanities and sciences. Winch argued that while science searched for causal explanations by formulating empirical generalisations about regularities, this asked the wrong questions of social behaviour because human actions are ‘meaningful’ and make sense only in terms of their meanings for actors, and so

the central concepts which belong to our understanding of social life are incompatible with concepts central to the activity of scientific prediction.

(1958: 94).

Versions of this position can be found across the humanities. Accordingly, much criticism was levelled at attempts by social scientists to use ‘scientific’ procedures: social science was humanist or it was mistaken. This ‘fallacy of imitative form’ (Steiner 1961: 36) was portrayed as attempting to share science’s rising status through crude mimicry; and

analogous to the technological primitive who builds himself crude wooden imitations of western mechanical tools and then expects miraculous cargo to arrive.

(Gellner 1959/1973: 207).

Scientific laws of causation were said to negate the full richness, idiosyncracy, uniqueness and unrepeatability of individual human life and deny human agency. Scientific ‘laws’ and moral ‘laws’ were fundamentally different and so ‘a thorough-going acceptance of the autonomy or independent character of morals’ was required (Hirst 1965: 168, 169). Humanists thereby legitimated stronger relational autonomy with science: culture was about morals and values.

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359 For example, in History, Kitson Clark (1967) echoes (without citing Winch) this position by claiming that the significance of context, the unrepeatability of situations, the constant change and flux of social situations make the systematic observation of regularities in behaviour impossible and so rule out a science of history (1967: 19-31). The emphasis on the exploration of ‘meaning’ was a well established theme in Feuerer literary criticism that drew strength from the perceived threat of science (e.g. Knights 1955, Hoggart 1964b).

360 A second, less common argument that the humanities were actually scientific appears to contradict this position. In History, Carr (1961) claimed the inductive image of science was being radically overhauled, reducing differences between scientists and historians. However, such arguments rewrote science in the image of the humanities, thereby maintaining strong relational autonomy from the scientific idea of culture.
This emphasis on autonomy also shaped discussion of ways forward for humanities disciplines. Addressing vocational relevance, commentators on crisis quickly dismissed the traditional ‘faculty theory’ notion of claiming the humanities train the cognitive pathways of the mind and impart such broad-brushed practical skills as discipline of thought, rigour and logic. Such arguments were ‘myths, dangerous myths’ (Finley 1964: 19); because they could be made by (already directly vocational) science, such appeals to utility played to science’s strength. Instead, instrumentalism was conceded to science and strongly bounded from humanist culture, for whom ‘practical’ benefits remained firmly secondary to its ‘far greater benefits, moral, aesthetic, experiential’ (Finley 1964: 23). Enveloping sociology within this culture, the problems of sociology were deemed to result from having become a ‘handmaiden’ of external interests. Discussion of relations with science thereby represented a declaration of independence: “Culture is not like science, scientists cannot do humanist work, and therein lies our value”: higher autonomy.

Density: One Culture
Leavis’s response to Snow’s claim that science represented a second culture was simple: ‘there is only one culture’ (1966: 88). This singularity also characterised proposed ways forward for humanities disciplines: struggles to fill the hole left by the decline of Classics comprised calls for re-integration of the humanities into a new, singular common culture and what can be described as a ‘sociological turn’. Together these aimed to reduce the number of legitimate cultures within the disciplinary field to one, integrated, common and humanist culture: lower density.

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361 The possibility of this argument, based on the faculty theory of psychology, stemmed from its use in legitimating the intellectual gymnastics of repetitive exercises in classical grammar (Campbell 1970: 258-9). Such exercises had been under mounting criticism; commentators blamed an overemphasis on composition (Bowra 1955), textual criticism (Bowra 1955), and purity of linguistic style (Burn 1955) for the declining popularity of Classics. English literary studies was detaching itself from the study of philology and Anglo-Saxon on similar grounds.

362 MacRae (1964a: 133-4), for example, claimed:

In so far as there is a crisis in sociology it results largely from the fact that sociology is not and should not be the handmaiden of universal virtue, a discipline which exists only to help the public zeal of influential persons and institutions.
**Material density**

Intellectual ‘culture’ was, Leavis claimed, indivisible; culture could not by definition be plural; and to talk of two cultures was ‘to use an essential term with obviously disqualifying irresponsibility’ (Leavis 1966: 88). Moreover, where ‘culture’ was organic and integrated, science was one-sided and specialised. Thus, humanists claimed ‘most scientists see no further than a world of economic sufficiency’ (Symons 1959: 84) and were ‘troglodytes’ exhibiting ‘a depressing perversity of mind’ and questionable moral character (Mackerness 1960: 14, 15).363

Rebuffing claims for two cultures however still left the problem of fragmentation within the humanities (chapter 7). By the 1960s claims to replace Classics as the unifying element of humanist culture abounded, taking the form of calls for integration within and between humanities disciplines. Facing outwards, proponents staked the claims of their own discipline to provide the best basis for a new common culture; facing inwards, they called on fellow practitioners to integrate approaches within the discipline and look outwards to other disciplines. Proclamations on ways forward for the humanities emphasised crossing frontiers and borders. In English, for example, commentators both claimed it occupied ‘a terrain bordering equally on sociology, on poetry, on psychology, on logic, and even on mathematics’ (Steiner 1965: 84) and declared that ‘the study of literature cannot remain self-enclosed...there is important work waiting to be done “on the frontiers”’ (Knights 1964: 80).364 The need to weaken boundaries between and within disciplines was emphasised and thus breadth revalorised. In History, for example, Plumb (1964a: 9) attacked ‘the whole sickening deadening process of increasing specialisation within history’. Summarising a GED on ‘changing patterns of study’, Hall described

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363 The question of the ‘psychic and spiritual health’ of scientists was also often raised, particularly in its applications within such high profile areas as nuclear weaponry (e.g. Bantock 1959).

364 English literary criticism was particularly vociferous in such claims. Practitioners were said to be drawn into ‘history, politics, and morals’ (Knights 1955: 225) or classics, medieval study, political history, social history and philosophy (D. James 1951: 304). (See also Brown 1960, Butt 1951, Holloway 1960, Hough 1964, Knights 1958, 1964, Leavis 1956, Robson 1956, Southam 1959, and D. Thompson 1950, 1957). As the dates indicate, English was early in putting itself forward for ‘the task of providing “the staple”’ (D. James 1951: 304) and claiming itself ‘capable of providing in itself a fully adequate substitute for the classics’ (D. Thompson 1950: 61), predating claims for other disciplines by a decade. That literary criticism was, as Anderson (1968) argued, the ‘unlikely’ refuge for notions of the totality within the English disciplinary map placed English in a strong position to make such claims and made the valorisation of integration an obvious strategy for raising status. Only Classics was as vocal as early, but for converse reasons: calls to integration were a strategy for survival; proponents called for alliances with rising humanities disciplines (e.g. Bowra 1955, Kitto 1955).
how ‘the need to break the old moulds is acutely felt at the present time’ (1965: 158), and that it ‘is now taken for granted that the new curricula will lead us out of the traditional disciplines, and that we will be forced to move across boundaries’ (1965: 156).365

*Moral Density*

Calls to integrate the humanities were typically accompanied by claims to provide insight into the social; Winch, for example, argued:

any worthwhile study of society must be philosophical in character and any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with the nature of human society.

(1958: 3)

Humanities disciplines and sociology were said to require active dialogue; for example, a main theme of Carr’s *What Is History?* was the contention that:

the more sociological history becomes, and the more historical sociology becomes, the better for both. Let the frontier between them be kept wide open for two-way traffic.


Sociology was central to making humanist culture an organic whole and should, humanists claimed, be integrated into the humanities. In the aforementioned GED, curricular integration placed sociology at its centre: ‘To put it crudely, a good deal of the re-patterning has to do with the rise of sociology’ (Hall 1965: 156). ‘Sociology’, as Halsey put it, ‘has come to occupy a curiously strategic place in the intellectual world’ (in Pakenham 1963: 166). Though this sociological turn makes it appear extremely popular within the humanities, as MacRae (1961: 39) stated, it was sociology’s name (‘a magic word’) rather than its disciplinary content that was in fashion - actually existing sociology was strongly criticised, legitimating the reclaiming of this nascent ‘third culture’ for humanist culture. Discussion of future directions for the humanities and social sciences thereby proclaimed a singularity highlighted by Winch’s *The Idea of a Social Science: one idea of one social science*. Culture was an intellectual whole to be studied from within a single anthropological culture: lower moral density.

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365 See Chapter 3 on the Gulbenkian Educational Discussions.
Differentiation

By cleaving culture in two Snow undermined notions of a common culture, arousing the wrath of many humanists. Thus, despite his argument that ‘Renaissance man is not possible’ (Snow 1964: 61), commentators claimed Snow to be asking ‘that we become whole men again’ (Riesman 1959: 71) and deemed this impossible with specialist science. A well-rounded generalist was said to require an undifferentiated, indivisible and seamless humanist culture. Holism was a recurrent theme, such as Winch’s emphasis on the whole form of life, Leavisite notions of organic culture, and claims to study the social totality (see Specialisation, below). The attitude of many humanists was that it was “synthesis”, after all - not simple adjacency, which mattered’ (Hall 1965: 122):

Subjects are no longer to be allowed to stand, side by side, distinct: this is a much more self-conscious attempt to break the subjects themselves, and to bring the parts into a more meaningful - and organic - relationship.

(1965: 159).

The exclusion of science from and inclusion of sociology within a newly integrated humanist idea of culture thereby valorised lower density as the basis of legitimation within the disciplinary field.

Specialisation: Returning to knowers

The success and rising status of science threatened a Copernican revolution by decentering privileged knowers in favour of practicable knowledge of the world underpinned by specialist procedures (chapter 7). Within the humanities idealist arguments downplayed the possibility of generating humanist insight into external reality through inhuman procedures, a linguistic turn emphasised the significance of language for study of the social world, and the ‘sociological turn’ involved a contextualist emphasis on the centrality of knowers in specific social contexts to the understanding of meaning. These arguments advanced a weaker epistemic relation and stronger social relation as the basis of insight: knower specialisation.

Epistemic relation

Where proponents of science emphasised the epistemological basis of knowledge, arguments gaining ground within the humanities turned epistemology on its head by claiming reality to be a reflection of language. Winch (1958, 1964), for example, argued that ideas must be understood in terms of their ‘meaning’ as part of ‘language games’ within specific ‘forms of life’. For Winch meaning is not a mirror, reflection or echo of
the thing meant; rather, social phenomena acquire meaning through their conceptualisation with shared concepts, actions ‘express ideas’ and social relations are made by the ideas of participants (1958: 123). Thus, reality does not generate, structure or constrain language; rather, language makes reality: ‘the distinction between the real and the unreal and the concept of agreement with reality themselves belong to our language’ (1964: 82). Winch concluded that studies of the social should not legislate about the world; instead the proper object of social study is language. Social science should be, in short, properly humanist. Indeed, against claims by science to monopolise real knowledge of the world, humanists proclaimed such knowledge to be only accessible through its own object of study: what has been and is known and thought in the world. This argument captured two key issues repeated across humanist responses to disciplinary crisis: idealism and a linguistic turn. First, humanists retreated from external reality both as an object of study - ‘They say, in effect: we offer no World-pictures’ (Gellner 1965: 48) - and as an inductive basis of knowledge. Carr, for example, described a widespread crisis of belief in

the accumulation of hard facts as the foundation of history, the belief that facts speak for themselves and that we cannot have too many facts.


Instead, he argued, historians make history: ‘History means interpretation’ and facts are produced not discovered (1961: 23). Secondly, idealism was accompanied by a preoccupation with language. Literature and language were already central to the humanist idea of culture (chapter 5), but rather than being the means through which reality can be accessed, they became the makers of reality. Against the ‘retreat from the word’ signalled by mathematisation in science, practitioners in the humanities revalorised language and warned against its misuse.\(^{366}\) Wittgenstein’s account of intellectual problems as confusions resulting from misunderstanding how language works and portrait of philosophy as ‘a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language’ (1953: 47e) was highly influential across the humanities.\(^{367}\)

\(^{366}\) See, for example, Finley (1964), Holloway (1960), Leavis (1962, 1966), and Steiner (1961).

\(^{367}\) The influence of this approach was noted beyond academia; a leader in The Times for 26th October 1963, for example, reported:

The source of all philosophical puzzles, paradoxes, and dilemmas is held to be confusion in the employment of concepts, in particular the illegitimate transfer of a concept from one system to another.

(quoted Gellner 1964: 68n).
Social relation

Instead of the world being accessible to transhistorical and transcultural scientific procedures, humanists emphasised the centrality of knowers and characterised knowing as social, tacit and locked into a totalised, local context. Winch (1958: 40), for example, quoted Wittgenstein’s dictum: ‘What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life’. Winch argued that concepts are social and so what gives meaning to knowledge is found in its form of life. Thus, as Gellner summarised Winch’s position: ‘Sense, and hence the criteria of validity, are conferred by local use and context’ (1968b: 82). Such contextualism was central to the sociological turn. In History, for example, Kitson Clark emphasised as ‘perhaps the most important principle of historical scholarship’:

The significance of context. That is that words and events can only be understood in the terms of the situation in which they were spoken and enacted, that to take them from that context and present them in isolation is necessarily to falsify.

(1967: 204).

Historians repeatedly emphasised the influence of personality and, through this, the social context. Carr’s mantra for historical study was: ‘Before you study the history study the historian. ... Before you study the historian, study his historical and social environment’ (1961: 44). In other words, knowledge is reducible to knowers located within determinate contexts.368

These contexts were understood as social totalities. Winch (again quoting Wittgenstein) emphasised that social phenomena ‘are in fact difficult to isolate, and have the character of total phenomena’ (1958: 42). In humanist legitimation this extended to both objects and subjects of study. First, objects of humanist study were totalised within claims to study the social totality. In English Hoggart claimed literary criticism ‘starts and finishes with experience as a whole’ (1966b: 284). Such holism was also projected as the future for sociology; despite currently being fragmented and piecemeal, commentators claimed that ‘[s]ociologists, at their best, insist on a sense of the interconnectedness of the whole’

368 Compare Plumb (1964b: 29). One finds this argument echoed in other humanities disciplines; see, for example, Louch (1966) on anthropology.
Second, subjects of study were characterised as knowers by virtue of membership of holistic contexts. Winch maintained that because there is no position-free position from which objective judgements can be reached and no neutral tools with which to study other cultures, each form of life must be understood through its own concepts and in terms of its whole culture. The humanist must therefore acquire the *socialised* gaze of the insider. In a number of humanities disciplines such social contextualist arguments emphasised that knowers must either undergo prolonged immersion in a culture or cultivate empathic understanding of participation. This argument also collapses the distinction between subject and object, making the local context the focus for study. During the early 1960s the ‘stupefying absence’ of study of the national social totality was widely noted; Anderson, for example noted:

> We must be unique among advanced industrial nations in having *not one single structural* study of our society today
> (1964: 27, original emphasis).

Thus while science pushed towards the global (chapter 7), humanists re-emphasised the national context, arguing English society should be the focus of study.

In summary, such arguments proclaimed not only that the word makes the world but that meaning resided within the whole culture this word was located within. Knowledge was locked into social contexts and accessible only to members or those with an empathic sensibility (itself resulting from prolonged socialisation within humanist culture). Idealism, a linguistic turn and social contextualism thereby together worked towards making knower specialisation the basis of legitimate ‘culture’.

**Temporality: The tradition of the new**
Proposals for changes in the humanities appeared to transform them into contemporary, dynamic and fast-changing disciplines. However, they were revalorising established

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369 The lack of this ‘best practice’ within sociology was the focus of much criticism among humanists. MacRae, for example, complained, ‘we are tending to see British society as a society made up entirely of discrete, curable problems that have no relation to any general framework’ (1964b: 80).


371 Compare Birnbaum (1960) and Shils (1960).
positions in new guises and represented a new form of established humanist ideas: neo-retrospective temporality. What was viewed as representing the new was also traditional.

The new

An argument common to humanist discussions of crisis was that remaining the same was suicidal for the humanities; indeed, diagnoses often chided those slow to embrace the need for change. Revolutions were declared in disciplines (such as philosophy, anthropology and history) and teaching practices. Such declarations seemed to signal a shift from cautious, small-scale evolution to great leaps forward. Similarly, notices of births and deaths echoed across the humanities: traditional philosophy was about to be ‘finished off’ and ‘over’ and its Wittgensteinian successor was ‘the new idealism’; Classicists announced ‘a new Latin for a new situation’; and economists heard the cry of ‘Political economy is dead; long live economics!’ Humanist culture was thereby being valorised as young, fresh and new. It was also oriented towards the new. Calls to study contemporary society were manifest. Even Leavis, the supposed high priest of nostalgia, argued that humanist culture represented ‘the living creative response to the present’ (1962: 27) and argued for ‘a literary tradition that lives in the present’ (1966: 97). Similarly, proponents of History and Classics re-emphasised their insights into contemporary society. In terms of internal orientation, revolutions within disciplines typically comprised total breaks with their intellectual past. Proponents of new approaches portrayed predecessors as epitomising delusion and error and claimed that, as Gellner put it, past thinkers

have left behind a heritage of theory so confused, yet so ingrained, that it is almost beyond sorting out. Better far to turn to new areas.

(1964: 48)

In philosophy, for example, one commentator claimed ‘We flounder in the bogs ... extreme measures are called for’ (Warnock 1960: 617) and the influential position

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372 For example: The Revolution in Philosophy (Ryle, Ed. 1956), Revolution in Anthropology (Jarvie 1964), The Revolution in Psychiatry (Becker 1964), The Inner Revolution of the social sciences in history (Cochran 1964); and Revolution in Teacher-Training (Jeffreys 1961) and The Teaching Revolution (Richmond 1967).

373 Quotes on philosophy are from Times Literary Supplement, 9 September 1960, p.ix (quoted in Gellner 1964: 66n1) and Gellner (1968a), on Classics from Campbell (1970: 264) and on economics from Sargent (1964: 144).

374 On History, see Carr (1961); on Classics, see Bowra (1955), Finley (1964), Grant (1955), and Lee (1955).
represented by Winch effectively declared past philosophy redundant - it had not merely offered the wrong answers but had asked the wrong questions. Thus the entire history of the discipline could be dispensed with: an apparently prospective orientation.\footnote{This effect was reinforced by an emphasis on the significance to knowledge of context. The positions discussed in Specialisation regarding social context were applicable to temporality; one could argue not only that different co-existing cultures were incommensurable but that the past is a different country.}

The proclaimed rate of change within humanist culture also accelerated. Describing a ‘permanent revolution’ in philosophy, for example, Gellner (1964) sardonically pitied physics which, despite vast financial resources and an international community, had managed only two revolutions in the previous half-century while mainstream philosophy alone, with barely any staff numbers or resources and within one country, had achieved at least four revolutions.\footnote{Compare Gallie (1964).} Similarly, the fine arts were described as ‘in a state of permanent revolution’ (Bell 1964: 110) and as comprising ‘leaps from vanguard to vanguard’ (Rosenberg 1962: 23). Change became increasingly pronounced as the norm for humanities disciplines and their objects of study; both were increasingly being redescribed from states of being to becoming, from fixed to fluid categories. For example, History, claimed Carr (1961: 132), ‘in its essence is change, movement’ and, according to Plumb (1964b: 42-43), should focus on change and progress. The humanities were thus legitimated as not only new and contemporary but also undergoing permanent cultural revolution.

\textit{The tradition}

The humanities were not, however, embracing the temporal ruler associated with science. First, claims to study the contemporary social totality and so provide a new centre for the humanities were legitimated as updated versions of Classics rather than new forms of humanist culture (see Density). Indeed, it was the past ideal from which Classics was portrayed as having fallen that subjects were said to offer - a return to past principles. Similarly, arguments repositioning sociology aimed to bring it back into the humanist fold rather than set out a bold new path; for example, as Gellner argued, ‘what Mr Winch has to tell the sociologist is not new’ (1960: 72).
Secondly, in terms of orientation, new directions for humanist culture did not turn time’s arrow to point forward but instead broke it. In science past work was portrayed as less approximate to truth than but living on within newer, grander theories. In humanist culture old approaches were characterised as the paragon of error and replaced rather than engulfed by new ideas. Breaks with the past were total and new approaches were announced as truth first, only becoming tentative later; Winch (1958), for example, declared a coup that was *fait accompli*. Thirdly, revolution quickly became a ‘tradition of the new ’ (Rosenberg 1962). In the study of arts, for example, declarations of innovation were already the norm (Bell 1964). By the end of the decade, Rosenberg argued that such declarations had ‘become the accepted tradition, taken for granted and no longer the object of thought’ (1970: 15). Moreover, alongside revolutionary claims many humanists praised highly conservative progress; for example:

I do not want to laud present fashions but there surely is a real advance in trying to go a little way certainly rather than a long way uncertainly
(Wheatley 1962: 435-6).

Proclaimed revolution was often a great leap forward that enabled one once again to make small steps.

Renewed legitimation of the humanities did not, therefore, simply restate existing positions: commentators called for humanities disciplines to embrace dynamic change, revolution and the new. However, this was not the prospective temporality of science. Calls for change involved a series of *prima facie* contradictions, such as revitalising the past through total breaks with the history of disciplines and revolutions to achieve small sure-footed gains. In short, in terms of age, orientation and rate of change, humanist responses to crisis and revolution embodied an updated, revalorised version (-C†) of an idealised past (+F†): neo-retrospective temporality.

**Summary**

Plumb introduced *Crisis in the Humanities* by announcing that ‘the social sciences are fighting for life, the humanities against death. What is certain is that neither is properly adjusted to the educational and social needs of the modern world’ (1964a: 10). Both, in

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377 The idealism of these positions (see Specialisation) is apparent here: claiming revolution or rebirth is sufficient to bringing it into being.

378 Quoted by Gellner (1964: 59n) who also quotes similar statements from Strawson and Warnock.
other words, needed to be changed. Though the humanities were in crisis, the way forward offered by the scientistic aspirations of sociology was not an option but rather a threat to be countered. Responses to disciplinary crisis and the threat posed by science varied across humanities disciplines in terms of names and faces but shared underlying themes that revalorised humanist ideas of culture and struggled against encroachments by natural and social science. These ‘war aims’ (in Winch’s terms) were realised in such arguments as proclamations of incompatibility with scientific practices, the restriction of ‘culture’ to the humanities, calls for curricular re-integration, idealist underscoring of the significance of language to reality and a sociological turn emphasising the significance of context for meaning, and proclamations of rebirth, renewal and revolution. In terms of the legitimation device, this humanist counterrevolution can be understood as proclaiming stronger autonomy, lower density, knower specialisation and neo-retrospective temporality as the basis of a revitalised and humanist idea of culture.

[3] The Two Cultures Debate: Controlling the legitimation device

*Crisis is a way of thinking about one’s moment, and not inherent in the moment itself*

Frank Kermode (1966: 101)

Concern over ‘crisis’ and ‘revolution’ in the disciplinary field of higher education centred in the ‘two cultures’ debate on the symbiotic issues of problems caused by a humanist crisis of confidence and an ascendant science (chapter 7), and solutions proposed in the form of revitalised humanist disciplines. Having discussed what these comprised in terms of their modalities of legitimation, I shall now analyse the two cultures debate as a whole to examine the nature of the threat and its resolution. I begin by comparing these collective representations with the empirical reality of early 1960s higher education.

Myths and realities

As with the ‘new student’, representations of science and the humanities were in many ways myths. The humanities were portrayed as in terminal decline, unwanted by students, deemed irrelevant by economic and political interests and derided as providing little knowledge and passé. In reality, student interest remained healthy: governmental reports reported not only great demand but also a student ‘swing’ away from and
antithetical attitudes towards science. Industrial demand for humanities graduates was strong, particularly for management roles and in the emergent service economy, and governments remained committed to the humanities. Indeed, they remained a key ladder for social mobility; as Gellner put it:

humanist intellectuals find themselves in an extraordinarily powerful strategic position: they control the entry point, they must initiate the clamouring entrants, and supply the demand from the promotion side of an industrial society. ... They are indispensable to both sides.

(1964: 77)

Though the humanities were declining as a proportion of total student and staff populations, this was not absolute but merely relative change - a loss of monopoly. Reports of the death of the humanities were thus greatly exaggerated.

Talk of scientific revolution was similarly polemical. The portrayal of science as utilitarian, vocational, handmaiden of political and economic interests and providing the ‘white heat’ of ‘revolution’ in society was accurate of one only region of science: technology, engineering and applied science (typically labelled collectively as ‘technology’). Significantly, in the debate sparked by his lecture humanist commentators overlooked Snow’s critique of pure scientists for being ‘devastatingly ignorant of productive industry’ and taking ‘it for granted that applied science was an occupation for second-rate minds’ (1959c: 31, 32); pure scientists and humanists had more in common than humanist representations suggested. Technology was indeed on the rise: numerous governmental reports focused on technical education and eight former technical colleges

379 Absolute numbers of students studying the Classics, for example, were actually on the rise: GCE ‘O’ level examination passes in Latin, for example, rose from 18,500 in 1952 to 34,000 in 1963 (Ministry of Education, 1964: 9-10). See Layard et al. (1969) on how potential student demand for science and technology was consistently overestimated while demand for the humanities remained strong. During the 1960s a succession of governmental reports focused on science, concerned about: a ‘swing away’ from science at A level and in higher education (Dainton Committee 1965-68), a ‘brain drain’ of scientists migrating abroad (Jones Committee 1964-67) and The Flow into Employment of Scientists, Engineers and Technologists (Swann Committee 1965-68). Indeed, the Dainton Report (1968) found the attitudes humanists claimed students had towards humanities to be in fact prevalent towards science: ‘for many young people science, engineering and technology seem out of touch with human and social affairs’ (quoted Hough 1991: 13).


381 For example, at the end of the 1920s humanities faculties accounted for half the academic staff of universities; by the end of the 1960s they comprised one-sixth (Halsey & Trow 1971: 156).
were chartered as universities in 1966-67.\textsuperscript{382} However, reports often led to little change, the curricula of the CATs were ‘liberalised’ with humanist culture prior to chartering, and the resulting ‘technological’ universities were failing to recruit sufficient students to fill courses.\textsuperscript{383} Though expanding, technology remained low in the status hierarchy and, moreover, made few claims to ‘cultural’ status.\textsuperscript{384} Sociology was similarly caricatured: positivist emulation of science was not overwhelmingly dominant and its expansion was from a very small base and far from rivalling the humanities.\textsuperscript{385} In short, humanist culture was not in free fall, science resembled little ‘scientific culture’, what was really being described (technology) was not threatening to overturn the status hierarchy, and sociology was still only nascent rather than an overpowering force.

Proposed solutions to these spectres were just as rhetorical. Key themes of this counter-revolution included integrating humanities and social sciences in a sociological turn towards analysing a contemporary, local, social totality. An analysis of the disciplinary terrain during the late 1960s, however, revealed a different landscape. Anderson highlighted a continuing ‘deep, instinctive aversion to the very category of the totality’ (1968: 13) and argued that many disciplines were either unsociologised, unhistoricised and reductive or untheorised. Only in anthropology and English literary criticism was the notion of the totality found but this was projected abroad and strongly bounded from actually existing sociology, respectively. No established humanities disciplines were capturing the contemporary social totality or becoming the unifying centre of a newly integrated humanist culture that encompassed sociology. Sociology itself remained similarly unmoved; its utilitarianism, separation from the humanities and fragmentation thrived. Sociology was ‘still largely a poor cousin of “social work” and “social

\textsuperscript{382} Reports included: the supply and training of teachers for technical colleges (Willis Jackson Report 1957), commercial education (McMeeking Report 1959) and day release (Henniker-Heaton Report 1964); and White Papers on Better Opportunities in Technical Education (1951), Technical Education (1956) and Industrial Training (1962).

\textsuperscript{383} See Hough (1991) and Sanderson (1972).

\textsuperscript{384} Snow’s claims were ambivalent here. It is clear that his claims for the significance of his second culture were based on the impact and potential of applications of science, but when advocating science as an aesthetic and intellectual equal of traditional culture he writes of pure science.

\textsuperscript{385} A study of British sociology during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s found a positive attitude to science in textbooks for teaching prior to 1970 but little sign of positivist characteristics, broadly understood, in knowledge production (Platt 1981). Students taking social studies disciplines were still only 11.3% of all undergraduates, compared to 30.9% taking humanities in 1961-2 (Sanderson 1972: 365).
professionalisation was proceeding apace, sub-disciplines showed few signs of integration and, Anderson concluded, ‘the record of listless mediocrity and wizened provincialism is unrelieved’ (*Ibid.*).

Thus both threats and their solutions advanced in the debates were more rhetoric than reality. This raises questions of what the threat actually comprised, how the manifesto of counter-revolution served as a response to this threat, and what effects the debate as a whole had for higher education.

**The real threat of non-U**
The public face of debates over the disciplinary map was concern over the ‘sheer loss to us all’ (Snow 1959c: 11) caused by a growing gulf between two cultures and how this gap could be overcome in the interests of both scientists and humanists. It can also, I suggest, be understood as realisations of struggles for control of the legitimization device. Snow’s claims for science were perceived as a bid to control the key status term of ‘culture’; the scientific idea of culture represented everything against which humanist culture was defined. As discussed in chapter 7, this threat can be rewritten as embodying lower autonomy, higher density, knowledge specialisation and prospective temporality (see Table 8.2). Returning to the existing structure of higher education analysed in chapter 5, this represents a non-U legitimization code, the dominated code of the field. The rise of science thereby threatened to make non-U the basis of status and so invert the hierarchy of the field. Characterisations of crises in the humanities reflected how they would fare when measured by the settings associated with science. Crisis and revolution were, therefore, realisations of a perceived threat to humanist ownership of the legitimization device.

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**Table 8.2:**
Legitimation modalities and codes for humanist culture, scientific culture and humanist counter-revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimation principle</th>
<th>Humanist culture</th>
<th>Scientific culture</th>
<th>Counter-revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autonomy</strong></td>
<td>higher</td>
<td>lower</td>
<td>higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Density</strong></td>
<td>lower</td>
<td>higher</td>
<td>lower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Scientific revolution and humanist crisis, however, were myths occasioning moral panics. That there was no clear and present danger to the humanities from within higher education raises the question of the basis of the threat: what was the real source of anxiety? This, I argue, lay beyond higher education, in social, economic, political and cultural changes underlying the social fortunes of the two cultures. At the start of chapter 7 I discussed how ‘culture’ was being redefined by such developments as: growing political involvement (through governmental commissions, legislation, etc.); burgeoning culture industries catering to commercial markets; diversification of forms and sources of cultural products; mass production and mass consumption of culture; breaking down of social distinctions in the face of universal literacy and the market ‘democracy’ of consumer power; a widespread perception of cultural renewal and association of mass culture with youth. In short, ‘culture’ was becoming viewed *inter alia* as a political issue, big business, ‘mass’ and continually renewing. Rewriting these in terms of the device, they become: lowering of autonomy (from state and economy), higher density (massification), knowledge specialisation (democratisation), and prospective temporality (neophilia). These processes of change represent moves toward a non-U legitimation code. ‘Culture’, the basis of status within the field, was not merely changing beyond the field but in ways antithetical to humanists and, as Gellner put it, their ‘culture is their fortune, poor dears’ (1964: 63n). Though, as I argued, the principal focus of academic debate focused on changes *within* higher education, these wider developments did not go unnoticed. Humanists’ writings offered an often tacit history where an ill-defined but fundamental move towards a technological and industrial society was pressuring intellectuals to move towards an instrumentalist idea of culture.386 Crisis in the humanities and scientific revolution embodied fear of changes to the field from sources beyond higher education.

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386 See Halsey (1958) for an account of this tacit history.
An early commentator claimed that ‘sociology is essentially the product of rapid social change and crisis (Rumney 1945: 562); I am arguing that *inter alia* a sociological turn was essentially the product of rapid change and crisis in the social position of humanists. The rise of science embodied the external threat of non-U; the response to this threat was a humanist counterrevolution whose constituent stances were legitimated as new, radical and innovative. As discussed above, underlying claims to renewal was a more ambivalent relationship to change. Comparing the legitimation code underlying the dominant idea of culture prior to the early 1960s, scientific culture, and the humanist response (see Table 8.2) shows that in all but Temporality the latter reaffirms the modalities already underlying the liberal humanist idea of culture. However, this was not a simple restoration of the *status quo ante* but rather returning to renewed, revitalised first principles. In the course of the debate the established dominant legitimation code was transformed through a variation of temporal modality. Calls for new directions in the humanities comprised new versions of the traditional idea of culture rather than new ideas of culture. This position represented neither reproduction nor change of U but a variation, an updated or neo-U.

Retaining control of the legitimation device

The two cultures debate was about more than relations in the disciplinary map. The threat posed by scientific culture embodied anxieties over social changes that were redefining culture towards a non-U code, a measure of achievement and status at odds with the U code underlying the humanities. The neo-U code modality underlying proposed solutions to crisis in the humanities can be understood as a public response by actors within these disciplines to this embodied threat to humanist ownership of the device. This leaves the question of what the solution to the wider threat to humanist control of the device comprised. Having analysed the messages (of crisis and its resolution) in the debate, I now turn to analyse the medium of the debate as a whole. The medium of the debate itself, I argue, proclaims a message about the definition of cultural status and achievement, one which worked to maintain the established underlying principles of the field in four principal ways: retaining control over ‘culture’ within the field, keeping debate within one culture, conducting the debate from a knower basis and renewing structuring principles.
(i) *Deciding for ourselves*

The rapid growth of commercialised culture and mass media was increasingly making culture an economic and political issue. Speaking to a conference of English teachers in 1965 Richard Hoggart pressed the urgency of the need for practitioners to reshape the discipline themselves:

> Things are moving fast, and new lines soon set hard. If we do not decide for ourselves, matters may be decided for us in ways we like less and less. (1966a: 167).

The structure of the debate worked to maintain control over culture in two principal ways. First, it proclaimed ‘culture’ as belonging to higher education, as something argued over and decided among intellectuals rather than actors from other fields. This is illustrated by the way Snow’s lecture was recontextualised in the ensuing debate. Both of Snow’s two cultures lay *beyond* higher education: modernist writers and ‘literary intellectuals’ of ‘Chelsea and Greenwich Village’ (1959c: 2) and the application of technology in industry. Moreover, his focus was the impact of these cultures in society, particularly relations between richer and poorer countries.\(^{387}\) In the debate triggered by his lecture, however, Snow’s social focus was almost universally ignored and his ‘two cultures’ were taken as referring to the humanities and sciences in higher education. Commercial forms of literary culture and technology were considered, as Leavis put it, ‘the sum of two nothings’ (1966: 93), other possible forms of culture such as ‘mass’ and folk or working-class culture were ignored and the focus became instead a struggle for ascendancy between two groups of intellectuals. Culture thereby remained something controlled by actors *within* higher education. However, it was not merely of local import. The debate seemed to many participants to be ‘not only an intellectual argument about our cultural situation, but a political argument about the future of Britain’ (M. Morris 1959: 375) and ‘a controversy over the future shape of life in England’ (Steiner 1962: 261). Culture and society were seemingly in the hands of academics.\(^{388}\)

Secondly, the debate crystallised events beyond their control into specifically *intellectual* problems, rendering them specific and manageable. This is evident in a recurrent

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\(^{387}\) Snow later wished he had used his original title idea, ‘The Rich and the Poor’, as it ‘was what I intended to be the centre of the whole argument’ (1964: 79).

\(^{388}\) This is not to say nobody else contributed - articles on the controversy appeared in a variety of non-academic periodicals, journals and newspapers. However, a common tendency was for these to report on the debate as an *academic* controversy.
emphasis on language; among its many appearances are claims that scientists and humanists speak different languages, that the humanities were being undermined by a retreat from the word and that a key way forward was to interpret everything as language-games and appreciate the significance of language in making reality. This picture suited a caste of intellectuals whose education was primarily literary and whose position rested on the mastery of language. Where culture was becoming an increasingly commercial or social issue in the fields of economic and political power, here it remained an intellectual issue. Culture was to be decided in specifically cultural terms rather than balance sheets or political value. The debate thereby cast the impact of broad, longstanding historical processes, such as the expansion of literacy and growth of new culture industries, on a scale and in a register recognisable and amenable to change by humanists, maintaining relatively strong relational autonomy between higher education and other fields.

(ii) Debating within one culture
The idea of culture as the basis of an organic community was under threat of being dissolved as audiences grew to unprecedented levels for a wider range of cultural products. The two cultures debate, however, worked against such raising of density in two ways. First, ‘quantity versus quality’ remained an underlying theme of the debate: massification and diversification by commercial culture was, as one leading researcher put it, ‘terrifying...the scale of the problem in front of us’ (Trenaman, in NUT 1960: 40). Suggestions that the humanities be revitalised by reaching the new constituency offered by media interest and burgeoning book sales of popular versions of humanities work were strongly rebutted. Winch, for example, exclaimed that ‘the day when philosophy becomes a popular subject is the day for the philosopher to consider where he took the wrong turning’ (1958: 2), and Plumb argued that History was ‘outside the general culture, can never be a part of it: it is caviar to the general’ (1964b: 34).

Secondly, the debate itself was not really a debate between two cultures. Of the principal contributors to the Snow-Leavis debate, Snow refused to directly reply to Leavis, Snow’s supporters claimed Leavis failed to address Snow’s substantive points and Leavis claimed they were ‘abusive’, misrepresented his position and failed to answer his arguments. Each remained unmoved, with subsequent contributions repeating original positions; Leavis (1970) and Snow (1970) even disagreed on whether there had even been a debate at all. It was not that they could not agree; they could not agree on what was to be agreed or not - Leavis could be speaking for both sides when he exclaimed: ‘He doesn’t know what he means, and doesn’t know he doesn’t know’ (1962: 10). In the
ensuing debate scientists were rare and protagonists for scientific culture within the humanities did not rival those denouncing scientism. It was often less a debate than a strike against an enemy who does not respond. Relations with science were often described in warlike imagery (Winch, for example, talked of a war on two fronts, tactics, war aims and a pincer movement) and discussion of sociology often took the form of proselytising rather than dialogue, telling sociologists of their legitimate future; as Gellner wrote:

They were not modest men. They came to teach, not to learn ...
missionaries bringing methodological salvation
(1968b: 80).

The debate was also conducted in humanist terms - few scientific concepts and less mathematics appeared and even Snow’s contributions, widely taken as exemplifying the claims of science, were literary in form, style and tone. A debate over two cultures was thus conducted within a small community and on the terms of one culture.

(iii) Humanists as knowers

Commercial culture offered an economic entry requirement as the basis of legitimate participation (in at least consumption) while the extension of literacy under educational expansion had slowly dissolved cultural barriers giving birth to ‘the articulate society’ in which everyone felt entitled to speak.389 Where classical literacy had previously divided cultural knowers from laity, now popular translations and mass culture threatened to make basic English literacy and financial capacity the qualifications for cultural judgement. On this measure the ‘clerk is a nobody not merely because he is not a scientist, but also because in the developed societies everyone is now a clerk’ (Gellner 1964: 78). Not only had the humanist monopoly of literacy been undermined but this form of literacy was also being devalued by a wider ‘retreat from the word’ beyond higher education: the rise of what Marshall McLuhan (1962, 1964) called the ‘secondary orality’ of a new ‘electronic culture’.390

389 Hoggart (1963: 78), quoting ‘a media figure’.

390 McLuhan (1962, 1964) celebrated a shift from ‘print culture’ to ‘electronic culture’ as breaking down cultural hierarchies, supplanting the written word, and enabling greater democratic participation in cultural production and thus diminishing the role of specialised cultural elites. In terms of access to and the significance of humanist knowledge the humanities were becoming nothing special.
In contrast, the two cultures debate was structured around privileged *knowers*. That science provided greater purchase on external reality was a threat only in terms of its higher social status, instrumental values attributed to politicians, industrialists and prospective students and the impact these would have on the social position of humanists. Science as a cognitively superior form of knowledge was not considered; rather, scientists as a privileged group of knowers possessing a new measure of success was the issue. The solution to this problem was not to make the humanities cognitively stronger by expounding a more rigorous epistemological basis but to renounce epistemology altogether. The answer was relativism and a denial of the reality of science’s cognitive effectiveness and global diffusion.\(^{391}\) Moreover, both diagnosis and prescription are conducted as if from within a form of life exempted from the relativising implications of the arguments being wielded; neither appeal to the nature of reality for support but are simply posited. As Gellner (1968a: 70-71) argued, the main basis of the appeal of such arguments was that they ‘provided a justification for a “form of life” which in fact was threatened by the implication of scientific revisions of our world-views’. In short, that science was a fashionable but unexceptionable form of life was simply clear to knowers located in the humanist form of life.

*(iv) Renewing structuring principles*

Science was symbolic of what Booker (1969) was to describe as the ‘neophilia’ of the 1960s. A new society was said to be emerging and culture was both changing and about change. This emphasis is also evident throughout the two cultures debate: science is dynamic and the humanities must change or die. Beneath this rhetoric, however, the debate was not so new. It was constructed as between realisations of the two legitimisation codes already structuring the disciplinary field: scientific culture represented the non-U code; the humanist response represented a variant modality of U (Table 8.2). This dichotomising was a key attribute of debate. The choice for culture (and for sociology) was between instrumentalist science and liberal humanism. Snow’s notion of ‘two cultures’, which he described as ‘something a little more than a dashing metaphor, a good deal less than a cultural map’ (1959c: 9) was mapped directly onto existing representations of higher education as a polarised field. Though Snow (1964) half-heartedly conceded the future possibility of a third culture of social science, positions in

\(^{391}\) ‘For most modern thinkers, relativism is a *problem*: for Winch and Wittgenstein, it is a *solution*’ (Gellner 1968a: 67; original emphasis).
the debate were typically confined to two; as Plumb put it, social science ‘could so easily be developed as a bridge between the humanities and the sciences; but bridges are not wanted’ (1964a: 10). The question of whether the human or social world can be studied the same way as the natural world had only two answers: positivist yes and anti-positivist no. This reveals a second key attribute: false dichotomy. These two answers were constructed by the debate as fundamentally opposed and exhausting possibilities, concealing their shared common basis in a positivist account of science. Winch’s ‘idea’, for example, rejected study of the human world by an empiricist science based on Humean notions of causation – a positivist conception of science. The possibility of alternative visions of science and the humanities were not widely considered. For example, though Karl Popper’s *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (published in translation in 1959) offered a different vision of science, during the early 1960s his ideas were understood as anti-positivist; that he had shown the positivist model to be fundamentally mistaken (and so the choice to be false) went largely unnoticed. The influence of another contemporary post-positivist account, Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), did not spread through humanities and social science disciplines until the end of the decade (and even then his ideas were recontextualised to define science in the image of the humanities).\(^{392}\) Instead the struggle was constructed as between the U and non-U codes, with the latter an entirely negative influence. The debate thereby perpetuated an old struggle in new form.

**Summary**

Having analysed the model of science and plans for the humanities in terms of the legitimisation device, it is now possible to also apply the conceptual framework at a macro level to the two cultures debate as a whole:

- **autonomy** Continuing the debate between two groups of intellectuals in higher education worked to maintain relatively high autonomy from extra-field interests over the power of cultural nomination (positional autonomy) and made specifically cultural terms the language of debate (relational autonomy) such that legitimate ‘culture’ was controlled from within the field.

- **density** Excluding the possibility of reaching beyond the academy and rarely

engaging with scientists or on scientific terms, ‘debate’ over the
disciplinary field remained based within a relatively restricted community largely sharing common outlooks.

- *specialisation* Though ostensibly about competing forms of knowledge, the privileged knower status of humanists was the basis for both their diagnoses of and prescriptions for the cultural ills facing the disciplinary field.

- *temporality* The liberal humanist notion of culture remained fundamentally unquestioned; the debate was constructed as an updated variation of the established structure of struggles within the disciplinary field (U versus non-U).

The debate as a whole thus exhibited higher autonomy, lower density, knower specialisation and neo-retrospective temporality: a neo-U code. As in the ‘new student debate’ (chapter 6), the message proclaimed by the structure of the debate was of continuity through change. As commentators argued with urgency, inaction within the humanities was not an option for it would not prevent change. Like a person standing on a moving escalator, if the humanities stood still they would be carried along anyway by wider currents that were reshaping the field; to remain in place they had to shift position. In other words, to maintain ownership of the legitimation device, humanists had to alter their stances. The very terms of the debate enabled this by reinforcing established principles in a new form - how the changes to the disciplinary map were conceived was the response to moves to redefine ‘culture’ according to a non-U code outside higher education. Though scientific revolution, humanist crisis and the redrawing of the disciplinary map were more rhetoric than reality, they had real effects – in helping the established managers of culture retain control of the legitimation device in the face of threats from beyond the field.

[4] Conclusion

Chapters 7 and 8 have analysed participants’ perceptions of changes to the disciplinary field of English higher education during the early 1960s. These centred on public debate over ‘two cultures’ and portrayed natural and social science as displacing the humanities
in the field’s status hierarchy by redefining ‘culture’. This debate was analysed in three main stages. First, in chapter 7 I examined collective representations of the threats represented to the established structure of higher education by the rise of science and sociology and crisis in the humanities. Analysing these characteristics in terms of the legitimation device, these represented the rise of a ruler of legitimacy based on lower autonomy, higher density, knowledge specialisation and prospective temporality - a non-U code. Secondly, I discussed humanist proposals for the revitalisation of the humanities and the future of social science, and analysed these stances as exhibiting a neo-U code (higher autonomy, lower density, knower specialisation and neo-retrospective temporality). Thirdly, having analysed the messages of the debate, I addressed the medium of the debate itself. Comparing the representations of the debate to the reality of higher education showed that neither crisis nor revolution threatened the position of the humanities within the field and that proposed redrawning of the disciplinary map was largely rhetorical. The real threat generating the two cultures debate, I argued, lay in social, political and economic processes engendering wider change in the meaning of culture and so threatening control of the device by actors within higher education. Analysing the debate as a whole showed that it posited higher autonomy for the field over culture, restricted cultural debate to humanists, conducted this debate on a knower basis and in so doing renewed the established principles of the field: a neo-U code. The debate thereby enabled dominant positions to retain control of the legitimation device within the field. Having analysed changes facing the institutional and disciplinary fields the question I now turn to address how these together created conditions of emergence for cultural studies.
Chapter 9
Conditions of Possibility for Cultural Studies:
Legitimated vacuums in higher education

If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences
W. I. Thomas (1928)
The Child in America (Chicago, University of Chicago Press), p.586

When myth hits myth the impact is very real.
Stanislaw J. Lec (1962)
Unkempt Thoughts (New York, St Martin’s Press).

[1] Introduction

This chapter integrates and develops preceding analyses to explore the conditions in
higher education enabling the possibility for emergence of cultural studies as a discrete
intellectual and institutional presence during the mid 1960s. Previous chapters analysed
the structuring of English higher education (chapter 5) and debates over perceived
changes in its institutional field (chapter 6) and disciplinary field (chapters 7-8) during
the early 1960s. These analyses raise the question of how the debates created conditions
enabling the emergence of cultural studies. I address this in three stages that examine:
how conditions of emergence were created, what these conditions comprised, and where
they were located within higher education. First, I analyse the underlying principles of
the debates to show how the field of higher education refracted and recontextualised
extrinsic pressures into specifically intellectual and educational forms to create a
combination of continuity and change within the field. Second, comparing the principal
positions expounded in the debates with those characterising cultural studies, I illustrate
how the debates unintentionally created positive and negative conditions of possibility by
legitimating but failing to deliver innovations. Third, I analyse how different kinds of
conditions of emergence were distributed across the institutional and disciplinary fields
and highlight where, how and in what form cultural studies emerged.

The first stage of the analysis is to bring together the analyses of debates over the institutional and disciplinary fields (chapters 5-8) and examine their underlying principles as a whole. As set out in chapter 3, these analyses examine events in higher education along two dimensions: a field dimension, exploring higher education as a relatively autonomous social field of practice, and a dynamic dimension addressing the development of this field over time. These dimensions have respectively highlighted:
(i) a process of refraction and recontextualisation by the institutional and disciplinary fields of extrinsic pressures on higher education; and
(ii) a diachronic process of structural conditioning, social interaction and structural elaboration creating change and continuity within the field.
I address each dimension in turn before establishing how together they reveal the underlying principles of the debates.

Field dimension: The refraction-recontextualisation process
The relative autonomy of higher education provides the field dimension of analysis: transformations undergone by pressures originating beyond higher education as they become active within the field. These transformations can be understood in terms of analytically distinguishable processes of refraction and recontextualisation, where:
• refraction refers to how extrinsic pressures are transformed as they become salient for the field; and
• recontextualisation refers to the process whereby these saliences are further transformed into specific issues within the field’s discourses.393

In preceding chapters I argued that academic debates over higher education exhibited this double process. Analysing debate over the institutional field (chapter 6), I argued that the source of anxiety for senior institutional managers was wider changes impacting upon higher education in the refracted form of an expansion of student numbers which was recontextualised within debates into threats posed to the university ideal by mythical ‘new students’. Similarly, I showed that humanist anxieties originated in extrinsic changes impacting on the field in the refracted form of an expansion of ‘culture’ which

393 These concepts originate in the work of Bourdieu and Bernstein, respectively (see chapter 2). I discuss these concepts further in chapter 10.
was recontextualised within debates over the disciplinary field into perceptions of humanist crisis and scientific revolution (chapters 7-8).

Though the debates had their own specific foci, terms and participants, they are, I argue, the outcome of the refraction and recontextualisation of similar changes according to the specific logics of the institutional and disciplinary fields. This twin process is illustrated in Figure 9.1. Extrinsic changes were *refracted* into the institutional and disciplinary fields of higher education as expansion of students and culture, respectively. These were then *recontextualised* into the specific discourse of debate over each field in the form of new students and science, respectively.\textsuperscript{394}

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**Figure 9.1:**
The refraction-recontextualisation process

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**Extrinsic changes**

One question this raises is: what were these ‘extrinsic changes’? Rapid social change was a common theme in social analyses of the early 1960s. ‘The mark of our time’, claimed Marshall McLuhan, ‘is its revulsion against imposed patterns’ (1964: 13); in ‘this revolutionary epoch when art, ideas, mass movements, keep changing their nature’

\textsuperscript{394} I have collapsed the problems of ‘crisis in the humanities’ into the rise of science here for the sake of brevity - I argued in chapter 7 they were two sides of the same coin.
(Rosenberg 1962: 9), numerous studies identified social and cultural revolutions. In
debate over ‘the condition of England’ commentators announced that, as Anderson put it,
‘British society is in the throes of a profound, pervasive but cryptic crisis, undramatic in
appearance, but ubiquitous in its reverberations’ (1964: 26). Studies announced the
death of, *inter alia*, capitalism, the working class, class consciousness, class struggle, the
family, God and ideology, and births of a new society, culture and politics. ‘The rate
of change’, Snow claimed, ‘has increased so much that our imagination can’t keep up.’
(1959c: 42-3).

I outlined many economic, political, social and cultural changes impacting on the field at
the outset of chapters 6 and 7. The relation of these diverse changes to higher education
shared several structural features. First, extrinsic changes were heterogeneous. It was a
cumulation of complex developments, often extending over protracted periods of time
(such as an extension of literacy over the previous century), rather than a single,
immediate and direct change that helped trigger debates over higher education. In
impacting on higher education the specific dynamics of each of the numerous, diverse
and overlapping fields of practice constituting social space were subject to the
complementary and countervailing tendencies of other fields. One cannot, I argue,
highlight a single issue that by itself created a critical mass. Instead, perceptions of crisis
and revolution within higher education were the refracted outcomes of complex
interactions within the open system of society. Second and conversely, these complex
interactions took the refracted form of expansion in student numbers and cultural forms
because of the nature of the field. Higher education is a socio-cultural system; in
impacting on the field extrinsic changes are affecting a social system of actors, groups of
actors, and institutions (such as students, staff and universities) and an interrelated
cultural system of ideas, symbols and practices. ‘A university,’ as Newman suggested,
‘may be considered with reference either to its students or its studies’ (1852/1965: 80).
These are the form taken by the tips of the arrows in Table 9.1 - how extrinsic changes

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395 For example *The Long Revolution* (Williams 1961), *The Humanist Revolution* (Hawton 1963), *The
Democratic Revolution* (Magee 1964), *The Teenage Revolution* (Laurie 1965), *The Book Revolution*
(Escarpié 1966) and *The Electronic Revolution* (Handel 1967).

396 See, for example, Crosland (1962), Hartley (1963), N. MacRae (1963), Sampson (1962), Shanks
(1961), Shonfield (1958) and Williams (1961).

397 See Bell (1960), MacIntyre (1967) and Waxman (1968).
are felt within the field. Third, by ‘extrinsic’ changes I am not suggesting the field is passive. Higher education contributes to the dynamics of social space and their effects and its own dynamic shapes their impact; for example, the relatively stable and consensual state of higher education prior to the early 1960s contributed to the perceived impact on the field of changes emanating from other social fields because, for example, higher education was expanding relatively slowly compared to lower levels of education (chapter 6).

**Problems and solutions**

The next question the refraction-recontextualisation process raises is how these extrinsic changes are transformed within debates. To explore this I distinguish between field-level and intra-field problems and solutions. In preceding chapters I argued that refracted extrinsic changes threatened a change of legitimation code that would restructure the field. This threat to control of the legitimation device from beyond the field represents a field-problem. Recontextualisation translates this field-problem into the languages of discussions over the institutional and disciplinary fields to become the intra-field problems presented to universities and the humanities by new students and science, respectively. There are, therefore, empirical differences between extrinsic changes and the field-problem, and between the field-problem and the specifically educational and intellectual intra-field problems discussed in debates. These differences reflect the outcome of refraction and recontextualisation, respectively. One can also distinguish between the intra-field solutions offered in debates (such as plans for new universities) and how the structure of each debate as a whole offered a field-solution (to the field-problem). In chapters 6-8 I analysed the ‘messages’ of debates (such as new students and new universities) and then the ‘medium’ of each debate as a whole, arguing that the medium was also a message, one offering a response to threats to control of the legitimation device from beyond higher education that aimed to retain ownership within the field – this is a field-solution.

Figure 9.2 overleaf portrays the analyses of debates over the institutional and disciplinary fields in terms of these different kinds of problems and solutions. It is important to clarify that the field-problems and field-solutions were not the subject of participants’

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398 Thus further episodes of proclaimed crisis within higher education would, I hypothesise, be accompanied by expansion of students and cultural change (see chapter 10).
discussions in the debates; their focus was directed to *intra-field* problems and solutions (boxed in Figure 9.2). (I have related these by arrows because, though temporally simultaneous - indeed one could argue that proclaimed ‘problems’ were created to justify their proposed solutions - they were proffered by participants as *logically* sequenced, such that plans for new universities, for example, were justified by the needs of new students).
Dynamic dimension: Continuity and change
The dynamic dimension of chapters 5-9 comprises an analysis of the three stages of structural conditioning, social interaction and structural elaboration outlined in chapter 3 (see Figure 9.3). Analysing higher education in terms of the legitimation device for each of these phases aimed to explore what changed, what varied and what remained the same within the field.

Figure 9.3:
Dynamic dimension of chapters 5-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>structural conditioning</th>
<th>postwar contextual field</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>social interaction</th>
<th>debates over institutional and disciplinary fields</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>structural elaboration</th>
<th>conditions of possibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The contextual field of higher education within which the debates took place (structural conditioning phase) was structured by two principal competing legitimisation codes: a dominant U code and a dominated non-U code underlying higher and lower status positions within the field, respectively. Analyses of the debates (social interaction phase) revealed:

- intra-field problems identified by participants (in the form of new students and science) were characterised by a non-U code; and
- intra-field solutions they proposed (new universities and a sociological turn) exhibited a neo-U code.

Intra-field problems and solutions advanced in these largely separate debates thus exhibited the same legitimisation code modalities. Similarly, the codes underlying the field-problem facing each field (extrinsic changes) was non-U and the field-solution (debate as a whole) was neo-U (see chapters 6 and 8).

The analyses of preceding chapters have thus shown the underlying principles structuring the first two phases of the morphogenetic sequence. This raises the question of the structure of the field which emerged from these developments by the mid 1960s (structural elaboration phase).399 Analysing higher education in terms of the legitimisation device shows that the emergent field resulted from a combination of change and continuity. On the one hand, the debates legitimated the creation of new positions and stances within the field. New universities added a new cluster of positions associated with radical and innovative practices to the institutional field and the sociological turn in the humanities proposed a new set of stances in the disciplinary field. On the other hand, the debates embodied a neo-U code which enabled the maintenance of the field’s established structure. It is important here to clarify that this neo-U code (the field-solution) does not describe the resulting shape of the field (which emerged from the transformation of the existing field by the results of the debates). The field-solution or medium of the debates, I argue, announced “This is the lens through which changes to the field are to be understood and responded to.” That lens was neo-U. This field-solution enabled the maintenance of the pre-existing structure of the field as polarised between U and non-U. The debates did not make a neo-U code the basis of status in the field; rather they neutralised the threat of non-U and enabled U to remain dominant. The field that

399 My focus is specifically effects of refraction-recontextualisation creating conditions of emergence for cultural studies, one aspect of changes in higher education.
emerged from the debates remained structured according to the underlying principles discussed in chapter 5. This can be illustrated by the way new universities quickly occupied a middle-ranking position in the institutional status hierarchies of participants.\textsuperscript{400} A warning by the foremost figure in technical education that expansion might produce a hierarchy of ‘U, near U, non-U and sub-U’ (Sir Peter Venables, quoted in Halsey 1962: 175) was realised; the status hierarchy remained: ancients, other universities (federal, civics, redbricks and new), CATs and other colleges. The ancients remained firmly at the apex of a hierarchy that now included a cluster of institutions that emulated an (updated) U code and so were higher status than non-U colleges but too new to assume highest status. U remained the ruler of the field and the lens of neo-U represents the addition of new or transformed positions within the existing structure. In short, the field changed empirically but its underlying structuring principles were maintained, keeping the legitimation device in the control of established higher status positions: continuity through change.

**Summary**

I can now bring together the analyses of the field and dynamic dimensions. The process of refraction-recontextualisation (field dimension) explores the ways in which the social interaction impacted on the pre-existing structure of the field to create a new field (dynamic dimension). One can rewrite changes in higher education prior to the emergence of cultural studies as follows:

(i) By the early 1960s perceived changes to the social position of higher education reached a critical mass sufficient to threaten control of the legitimation device by actors within the field. Extrinsic changes were refracted by the field’s relatively autonomous structure into an expansion of students and of culture leading to proclamations that the institutional and disciplinary fields were facing ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’. These field-problems threatened the reproduction of the existing status hierarchies of higher education.

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\textsuperscript{400} Explicit typologies (Dolton & Makepeace 1982, King 1970 and Tight 1988, 1996) show new universities occupying a middle-ranking position, below ancients, civics and redbricks but above institutions either unchartered or chartered subsequently (including former CATs and polytechnics). On the one hand at first they assumed lowest status among universities because of their temporality as the youngest, most forward-thinking and rapidly changing institutions (all other code modalities being the same as the English university idea). It was not long before they were no longer the newest universities: eight CATs were chartered as universities in 1966-67 assuming positions below new universities. On the other hand, their chartered status and liberal humanist credentials (high autonomy, low density, knower specialisation) enabled them to instantly stand above (non-U) colleges and polytechnics.
(ii) In ensuing debates over changes affecting higher education these field-problems were recontextualised into intra-field problems that were specifically educational or intellectual in their definition and specifically institutional or disciplinary in their focus: new students posed problems for universities; scientific revolution threatened crisis for the humanities. Each debate also offered proposals for (intra-field) solutions to their respective problems: new universities for new students and a sociological turn in the humanities.

(iii) The creation of new positions or transformation of existing positions (intra-field solutions) enabled the established structuring principles underlying higher education to be maintained.

(iv) Each debate as a whole represented a field-solution to the field-problem; the way in which the debates constructed changes affecting higher education worked to retain control of the legitimation device within higher education.

[3] Positive and Negative Conditions of Possibility

The second stage of the analysis focuses on the effects for the field of the combination of continuity and change created by the debates. I have shown that continued control of the device came at a cost: the intentional creation of new or transformed positions. A second consequence was the unintentional creation of conditions of possibility for the emergence of cultural studies as a discrete intellectual and institutional presence. Similarities and differences between dominant positions expounded within the debates and those associated with cultural studies represent, I suggest, two kinds of conditions of possibility:

• similarities offer positive conditions offering impetus and legitimation for positions that were to characterise cultural studies; and
• differences offer negative conditions providing spaces into which cultural studies could emerge.

In discussing these conditions I shall illustratively draw on positions expressed during this period by the ‘founders’ of cultural studies - Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall and E. P. Thompson – (what I shall call ‘nascent’ cultural studies).401

401 As my central focus remains the field of higher education I will be only illustrative and suggestive regarding cultural studies, for I am pointing ahead to issues, themes and ideas beyond the remit of this study.
Positive conditions
Principal positions within the debates were similar to concerns and ideas characterising nascent cultural studies along three principal fronts: questioning previously doxic ideas; valorising specific practices; and legitimating change itself.

Debating doxic ideas
The debates explored previously doxic ideas of ‘the university’ and ‘culture’ - the bases of status within higher education - in ways overlapping with the signature concerns of the founders. The English university idea was being challenged, participants proclaimed, by new working-class students. At a time when political analysts and social commentators were announcing the end of the working class, this debate made the cultural background of working-class students central to the future shape of higher education.402 This paralleled the focus of the founding texts of cultural studies. In The Making of the English Working Class (1963) Thompson was rescuing the history of the working class from the condescension of posterity; The Long Revolution by Williams (1961) concluded by focusing on working-class educational mobility in 1960s Britain; and Hall was involved in attempts by the first New Left to forge connections between intellectuals and workers.403 Perhaps most directly related was Richard Hoggart’s account of changes in working-class culture in The Uses of Literacy (1957), especially its final chapter on working-class ‘scholarship boys’.404 The success of this study not only brought Hoggart directly into the new student debate but provided sufficient status leverage for him to make the creation of a Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) a condition for accepting the post of Professor of English at Birmingham University in 1963.405

The focus of the ‘two cultures’ debate on questioning the meaning of ‘culture’ was similarly a central theme in the founding texts of cultural studies. Claims for the cultural status of science spearheaded by Snow signalled that humanist ideas were not

402 See Laing (1986) on representations of working-class life during 1957-64.


404 Hoggart later recounted that letters he received about the book, including from several university Vice-Chancellors, focused on this chapter (1992: 7).

unchallenged: ‘culture’ could no longer go without saying. The founders were also deeply engaged in the task of critiquing canonical notions of culture. In *Culture and Society* Williams (1958a) outlined an alternative tradition of debate that showed ‘culture’ had been subject to struggle, contestation and debate for centuries, and in *The Long Revolution* (1961) discussed an ongoing ‘cultural revolution’. Similarly, Hoggart made the founding mission of the CCCS mapping the contours of change in culture more widely (1963, 1964a). At the same time as the founders were exploring changes in the working class and culture, the new student and two culture debates were bringing these legitimate foci for discussion over the future of higher education.

**Valorising positions**

Institutional, curricular and pedagogic practices valorised in the debates were echoed by those established at and propagated by the CCCS. Weakening of boundaries between disciplines and between teacher and taught through the creation of interdisciplinary Schools of Study, shared foundation programmes, coursework assessment and small-group tutorials, were central both to new universities and to the CCCS; indeed Hoggart’s founding plans (1963, 1964a) were effectively to create the postgraduate equivalent of a School of Study. Parallels between them abound. The CCCS, for example, drew together students from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds to work closely in small groups and in close working relationships with one or two tutors. Hoggart aimed to integrate a range of humanities disciplines within a curriculum focused on contemporary society, the subject of foundation courses in Schools of Study of humanities and social sciences in several new universities. The CCCS was also independent of external direction and the founders were vehemently anti-commercial - both traits of plans for new universities.

Similarly, at least three key themes associated with nascent cultural studies were propagated in the two cultures debate. First, the definition of culture as ‘a whole way of life’ by Williams (1961) - highlighted by secondary accounts as a seminal moment in the emergence of cultural studies - echoes definitions offered by Snow and Winch. Snow’s

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407 Hoggart expressed very strong criticisms about proposed courses in journalism and ‘communications’ sent to him by the CNAA (see Nash 1966: 178-9) and wrote ‘I am sorry when any of my students go into advertising’ (1963: 80).
‘anthropological’ definition of culture was discussed extremely widely (chapter 7). Similarly, Winch propagated widely Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘forms of life’, a totalising notion that defined culture as holistic and defined socially rather than aesthetically. The founding moment wherein Williams ‘sociologised’ culture was thus within an intellectual context where similar definitions were being aired. Secondly, a further seminal moment - Williams’ proclamation that ‘culture is ordinary’ (1958b) - parallels the claims of critics that Snow’s ideas extended culture to the everyday lives of ordinary people. ‘That sort of “culture”’, as one commentator on Snow desirously put it, ‘joins the dwellers in suburban semi’s all over Britain’ (Symons 1959: 84). Thirdly, calls by the founders for a subject area to integrate the humanities around study of the contemporary, local social totality were central to proposed solutions to crisis in the humanities and to cultural studies. Hoggart (1963, 1964a), for example, outlined in his inaugural lecture the ‘field for possible work in Contemporary Cultural Studies’ as bringing together English literary criticism, sociology, history and social psychology, and emphasised, above all, the importance of connecting with sociology. These plans for integration and a sociological turn echo positions advanced across the humanities during the early 1960s. Given that many practices that came to define cultural studies were valorised in debates over higher education, one could argue that to some extent an *ostensible* seal of approval from the senior managers of ‘the university’ and ‘culture’ existed for something like cultural studies.

**Legitimating change**

The debates valorised not only specific innovations, but also innovation itself. Criticism of established practices was central to both debates: the rationale for creating new universities was that established universities were incapable of change and discussion of crisis in the humanities criticised existing intellectual practices as outdated, sclerotic and

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408 Snow’s and Winch’s definitions of culture have been overwhelmingly ignored by histories of cultural studies. Paradoxically such accounts often fail to follow the approach advocated by Raymond Williams (examining ‘relationships between elements in a whole way of life’) when discussing the intellectual emergence of cultural studies and so isolate his texts from the wider disciplinary field within which they were located (see Chapter 1).

409 This lecture was the Centre’s ‘founding document and “charter”’ (Hall in CCCS 1974: 1) and defined the purpose and scope of the Centre (CCCS 1964: 2). It was explicitly referred to in Annual Reports throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s.

410 This is not to downplay the resistance met by cultural studies as it struggled to emerge. As I shall discuss below, official valorisation was confined to specific sectors of the field, it was *licensed innovation*. 
debilitating. Both debates legitimated innovation, experiment and revolution, including the redrawing of the map of learning, integrated curricula and progressive forms of pedagogy and assessment of the new universities. This valorisation of change offered nascent cultural studies potential resources of legitimation not only for the creation of a new subject area but also for one attempting to contribute to the redrawing of the disciplinary map. Nascent cultural studies emphasised change, both as subject and object. Hoggart, for example, opened the CCCS declaring that ‘the best growing points occur in the borderland between two disciplines’ (1964a: 171) and made new, fresh, innovative thinking central to its remit, and the founders focused on understanding social, political and cultural change in contemporary Britain.

Negative conditions
Debates over the future of higher education underlined the lack of something akin to cultural studies within the field because of the atrophy and erosion of proposed innovation, marginalisation of alternative positions on higher education, and repression of the real cause of debates.

Attrition of innovation
Though innovative practices and change were legitimated, they remained largely unfulfilled. Much of the plans for new universities and calls to sociologise the humanities remained rhetoric rather than reality. Changes that were enacted were subject to attrition or ‘mission drift’, as momentum towards change proved difficult to maintain. In the new universities, for example, such factors as the arrival of junior staff, whose experiences of PhD research and the ‘departmentalism’ of modern universities strengthened their allegiance to disciplinary specialisms, atrophied initial intentions and turned the new universities into ‘a seedbed in which the vested interests within the academic community can grow and smother innovation’ (Osborne 1970: 5). By the early 1970s staff were said to be ‘not pioneers, but career-centred specialists keen to turn their own students into apprentices to a particular academic craft’ (Jobling 1972: 329), something students were only too willing to become (Beloff 1968: 46). Similarly, financial restrictions imposed as the 1960s progressed meant new universities were especially lacking in books, problematising the proposed ‘new map of learning’.411 A

411 Financially, new universities began at a comparative disadvantage - far less was spent in England than on similar projects in Germany, the USA and Canada - and endured a series of unanticipated reductions in UGC funding during the late 1960s, resulting in many proposed projects being abandoned. These problems
similar story of attrition was being found by the late 1960s in the humanities as enthusiasm for integration and a sociological turn failed to produce a sea-change; within a decade similar calls were being repeated.\(^\text{412}\) Thus even where rhetoric was enacted, atrophy of momentum, dissipation of will and erosion of enacted practices whittled away innovations. Legitimated positions thereby remained largely unrealised in the humanities departments of universities.

**Marginalising alternatives**

The debates opened up ideas of ‘the university’ and ‘culture’ for examination but also narrowed the range of positions given serious consideration. Solutions proposed to proclaimed crises were updated versions of established ideas and possible alternatives (including those of the founders) were excluded, obscured or marginalised. This is clearly observable in the GEDs, in which Hoggart and Hall participated.\(^\text{413}\) For example, Hoggart argued against the prevailing view of new students as suffering from cultural deficit:

> many of our students who are from working-class homes, have in fact got a culture which is of quite remarkable strength. It is not an intellectual, literary culture; yet it is something which we do wrong to turn our noses up at.

(quoted in Hall 1961: 160).

Where the senior managers of expansion proposed resocialising new students into the requisite habitus, Hoggart offered a different vision:

> The particular task of the university, in face of this situation, was to help its students grow from their roots, rather than attempt to transplant themselves into a different social soil.

(reported by Hall 1961: 161).\(^\text{414}\)

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\(^{412}\) See chapter 8, ‘Myths and realities’. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw similar arguments to those of Winch but under the names of ‘ethnomethodology’ and ‘phenomenology’.

\(^{413}\) See chapter 3 on the Gulbenkian Educational Discussions. Sessions attended by Hoggart and Hall include those on the ‘new student’ and ‘changing patterns of study’ (see Appendix A, Table A.3). Their participation has been overlooked within histories of cultural studies.

\(^{414}\) Such arguments (here Hall is summarising Hoggart) also echo those of Williams in publications during the 1950s (e.g. 1952).
The new universities aimed to change new students to fit the university idea; Hoggart argued that the university should change to help new students develop organically from their working-class culture. For example, though advocating the tutorial, both Hall and Hoggart were quick to highlight the difference between their ideas of drawing and building on students’ experiences and simply exporting Oxbridge forms of pedagogy (Hall 1961: 161-2). The founders repeatedly offered visions of working-class culture, the university and ways of overcoming differences between them that differed from the prevailing orthodoxy and even directly questioned the assumptions of the new student debate; for example:

Putting it very crudely, what we are saying is that hitherto we have been choosing first-raters and they have looked after themselves: now we are going to choose second-raters and they have to be looked after. I doubt both these things.

(Hoggart, in Ashby et al. 1964: 237).

Such positions, however, were either marginalised or their differences unnoticed by other participants in the debate. There is little within plans for the new universities and accounts of the new student that echoes the views of Hoggart, and in the GEDs these differences appear unnoticed by other participants. Similarly, in the two cultures debate, that Snow’s definition implied the extension of ‘culture’ to embrace the study of everyday life or commercial culture was held as a sign of his impoverished understanding of ‘culture’ by most humanist commentators (chapter 8). The study of contemporary culture was repeatedly discussed by the founders (mostly in debates over literary criticism) but this work was little engaged with in the debate, and humanities disciplines continued into the later 1960s largely untouched by their ideas.

Repressing debates

At a GED in 1960 Hoggart remarked:

I am struck, in the universities I know, by the extent to which so many lecturers seem to me to be not aware of the society they are living in.


The debates helped maintain this apparent lack of awareness. External pressures threatening the established structure of higher education were refracted and recontextualised into problems caused by the new student and scientific revolution, so the focus of debates remained fixed on *intra*-field problems and solutions; for example, working-class students became the ‘new’ student within the discourse of debate; though making working-class culture central to debates over higher education, academic debate
thereby repressed its social class basis. Wider social change was not central to debates over the future of the field; discussion of social changes remained relatively muted or comprised assertions rather than the focus of study. Descriptions of the cultural backgrounds of new students or of the impact of universal literacy on public perceptions of the humanities, for example, were based on little more than the personal experiences or beliefs of the author, with no evidence offered or studies referred to. Calls for a sociological turn towards study of the contemporary social totality in the humanities bore little fruit; conversely, changes in society and culture characterising postwar Britain were the subject of considerable discussion by academics but at one remove from debates over the future of higher education. For example, the ‘condition of England’ question, a debate over the political and economic landscape, is rarely mentioned in the new student and two cultures debates. In contrast, as Hall later stated:

For me cultural studies really begins with the debate about the nature of social and cultural change in postwar Britain.
(1990: 12)

Nascent cultural studies often focused on understanding these changes in relation to personal experiences of educational and social mobility. In perhaps the first account of the emergence of cultural studies, Hall described the founding texts as having expressed, crystallised and attempted to transcend a particular “moment” in post-war British society and culture … when we became aware of a profound historical and cultural transformation in British society: a transformation in political structures and ideology, in the agencies of change, in economic institutions and their organisation, in the style and pattern of relationships between the social classes, in the systems of communication, in cultural modes and attitudes especially among the young.
(1969: 2)

Though all these changes meant, as Hoggart put it, university teachers ‘feel that society itself is “changing like mad”’ (in Rosselli 1963: 144), none of the above changes were central to debates over changes affecting higher education.

Conditions of possibility
How the debates unintentionally created conditions of possibility for the emergence of cultural studies can be shown by examining, first, the combination of continuity and
change represented by mainstream positions and, second, similarities and differences between these mainstream positions and nascent cultural studies.

First, I argued that the debates enabled underlying continuity through surface change, a combination creating a rhetoric-reality gap. The rhetoric of the debates provided legitimation for specific positions and practices and for change itself (positive conditions); the reality of unrealised practices, attrition of enacted innovation, and continuity created a vacuum (negative conditions). When combined these create \textit{legitimated vacuums} within higher education.\footnote{A legitimated vacuum is not a vacuum of legitimation (the absence of legitimation of any kind).} By opening up debate and then restricting lines of argument or by proposing ways forward that failed to materialise or were quickly eroded, the debates generated momentum for changes that were then stifled and legitimation for specific positions in and on the field that did not exist in a readily identifiable form. They helped fuel an appetite and provide legitimation for critical debate, curricular, pedagogic and intellectual innovation, and fundamental change but these remained unfulfilled, as if offering diners at a restaurant a tantalising menu, taking their orders but delivering little if any food.

Second, nascent cultural studies was well placed to exploit this situation because it shared characteristics with but was not identical to the mainstream positions of the debates. To emerge within higher education as a discrete entity cultural studies \textit{avant la lettre} needed to combine similarity and difference with mainstream positions: on the one hand, it must be sufficiently similar to contextual developments to flourish within the environment within which they occurred and to which they contributed; on the other hand, to emerge as a separate and named presence it must be sufficiently different to not be assimilated within these developments. Rewriting the selective illustration of nascent cultural studies offered above in terms of the principles of the legitimation device reveals this more clearly.\footnote{This necessarily brief thumbnail sketch draws on the foundational research. On stances propounded by the founders see Dworkin (1997), Steele (1997), Hoggart (1973b, 1973c) and McIroy & Westwood (1993).}
The founders of cultural studies:

- **autonomy** - brought working-class experiences into higher education (weaker positional autonomy or PA-) but valorised liberal humanist values and criticised utilitarian ideas of university education (stronger relational autonomy or RA+)

- **density** - emphasised quality over quantity and advocated weaker internal classification and framing in terms of disciplinary integration, institutional arrangements and forms of pedagogy

- **specialisation** - connected ideas of culture and the university to the personal experiences of working-class knowers and extended the knower specialisation of Leavisite literary criticism (which emphasised one’s dispositions) to analysing their own experiences

- **temporality** - valorised studying contemporary culture, changing university education and reordering the disciplinary map, but through the re-enlivening of *existing* forms of analysis (such as Leavisite literary criticism) and to reinvigorate notions of a lost organic community

Nascent cultural studies thereby represents: a mixed modality of autonomy (PA-, RA+), lower density, knower specialisation and neo-retrospective temporality. This exhibits similarities with dominant positions in higher education. Though often vigorously opposed to liberal humanist ideas of the university and culture, its underlying legitimation code shared modalities with the U code (lower density, knower specialisation) and the neo-U code (lower density, knower specialisation and neo-retrospective temporality).

The debates created conditions of possibility which cultural studies was well placed in terms of its legitimation code modalities to realise. Their similarities represent positive conditions by offering *resources for legitimation* for actors engaged in nascent cultural studies to draw on when advancing their positions and attempting to carve out institutional and intellectual spaces. The differences represent negative conditions by offering *spaces for emergence*: failure to deliver or maintain legitimated practices, and
marginalisation of alternative positions meant something like cultural studies was lacking within the field. Together these conditions offered nascent cultural studies the possibility of institutional and disciplinary niches within the field. The question this raises is where these resources for legitimation and spaces of emergence were positioned within higher education.


_Natura vacuum abhorret_
François Rabelais (1534)
_Gargantua_ (A Lion, par Iean Martin; Book 1, chapter 5)

Thus far I have analysed how conditions of possibility within higher education were created by the debates and what those conditions comprised, focusing at the level of the field as whole. However, neither positive nor negative conditions were evenly distributed across higher education. Positive conditions in the debates represent what could be called _licensed innovation_: resources for legitimation were limited to a specific range of practices and ideas (characterised by a neo-U code) and a specific group of institutional and disciplinary positions within the field. For example, the seminar was legitimated in new universities because of the proclaimed needs of new students; this did not necessarily mean it was welcome everywhere else. Similarly, negative conditions were not evenly distributed; institutions and disciplines differed in the extent to which innovations were realised and alternative ideas given space for emergence.

To analyse the kinds of spaces produced by the differential distribution of conditions across the field I shall develop these concepts further. I stated that positive conditions (P) provide resources for legitimation, and negative conditions (N) offer spaces for emergence.417 The extent to which these conditions are present (+) or not (-) can vary independently of each other; we can, for example, envisage sites offering resources for

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417 The concepts of positive and negative conditions of possibility can be related to Bernstein’s approach. Positive conditions effectively establish sites where an unrecognised and unrealised possibility could emerge: it establishes punctuation marks in the otherwise seamless field - the creation and maintenance of boundaries. Negative conditions establish the nature of that space: whether the space has been filled (and to what extent and in what ways) or not. Positive conditions thereby relay power relations and negative conditions relay principles of control. They are thus analogous to classification and framing. However, the concepts are _not_ reducible to C/F without loss of analytical power and empirical integrity; conditions of possibility are not identical to ‘relations between contexts’ and ‘locus of control within contexts’.
legitimation (P+) but little space for emergence (N-). Taking positive and negative conditions in turn, we can thereby analytically distinguish between:

- *legitimated* spaces (P+), where innovations similar to cultural studies are valorised, and *oppositional* spaces (P-), where the creation of named courses or departments in cultural studies face obstruction; and between

- *competitive* spaces (N-), where something similar to cultural studies already exists; and *vacuums* (N+), where nothing like cultural studies exists.418

Put crudely, this is to ask whether specific practices or ideas have been legitimated or not and realised or not, respectively, within any institutional or disciplinary position. I thus distinguish between conditions of *possibility* which may or may not be actualised within any specific position; and conditions of *emergence*, where positive and negative conditions of possibility are actualised. This enables us to conceptualise whether conditions of possibility are present and thus become conditions of emergence within specific positions.

Bringing these analytical distinctions together as orthogonal variables, one can describe four principal kinds of spaces in terms of their conditions of emergence (see Table 9.1). These represent a continuum: from the unwelcoming *oppositional* and *competitive* site (P-, N-), through spaces that exhibit different combinations of obstacles and opportunities - *legitimated but competitive* (P+, N-) and *oppositional vacuums* (P-, N+) - to the most likely candidates for emergence, those offering *legitimated vacuums* (P+, N+). These different kinds of space represent different obstacles and opportunities to the emergence of cultural studies as a named, discrete presence.419 Taking each field in turn, I now return to where the substantive study began in chapter 5 to analyse whether each of the main clusters of positions identified by participants in their maps of the field offered

418 Space precludes detailed exploration here, but I would further distinguish:
- within ‘legitimated spaces’ between *benign spaces* where something similar to cultural studies has been legitimated from above, and *invited spaces* where cultural studies itself has been legitimated; and
- within ‘competitive spaces’ between *rival spaces* where something similar to cultural studies (such as media studies, for example) exists and *occupied spaces*, where cultural studies is established as a named presence.

419 I should emphasise these are relative descriptors; one can, for example, talk of relatively more or less competitive or oppositional spaces. I am not suggesting only four kinds of spaces exist; these are conceptual distinctions drawn to enable comparisons between positions and so provide a means of exploring the conditions of emergence distributed across the institutional and disciplinary fields of higher education.
resources for legitimation and spaces for emergence, and highlight whether and how these were recognised and/or realised by actors in nascent cultural studies.

Table 9.1:  
Conditions of emergence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>positive</th>
<th>present (P+)</th>
<th>absent (N-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>negativ conditions</td>
<td>legimitated vacuum</td>
<td>legimated but competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absent (P-)</td>
<td>oppositional vacuum</td>
<td>oppositional &amp; competitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spaces in the institutional field

- Ancients

The ancients appear *prima facie* to represent legitimated vacuums. They were the basis of the ‘English’ university idea but widely criticised in the new student debate for having fallen from this ideal - a rhetoric-reality gap. However, their elevated position of power and status offered relative immunity to the licensed innovation of the debates. Indeed, they wrote the license: ancients provided the overwhelming majority of actors overseeing the creation of new universities (see chapter 6). They also provided the blueprint for the license; new universities represented a re-enlivened, 1960s vision of the Oxbridge model. In short, they were the breeding ground for innovation *elsewhere*. This was also true for cultural studies: Williams (Cambridge), Hall (Oxford) and Thompson (Cambridge) were graduates, and all teaching staff at the CCCS were alumni. As Sir Charles Morris put it, ‘you have to be confident and ruthless to make major changes in long-established patterns’ (in Hutchinson 1961: 172) and an Oxbridge education provides, for actors who do not easily fit into the established patterns, the requisite habitus and status with which

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420 See Appendix A for a full list of institutions arranged in cluster order.

421 The exception was Hoggart, who was a graduate of Leeds University, one of the older civics. Other staff of the CCCS during its existence included Richard Johnson (BA, PhD, Lecturer – Cambridge), Michael Green (MA, Cambridge) and Maureen McNeil (PhD, Cambridge) (collated from Birmingham University *Calendars* 1964-1986).
to attempt to change those patterns. The ancients served as the base of those involved in movements for change (such as the first New Left in which Hall was involved) and for intellectual innovation.\footnote{Compare also the case of F. R Leavis and the Scrutiny movement, based in but not institutionally housed by Cambridge. The importance of the confidence an Oxbridge university education instilled for those in the first New Left was highlighted by Raphael Samuel, who worked closely with Stuart Hall: The very idea of four Oxford graduates setting out to teach socialism to the world comes from the particular vanity of this university (OUSDG 1989: 138-9).} However, as potential spaces for the emergence of cultural studies, the ancients embodied oppositional and competitive spaces: they remained highly conservative and those elements of cultural studies absent (such as a focus on working-class and contemporary culture) were extremely unwelcome; and they already offered courses serving as the basis of change elsewhere (such as PPE at Oxford).\footnote{Williams returned to Cambridge as a Lecturer in the English Faculty in 1961 but did not create a cultural studies course there.}

- **Modern universities (civics and redbricks)**

Though criticised, the ancients were still the closest approximation to the English idea; the distance between this idea and the empirical reality of university life was more keenly felt in modern universities. Intense frustration among staff was well noted by contemporary commentators (chapter 5) and modern universities were the focus of much criticism over ‘departmentalism’ and overspecialisation. They thus offered some resources for legitimation. However, the new student debate focused legitimation for innovation elsewhere and so could be said to excuse their continuing conservatism. The kind of space they presented for the emergence of cultural studies was thus mixed. On the one hand they offered relatively high status and the possibility of research and graduate work, both lacking in non-universities. On the other hand, the focus of debates over the institutional field left them continuing to emulate the ancients and attempting to overcome their relative youth, making them unwelcoming environments. From his own experiences as a senior lecturer at a redbrick (Leicester), Hoggart argued that:

> there were limits to what could be done and the limits were set, not only by lack of time, but by the resistance of some professors … They were “two or three decades behind” and any attempt at change had to reckon with this kind of opposition.
Similarly, that sociology had already colonised modern universities during the early postwar period provided both a precedent smoothing entry for the kind of sociologised humanities represented by cultural studies but also competition in the form of established and relatively new undergraduate courses. As potential sites for undergraduate courses modern universities could thus be described as legitimated but (highly) competitive spaces. They became instead sites of postgraduate courses and intellectual production for cultural studies. As well as the opening of the CCCS at Birmingham University in 1964, a Centre for Television Research was established at Leeds in 1963, and the Centre for Mass Communication Research - considered by secondary accounts as highly significant to the intellectual history of cultural studies - was founded at Leicester in 1966. These spaces for production were, however, also legitimated but competitive and the centres were not always welcomed; the CCCS had to find external funding and was tolerated rather than supported by its host institution.

- New universities

As sites of innovation licensed in the new student debate the new universities offered a legitimated but competitive space. At least until the attrition of innovation became evident during the later 1960s they promised to offer much of what would become associated with cultural studies. They also attracted actors with similar educational backgrounds to the founders of cultural studies. Asa Briggs, for example, who helped shape the early formation of Sussex University, was a ‘scholarship boy’, educated at the ancients, contributed to the first New Left, and had been closely tied to adult education - attributes shared across the founding authors of cultural studies. That the new universities offered legitimation for innovation and attracted similar actors suggests that

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424 Hoggart was a senior lecturer at Leicester 1959-62 and later stated that he would have stayed and sought to start a centre of contemporary cultural studies there if he had been offered a chair (1992: 78).

425 By 1963 sociology was offered as a degree or a main subject at eleven English universities, ten of which were civics or redbricks: Birmingham, Exeter, Hull, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, Manchester, Nottingham, Sheffield and Southampton (the exception was London). See Fincham (1972) and Little (1963a).


427 Williams, Hoggart and Hall were ‘scholarship boys’; Williams, Hall and Thompson were educated at the ancients; Hall above all contributed to the first New Left; and Williams, Hoggart and Thompson were involved in adult education.
cultural studies could have emerged within this cluster, as other ‘studies’ did, such as American Studies. Indeed, during the early 1960s Hoggart was interviewed for the post of founding Vice-Chancellor of Essex and later offered a Chair at Sussex, where it is likely he would have tried to establish a centre for cultural studies. Sociologically was also widely instituted in the new universities, suggesting a fertile space for cultural studies (and one where, unlike civics and redbricks, sociology had not established itself yet). However, it is uncertain whether ‘cultural studies’ as a distinct, discrete and noticeable subject area with radical political commitments would have emerged. On the one hand, similarities between cultural studies and such developments as Schools of Studies might have submerged its distinctiveness and then subjected cultural studies to the ‘mission drift’ that new universities soon exhibited; on the other hand, differences between them may have been eroded or obscured such that it became simply one part of the wider new university experiment.

- **Colleges of Advanced Technology**

  CATs offered few resources for legitimation to cultural studies. Almost completely overlooked by debates over higher education, they were historically oriented towards the technological idea of the university, highly hierarchical and oligarchically organised institutions, and (until after chartering in 1966-67) provided no space for intellectual production. They did, however, serve as a breeding ground for courses that contributed to cultural studies *avant la lettre*. Though little discussed in the new student debate, CATs were ‘liberalised’ during their transition to chartered status. Concerned that their technical and scientific students were overspecialised and uncultured, the UGC insisted on additional courses in ‘general studies’, ‘liberal studies’ or ‘social studies’. What this meant in practice, though, was vague. Debates over higher education did not provide the kind of legitimation licensed to the new universities which might have seen these subjects more clearly defined and supported. As Williams later recounted:

  I can still remember my own students getting their first jobs and coming back and saying “I just went to meet the principal as the newly appointed lecturer in Liberal Studies, and I asked him what Liberal Studies was and he said, ‘I don’t know; I only know I’ve got to have it’.”

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428 Of the Essex position Hoggart states baldly: ‘I would have taken the job if invited’ (1992: 113). He declined the Sussex post because it came too soon after moving to Birmingham (1992: 83). My conjecture about a Sussex centre is based on Hoggart’s retrospectively stated intention to create a centre wherever he could (cf. 1992: 78). Of the other founders, E.P. Thompson was appointed Reader in Social History at Warwick in 1965 and established a Centre of the Study of Social History.
(1989: 155-6).\textsuperscript{429}

On the one hand this left space for teachers to invent their courses and engage enthusiasms that often later fed into cultural studies. Stuart Hall, for example, taught courses in ‘Cinema and the Mass Media’ and ‘Liberal Studies’ to day-release and evening students at Chelsea College of Science and Technology in 1961-64 that were to become central to the early cultural studies textbook *The Popular Arts* (Hall & Whannel 1964).\textsuperscript{430} On the other hand, the emergence of such courses depended upon the enthusiasm of individual teachers who were ‘very lonely people’ in their institutions (Vaizey, in Monkhouse 1962: 146), limiting opportunities for collaborative integration of disciplines. Liberal studies was not an integration of humanities and sociology in order to understand changes in culture; rather, studying film was often simply a means of engaging technology students forced to have ‘cultural’ education.\textsuperscript{431} Though they provided a useful space for experimentation, as possible sites for the emergence of cultural studies the colleges remained oppositional vacuums.

- *Colleges (and polytechnics)*

Non-university institutions did not figure in the debates, as if not counting as higher education. Though they attracted a student population more akin to the working-class concerns of cultural studies, colleges were primarily oriented towards the instrumentalist and vocational non-U pole of the field rather than emphasising social or political issues. During the early 1960s some colleges did host courses in subject areas such as film studies and colleges were the focus of attempts by the British Film Institute to encourage ‘screen education’.\textsuperscript{432} Like liberal studies, these courses provided a limited space for actors in the first wave of cultural studies but, again like CATs, they offered no space for

\textsuperscript{429} See also Foden (1959) and Monkhouse (1962).

\textsuperscript{430} See Hall (1964), Hall & Whannel (1964) and Morley & Chen (1996: 493, 497).

\textsuperscript{431} See Hall (1964: 12-14).

\textsuperscript{432} In 1964 a dedicated issue of the journal *Screen Education* on ‘Film study and higher education’ featured only non-universities in reports of courses: a college of art (Burton 1964) and a teacher training college (Stanley 1964). Two of the most often cited examples of courses in film study within higher education were at Bede and Bulmershe, both teacher training colleges (Knight, 1962). In the early 1960s the belief in the Education Department of the British Film Institute was that ‘the best field of attack is the Teachers’ Training Colleges’, after which came university departments of education, technical colleges, colleges of further education, and colleges of art (Harcourt 1964: 24).
intellectual production and, under the supervision of sponsoring universities, few opportunities to create an integrated interdisciplinary degree-level curriculum.\textsuperscript{433}

This, however, was to change. The debates had barely subsided before the government announced its intention to create a wholly new stratum of institutions that was intended to be equal but different to universities.\textsuperscript{434} This major shift of policy towards a ‘binary system’ of higher education would upgrade thirty colleges into a cluster of institutions separate from universities and (unlike CATs) not aiming for chartered status but where higher education would be offered under license.\textsuperscript{435} These polytechnics (designated during 1969–73) were intended to embody a model of higher education characterised by local orientation and control, a non-traditional student body, greater flexibility of degree paths, more part-time provision, greater emphasis on vocational education, and innovative forms of curricula and teaching.\textsuperscript{436} As Robinson (1968) put it, the polytechnics were intended to be the ‘people’s universities’. (The further development of the actual institutions falls beyond the scope of my focus.\textsuperscript{437}) Here it is noteworthy that at the same time as new universities were criticised for ‘academic drift’ the polytechnics became the focus for legitimated innovation within higher education (this license being granted from government policy rather than intra-field debates). They then offered resources for legitimation and spaces for emergence of courses in cultural studies, and it is within polytechnics that such courses were first created (e.g. Portsmouth 1975, North East London Polytechnic 1980).

\textsuperscript{433} For example, Hall was a resident tutor of an Easter course on film and television in 1962 at Bede College (Knight 1962).

\textsuperscript{434} This policy was announced in a speech by Anthony Crosland at Woolwich on 17 April 1965 and codified in a White Paper of May 1966 (DES 1966).

\textsuperscript{435} The license was administered by the Council for National Academic Awards, which drew on university-based actors to judge applications to create and then monitor courses in polytechnics (Silver 1990).

\textsuperscript{436} See, for example, Nuttgens (1972), Pratt (1997), Pratt & Burgess (1974), Robinson (1968), Warner & Shackleton (1979) and Whitburn \textit{et al.} (1979).

\textsuperscript{437} It is well documented that they were quickly described as suffering from ‘academic drift’ (see Campbell 1974, Donaldson, 1975, and Jacka \textit{et al.} 1975).
Spaces in the disciplinary field

• The humanities
Like the ancients Classics was the basis of the established humanist idea of ‘culture’ and widely criticised in debates over the disciplinary field for having fallen from this ideal - a rhetoric-reality gap. Though Classics might seem the antithesis of contemporary cultural studies, it did provide a blueprint for ideas that cultural studies became associated with, in particular the integrated study of ‘a whole way of life’ through its language and literature. However, though proclamations of crisis and calls for change were experienced first in Classics (chapter 7), they remained highly conservative in outlook and, fighting for their lives against all-comers, represented oppositional vacancies.

Newer humanities disciplines were more likely candidates. Such disciplines as English, History and geography had been established in higher education long enough for their first flush of youth to have passed, allowing time for any failure to realise founding manifestos to become evident and for the attrition of enacted innovations, but young enough for founding calls for innovation to retain rhetorical power. They thereby offered both spaces for emergence and resources for legitimization: legitimated vacuums. It was from within these disciplines that influential practitioners of cultural studies emerged. All four of the founders studied English literature at university and taught the subject in adult education.438 (History spawned its own movement, the history ‘from below’ offered by Christopher Hill, George Rudé and Asa Briggs, among others and associated with the History Workshop beginning in 1966, that shared features, particularly its insistence on ‘social relevance’, with the work of cultural studies.439)

English was particularly favourable as a growing point for cultural studies thanks to the movement to reinvigorate the discipline surrounding Leavis and the ‘Scrutiny group’.440 According to Anderson (1968) it was only within Leavisite literary criticism that the

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438 Though later known as a social historian E. P. Thompson took Part I of his Cambridge tripos in History and Part II in English; similarly, though later commonly viewed as a sociologist, Stuart Hall read English at Oxford University and wrote a Masters thesis on ‘The Novels of Henry James’. On their adult education experiences, see further below.


440 See Mulhern (1979).
the notion of the local social totality was to be found.\textsuperscript{441} Leavis had also been, as Williams argued, ‘working to make English grow to its place as a central subject in a contemporary humane education’ (1959: 246) well before other disciplines in debates proclaiming crisis in the humanities. Leavisism had been gaining momentum while the founders were undergraduates but by the early 1960s Hoggart and Williams in particular were arguing against what they considered to be the degeneration of Leavisite criticism and calling for a return to a more authentic, though modified, version of Leavis’s project.\textsuperscript{442} English thereby appeared to offer a fertile ground for growth; indeed, cultural studies emerged as an extension of literary critical methods to the study of contemporary ‘mass’ culture and the CCCS was attached to an English department.\textsuperscript{443} However, the principal influence of the Leavisite movement was in schools. Within higher education, the realisation of innovation was pushed to the margins. Looking back Hoggart remarked of those in English during the 1960s that

\begin{quote}
for every one who tried to think critically about the nature of ‘the subject’ itself, three or four took the present rules of the game as given and sought to become expert at playing them.
\end{quote}

\textit{(1977: 15)}

Moreover, nascent cultural studies differed with typical Leavisite positions, which were highly condemnatory of commercial culture rather than critically evaluative, decidedly petit bourgeois and provincial in background and orientation rather than urban and working class, and increasingly insular and exclusive as opposed to emphasising social commitment.\textsuperscript{444} Cultural studies was unwelcome as an organic development \textit{within} the subject area. In summary, the kinds of stances associated with early cultural studies were thus evoked by the humanities but did not easily find a home within the humanities; as Stuart Hall later argued:

\begin{quote}
\vspace{1em}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{441} As discussed in chapter 8, Anderson did also highlight anthropology but here the social totality as object of study was projected overseas.

\textsuperscript{442} Both Williams and Thompson attended lectures by Leavis at Cambridge, though neither were in his circle of followers.

\textsuperscript{443} Of numerous accounts highlighting the influence of Leavis on the founders of cultural studies, see CCCS (1966), Hall & Whannel (1964), Hoggart (1966c) and Williams (1959).

\textsuperscript{444} See, for example, Bradbury (1956), Mulhern (1979) and Williams (1989). As one commentator put it, ‘such teachers as … Professor Richard Hoggart and Mr Raymond Williams in the universities, have stressed the social commitment of the subject’ (Lister 1964: 158)
cultural studies in Britain emerged precisely from a crisis in the humanities ... the truth is that most of us had to leave the humanities in order to do serious work in it. (1990: 11-12).

- **Social sciences**
  Of social science disciplines, economics and psychology were oriented towards the positivist model of science and so represented oppositional vacuums. In contrast, sociology offered resources for legitimation; a sociological turn was central to proposed ways forward for the humanities in the two cultures debates and sociology was oriented towards innovation. Sociology thereby seems an ideal candidate for the emergence of something like cultural studies. This was certainly the hope of the founders. Their work was often described as sociological, received well in sociology, Hoggart and Williams were labelled ‘left-wing sociologists’ (Arnold 1959), and Hoggart was particularly vocal in calling for literary critics and sociology to ‘speak to each other’. In practice, however, sociology was a legitimated but competitive space. As mentioned above, sociology had only recently been established as courses in universities and sociologists were obsessed with the question of their status and busy creating curricula, canons, and publishing series. Though the CCCS attempted to reach out towards sociologists, they were unable to create a dialogue and had to create their own sociology and so a distinctive subject area.

- **Science and technology**
  Science and technology were unlikely to provide conditions for emergence. Though Snow claimed ‘culture’ for science, not only was this fiercely rebuffed by the humanities but the debate itself was conducted within the humanities (chapter 8). As discussed above, the introduction of general or liberal studies as adjuncts to science opened up a space for early experiments. According to those shaping one CAT, these subjects were intended ‘to close the gap between the “two cultures”’ but should be part of a

445 Williams described Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy as often ‘hesitating between fiction or autobiography on the one hand, and sociology on the other’ (1957, in 1989: 28). According to Hoggart, it was received well by social scientists (1992: 7). One sociologist later claimed that it ‘set the tone for the next generation of sociological work on the working class’ and that Thompson’s famous text had ‘a seminal influence’ on sociologists (Albrow 1989: 209, 211).

446 See Hall (1980).
professional or vocational training. To the extent that such courses were vocational they offered no space for cultural studies; where space for early experiments was possible it was thanks to the absence of science and technology expected within them.

Summary: A binary field of spaces
Having examined each of the clusters of positions, the final step is to return to the field as a whole. The distribution of conditions of emergence across higher education resulting from debates over the future of the field during the early 1960s echoed its binary, polarised structure by offering spaces (albeit marginal and contested) for intellectual production in universities and spaces for reproduction in non-university institutions.

The university subfield offered little space for the creation of undergraduate courses in cultural studies. In debates over expansion the mainstream position is summarised by the Robbins Report’s declaration that:

Undergraduates should not be made the guinea-pigs of experiments with totally new subjects without textbooks or a commonly accepted core of methods of thought. ... the place for thought when it is still inchoate and embryonic is chiefly at the postgraduate level (1963: 94).

Though innovation in the new universities included redrawing the disciplinary map, the license was limited and the old map slowly reasserted itself. What Hoggart planned for the CCCS was echoed to some extent by foundation-level courses, such as ‘Contemporary Britain’ at Sussex, but this was quickly described by staff and students as ‘not a subject’ and inchoate and confused (Riesman 1966: 143).

Cultural studies found instead resources and space for intellectual production in the universities. Of institutional clusters, the ancients were oppositional and competitive spaces but contributed to the habituses and status of the founders; several moderns provided institutional space on their fringes but very limited resources; and new universities represented a legitimated but competitive possibility that remained

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447 Peter Venables, Principal of Birmingham College of Advanced Technology, quoting from papers prepared for its Academic Board of Studies (reported in Monkhouse 1962: 145).
unrealised. As intellectual production cultural studies was pushed to the interstices of the institutional map, carving a precarious space on the fringes of middle-ranking universities. Significantly at a 1961 GED,

Stuart Hall urged the view that if the universities fail to meet the challenge of the expansion years, we should not hesitate to seek new vehicles of enthusiasm and experiment.

(Halsey 1962: 170)

Three years later, he joined Richard Hoggart at the newly founded CCCS.

In terms of reproduction, spaces for cultural studies to emerge, though not yet as a distinct and named presence, lay beyond the universities. First historically was a space not mentioned thus far (as it is outside my temporal and field foci): adult education. The experience of teaching in adult education proved formative in the intellectual and educational ideas of all the founders but was not a point of named emergence in higher education. A second space was brief: courses of liberal or general studies in the CATs offered a chance for some members of the first generation of practitioners to begin to sketch preliminary interests, though not space to create a new subject area. A third space was sporadic and marginal: in several teacher training colleges courses in film studies emerged, though as an ancillary to the main curriculum. In the 1960s none of these were sufficient to enable the emergence of taught, named, undergraduate courses in cultural studies - they offered neither legitimisation nor space. The ‘new vehicles of enthusiasm and experiment’ called for by Hall did, however, later open up: in polytechnics and the Open University. Studies of English higher education argue that the creation of polytechnics by the government during the late 1960s resulted from a realisation that universities were unwilling or unable to make the changes it deemed necessary.

Indeed, their creation was strongly opposed during the mid 1960s by the senior managers

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448 That possibilities remained un-realised highlights that this analysis is simply of what the higher education field offered in terms of resources and spaces. Whether these are realised or not depends on more than the field’s structure (see chapter 10).

449 Williams taught in Sussex for the Oxford University’s Extra-mural Delegation, 1946-61; Hoggart in the extramural department of the Universities of Hull and Leicester, 1946-59; and Thompson in Leeds, 1947-65. It was whilst working in adult education that Williams and Hoggart wrote their seminal founding texts. On this pre-history of cultural studies see Steele (1994, 1997) and Williams (1989, 1990).

450 See, for example, Becher & Kogan (1992: 30-31).
of expansion. The Open University - a unique institution for part-time, distance tuition of adult learners - was created at the same time (chartered 1969) and by similar state intervention. Like cultural studies they represent an unintended consequence of the debates: the licensed innovation that enabled continuity in the university subfield saw change channelled elsewhere. Though there were differences with cultural studies - polytechnics, for example, were intended to have a vocational emphasis - their creation was the equivalent from above of what cultural studies represents from below: the return of the repressed. During the later 1970s and 1980s the polytechnics came to be the primary site for named undergraduate courses in cultural studies and the Open University became the main influence on the curriculum in cultural studies.

The distribution of conditions of emergence across the disciplinary field was simpler. The debates comprised a competition for legitimation among humanities disciplines who were facing threats from science and sociology but seeing opportunities for ascendancy in the decline of the dominance of Classics. Among these disciplines English was, thanks to Leavisite literary criticism, particularly well placed to take advantage of calls to integrate ‘culture’ around the study of the local social totality and to proclaim a sociological turn. However, the position of English as best placed but at the same time unwilling or unable to realise change created a growing rhetoric-reality gap. It offered actors hopes of changes that were then repressed and legitimated practices that were pushed out to the margins, where they began to coalesce around what began increasingly to have a distinct identity: cultural studies.

[5] Conclusion

This chapter integrated and developed the preceding analyses to explore the conditions within English higher education enabling the emergence of cultural studies during the mid 1960s. The analysis comprised three stages. First I redescribed the debates discussed in chapters 6-8 in terms of a process of refraction and recontextualisation by the institutional and disciplinary fields of extrinsic pressures on higher education. This, I argued, resulted in a combination of continuity and change in the field: the intentional creation of new and transformed positions enabled the maintenance of the established

\[451\] Participants at the 1965 GED (including Hoggart) wrote a letter condemning the binary system policy (see Nash 1966: 207-8). Robbins also attacked the policy in a speech in the House of Lords in 1965 (1966: 138-157) and in print as ‘reactionary and half-baked’ (Robbins & Ford 1965: 7).
status hierarchies of higher education. Second, I analysed how this process also unintentionally created conditions of possibility for the emergence of cultural studies. Discussing similarities and differences between mainstream positions in the debates and those of the founders of cultural studies, I showed that the debates provided resources for legitimation and spaces for emergence. Third, I discussed the distribution of different kinds of spaces within higher education, addressing the conditions of emergence offered by different positions in the institutional and disciplinary fields of higher education. Their distribution represented a binary field of spaces for intellectual production in (marginal positions in) universities and educational reproduction in non-university institutions. The chapter as a whole showed how debates over crisis in higher education during the early 1960s both helped enable the reproduction of the status hierarchies of the field and created conditions of emergence for positions aiming to transform the field.
PART III

HIGHER EDUCATION AS A DYNAMIC FIELD OF POSSIBILITIES

‘Theories’ are research programmes which call not for ‘theoretical discussion’
but for practical implementation, which refutes or generalises. ...
When the particular case is well constructed, it ceases to be particular
and, normally, everyone ought to be able to make it work.
Pierre Bourdieu,
in Bourdieu et al. (1991)
The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological preliminaries
(Berlin, Walter de Gruyter), p.255.
Chapter 10
Conclusion: A dynamic field of possibilities

*Productive imperfection!*
Basil Bernstein (personal communication, late 1990s)

*The most important stage of any enterprise is the beginning*
Plato *The Republic*, 377b

[1] Introduction

This chapter reviews the study as a whole. I begin by returning to the research question to discuss how the substantive study reveals the ways English higher education enabled the possibility for cultural studies to emerge during the mid 1960s. Second, I broaden the focus to consider what the research shows about the basis and process of change in higher education more generally, reviewing the need for the theoretical development undertaken in the research, the resulting conceptual framework and the model of change generated by its application in the empirical research. Third, I address potential substantive, methodological and theoretical limitations of the study and the directions for further research these suggest. I conclude by highlighting the implications of the approach established in the thesis for the sociology of higher education.


To review the research one must begin at its beginnings. The origins of the study lie with the paradox presented by the emergence of cultural studies as a named and discrete institutional and intellectual presence during the mid-1960s: from within the institutional and disciplinary frameworks of English higher education emerged an avowedly radical, innovative, anti-institutional and inter-disciplinary subject area which questioned, challenged and attempted to change those frameworks. My substantive research question is:

How did English higher education enable the possibility of emergence for cultural studies during the mid 1960s?
The answer to the question lies in the study’s three-part analysis of higher education in terms of the structure of the contextual field within which changes were taking place, debates among participants over changes affecting higher education, and the effects these were to have on the field. I shall briefly draw out the main conclusions of each of these analyses in turn, before bringing them together to show that the ways participants within higher education responded to wider changes affecting the field enabled the maintenance of its established institutional and disciplinary hierarchies, but also unintentionally created spaces within these for the emergence of cultural studies.

The contextual field
The substantive study provides firstly an analysis of the field of higher education prior to the emergence of cultural studies (chapter 5). Focusing on the contemporary, published views of participants in order to reconstitute the contemporary field in its historical moment shows that English higher education during the late 1950s was characterised as stable, settled and based on an established consensus. The structure portrayed by participants was of a field polarised by models of achievement based on competing ideas of ‘the university’ and of ‘culture’: a higher status ‘English’ idea of the university and liberal humanist culture (identified with ancient universities and the humanities); and a lower status technological idea of the university and instrumentalist view of knowledge (associated with university colleges and science). Analysing these accounts of higher education in terms of the conceptual framework of the legitimation device identifies two principal legitimation codes, a dominant U code and a dominated non-U code, characterised by oppositional modalities of higher/lower autonomy, lower/higher density, knower/knowledge specialisation and retrospective/prospective temporality, respectively. In short, this analysis shows the field prior to the emergence of cultural studies was based on a ruler of status (the U code) proclaiming: externally things must be kept apart, internally things must be put together, who you are matters more than what you know, and always look back.

Having established the structuring principles underlying the contextual field, the study focuses next on public debates among participants over changes facing higher education. This analysis shows the complacent consensus of the late 1950s was the calm before a storm. During the early 1960s participants paint a picture of turmoil, impending doom and crisis. Thematic analysis of these debates shows two principal foci: higher education is portrayed as facing a ‘short term emergency’ necessitating dramatic expansion of the
institutional field; and a ‘crisis in the humanities’ and ‘scientific revolution’ are said to be redrawing the disciplinary map.

*Debates over change*

The first focus of debate is over the impact of an imminent expansion of student numbers on the institutional field (chapter 6). This debate centres on difficulties likely to be caused for universities by the arrival of a ‘new’ (working-class) student, and the creation of new campus universities as providing solutions to these difficulties. Analysis of these problems and solutions in terms of their respective legitimisation codes shows, first, that the model of the ‘new student’ offered within the accounts of participants - careerist and instrumental (lower autonomy), unable to integrate into universities (higher density), overly scholastic and lacking in cultural breadth (knowledge specialisation), and endangering inherited standards in favour of change (prospective temporality) - represents a non-U legitimisation code. Second, plans for new universities to insulate new students from influences beyond the university (higher autonomy), integrate them within the university community (lower density), provide a compensatory breadth of culture (knower specialisation), and offer an updated version of the ancients (neo-retrospective temporality), represent a neo-U code modality. From this analysis I argue that the new student symbolises the potential rise in status of the non-U code within higher education, and that plans for the new universities can be understood as attempting to counter this possibility.

The next step is to examine where this perceived threat to the field emanated from. Comparing the representations of new students and new universities to the realities of higher education shows neither were empirically realised in the form they took in the debate. This raises the question of what lies behind the new student debate. Analysing those changes beyond higher education contributing to anticipated expansion in terms of legitimisation code reveals that the real threat embodied in the figure of the ‘new student’ is a perceived valorisation of the non-U code by pressures emanating from beyond higher education that would invert established hierarchies within the field. Analysis of the debate as a whole highlights how it serves as a response to this threat. The structure of the debate maintains autonomy for higher education, restricts possible positions within the field, makes socialising knowers its central concern, and in so doing renews the established principles of higher education. This represents a neo-U code, an updated modality of the dominant code underlying the contextual field. From this analysis it can be seen that the terms on which the debate over change to the institutional field are
conducted thereby works to enable dominant positions within higher education to maintain control of the legitimation device in the face of perceived threats to its ownership from beyond the field.

The second principal source of claims of ‘crisis’ and ‘revolution’ within higher education during the early 1960s is over changes to the disciplinary field (chapters 7-8). This takes the form of debates focusing on the contrasting fortunes of the ‘two cultures’ of the humanities and science. In these debates, participants portray the humanities as undergoing a crisis of legitimation and science as usurping its dominant status and (in the form of sociology) taking over study of the human world; together these were said to be fundamentally redrawning the disciplinary map. Analysing, first, the threats posed to the humanities in terms of legitimation code shows scientific culture is represented as being an instrumentalist conduit for external influence (lower autonomy), fragmenting culture into specialist sub-cultures (higher density), making specialist procedures the basis of knowledge (knowledge specialisation), and dismissing the past in favour of rapid change (prospective temporality) - a non-U code. At the same time the portrayal of crises afflicting the humanities (dismissed by politicians and industrialists, only one of several ‘cultures’, providing no real knowledge, and passé) represents how they will be viewed when measured by the modalities of this code. Secondly, an analysis of proposals within the debate for the revitalisation of the humanities reveals that proclamations of incompatibility with scientific practices (higher autonomy), calls for curricular re-integration (lower density), idealism and contextualism (knower specialisation), and a revolutionary return to past principles (neo-retrospective temporality) together comprise a neo-U code. From these analyses it is clear that declarations of ‘crisis in the humanities’ and ‘scientific revolution’ symbolise concern over changes in the basis of hierarchy within the field (to a non-U code), and that the response of protagonists within the humanities reaffirms a revitalised form of its established principles.

Comparing these representations to realities reveals claims of crisis in the position of the humanities to be overblown and proposals for redrawing of the disciplinary map to be largely rhetorical. As with the new student debate, analysing wider social, political, economic and cultural changes affecting the meaning of ‘culture’ in terms of legitimation code reveals these represent the threat of a non-U code and thus the shifting of control of the legitimation device to outside higher education. Analysis of the debate as a whole again shows how its structure serves as a response to this threat to the established hierarchies of the field. The debate’s structure proclaims autonomy for the field over
culture, restricts cultural debate to humanists and on their terms, conducts this debate on a knower basis, and renews established principles - a neo-U code. This analysis shows that the grounds of debate over change among participants works to maintain control of the legitimization device by dominant positions within higher education.

Conditions of emergence

Having analysed in the first two parts of the study the contextual field and the nature of changes said to be affecting it, the final part draws out the effects of these developments for higher education, focusing on how they created conditions of possibility for cultural studies, what these conditions comprised, and where they were positioned within the field (chapter 9). The analyses of debates over change show that, despite differences of focus, terms and participants, they take a parallel form. Both include a process of refraction-recontextualisation whereby the field, acting as a prism, transforms extrinsic changes affecting its social position into specifically educational and intellectual issues within its discourse, where these take different forms within discussions of the social and symbolic systems of higher education. The analyses highlight how social changes threatening to move control of the legitimization device beyond higher education are refracted into the issues of an expansion of students (institutional field) and of culture (disciplinary field) that present field-problems for the reproduction of existing status hierarchies within the field. These issues are in turn recontextualised to become specifically intra-field problems posed by new students and science, for which new universities and the sociological turn comprise intra-field solutions. Comparing the resulting structure of higher education to that of the contextual field, one can then see that each debate understood as a whole comprises a field-solution to the original field-problem: the creation of new and transformed positions (new universities, a sociological turn) enables the maintenance of the established U code as dominant in higher education and so both maintains the basis of established hierarchies and retains ownership of the legitimization device by actors within the field. The effects for higher education of the way changes were understood within the field can thus be summarised as comprising a combination of surface change and underlying continuity.

This three-part analysis of the contextual field, debates over changes, and their effects on the field enables the substantive question to be answered. The process of continuity and change outlined by the preceding analysis unintentionally creates conditions of possibility for the emergence of cultural studies. On one hand, the rhetoric of change characterising the debates offers positive conditions of possibility by providing resources for
legitimation for actors in nascent cultural studies to draw on when carving out
institutional and intellectual spaces within higher education. On the other hand, the
failure of the reality to match this rhetoric (the underlying continuity of the field) offers
negative conditions of possibility by leaving unfilled spaces for the emergence of cultural
studies. Analysing the ways the absence and presence of different conditions of
possibility come together portrays the different kinds of conditions within higher
education that were available for cultural studies. This shows that by the mid 1960s the
institutional field of higher education offers spaces for intellectual production in cultural
studies within modern universities and for small-scale and largely nascent educational
reproduction in non-university institutions, and the disciplinary framework offers the
most resources for legitimation and space for emergence in newer humanities disciplines,
especially English. Taken as a whole the analyses presented in the substantive study
show that it is the specific ways in which dominant agents within higher education
respond to wider social changes that unintentionally creates conditions of possibility
within specific positions within the field for the emergence of cultural studies.

[3] Change in Higher Education and the Legitimation Device

As outlined at the outset of the thesis, the original substantive question raises two further
questions about the wider issues of change in higher education, the first of which is:
• What is the basis of reproduction, transformation and change in higher education, and
  what is the process by which they occur?
The answers to the two aspects of this question equate to the conceptual framework
developed in the study and the model of change in higher education generated by
applying that framework, respectively. In short, I propose that the basis of change is the
legitimation device and the process whereby change occurs is one of emergent evolution.
The latter process also provides insight into my final question:
• How does higher education enable the emergence of practices and ideas aiming to
  change its existing structures?
This, I suggest, can be understood in terms of what I term the paradox of the dominant. I
shall address these two questions in turn.
Higher education as a field of possibilities

Conceptual development
The basis of change in higher education is conceptualised in the study in terms of the legitimisation device. The initial impetus for developing this concept flows from two sources: the research question on cultural studies and the state of the problem-field on change in higher education. To explore how higher education enabled the possibility of cultural studies requires analysing both higher education as a distinctive object of study and changes within that object of study enabling the possibility of cultural studies to come into being. These requirements in turn necessitate an approach capable of objectifying higher education as an irreducible social structure, unambiguously conceptualising change, and generatively conceptualising possibilities prior to their empirical emergence. The main existing approaches to higher education, however, were unable to provide the basis for the study: the sociology of higher education is underdeveloped and, though other research on higher education (such as HE studies) is voluminous, it could not see higher education as a social structure (see chapter 1). The basis of this blindspot resides in a substantialist mode of thinking shared by the principal epistemic positions underlying these approaches. This mode conceives social relations in terms of cumulative interactions between specific elements (whether internal or external, structures or agents) and obscures higher education as an object of study sui generis. To see higher education, I argue, requires a relational mode of thinking, one exemplified by the ‘field’ approaches of Pierre Bourdieu and Basil Bernstein but which had not as yet been fully realised within studies of higher education. These two approaches provided the basis for constructing a conceptual framework capable of meeting the question’s requirements (chapter 2). However they do not by themselves conceptualise the basis of change in higher education. Using a framework drawing on these approaches in empirical research into higher education leaves a surplus element (chapter 3). Analysis of higher education as a field, I argue, thereby necessitates further conceptual development to evolve principles of description both appropriate to this object of study and generatively capable of going beyond its specificities.

The legitimisation device
The framework resulting from this empirically based conceptual development is used to analyse and structure the substantive study, centres on the concept of the legitimisation device and conceives of higher education as a dynamic field of possibilities (chapter 4).
The device is, I propose, the generative mechanism underlying higher education; it is the means whereby the field is created, reproduced, transformed and changed. This device is the focus of struggles between agents, for whoever controls it is able to make their own attributes the basis of legitimate participation, achievement and status. The effects of the device can be researched through analysing the structuring principles of a field, which I conceptualise in terms of *legitimation codes*. A legitimation code modality is given by the settings of four legitimating principles that conceptualise different dimensions of the object of study: Autonomy (external relations to the field), Density (relations within the field), Specialisation (relations between the social and symbolic dimensions of the field), and Temporality (temporal aspects of these relations). Together the modalities of these four principles give the legitimation code. The concepts build on Bernstein’s concepts of classification and framing, providing a strong external language of description, and enable generative conceptualisation of as yet unrecognised or unrealised possibilities.

The conceptual framework is broader in scope than its formal definition (chapter 4) might suggest for it assumes the advantages of the relational field approaches on which it builds (chapter 2). Conceptualising higher education as a field of possibilities thereby overcomes tendencies to substantalist thinking inherent in many existing approaches. Against the false dichotomy of internalism / externalism, the approach draws on Bourdieu’s ideas to posit the mediating context of the relatively autonomous field. Moreover, building on Bernstein’s code theory to posit the relative autonomy of ‘stances’, the framework also overcomes the sociological reductionism inherent in Bourdieu’s approach. Thus the analysis highlights how the field operates not only to *refract* but also to *recontextualise* external changes according to the specific logics of the social and symbolic spaces of the field (in the substantive study, the institutional and disciplinary maps). The framework also goes beyond Bernstein’s pedagogic focus to embrace epistemic issues in order to analyse higher education as both an educational and intellectual field.

The concept of legitimation code provides the key to objectifying English higher education in the substantive study. As outlined further above, I use the framework to analyse the underlying structuring principles of the contextual field, the positions advanced in debates over change, and the resulting effects for the field (chapters 5-9). A code modality, I argue, represents a particular structure of possibilities; each code describes a structure in which some positions and stances are possible and others are not. Analysing changes in higher education in terms of legitimation code is thus to explore an
evolving structure of possibilities in which new possibilities emerge. In the study I show how reproduction, transformation and change in code modalities create changes in the structure of the field that enable the emergence of new possibilities. Thus struggles over control of the legitimation device within higher education are the basis of changes in the field and provide enabling conditions for further developments.

Modelling change in higher education
If the legitimation device is the basis of change within higher education, the next issue concerns the process of change. This is to move from discussing how the conceptual framework theorises higher education to how this framework can be used to model change. In chapter 9 I offer such an analysis in terms of the specific empirical context of the substantive study. I shall now develop this model in more abstract terms to consider, first, how higher education as a field of possibilities evolves through time and, second, what this shows about how avowedly radical positions are enabled by this process.

Emergent evolution of higher education
Applying the conceptual framework to the three stages of the morphogenetic sequence (structural conditioning - social interaction - structural elaboration) shows that higher education as a social structure at a given point in time can be understood as emergent from the actions of agents within the context of a pre-existing structure. This dynamic dimension is cross-cut by a field dimension: the analysis of how field-problems presented by extrinsic changes are refracted and recontextualised into (intra-field) problems and solutions that together offer a field-solution to the initial threat (see chapter 9). Together these two dimensions provide the basis for understanding change in higher education as a process of emergent evolution. To explicate this one can adapt a simple tetradic schema used by Karl Popper (1994) to conceptualise change in scientific knowledge:

\[
P^1 \rightarrow \text{TT} \rightarrow \text{EE} \rightarrow P^2
\]

Popper suggests that a problem situation (P^1) is responded to with a tentative theory (TT) which is subject to critical tests that create a process of error elimination (EE), which in turn produces a new or redefined problem situation (P^2). This schema can be heuristically adapted here. Beginning with the structural conditioning phase of the morphogenetic sequence, one can describe the contextual field of possibilities (early 1960s English higher education) as being faced with problems produced by wider social changes and inherited from past development of the field that create a problem situation P^1. ‘Refraction-recontextualisation’ conceptualises the process whereby the originating
problems come to create the perception of P1 among actors within the field. This leads, in the social interaction phase, to proposed (intra-field) solutions in debates over change (TT). As the solutions impact on the field they are then subject to adaptation through, for example, non-enactment, attrition of innovation and unintended valorisation of other positions (the equivalent of EE). Any social field is an open system, so specific solutions interact with other actions in unanticipated ways. This in turn creates a new, transformed field or P2 primed with new possibilities (the structural elaboration phase). So, the field within which it was possible for cultural studies to emerge was the product of emergent evolution.

The legitimation device plays a key role in this process. Refraction-recontextualisation reflects the relative autonomy of the field (refraction) and the relative autonomy within the field of its social and symbolic dimensions (recontextualisation). These relative自主s create spaces for the play of ideology where one witnesses the effects of relations of power and control within the field. The legitimation device shapes the way problems and solutions are perceived within the field because the form taken by the refraction-recontextualisation of wider changes reflects the structure of the field. Whoever controls the device thereby shapes this process. This is crucial in the process of change for it mediates the perceptions of problems and solutions and so is the basis for any mismatch between the objective needs of P1 for complete reproduction or change of the field to be achieved and P2, the outcome of struggles to do so. The relationship between P1 and P2 (its emergent evolution) thereby shows the effects of the device. (The extent to which the resulting field is reproduced, varied or changed thus depends on its determinate conditions and must be established through empirical research).

This process also creates possibilities for further change. One can rewrite Popper’s schema as:

field-problem -> intra-field problems & solutions -> new field-problem

where the ‘new field-problem’ includes the effects on the field of both intended changes (such as new universities) and spaces created for alternative positions (such as cultural

452 These concepts originate in the work of Bourdieu and Bernstein and are being modified here. Bourdieu’s concept of ‘refraction’ refers to the way the relative autonomy of fields transforms external pressures; it highlights the effect of the field qua field (which Bernstein’s concept does not explicitly emphasise) but does not capture the process whereby these pressures are decontextualised from their originating contexts and recontextualised within the field’s discourse, a process highlighted by Bernstein’s notion of ‘recontextualisation’.

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studies). The emergent field presents its own field-problem to be addressed because of the unintended consequences resulting from the effects of refraction-recontextualisation. For example, in the current study the adaptation to changed circumstances by dominant figures within higher education proved insufficient to deflect further change. Not only did the transformed field present possibilities for the emergence of cultural studies but the failure to sufficiently address the desire from beyond higher education for rapid expansion of student numbers saw an unprecedented intervention by government with the announcement in 1965 of the policy of the ‘binary system’ and creation of polytechnics (see chapter 9). Thus, a further unintended consequence of the actions of leading academics (and fiercely condemned by them) was the creation of a rival sector of institutions exhibiting a different code modality: a new problem situation.

*The paradox of the dominant*

Turning to the question of how higher education enables avowedly radical positions to emerge, the process of emergent evolution highlights how change is intrinsic to the field. This is what one could call the paradox of the dominant. Pierre Bourdieu describes a choice faced by the dominated: refuse the dominant markers of status and remain marginalised or climb the existing ladder and be assimilated. ‘Resistance,’ he concludes, ‘may be alienating and submission may be liberating. Such is the paradox of the dominated, and there is no way out of it’ (1994: 155). I am describing a choice faced by the dominant: remain the same and things will change, or change to enable the underlying structures to remain the same but thereby create spaces for further pressures to change. It is as if a container is being heated: one could press the lid more firmly into place but increase the pressure further or create a safety valve in the hope of diminishing that pressure. The paradox comes because no safety valve is perfect, eternal or lacking in unintended consequences. In the substantive study I show that for some things to stay as they are (underlying structuring principles of the field), something has to change (the creation of new positions and stances). The route chosen by dominant agents in the study was to accommodate and so attempt to neutralise change. However, changing some things in the field (whether in rhetoric or reality) changes the relational structure of possibilities and so enables further, unanticipated changes. This is not to suggest fundamental change in a field is simple; achieving continuity through change may be effective over prolonged periods of time. Nonetheless, change can be enabled through the very process of maintaining relations of power and control: attempts to reproduce the existing structure of the field themselves create conditions enabling spaces for forces of change. Returning to the theoretical questions, in summary, the basis for the impossible
to become possible is the legitimation device, the process whereby this occurs is one of emergent evolution, and its catalyst lies in the paradox of the dominant.

[4] Delimitations, Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Having discussed how the substantive study and theoretical developments of the research address the thesis questions, the final issues for this review of the research to consider concern delimitations, possible limitations and suggestions for future development of the substantive study, methodological approach and theoretical framework.

The substantive study
Placing the field of higher education at the centre of the analysis avoids the short-circuiting of external relations characterising externalist approaches (chapter 1), reveals higher education as a mediating context with its own distinctive properties and powers and highlights the role it plays in providing conditions of possibility within which cultural studies emerged. At the same time, however, this delimited focus limits understanding of changes beyond higher education and occludes the story of cultural studies itself.

• extrinsic changes
Allocating wider social, economic, political and cultural contexts a secondary position in the study means the ‘extrinsic changes’ impacting on higher education and subject to refraction-recontextualisation are less than fully explored. Having established the process of change in the field, a next step for the analysis is to investigate further the ‘input’ to the process - what precisely is being refracted and recontextualised - and determine what triggered announcements of ‘crisis’ and ‘revolution’ at this moment in time. In chapter 9 I suggest there is no magic bullet but instead a series of heterogeneous changes emanating from interaction between higher education and the cumulative effects of iterative changes in other social fields. Establishing the nature of these changes and the final trigger for reaching critical mass, however, requires further research into the wider social context prior to and during the early 1960s and comparative analyses of similar proclamations of crisis.

• cultural studies
In the approach I develop in the thesis, I distinguish between a distribution of possibilities within higher education and the recognition and realisation of those possibilities by actors
who became the founders of cultural studies. These represent different research questions and different objects: how higher education provided conditions of possibility for cultural studies, and how agents within cultural studies carved out spaces within higher education. Analysis of the former is logically prior, for it is the possibilities presented by higher education that provide the conditions within which cultural studies could emerge. Focusing on the former made higher education the object of study and the arrival of cultural studies its terminus.\textsuperscript{453} From the viewpoint of fully accounting for the emergence of cultural studies, therefore, the current study offers but one aspect of the story. This is not to say the study is limited on its own terms but to emphasise its specific focus. The conditions of emergence identified in the study are necessary but not sufficient conditions. One cannot `read off' the trajectory of emergence of cultural studies from the distribution of conditions of possibility within the field because its emergence is doubly contingent: on the recognition of possibilities and on the realisation of those possibilities.\textsuperscript{454} To clarify this point one can heuristically return to Bourdieu's formula for conceptualising practices (chapter 2):

$$[(\text{habitus})(\text{capital})] + \text{field} = \text{practice}$$

If higher education is `field' (analysed in the substantive study), then other aspects to the full story of the birth of cultural studies include:

(i) how the founders came to occupy specific positions within the field, focusing on the social and educational backgrounds of the founders (exploring their habituses and capital);

(ii) how these actors interacted with the structure of possibilities represented by the state of the field of higher education, such that in carving out spaces specific possibilities were recognised and / or realised (the `+' in the equation); and

(iii) the resulting structuring of discourses and practices that characterised cultural studies (`practice').

This represents the next phase for empirical study, and was the focus of my foundational research. This brings me full circle to the beginnings of the thesis (see Prolegomena): having analysed the ways in which the field of higher education presented possibilities,

\textsuperscript{453} In chapter 9 I reach beyond the logical remit of the research to indicate whether positions came to be occupied by cultural studies in order to shed light on the possibilities rather than to analyse the processes whereby they were recognised and/or realised.

\textsuperscript{454} It cannot be overemphasised that I am not suggesting the debates by themselves evoked or engendered cultural studies.
the study of whether and how these were recognised and realised by the founders can now be completed.455

Methodological issues
Central to the approach adopted in the research is the aim of theoretically reconstituting the contemporary field in its historical moment. Focusing on the field as a whole and beginning from the views of participants brings to light hitherto neglected objects of study. Secondary accounts of institutional development tended towards either externalist studies of policy or internalist studies of individual institutions; the ‘new student’ debate had been almost entirely ignored and unrelated to the creation of the new universities. Similarly, the conventional retrospective account of the disciplinary map portrayed disputes between individuals (such as Snow-Leavis or Popper-Kuhn) or focused on individual disciplines; the ‘crisis in the humanities’ debate had been largely forgotten and accounts of the famous ‘two cultures’ debate typically neglected its relations to debates over the rise of sociology and decline of the humanities. Reconstituting the field has thereby revealed new field-level phenomena.456 The approach, however, is open to criticisms, including those of marginalising dominated positions, insensitivity to differences, overreliance on textual sources, and unsystematic analysis.

• marginalising dominated positions
It could be argued the study is a tale of the dominant where the voice of the dominated is silenced and contestation is lacking. Reflecting the methodology of allowing the object to shape the research, the analysis focuses on public debates which are predominantly dominated by leading figures within higher education. The analysis of the contextual field encompasses both dominant and dominated positions, but the debates were

455 It is tempting to equate ‘structure’ to analysis of higher education and ‘agency’ to research on actors in cultural studies. Such anthropomorphism would overlook both that my analysis of higher education embraces both structure and agency in the morphogenetic sequence, and that an account of how the founders recognised and realised possibilities would include analyses of both structures (such as of habituses and practices) and agency.

456 The omissions it creates may be just as unexpected as these inclusions. For example, retrospective accounts of the understanding of science during the early 1960s often focus on the influence of logical positivism and the work of Karl Popper and T.S. Kuhn. However, in debates over science within the humanities (at a time when the philosophy and history of science were marginal) the ideas of these thinkers were almost never mentioned. Kuhn’s position in particular highlights the telescoping effects of retrospective analyses; though his most famous text was published in 1962 its influence in published academic debate was not widely felt until nearer the end of the decade.
overwhelmingly a struggle by dominant actors within the field against an ill-defined, invisible and mute enemy lying beyond higher education and (as discussed in chapter 9) tended to marginalise, silence or ignore alternative positions within the field. (The emergence of cultural studies as a discrete position was, to some extent, the return of the repressed). Research on how and why such voices come to be marginalised would enhance the current study by bringing to light those aspects of the field that were cast into shadow. This empirical study would be at least partly addressed by the substantive research on struggles to establish cultural studies outlined above. Such dominated positions should not, however, be overinflated; elevating dominated positions to centre-stage would change the problematic by rewriting the historical field, and so would do symbolic violence to the integrity of an object of study in which certain positions and stances were dominated and marginalised.

- macro-level analysis

Conducting the analysis at the level of the field suggests a neglect of differences in favour of viewing higher education as comprising large-scale, homogeneous blocs. Though the study is not as macro as it may appear (it includes analysis of specific intellectual and disciplinary positions), one could argue that discussion of ‘the humanities’ (chapters 7-8), for example, conceals differences between and within individual disciplines. Taking into account that I argue that, in this example, underlying differences of names and terms in debates was a fundamental similarity of argument, this criticism does point towards fruitful further research. As I show in chapter 9, refraction-recontextualisation does not impact uniformly across higher education. It would thus be valuable to explore how field-level tidal movements are differently realised across the field; for example, whether the problem-solution of the ‘two cultures’ debate was addressed in systematically different ways among the disciplines of the humanities. Analysing differences within disciplines can be conducted using the approach outlined in this thesis. The concepts are capable of application at and movement between macro and micro levels of analysis and a sensitivity to empirical differences is built into the framework. The concepts generated far more possibilities than were encountered in the substantive study. Each principle generates at least four possible modalities (given, for

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457 I touched on this issue when highlighting how actors in Classics and English were differently placed and responded faster and more firmly to proclamations of crisis than other humanities disciplines (chapters 7 and 8).
example, in Autonomy by +/-PA, +/-RA). There are thus at least 256 possible combinations of modalities of the four principles, i.e. 256 legitimation code modalities. The framework is, therefore, potentially a highly sensitive tool for micro-analyses of reproduction, variation and change.

• a textual field
Focusing on a discourse analysis of published accounts by participants begs the question of whether what is reconstituted by the research is not the contemporary field but rather its presentation on paper. This is part of the research design: the aim is not to offer a historical ethnography of the lived experience of participants but rather to reconstitute the field’s language of legitimation, its reflection upon itself. Nonetheless, more extensive use of retrospective interviews would enrich the empirical basis of the research. The interviews I conducted (in both the foundational and thesis researches) triangulated the textual analysis and offered further insights. However, such sources should, I argue, remain secondary in directing the unfolding research process as they may offer a retrospective account of the field. Though the aim was to theoretically rather than empirically reconstitute the field, other methods and sources would provide the basis for thicker description.

• systematic analysis
Temptations to analyse an apparently self-evident object (such as specific institutional case studies) and use quantitative sampling (such as selecting articles in alternate issues of a journal), I argue, distort the object of study by abstracting fragments from their defining context and assuming a field of uniform qualitative significance, respectively (see chapter 3). Such temptations, however, have the advantage, as Bourdieu puts it, ‘of “studying exhaustively a very precise and well-circumscribed object” as thesis advisors like to say’ (in Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 232). In comparison, beginning from the

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458 PA refers to positional autonomy; RA refers to relational autonomy; +/- is the strengths of both classification and framing.

459 For Autonomy, Density and Specialisation one may also conceptualise variations of classification and framing for each of their constituent concepts; for example, +/-C, +/-F for PA and for RA. This increases the number of possible combinations considerably.

460 In an interview with the late Professor Frank Thistlethwaite, for example, he began by offering a history of the creation of a new university echoing that of secondary accounts. After prompting this shifted to a focus on the needs of new students. Consulting his private archives confirmed the significance of the latter at the time.
views of participants and making numerous amendments and rectifications that construct
the object through an extended and iterative process of movement between the abstract
and concrete can appear less systematic. Scientific fidelity to the object may be at the
expense of the appearance of scientificity. A further cost is that reconstituting the field is
time-consuming, requiring extended immersion in the data. However, the process can
be facilitated. The creation of the theoretical framework makes this task easier; a
valuable next stage would be the refinement of this framework to provide a tool for
analysing specific texts and contexts. Though one must beware deafening the theory to
the possibilities of new empirical objects and replacing methodological rigour with
rigidity, a simplified conceptual grid would facilitate case studies and corpus sampling.
Placed within the context of a field analysis, both approaches are valuable. Comparative
analyses of the difference between the qualitative concerns of academics and quantitative
measures of their research focus could shed light on refraction-recontextualisation by
exploring how specific issues assume significance within the field. Similarly, case
studies of institutions or disciplines, if located within the analysis of the relational field as
a whole, would enable more insight into its impact within specific positions in the field.

Theoretical developments
The conceptual framework integrates the insights of the relational approaches of
Bourdieu and Bernstein in order to develop greater powers of description for analysing
higher education. To enable further conceptual clarity, increased generality and greater
delicacy at the level of empirical detail, principal future directions for its development are
the exploration of the conceptual framework itself and its application to new empirical
contexts.

•  intrinsic development
Prioritising the substantive research question restricted further discussion of the
conceptual framework’s internal language of description which could be strengthened in
three principal ways. First, exploring relations between the legitimation device and the
approaches of Bourdieu and Bernstein on which the framework builds would clarify how
it integrates their insights and overcomes their limitations. For example, I suggest the

461 It can become more time-consuming if the methodology is not followed from the outset. Influenced by
conventional retrospective accounts of the disciplinary map, I assumed the significance of T. S. Kuhn to
debates over science during the early 1960s and immersed myself in his work for a lengthy period before
discovering the absence of both his influence and of similar accounts of science at the time.
legitimation device subsumes the workings of the pedagogic and epistemic devices; elaborating the precise nature of this relationship would strengthen this claim. Second, explicating the internal workings of the legitimation device would shed light on how it generates a field, the ‘rules’ underlying its operation, and how the device gives rise to code modalities. A key issue is how the legitimation device, the ruler of legitimacy within a field, comprises rules for the distribution, recontextualisation and evaluation of legitimacy, and how the legitimation principles relate to these rules. Additionally, the nature of relations between the four principles of the legitimation device and how changes in the modality of one principle affects changes in the others remains underexplored. For example, in both the debates analysed in the study the threat facing the field was of changes to self-determination (Autonomy) bringing more ways of thinking (Density) that would change the basis of relations (Specialisation) in a new direction (Temporality); a question this raises is whether and how these changes might be causally connected. Finally, having argued that the blindspot within studies of higher education needs to be ‘pulled out by the roots’ (chapter 1), a question I faced in the research was how far to dig. The temptation to fully explore the epistemological basis of this blindspot was tempered by the need to answer the substantive question. Similarly, the study is effectively an enacted critical realist sociology, but though I discuss aspects of this philosophical position briefly in terms of relationalism (chapter 1) and its methodological implications (chapter 3), it remains, like foundations, largely out of sight.462 Excavating the philosophical position of the substantialist mode of thinking (such as its empiricism and Humean notions of causation) and clarifying differences with the epistemology underlying relational approaches would help strengthen the basis for thinking about higher education in a new way.

- **extrinsic development**

Application of the theory to new empirical objects of study would develop both the framework and the understanding of higher education the thesis offers. First, empirical research into other subject areas, fields of higher education and periods of time would show the extent to which the focus of the substantive study (English higher education during the early 1960s) is unique. The analysis of this particular case was constructed to

462 Space precluded discussion of the compatibility of critical realism with the approaches of Bourdieu and Bernstein. Bourdieu is often referred to as at least partly compatible with critical realism (e.g. Danemark et al. 2002: 5), and Bernstein’s concept of the ‘device’ is, I argue, equivalent to critical realist ideas of ‘generative mechanisms’.
offer insights beyond its specificities: the creation of a generative conceptual framework enables its application to other cases, and the model of change is designed to capture the dynamic of the field underlying different empirical realisations. Comparative analyses would strengthen these ideas by further highlighting what is specific and what may be more general within the analysis. For example, from preliminary research into similar episodes in higher education, such as debates at the end of the nineteenth century over new middle-class students and the two cultures that accompanied the chartering of civic universities and emergence of English, I would suggest the phenomenon analysed in the thesis may be paradigmatic and recurrent. Second, I conjecture that the legitimation device is the fundamental principle of all cultural fields; refutation requires analysis of fields other than higher education, such as schooling or commercial cultural production. Lastly, the concepts and model require empirical application; the structure of higher education and the form taken by its change depends on determinate contexts that require empirical research. The contemporary situation in British higher education, for example, has striking parallels with the case studied in the thesis: rapid expansion of student numbers, chartering of ‘new new’ universities, proclamations of crisis over the social position and role of intellectuals, claims of fundamental changes in ‘culture’, political and economic threats to the autonomy of the field, and academic studies of new students are among many echoes of the early 1960s. However, these are being realised within such changed circumstances as the introduction of market mechanisms and the emergence of a potentially global field of higher education. To ascertain the precise nature of these changes thus requires empirical research using the concepts. In turn, such use of the approach to address different periods and cultural fields would undoubtedly help refine and redefine the conceptual framework.


The approach developed and used in this thesis provides, I believe, a starting point for developing a sociology of higher education able to grasp its ostensible object of study. It is but a first and provisional step, one necessitating further empirical research and integrative theoretical development, but a significant step nonetheless. The parlous state of the sociology of higher education is an urgent problem. Higher education is perhaps the most talked about but least analysed objects of study within academia and, if reflexivity begins at home, current calls for reflexive social science without a sociology of higher education must remain hollow. Higher education is also continually subject to
attempts to achieve social, political and economic aims. Avowedly radical subject areas such as cultural studies seek to change higher education in order to give voice to marginalised and dominated social groups and achieve wider social and political change. Political policy initiatives aim at meeting the perceived needs of the apparently changed economic and social conditions of a globalised knowledge society. However, without an understanding of how higher education works as a dynamic field of possibilities, attempts to achieve such goals will remain a matter of desires and intentions based on little more than ideology and blind faith. Thus far actors from both within and beyond the field have tried to change higher education in various ways; the point, however, is to understand it, in order to know what and how change may be effected.

To understand higher education requires a sociology of higher education and any sociology of higher education must be able to construct higher education as a sociological object of study. To do so requires a relational mode of thinking capable of providing empirically-applicable conceptual tools. This is the aim of the concept of the legitimization device at the centre of this thesis. Using this concept one can analyse higher education as a dynamic field of possibilities to explore what is currently possible, what needs to be changed in order to make one’s goals possible, and how these may in turn shape future possibilities within the field. The model of change this concept enables also provides the basis for better understanding the unintended consequences of reproduction, transformation and change. To adapt a passage from Bernstein (1990: 190): any sociology of higher education should have a theory of the legitimization device; indeed such a theory could well be its necessary foundation and provide the fundamental theoretical object of the discipline.
Appendix A: Selected Sources

Table A.1:

Reports consulted on higher education prior to 1965, in chronological order with conventional names

Royal Commission on the University of Oxford (1852) _Report._ London.
Royal Commission on the University of Cambridge (1853) _Report._ London.
Board of Education (1904) _Regulations for Secondary Schools._ London, HMSO.
Board of Education Consultative Committee (1916) _Interim Report on Scholarships for Higher Education._ London, HMSO.
Committee on Industry & Trade (1929) _Industry and Trade._ (Balfour Report). London, HMSO.
Consultative Committee of the Board of Education (1938) _Secondary Education (Grammar Schools and Technical High Schools)._ (Spens Report). London, HMSO.
British Association for Commercial and Industrial Education (1944) _Mutual Relations of Education and Industry._ London, BACIE.
Board of Education (1945) _The Supply, Recruitment and Training of Teachers and Youth Leaders._ (McNair Report). London, HMSO.
Federation of British Industries (1945) _Industry and Education._ London, FBI.
Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (1946) _A Note on University Policy and Finance in the Decennium 1947-1956._ London, CVCP.
Committee on Scientific Manpower (1946) _Scientific Manpower._ (Barlow Report). London, HMSO.
Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (1948) _The Planning of University Halls of Residence._ Oxford, CVCP.
Federation of British Industries (1949a) _Industry and the Universities._ London, FBI.
Federation of British Industries (1949b) _The Education and Training of Technologists._ London, FBI.


University Grants Committee (1961) Returns from Universities and University Colleges in receipt of Treasury Grant: academic year 1959/60. London, HMSO.


Hale Report (1964) University Teaching Methods. HMSO.


University Grants Committee (1964) University Development 1957-1962. London, HMSO.

Table A.2:
Contemporary periodicals consulted for primary sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal Title</th>
<th>Years consulted</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>British Journal of Educational Studies</td>
<td>1952 - 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>British Journal of Sociology</td>
<td>1950 - 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Quarterly</td>
<td>1959 - 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounter (weekly)</td>
<td>Jan 1953 - Dec 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education Review</td>
<td>1968 - 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Contemporary History</td>
<td>1966 - 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Education</td>
<td>Nov 1964 - Dec 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Society: The social science weekly</td>
<td>4 Oct 1962 - 30 Dec 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New University Messenger</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>Screen Education</td>
<td>1959 - 1968</td>
</tr>
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<td>Screen Education Year Book</td>
<td>1960 - 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Listener (weekly)</td>
<td>Jan 1 1959 - Dec 1965</td>
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<tr>
<td>The New University</td>
<td>Oct 31 1960 - Summer 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sociological Review</td>
<td>1953 - 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Spectator</td>
<td>1955 - 1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Twentieth Century (weekly)</td>
<td>1955 - 1965</td>
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<td>1945 - 1962</td>
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<td>The Use of English</td>
<td>1950 - 1969</td>
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<td>1955 - 1969</td>
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<td>1957 - 1959</td>
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<td>Universities Quarterly</td>
<td>1946 - 1975</td>
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<td>Year Book of Education</td>
<td>1948 - 1964</td>
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<td>World Year Book of Education</td>
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### Table A.3: Topics of Gulbenkian Educational Discussions and sources, 1960-1965

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<td><strong>1960</strong></td>
<td><strong>New and larger universities?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New and larger universities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Starting a new university: The case of Sussex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The new student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialization and the curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The balance between research and teaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1961</strong></td>
<td><strong>Intellectual responsibilities and the pattern of higher education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intellectual responsibilities in higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The education and training of the technologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The education and training of the teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The responsibilities of universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The control and government of higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Boyle 1962, David 1962, Halsey 1962, Hutchinson 1962, Monkhouse 1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1962</strong></td>
<td><strong>Research into higher education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A time and mood for research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How many and how much?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Studying higher education in Britain and America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research into rejuvenation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The study of the university teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thoughts for tomorrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observations on the American university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1963</strong></td>
<td><strong>Attention to graduates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pressure or suction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The organization of graduate studies and the training of graduates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The objectives and character of graduate studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graduates and the academic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Ashby et al. 1964, Bondi et al. 1964, Chester 1964, Fulton 1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1964</strong></td>
<td><strong>Changing patterns of study</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Towards a reconsideration of curricula and patterns of study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three areas of science:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I. The social sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Comparative studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The biological sciences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching, examining and the curriculum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The academic organization of studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hall 1965)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 <strong>Higher education for the professions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The professional society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ingredients of professionalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The education of the professional:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. technology and management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. music, architecture and the arts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. education and the social sciences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The disciplines and methods of professional education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organization of professional education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Nash 1966)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**
## Appendix B
### Universities in England and Wales by the end of the 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typological Cluster</th>
<th>Period of Charter</th>
<th>University Name</th>
<th>Date Founded</th>
<th>Former Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ancients</td>
<td>12th century</td>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13th century</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>19th century</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>University College founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1829</td>
<td>King’s College founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Further colleges added periodically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>1872, 1883, 1884</td>
<td>Constituent colleges founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Became full teaching university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>1900s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1837</td>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>1832</td>
<td>University founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Newcastle University separated from Durham, to become a university.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>Owens College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>1880s</td>
<td>Mason Science College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Liverpool University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>1860s</td>
<td>Yorkshire College of Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Sheffield College of Arts &amp; Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>Bristol University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redbrick</td>
<td>1948-57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>---- University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>---- University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>---- University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>---- University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>---- University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>---- University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New (1960s)</td>
<td>1961-65</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Incarnation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Keele</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>University College of North Staffordshire at Keele</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>East Anglia (UEA)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>York</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technological</th>
<th>1966-7</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incarnation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Aston in</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>Birmingham Municipal Technical School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Technology</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Under LEA control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Bradford</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Became CAT (and moved to Bath)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th C. University of Bradford</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>City Council took control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunel Uni., Uxbridge</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Become CAT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Outgrowth of Acton Technical College, created by Middlesex County Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Brunel College of Technology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City University, London</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Northampton Institute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loughborough</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Northampton CAT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loughborough Technical Institute</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loughborough College</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Became independent of Leicestershire County Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Loughborough CAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Salford</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>Royal Technical Institute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Under Lancashire County Council and Salford City Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Became CAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Surrey</td>
<td>1890s</td>
<td>Battersea College of Technology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Became CAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATs affiliating to federal universities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>UWIST</td>
<td>1866 Welsh College at Cardiff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1957 Became CAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1967 Became Wales Institute of Science &amp; Technology, Cardiff (part of University of Wales).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Chelsea</td>
<td>1890s Chelsea College of Science &amp; Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1957 Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1966 Became CAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Joined University of London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Open University</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix C: Selected Data on New Universities

### Table C.1: Timetable of a new university: Warwick University

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953-56</td>
<td>Emergence of campaign by local academics, politicians and newspapers results in founding of Council for the Establishment of a University in Coventry in April 1954. Council disbanded itself in April 1956 when prospects for new universities looked dim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1958</td>
<td>Campaign renewed upon announcement of budget for founding of Sussex University. Initial contact with UGC declaring an interest in June, followed by informal meetings with UGC and preparation of proposals during 1959.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1960</td>
<td>Formation of Promotion Committee. Proposal immediately submitted to UGC, who receive a delegation from Coventry in May and visit the proposed site in July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1961</td>
<td>UGC announces it will recommend ‘University of Warwick’ to Chancellor of Exchequer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1961</td>
<td>Creation of Academic Planning Board, first meeting in October.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1963</td>
<td>Architects are appointed. Preliminary building work begins in May. Major building work begins June 1964. Eight PhD students had already arrived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1963</td>
<td>First professors are appointed, ten by November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1964</td>
<td>Publication of Development Plan, setting out the shape and layout of the university.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1965</td>
<td>University receives a Royal Charter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1965</td>
<td>The first undergraduate students are admitted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:**
Timetable constructed drawing on the detailed participant account of Henry Rees (1989, *passim*).
Table C.2:
Higher Educational Backgrounds of Founding Vice-Chancellors of New Universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘New’ University</th>
<th>Founding Vice-Chancellor</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keele</td>
<td>A.D. Lindsay</td>
<td>University College, Oxford</td>
<td>undergraduate</td>
<td>1898-1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Balliol College, Oxford</td>
<td>Fellow</td>
<td>1906-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University of Glasgow</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>1922-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Balliol College, Oxford</td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>1924-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oxford University</td>
<td>Vice-Chancellor</td>
<td>1935-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>Sir John Fulton</td>
<td>Balliol College, Oxford</td>
<td>undergraduate</td>
<td>1923-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>London School of Economics</td>
<td>Assistant Lecturer</td>
<td>1926-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Balliol College, Oxford</td>
<td>Fellow</td>
<td>1928-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University College, Swansea</td>
<td>Principal</td>
<td>1947-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEA</td>
<td>Frank Thistlethwaite</td>
<td>St. John’s College, Cambridge</td>
<td>undergraduate</td>
<td>1930s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University of Minnesota</td>
<td>Fellow</td>
<td>1938-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>St. John’s College, Cambridge</td>
<td>Fellow</td>
<td>1945-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York</td>
<td>Lord James of Rusholme</td>
<td>Queen’s College, Oxford</td>
<td>undergraduate /</td>
<td>1927-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(E.J.F. James)</td>
<td></td>
<td>postgraduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Winchester College</td>
<td>Assistant Master</td>
<td>1933-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Manchester Grammar School</td>
<td>High Master</td>
<td>1945-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>Albert E. Sloman</td>
<td>Wadham College, Oxford</td>
<td>undergraduate /</td>
<td>1940s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>postgraduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University of California,</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>1946-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University of Dublin</td>
<td>Reader</td>
<td>1947-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University of Liverpool</td>
<td>Dean of Faculty</td>
<td>1953-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>Charles F. Carter</td>
<td>St. John’s College, Cambridge</td>
<td>undergraduate</td>
<td>1940s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University of Cambridge</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>1945-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emmanuel College</td>
<td>Fellow</td>
<td>1947-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Queen’s University, Belfast</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>1952-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University of Manchester</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>1959-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>Geoffrey Templeman</td>
<td>Universities of Birmingham, London</td>
<td>undergraduate /</td>
<td>1930s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&amp; Paris</td>
<td>postgraduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University of Birmingham</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>1938-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University of Birmingham</td>
<td>Registrar</td>
<td>1955-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>Jack (John B.) Butterworth</td>
<td>Queen’s College, Oxford</td>
<td>undergraduate</td>
<td>1940s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New College, Oxford</td>
<td>Fellow, Dean,</td>
<td>1946-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bursar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
Dates are occasionally imprecise for undergraduate study because of interruptions for service in World War II.
Table C.3:
Elite education backgrounds of early Professors: University of Warwick

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professor of</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>J.R. Sargent</td>
<td>Head Boy Undergraduate (First, P.P.E) Fellow</td>
<td>Rugby Christ Church, Oxford Worcester College, Oxford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>D.G. Charlton</td>
<td>Undergraduate (First)</td>
<td>Emmanuel College, Oxford</td>
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<td>Undergraduate, Masters, Lecturer</td>
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